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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JANE DOE, ; 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
vs. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC : 
SAFETY; PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS 
AND TRAINING; TED E. LEAMONS, : 
DIRECTOR; WILLIAM L. FLINK j 
and John Does I through IV, : 
Respondents-Appellants. • 
: Case No. 860138 
: Category No. 13b 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue on appeal is whether the district court 
correctly interpreted and applied U.C.A. Section 77-18-2 (1980) 
to the fact situation at hand. 
The statute, in its entirety, reads as follows: 
(1)(a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime 
within this state may petition the convicting court 
for a judicial pardon and for sealing of his record in 
that court. At the time the petition is filed and 
served upon the prosecuting attorney, the court shall 
set a date for a hearing and notify the prosecuting 
attorney for the jurisdiction of the date set for 
hearing. Any person who may have relevant information 
about the petitioner may testify at the hearing and 
the court, in its discretion, may request a written 
evaluation of the adult parole and probation section 
of the state division of corrections. 
(b) If the court finds the petitioner for a period 
of five years in the case of a class A misdemeanor or 
felony, or for a period of three years in the case of 
other misdemeanors or infractions, after his release 
from incarceration, parole, or probation whichever 
occurs last, has not been convicted of a felony or of 
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a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that no 
proceeding involving such a crime is pending or being 
instituted against the petitioner and further finds 
that the rehabilitation of petitioner has been 
attained to the satisfaction of the court, it shall 
enter an order that all records in petitioner's case 
in the custody of that court or in the custody of any 
other court, agency or official be sealed. The 
provisions of this subsection shall not apply to 
violations for the operation of motor vehicle under 
Title 41. The court shall also issue to the 
petitioner a certificate stating the court's finding 
that he has satisfied the court of his rehabilitation. 
(2)(a) In any case in which a person has been arrested 
with or without a warrant, that individual after 12 
months, provided there have been no intervening 
arrests, may petition the court in which the 
proceeding occurred, or, if there were no court 
proceedings, any court in the jurisdiction where the 
arrest occurred, for an order expunging any and all 
records of arrest and detention which may have been 
made, if any of the following occurred: 
(i) He was released without the filing of formal 
charges; 
(ii) Proceedings against him were dismissed, he 
was discharged without a conviction and no charges 
were refiled against him within 30 days thereafter, or 
he was acquitted at trial; or 
(iii) The record of any proceedings against him 
has been sealed pursuant to Subsection (1). 
(b) If the court finds that the petitioner is 
eligible for relief under this subsection, it shall 
issue its order granting the relief prayed for and 
further directing the law enforcement agency making 
the initial arrest to retrieve any record of that 
arrest which may have been forwarded to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the Utah Bureau of 
Criminal Identification. 
(c) This subsection shall apply to all arrests and 
any proceedings which occurred before, as well ais 
those which may occur after, the effective date of 
this act. 
(3) Employers may inquire concerning arrests or 
convictions only to the extent that the arrests have 
not been expunged or the record of convictions sealed 
under this provision. In the event an employer asks 
concerning arrests which have been expunged or 
convictions the records of which have been sealed, the 
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person who has received expungement of arrest or 
judicial pardon may answer as though the arrest or 
conviction had not occurred. 
(4) Inspection of the sealed records shall be 
permitted by the court only upon petition by the 
person who is the subject of those records and only to 
the persons named in the petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent stipulates to Appellant's Statement of the 
Case and Statement of the Facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah "Expungement and Sealing of Records" statute, 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-2 (1980), is ambiguous on its 
face as to its applicability to P.O.S.T.. The history and intent 
of the framers was to provide a meaningful opportunity for ex-
felons to rehabilitate and assimilate back into society, 
especially through employment. Neither the expungement statute 
nor the P.O.S.T. authorizing statute, Utah Code Annotated Section 
67-15-1 et seq. (1985), provide for any but the court to 
determine when an expungement should be granted, and once given, 
only the pardoned person may reopen the records. 
ARGUMENT 
The public policy behind the enactment of Utah's 
"Expungement and sealing of records" statute has been the same 
since its inception, when "the legislature intended that trial 
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courts should have considerable authority to reform wrongdoers." 
William v. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640, 642 (1944). See 
also State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044 (1927). In 
effect, expungement embodies the age old notion of "forgiving and 
forgetting", thereby providing the ex-felon an opportunity to 
start over again, unhampered by the attendant disabilities of her 
past conviction. While this has been the basic premise behind 
the policy of expungement, a split exists among the states as to 
the actual effect an expungement. Gough, The Expungement of 
Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem 
of Status, 1966 Wash. Univ. L.Q. 147 (1966). 
In Utah, the expungement statute originated in 1943 
when the legislature amended the statute on probation, to include 
the following language in pertinent part: 
Where it appears to the court from the report ... that 
the defendant has complied with the conditions of such 
probation the court may, if it be compatible with the 
public interest .•. terminate the sentence or set 
aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the 
defendant, and dismiss the action and discharge the 
defendant, (emphasis added) 
U.C.A. Section 105-36-17 (1943) 
The case law during this period indicated that the statute "was 
enacted for the court under the unusual circumstances and for 
good cause to expunge the record of crime." State v. Schreiber, 
121 Utah 653, 245 P.2d 222, 224 (1952). 
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The "Expungement of records11 statute was explicitly 
created in 1973 when the legislature enacted Section 77-35-17.5, 
which stated in part: 
(2) If the court finds that ... the rehabilitation of 
the petitioner has been attained to the satisfaction 
of the court, it shall enter an order that all records 
in the petitioner's case ... be sealed. 
(3) ... the petitioner shall be deemed judicially 
pardoned and the petitioner may thereafter respond to 
any inquiries relating to convictions of crimes as 
though that conviction never occurred. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-35-17.5 (1973) 
In the case of State v. Jones, 581 P.2d 141 (1978), the Utah 
Supreme Court construed the new statute, holding that an ex-
felon whose record had been expunged could not be impeached as a 
witness on his own account. The Court's holding implied that 
the expungement erased the ex-felon's past records. In 1980, 
both statutes described above were replaced by the present 
"Expungement and sealing of records" statute, Utah Code 
Annotated Section 77-18-2, when the legislature recodified the 
Code of Criminal Procedure. This most recent statute generally 
remains the same as its predecessor except in the following 
relevant parts: 
(1)(b) If the court finds ... that the rehabilitation 
of petitioner has been to the satisfaction of the 
court, it shall order that all records ... be sealed. 
(2)(a) In any case in which a person has been 
arrested ... that individual after 12 months, ... may 
petition the court ... for an order expunging any and 
all records of arrest and detention which may have 
been made, if any of the following occurred:... 
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(iii) The record of any proceedings against him 
has been sealed pursuant to subsection (1). (emphasis 
added) 
(3) ••. In the event an employer asks concerning 
arrests which have been expunged or convictions the 
records of which have been sealed, the person who 
received expungement of arrest or judicial pardon may 
answer as though the arrest or conviction had not 
occurred, (emphasis added) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-2 (1980) 
A general rule of statutory construction directs 
courts to ascertain the legislative intent of the statute and 
favor the public interest and purpose behind the statute. See 
82 C.J.S. Statutes Section 311 (1953). See also Utah Code 
Annotated Section 68-3-2 (1985); Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 
7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (1958). 
The present Utah expungement statute is unquestionably 
ambiguous as concerns the right of an agency such as P.O.S.T. to 
consider the past expunged convictions of an ex-felon. 
Consequently, the court must look to the legislative intent 
behind the present expungement statute. 
The Federal Court in Thompson v. Department of the 
Treasury, 557 F. Supp. 158 (D. Utah 1982) was correct insofar as 
it found that lf[t]here is no explanation in the legislative 
history for the changes in the amended statute...." However, 
the attached affidavit of Professor Boyce provides some insight 
into the legislative intent behind the enactment. Affidavit of 
Ronald N. Boyce (July 30, 1986) (discussing U.C.A. 77-18-2 on 
expungement). Professor Boyce was a member of the Utah State 
Bar Code of Criminal Procedure Committee responsible for the 
£ 
drafting of U.C.A. 77-18-2, the present expungement statute. 
According to Professor Boyce, the Committee's primary concern 
while drafting U.C.A. 77-18-2 was to provide a meaningful 
opportunity for an ex-felon to rehabilitate and assimilate back 
into society. At the time the committee viewed employment as 
the greatest bar to rehabilitation for ex-felons. Consequently, 
the intent of the committee was to remove the attendant 
disabilities of a past conviction for an ex-felon, especially 
with respect to employers. This intent largely conforms with 
the Model Rules, on which the committee heavily relied in 
reaching its conclusion. 
Under the Model Rules for Law Enforcement a provision 
has been made for "Closing" or sealing the record of an 
individual's past conviction: 
Rule 602 Designation of a Closed Record 
(B) Conviction. If a person has been arrested and 
convicted, the record of that conviction shall be 
designated a closed record ten years after the date of 
the person's last known arrest or conviction.... 
Model Rules for Law Enforcement Release of 
Arrest and Conviction Records, College of Law, Arizona 
State University and University Police Foundation 20, 
36 (1974) (Hereinafter referred to as Release 
Records). 
Under the Model Rules 401(v), dissemination of past 
arrest records to prospective employers, even those not closed, 
is permitted "to the extent expressly and specifically required 
by state or federal statute or federal executive order." Id. at 
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22. It might be noted that prior to the alteration of Rule 
401(v) which resulted in the present proscription against 
dissemination, the prior subsection "permitted release when, in 
the judgment of an agency head, reasons of national security so 
required.11 Id. at 24. 
The commentary to Rule 401 suggests that "the best 
policy is for law enforcement agencies to eliminate altogether 
the voluntary dissemination of record information for employment 
related purposes." Id. at 24. It was apparently felt that 
concerns for national security would be covered by statute or 
executive order. See Executive Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 936 
(1953), and Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956). 
In short, the Model Rules for Law Enforcement, upon 
which U.C.A. Section 77-18-2 was patterned, provided for the 
"closing of records" for any person who maintained a clean 
record for ten years. Upon the closing of a record, only the 
person who was the subject of the record could re-open the file. 
The drafters of the Model Rules made clear their desire to 
promote the rehabilitation of ex-felons as well as their 
recognition that the lack of employment opportunities was the 
greatest impediment to this goal. (See Release of Records at 
20.) 
The fact that impediments to employment create the 
greatest barrier to rehabilitation is well supported. In the 
Report of the President's Task Force on Prisoner Rehabilitation, 
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10 J. Offender Counseling, Services and Rehab. 195 (1985), 
(Hereinafter referred to as Task Force), it was recommended 
that: 
The United States Civil Service Commission should 
devise and put into operation a plan to stimulate 
Federal Employment of ex-offenders. Id. at 201. 
The Task Force cogently indicated that: 
Surely, the very first step toward improving its 
correctional process that any government -- municipal, 
state or Federal — should take is to allow ex-
offenders to be employed by government. The 
government is scarcely persuasive when it urges 
industry to adopt employment policies toward ex-
offenders that itself is unwilling to adopt. Id. at 
201 . 
In light of the foregoing, it becomes clear that the 
only traceable "legislative intent11 behind the expungement 
statute was to promote rehabilitation by removing impediments to 
employment opportunity. It is a well recognized fact that 
evidence of a past arrest record is tantamount to an automatic 
foreclosure to employment. See Schwartz and Skolnick, Two 
Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 Soc. Probs. 133 (1962); Special 
Project -- The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 
23 Vand. L. Rev. 929 (1970). 
The effect of allowing P.O.S.T. to consider the past 
expunged convictions of an offender is to bar that individual 
from state employment, as a general rule. The underlying intent 
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behind the enactment of the Utah Code should be given effect by 
denying P.O.S.T.'s request to review the respondent's past 
record. 
The appellant cites to Thompson v. Department of 
Treasury, 557 F. Supp. 158 (D. Utah 1982), in support of the 
proposition that the amendment to the expungement statute was 
intended "to limit the effect of a judicial pardon and 
expungement". Id. at 167. 
However, this is an erroneous interpretation of the 
holding in that case. The facts of Thompson involved an ex-
felon who had been previously found guilty of violating 18 
U.S.C.A. Section 922, a federal firearms statute. Under the 
statute it was illegal for anyone who had a prior felony 
conviction to carry firearms. Thompson, who was employed as 
private firearms trainer for private security guards, obtained a 
judicial pardon and an expungement of his records under Utah 
law. One of the issues in Thompson was "whether a state 
expungement relieves a former convict of the Section 922 
disability". Id. at 166. Under Title VII, which encompasses 
Section 922, a provision was made for exempting any person from 
the Section 1202 disability who "...has been pardoned by the 
chief executive of a State and expressly been authorized by 
...such chief executive ...to receive, possess, or transport in 
commerce a firearm." Id. at 164 (citing 18 U.S.C. App. Section 
1203). Such an exemption clearly distinguishes Thompson from 
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the case at bar where no other relief exists for the ex-felon 
except for the expungement statute. 
The appellant cites several other cases to support the 
proposition that P.O.S.T. cannot reasonably be regarded as an 
employer and therefore, as a licensing agency, can require 
disclosure of expunged convictions. However, the cases cited do 
not directly parallel the case at bar with respect to 
expungements. 
In Dixon v. McMullen, 527 F. Supp. 711 (N.D. Tex. 
1981) the facts involved an ex-felon who had received a 
gubernatorial pardon which Utah does not have. The Texas Court, 
after reviewing the history of "pardons11 concluded that na 
pardon implies guilt.11 Id. at 718. 
The case of Patt v. Nevada State Board of Accountancy, 
93 Nev. 548, 571 P.2d 105 (1977), did not involve an 
expungement. In Patt, the petitioner had received an honorable 
discharge from probation. Neither the statute nor the court's 
discussion of it considered the removal of attendant 
disabilities to a conviction. 
In Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners, 34 Cal. 2d 62, 
206 P.2d 1085 (1949), the petitioner had received a court order 
terminating his probation and dismissing the information against 
him pursuant to Section 1203.3 of the California Penal Code. 
The petitioner challenged the right of the Board of Medical 
Examiners to suspend his license based upon his conviction. The 
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court reviewed the respondent Board's authority to suspend the 
license under Section 1203.4 which released the petitioner from 
all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense. The 
court then concluded that the order did not "remove or wipe out 
the conviction11, where 1203.4 contained a provision for allowing 
the conviction to be used against the petitioner in any later 
prosecution. Id. at 1086, 1087. 
The Utah statute specifically blocks employer 
inquiries, unlike the California Penal Code which preserved the 
right to use the past conviction in the future. 
(4) Inspection of the sealed records shall be 
permitted by the courts only upon petition by the 
person who is the subject of those records and only to 
the persons named in the petition. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-2 (1980). 
(emphasis added). 
The Utah Expungement statute contains no provision 
similar to that of the California penal code which clearly 
allowed inspection of past convictions, thereby distinguishing 
Meyer from the case at bar. 
Appellant cites Amberson v. Leamons, Third District 
Court No. C85-6240 (November 25, 1985), in support of the 
proposition that "P.O.S.T. could properly deny certification to 
an individual whose felony conviction had been expunged under 
Colorado's deferred sentencing law.11 (Appellant's Brief at 10). 
This proposition correctly states the law, but does not apply to 
the present case. 
The present case involves an expungement, not a 
deferred sentence. This distinction is critical where under the 
12 
Colorado deferred sentencing scheme, Colo. Rev. Stat. Section 
16-7-403 (1978), required that the conditions imposed be similar 
to those conditions imposed on probation. Expungement, on the 
other hand, relieves the ex-offender of any 'probationary 
requirements "as though the arrest or conviction had not 
occurred.11 Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-2(3). 
The case of Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 
460 U.S. 103 (1982) is cited as ,f [particularly applicable to 
the instant case.11 (Appellant's Brief at 10). However, 
Dickerson is not applicable to the present case for the same 
reasons that Thompson v. Department of the Treasury, supra, is 
not. Both cases involve a violation of the federal firearms 
statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g). 
In effect, the Dickerson court held that the federal 
firearms disabilities imposed by Sections 922(g)(1) and (h)(1), 
were not removed by a state expunction where the federal statute 
provides for an "affirmative action" to remove the disability. 
Dickerson at 115. 
In short, both Dickerson and Thompson involved a 
violation of the federal firearms statute which contained its 
own provisions for removal of the firearms disability and could 
not therefore be removed by a state expunction. 
Finally, it is contended that where Utah Code 
Annotated Section 77-18-2 does not focus on the question of 
whether one is fit to be a police officer, it necessarily 
follows that the expungement statute does not apply to P.O.S.T. 
or the P.O.S.T. council. This conclusion is not correct. 
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Professor Boyce indicates in his affidavit that it was 
the legislative committee's intent to encourage rehabilitation 
of ex-offenders by enhancing the opportunity for employment. 
While it is not disputed that "a high standard of fitness and 
character pertains to police officers/1 it does not follow that 
P.O.S.T. is automatically authorized to second guess a court of 
law and justice on the issue of the degree of rehabilitation an 
individual has undergone. 
Neither, the Utah expungement statute nor P.O.S.T.fs 
own enabling statute, Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-10.5(1) 
provides P.O.S.T. with the authority to require that the 
petitioner unseal her records. If it had been the intent of the 
legislature to cloak P.O.S.T. with such authority, it would have 
done so. 
The plain language of Utah Code Annotated Section 
77-18-2(4) clearly indicates that the legislature did not intend 
to give P.O.S.T. the authority to consider sealed records, in 
stating: 
(4) Inspection of the sealed records shall be 
permitted by the court only upon petition by the 
person who is the subject of those records and only to 
the persons named in the petition.(emphasis added) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-2(4) (1980) 
Nowhere in this provision is P.O.S.T. allowed to inspect the 
sealed records. Furthermore, while P.O.S.T.fs enabling statute, 
Section 67-15-1 (1985) sets forth as its purpose: 
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To better promote and insure the safety and welfare of 
the citizens of this state ...and to provide more 
efficient and professional law enforcement.... 
Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-1 (1985). 
and Section 67-15-10.5(1)(d) allows the director of P.O.S.T. to 
bring an action to revoke/ refuse or suspend P.O.S.T. 
certification against anyone who has had a "conviction of a 
felony ..." Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-10.5 (1)(d) 
(1985), these statutes do not include the consideration of an 
expunged conviction. 
In light of the available legislative history to have 
allowed P.O.S.T. to unseal the respondent's records would have 
been a blatant violation of the public policy behind 
expungement, namely rehabilitation. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should uphold the district court's order 
and rule prohibiting P.O.S.T. from inspecting the Respondent's 
sealed records. 
The legislative intent behind the amended version of 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-2 was to promote 
rehabilitation by providing fewer impediments to employment. 
This intent is manifested in both Utah Code Annotated Section 
77-18-2 and Section 67-15-10.5(1)(d) where the legislature did 
not provide an exception for P.O.S.T. under the general 
"employer" provision of Section 77-18-2(3), or provide P.O.S.T. 
with the explicit authority to consider expunged convictions 
under its own enabling statute. 
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Finally, to allow P.O.S.T. to consider expunged 
convictions would violate the public policy of rehabilitation, 
especially where no other means to purge one's .record of past 
convictions exists in Utah. 
P.O.S.T. is not better qualified than the court to 
determine whether an ex-offender has rehabilitated. Throughout 
the history of Utah, this has remained the province of the 
court, and so should remain. 
DATED this (0 day of August, 1986. 
Z&tie G i l l 
^orneY f o r 
L. 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that 10 true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT were hand delivered on the 
18th day of August, 1986, to the Supreme Court of Utah by my 
associate, Beth Kadlec. Also, 4 true and correct copies were 
hand delivered to The Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, Attorneys for Appellants. 
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ATTORNEY GENEfcaUf 
I The matter of Plaintiffs Petition for Issuance of an Extraordianary 
frit came on regularly for hearing on the 18th day of November, 1985 with 
ippearances as above indicated. The matter was fully presented, argued 
ind submitted and the decision thereon taken under advisement by the Court. 
rhe Court having n ov fully considered the matter makes its ruling and 
iecision thereon as follows: 
The Court is of the opinion that under the uncontroverted facts and the 
:ircumstances of thismatter the P.O.S.T. Council denial of certification 
*as justified under the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. 67-15-10.5(1)(d). flne 
rlear intent and purpose of the legislature to deny certification under 
fact3 as these seems apparent to the Court» The principal issue being the 
noral character of the applicant. The statutory proccedure for subsequent 
dismissal of charges following entry of a guilty plea, under Colorado lav, 
rfould not work contrary to the obvious intent of the legislature, 
BA3ed upon the foregoing and upon the grounds and reasons stated in 
the defendants memorandum the Petition of the Plaintiff is denied. 
X>PIES TO COUNSEL PArtP OF 
BATEMAN v. BOABD OF EXAMINERS 
Clt6«iS22P.2d381 
2. States $=»I73 
Utah 381 
7Utah2d221 
E. Alton BATEMAN and State Board of 
Education, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
BOARD OP EXAMINERS OF the STATE 
OF UTAH, Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 8457. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 28, 195a 
Declaratory judgment act by the Uni-
Tersity of Utah against State Board of 
Examiners and the State Finance Com-
mission, wherein the State Board of Edu-
cation intervened. From judgment entered 
by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
bkc County, Martin M. Larson, J., the 
State Board of Examiners appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that short 
of any capricious or arbitrary action, State 
Board of Examiners and its administrative 
inn, the Commission of Finance, have au-
thority to examine into and approve or dis-
approve of proposed expenditures, to adopt 
reflations pertaining generally to salary 
schedules and personnel in accordance with 
statutes conferring such powers upon them, 
and that Superintendent of Public Instruc-
tion and Board of Education are subject 
thereto in a similar manner to other de-
partments of State government 
J Judgment in accordance with opinion. 
i ; , . 
I Constitutional Law *=>50 
* The fundamental power of govern-
ment rests in the legislature.1 
L Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, 291 
r P.2d400. 
1 Thoreton v. 8tate Board of Examine**, 
21 Utah 187, 60 P.2d 982; Burrows v. 
Kimball, 11 Utah 149, 41 P. 719; Marion-
mi T. Cutler, 82 Utah 475, 91 P. 855; 
State ex rel Davis v. Edwards, 88 Utah 
143, 93 P. 720; State ex rel. Davis v. 
Cttler, 34 Utah 99, 95 P. 1071; Uintah 
State Bank v. AJaz, 77 Utah 455, 297 P. 
The State Board of Examiners has 
power beyond mere auditing. Const, art. 
7, § 13.* 
3. Statutes <£=>223.l 
A preference should be given to later 
statutes over prior ones where there is a 
conflict.8 
4. Statutes *=»223.4 
Where statutes are conflicting, the 
more specific takes precedence over the 
general.4 
5. Constitutional Law <S=>70(3) 
Statutes $=»2I4 
Usually Supreme Court is not con-
cerned with questions of policy nor with 
wisdom of legislation, but where there is 
confusion because of conflict between stat-
utes, it is permissible to look to general 
governmental policies and purposes to in-
terpret the legislative intent 
6. States $=>I73 
Short of any capricious or arbitrary 
actions, State Board of Examiners and its 
administrative arm, the Commission of 
Finance, have authority to examine into 
and approve or disapprove of proposed ex-
penditures, to adopt regulations pertain-
ing generally to salary schedules and per-
sonnel in accordance with statutes confer-
ring such powers upon them, and Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction and Board of 
Education are subject thereto in a similar 
manner to other departments of state 
government. U.CA.1953, 53-2-8, 53-3-7, 
53-3-8, 53-3-9, 63-2-13, 63-2-14, 63-2-20, 
63-6-8, 63-6-11, 63-6-19, 64-6-1, 64-6-2, 
64-7-2, 64-9-1, 67-3-1 et seq., 77-62-2, 
434; State Board of Education v. Com-
missioner of Finance, 122 Utah 1C4, 
247 PJ2d 435. 
3. Nclden v. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 50 P. 
524; Pacific International Express Co. 
v. State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 2d 15, 
816 P.2d 549. 
4. University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 
457, 50 P. 90. 
V V M -
77-624; Laws 1957, c 177, | 12; Const 
art. 7, H13,16; art. 10, $ & 
E. It Caflister, Atty. Gen^ H. I t Waldo, 
Jr„ Asst Atty. Gen, for appellants. 
Richards ft Bird and Dan 3 . BnshneO, 
Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
CROCKETT, Jostke. 
This ease arose originally as a suit for 
declaratory judgment by the University of 
Utah against the State Board of Exam-
iners and the State Finance Commission. 
The dispute between the University and 
those defendants was dealt with in a prior 
opinion.1 The State Board of Education 
intervened to determine its rights relating 
to both the University and the defendants, 
the issues between the University and the 
Board of Education have been resolved 
by stipulation. There is no dissonance be-
tween the Board of Examiners and the 
Gxmnission of Finance in this action. 
Their interests being parallel, for the pur-
pose of this decision, we will proceed upon 
the assumption that the Commission of 
Finance is the statutorily created ad-
ministrative arm of the Board of Exam-
iners and consider the rights of the Board 
of Education relative to i t These parties 
are hereinafter for brevity referred to 
simply as "Examiners" and "Education.'* 
Reduced to its simplest terms the dispute 
Is this: Education claims authority to ad-
minister the State Department of Educa-
tion and school system without let or 
hindrance from Examiners; whereas the 
latter Board claims authority to examine 
and approve or disapprove of proposed ex-
penditures, and to exercise general super-
1. U. of Utah v. Board of Ears* 4 Utah 
2d 408, 206 PJM 848. 
2. Education sets eat a net at iattaaets m 
which It contends that Examiners, 
Finance or the Governor bare interfered 
•ritls !ta foardooa by rafaafof to make 
available appropriated funds; approve 
appointments of omployeos and proposed 
risory control of salaries > and personnel 
practices of the Board of Education.* 
Both parties advance plausible argu-
ments in support of their claims to au-
thority based on their respective consti-
tutional origins and legislative implementa-
tion. Resolution of the problems present-
ed will be facilitated by examining the con-
stitutional foundation and the statutory 
structure of the authority of each separate-
ly 
The constitutional authority of Educa-
tion is found in Article X which provides 
for the establishment of a uniform system 
of public schools within the state, defines 
of what it shall be comprised, and in Sec-
tion 8 thereof vests "general control and 
supervision of the Public School System 
* * * in a State Board of Education, 
consisting of the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, and such other persons as the 
Legislature may provide. • • •" 
The language of Article X sheds little 
light as to just how the authority of Edu-
cation should relate to Examiners or to 
other state departments, nor can any help 
be found from the proceedings of the Con-
stitutional Convention, as there b no in-
dication that the matter was ever con-
sidered or discussed. However, there was 
rather extensive discussion as to whether 
the Superintendent of Public Instruction 
should be an elective or an appointive 
position. Considerable sentiment was ex-
pressed as to the undesirability of having 
it directly responsive to political pressures.1 
This attitude reflected in the statement 
of Delegate Carl G. Maeser, who said, *I 
would like to see that office removed as 
far as possible away from poUtics."« The 
important responsibilities and the neces-
sity of high qualifications of the superin-
tendent were also stressed,* and it is also 
1 M I ProcConttCoar. K» ot aeo. 
(1885). 
4. Ibid. p. 861. 
5. Ibid. p. 1154, Delegate Kerr arged: 1 
aobadt Mr. President, that the »^ • ^ 
Superintendent of PabSe lafeieetfon 
abonld be a man of learning, • • • 
who has spent years and a treat anwant 
true that there was no suggestion or inti-
mation that the superintendent or the 
Board of Education might be subject to 
the control of Examiners. 
The general purpose thus stated in the 
Constitution of establishing and maintain-
ing a public school system is implemented 
tn statutes which quite fully set forth the 
powers and duties of the superintendent 
and of the Board of Education. 
Section 53-3-2 provides in part as fol-
lows: 
The state board of education shall 
be charged with the administration of 
the system of public instruction, and 
with general superintendence of the 
district schools of the state and of the 
school revenue set apart and appropri-
ated for their support * * • * 
Section 53-3-7 provides: 
The state superintendent with the 
approval of the state board of educa-
tion shall prepare and submit to the 
governor to be included in his budget 
to be submitted to the legislature, a 
budget of the requirements of his office 
including the expenses of the state 
board of education, for his own and 
other salaries and wages, office and 
travel expense, equipment and repairs 
necessary for carrying out the duties 
Imposed upon the superintendent of 
public instruction and the state board 
of education * * V 
Section 53-3-8 provides: 
The state auditor shall transfer to 
the state general fund from the uni-
form school fund to the credit of 
the state board of education the 
amount designated by the legislature 
for the operation of the office of the 
state superintendent and the state 
board of education, • * *." 
i^ieae «u raa m 
Section 53-2-S gives the Superintendent 
authority to appoint subordinates and fix 
their salaries: 
The board may appoint such assist-
ant superintendents, directors, super-
visors, assistants, clerical workers, and 
other employees, as in the judgment of 
the board may be necessary to the 
proper administration and supervision 
of the public school system. The 
salaries of such assistant superin-
tendents, directors, supervisors, as-
sistants, clerical workers and other 
employees, shall be fixed by the board 
and shall be paid from money ap-
propriated for that purpose." (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
If the above statutes and constitutional 
provisions stood alone and could be given 
literal application, there would be no dif-
ficulty in determining the scope of the 
powers of Education. However, when we 
look at the over-all picture of our law, 
difficulty is encountered because, as will 
be seen, these powers are overlapped by 
others conferred upon Examiners.* 
The Board of Examiners was created by 
and its authority is rooted in Section 13, 
Article VII of our Constitution which pro-
vides: 
"Until otherwise provided by law, 
the Governor, Secretary of State and 
Attorney-General shall constitute a 
Board of State Prison Commissioners, 
* * *. [specifies duties] They shall, 
also, constitute a Board of Examiners, 
with power to examine all claims 
against the State except salaries or 
compensation of officers fixed by law, 
and perform such other duties as may 
be prescribed by law; and no claim 
against the State, except for salaries 
and compensation of officers fixed by 
law, shall be passed upon by the Leg> 
islature without having been consider-
ef BBoney la preparing • • •. It is 6, Tor an excellent article em tne 
not ttke the • • o
 offlce of Governor, of Examiner, aee Article by James W. 
wMen roouires little or no preparation. Bawling*, 5* Utah Law Review Mft. 
gangster} and ess be filled by & mas 
ef ordinary abffity." 
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ed and acted upon by the said Board 
of Exaafeers." 
The question of importance is the extent 
of the authority conferred by the language, 
* * * * * with power to examine all claims 
against the state." This phraseology has 
given rise to much concern over the re-
ciprocal powus and interrelationships of 
the departments of our state government 
In the first place, we think that the word 
Mdaimn was used in its broadest connota-
tion and we recognise that it is susceptible 
of a variety of meanings: ranging from a 
moral claim; or the seeking of legislative 
largesse; or asserting a privilege; to as-
serting rights to compensation for property 
or materials furnished, or salary for serv-
ices rendered, to the state. But the pivot of 
the controversy has devolved upon the term 
"to examine." On the one hand, Education 
espouses the view that the power "to ex-
amine all claims against the state0 merely 
denotes an auditing function; and on the 
other, Examiners takes the position that it 
confers plenary power to examine into the 
advisability and necessity of any expendi-
ture or proposed obligation of the state. 
The first facet of Education's argument 
against the power claimed by Examiners is 
that the framers of the Constitution envi-
sioned Section 13, above quoted, as legisla-
tive in nature, intended to be subsequently 
modified and controlled by legislative enact-
ments such as the statutes conferring 
powers on Education. They emphasize 
that such was the plain import of its first 
clause, "Until otherwise provided by law, 
* * * * which they insist modified the 
entire section. Without going into the de-
tail of the arguments pro and con on this 
facet of the subject it is readily seen that 
attempting to give that proviso application 
to each of the subsequent parts of the sec-
tion gives rise to some difficulty gram-
matically. L e. it would read: "Until 
otherwise provided by law, * * * [they 
shall] • * • perform such other duties 
as may be prescribed by law." Absent 
knowledge of the facts concerning its adop-
tion, the most natural meaning would be 
that it applies on!y to the first sentence 
dealing with the membership of the Board 
of State Prison Commissioners, and by 
parallel reasoning, to the second sentence 
relating only to the membership of the 
Board of Examiners. 
Education points to the constitutional 
convention in support of its reasoning that 
the entire section was intended to be sub-
ject to future legislation. Sections 12 
through 15 establish various administrative 
agencies: Section 12, the Board of Par-
dons; Section 13, the State Prison Com-
missioners and Board of Examiners; Sec-
tion 14, Insane Asylum Commissioners; 
Section 15, Reform School Commissioners. 
At the Convention, a motion was made to 
strike all of the sections on the theory that 
they dealt with legislative matters. During 
subsequent debates, in which section 12 was 
mast often mentioned, delegate Thurman 
observed: 
"I do not see why this matter cannot 
be left to the Legislature. Of course, 
this leaves the matter where it is now, 
but it gives to the Legislature the right 
to create a board such as is here 
named, or any other kind of a board of 
pardons. * * * 
Mr. Varian. Mr. Chairman, taking 
the propositions in their order, I would 
suggest, in speaking to the substitute 
offered by my friend from Utah Coun-
ty, that there is no reason why we 
should not leave it to the Legislature. 
and at the final reading, first Section 12 and 
then Sections 13, 14 and 15, were each 
amended by inserting at the beginning 
thereof the phrase: "Until otherwise pro-
vided by law." • Thus the manner in which 
the initial proviso of the section was adopt-
ed is somewhat persuasive that the whole 
section was intended to be applied and in-
terpreted in accordance with subsequent 
legislative enactments. 
[1] The idea that the boards themselves 
were to be subject to change by the Legis* 
7. n Proccedis«s Const.Conv.1890 p. 1C0S. t. Ibid pp. 1152 et seq. 
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lature also finds support in the practical 
construction which has been placed upon it 
The membership of all of the other boards 
provided for in the sections just referred to 
has now been changed.* A conclusion that 
the initial clause affects the entire section 
would not cast the die in favor of Educa-
tion any more than it would in favor of Ex-
aminers, as will appear from our discussion 
of the statutes relating to the powers of the 
latter board. Yet it docs have an im-
portant bearing on the over-all conclusion 
we reach in this opinion, which is based to 
a considerable extent upon the concept that 
the fundamental power of government rests 
in the legislature.1* 
Another argument of Education against 
the claim to general supervisory powers as-
serted by Examiners is that the concluding 
clause of the section of the Constitution in 
question, " * * * and no claim against 
the state, except for salaries and compensa-
tion of officers fixed by law, shall be passed 
upon by the legislature without having been 
considered and acted upon by the State 
Board of Examiners" characterizes the en-
tire section, showing an intent that they 
should pass only upon unliquidated claims 
against the state. Certain it is that one of 
the functions of Examiners is to investigate 
and act as a fact finder and advisor to the 
legislature on claims of that nature, such 
as tort claims, or other claims for damages 
or compensation claimed for property, 
goods or services, by persons who would 
not otherwise have legal redress available. 
[2] One of the major difficulties with 
Education's contention that, except as to 
unliquidated claims against the state, Ex-
aminers has no discretionary authority and 
^n perform only an auditing function, is 
that that would be but a duplication of the 
duties of the state auditor who is charged 
•• Sections TMO-2, T1-42-*. U.CJL19W 
modify Article 7, Section 12; Section 64-
9-1, U.CA.1953, modules Article 7, 8ec-
«oe 13 brtofHf ag tie Board of Prison 
Commissioners In concerned. Section 
W-7-2, U.CJL1953 modifies Article 7. 
Section 14; and Sections 64-6-1 and 04-
0-2. U.CA.1953 modify Article 7, Section 
15. 
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with the responsibility of auditing the rec-
ords and accounts of all departments of 
state government.11 The question as to the 
extent of the power of Examiners has been 
dealt with by this court in numerous deci-
sions. They clearly demonstrate that Ex-
aminers has powers beyond mere auditing. 
One of the earliest cases dealing with the 
problem of the authority of Examiners was 
Thoreson v. State Board of Examiners.1* 
Mandamus was sought to direct Examiners 
to audit and allow an unpaid balance for the 
lease of school lands. The statute provid-
ed: 
"The state board of examiners are 
hereby directed to receive and audit 
and allow all just claims of persons 
who have paid monies in pursuance of 
chapter 76 of the Session Laws of the 
territory of Utah of eighteen hundred 
and ninety-two, in relation to the leases 
of school lands and the state auditor is 
hereby directed to draw his warrant 
therefor on the state district school tax 
fund." 
The provision of the 1892 Session Laws 
which had authorized leasing of school 
lands had been held unconstitutional M and 
the statute was purposed to reimburse peo-
ple for money advanced on such leases. 
The court took occasion to observe that Ex-
aminers is more than a perfunctory body, 
and may exercise discretion, but held that 
under the statute the amount paid in was a 
"just claim** and therefore the only deter-
mination for Examiners to make was 
whether the amount of money claimed had 
actually been paid in and was under a 
mandatory duty to authorize payment of the 
amount. 
The next case dealing with the scope of 
Examiners' authority was Marioneaux v. 
19. See Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 
191. 291 P.2d 400. 
11. Sec 16, Art. VII. Constitution; Sees. 
67-3-1 et seq„ U.CA.1953. 
12. 1900, 21 Utah 187, 60 P. 982, 
13. Barrows v. Kimball, 11 Utah 149, 41 P. 
719. 
SSSP.S4—fti 
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Cutler.14 A district judge brought man-
damus against Examiners for approval of 
his claim for a mileage which they had re-
jected. The refusal had been justified on 
the ground that the law authorizing the 
tame was unconstitutional as containing 
more than one subject winch position was 
sustained. This case is relied upon as au-
thority for the discretionary power of Ex-
aminers but it is to be noted that the hold-
ing, if strictly limited to the facts, says 
only that they are not required to approve 
the payment of a claim which is not proper-
ly grounded under the law. The question 
of their discretion beyond that was not 
precisely involved. 
This case was followed by State ex rel. 
Davis v. Edwards11 wherein a court re-
porter sought to compel the State Auditor 
to allow his claim for mileage which the 
district judge had certified as correct. The 
statute stated that upon such certification 
by the judge and presentation of the cer-
tificate to the Auditor a warrant should be 
drawn for payment In spite of this stat-
ute the Auditor refused, relying on Sec 18> 
Ch. 35, I* 1896 which required approval of 
Examiners before he could draw the war-
rant The court held that the claim must 
be presented to Examiners for approval as 
required by the statute and used some very 
pointed language pertinent to the instant 
problem: 
"The powers conferred upon tht 
board of examiners, with regard to 
claims against the state, by the consti-
tutional provision quoted above, are 
general and sweeping. The power 
would include all claims against the 
state, were it not for the exception 
which excludes salaries or compensa-
tion of officers fixed by law. An excep-
tion of this character may not be en-
larged nor extended by implication. 
An exception which specifies the things 
that are excepted from a general pro-
vision strengthens the force of the gen-
84. 190?, S3 Utah 475, W P, 8M, 
IS. 1008, 83 Utah 243, 98 P. 720. 
If. 1908, 34 Utah 90, 95 P. 1071 
era! provisions of the v!aw." (Em-
phasis added.) 
While it might be said that the case could 
have been based upon the express provi-
sions of the statute involved, yet it indicated 
the conception the court had of the law and 
the trend of its development in recognizing 
a discretionary power in the Board of Ex-
aminers in passing on claims against the 
state. 
That same year in State ex ret Davis v. 
Cutler ** the question of Examiners' discre-
tionary power was judicially appraised 
from a slightly different angle. Another 
court stenographer brought mandamus to 
compel the Auditor to allow a claim which 
had been rejected by Examiners. The 
court again opined that Examiners may ex-
ercise discretion in allowance of claims but 
must not do so arbitrarily and that, if the 
claim, " * * * is one which is admitted 
to be just, and is authorized by law, and 
there is no dispute with regard to any fact 
involved, and the claim is presented to the 
board in due form as the law requires, we 
know of no law nor reason why respond-
ents [Examiners], although acting in a 
quasi-judicial capacity, should not be re-
quired to audit and allow the claim."" 
The actual holding was that Examiners had 
improperly refused to act, and thus the ob-
servations relating to its discretionary 
powers were by way of dicta. But even so, 
there was another clear expression of the 
view the court took of the law respecting 
the discretionary powers of Examiners. 
The landmark case on this subject is that 
of Uintah State Bank v. Ajax.1* Action 
was brought to compel the State Auditor to 
issue warrants to pay bounty certificates for 
killing predatory animals (coyotes). 'The 
plaintiff contended that inasmuch as the 
statute fixed the amount to be paid for each 
animal killed and directed the Auditor to 
issue the warrant upon the certificate of the 
County Clerk, and further that nothing in 
the act required submission of the claims to 
17. Ibid., at pag* 1074 of 96 P. 
18. 1931, 77 Utah 455, 297 P. 434, 438. 
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Examiners, the Auditor must issue the war-
rant upon presentation of the certificate. 
The bank argued that the amount having 
been thus "fixed by law," there was nothing 
but the ministerial duty of paying the claim 
and hence it was unnecessary to present it 
to Examiners. This contention was reject-
ed by the court, saying: 
The claims here are not fixed by 
law in the sense that the Legislature 
has made an appropriation of an 
amount certain to a definite named 
person." 
and further, 
"all claims are subject to action by the 
board of examiners except only claims 
for 'salaries and compensation of offi-
cers fixed by law.'" 
It refused to agree that Examiners should 
examine only "unliquidated?' claims against 
the state, using the following language: 
"If we should adopt petitioner's view, 
it would follow that the legislature 
might designate any officer other than 
the board of examiners as authorized 
in behalf of the state to settle, fix, or 
liquidate claims and agree upon the 
amount to be paid thereon, and thereby 
exclude the board of examiners from 
its duty * * *. We cannot agree to 
any such construction of the constitu-
tional language, nor may we by con-
struction interpolate the word 'unliqui-
dated' into the Constitution [which] 
* * * has vested in the Board of 
Examiners the power to examine and 
pass on all claims except those exempt-
ed, and the Legislature is without au-
thority to delegate such power to any 
other board or officer." 
The court went on to state: 
"If the view is taken that the Legis-
lature intended to make this claim pay-
able by the auditor without presenta-
tion to the board of examiners, then the 
Legislature attempted to do that which 
JS. 1332, 122 UUh 164, 247 P.2d 435, 439. 
» . 63-0-11, U.C.A-190S. 
21. 63-6~& U.C.A.1953. 
it had no power or authority to effec-
tuate, and on this question the language 
in the case of State ex rel Davis v. 
Edwards is not only appropriate, but 
decisive." 
Another case which Examiners rely upon 
is the recent one of State Board of Educa-
tion v. Coram, of Finance^ in which Fi-
nance refused to approve payment of the 
salary of the Superintendent of Public In-
struction. The reasons urged were that the 
Board of Education was not legally consti-
tuted and was without authority to appoint 
a superintendent and fix his salary. The 
holding was for Education as to this par-
ticular authority, but in passing the court 
observed: 
"The Board of Examiners * * * 
which must approve all salary claims 
against the State, except those fixed by 
law, approved by a vote of two to one 
the request of the Board of Education 
to pay Dr. Bateman a salary of $10,000 
per annum." 
again indicating the court's understanding 
of the law as it has developed in our state 
under the decisions hereinabove discussed. 
This interpretation of the law is also con-
sonant with the legislative conception of 
the powers of Examiners as manifest in the 
various statutes implementing the powers of 
that board. They provide for the presenta-
tion of all claims against the state to the 
Board of Examiners to be passed upon;19 
that it has certain supervisory powers over 
the Auditor;*1 and the unanimous consent 
of its members is required before officers 
of the state may make deficit expendi-
tures.** It is expressly provided that the 
Department of Finance, the legislatively 
created administrative arm of the Board of 
Examiners, is endowed with authority to 
approve or disapprove of the hiring of all 
personnel;** and is also charged in broad 
language with the responsibility of investi-
gating the need for existing positions in all 
departments of state government^** • * 
22. 33-3-1S, U.OA-I853, 
23. 63-2-14, U.CJM9S3. 
The argument of Education, not entirely 
implausible, is that it this section is con* 
strued with the other statutes relating to 
its powers and duties, the reasonable con-
struction is that the account required to be 
filed with and approved by Examiners re-
lates only to the personal expenses of him-
self and the Board, and not to the general 
costs of operation of the department The 
statute admittedly could have been plainer 
in meaning had the minds of its framers ad-
verted to the possibility of the difficulties 
here encountered. It is our view that if 
that section is considered against the back-
ground of the law as discussed in this opin-
ion, and particular note is made of the fact 
that the final clause singles out for manda-
tory payment the superintendent's salary, 
(which is actually fixed by statute and thus 
under the exception from Examiners' au-
thority of "salaries fixed by law,") a rather 
strong implication arises that all of the 
other expenses and expenditures of the de-
partment are left within the emphasized 
portion of the statute just quoted and under 
the discretionary power of Examiners. In 
fact it seems difficult to reconcile the lan-
guage, "if the account is found to be cor-
rect and the expenditures necessary" in any 
other way. 
3 * 5 UU* — — ~ — ~ — » 
•rith a view to eliminating any unnecessary 
9n&9 * * • " a n d * * * * no vacancy 
shall be filled until the commission [finance] 
has certified to the department requesting 
the creation of a new position or the filling 
of the vacancy that the position is necessary 
to carry on the work." ** 
Finance is also endowed with a general 
frant of power as to all departments of 
rtate government, to establish salary sched-
iles: 
• * * * for the officers, clerks, 
stenographers and employees of state 
offices, departments, boards and com* 
missions, except where such salaries 
are fixed by statute or by appropria-
tion; and such schedule of salaries 
shall have the force of law in all state 
offices, departments, boards and com-
missions, * * V * * 
Hie comprehensive nature of the author-
ty granted Finance is further demonstrated 
>y the provision for the appointment of a 
widget officer with certain supervisory du-
ies with respect to the use of funds in the 
various departments." 
Further of significance is the statutory 
nterdiction directed to the Board of Edu-
cation : 
"At the end of each month the state 
superintendent shall file with the state 
board of examiners an itemised account 
of his expenses, including those of the 
state board of education, verified by his 
oath. The said board shall examine the 
same, and if the account is found to be 
correct and the expenditures necessary, 
shall certify the same to the state audi-
tor. The state auditor shall issue a 
warrant on the state treasurer for the 
amount due on such account, and at the 
end of each month he shall issue his 
warrant for one-twelfth of the superin-
tendent's annual salary." ** (Emphasis 
added.) 
M. ibid. 
W. 63-2-13, U.C.A.19S3. 
t*. 05-2-20, U.OA.195S. 
17. 53-3-0, U.CJL1953. 
[3] Education advances another argu-
ment that under the rule giving preference 
to later statutes over prior ones where there 
is conflict*1 it is entitled to prevail in this 
controversy because Section 55-2-8, U.C.A. 
1953, quoted in the forepart of this opinion, 
authorizing the Board of Education to ap-
point and fix the salaries of the various offi-
cers and employees of the department which 
was re-enacted in 1953 constitutes the most 
recent pronouncement of the legislature and 
is thus controlling. Generally speaking we 
do not disagree with this rule, nor with the 
reasoning upon which it is based. But like 
all general rules it must be applied with 
discernment as to whether it fits the fact 
28. NeMen •. Clark, 20 Utah 882, 09 P. 
824, 526; Pacific In te mountain £xpre*s 
Co. v. Stat© Tax Comm., 7 Utah 2d 1ft. 
816 P.2d 549. 
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titnation at hand and no rale should be 
given force in application where the facts 
plainly negative any such intent The pur-
pose of the re-enactment of the statute just 
referred to was solely to amend the provi-
sion relating to the Superintendent's salary. 
No change was made in the other portions 
of the act and it is obvious that the legisla-
ture did not intend any significance to the 
re-enactment in nullifying other existing 
statutes of the state because it was later in 
time. 
On the point of statutes taking priority 
because of subsequent enactment, die fact 
is that the sections hereinabove discussed 
conferring supervisory powers upon Fi-
nance were all enacted in connection with 
the reorganization of state government in 
1941, (and some subsequent amendments 
thereto,) and thus, as expressions of legis-
lative will as to governmental policy, were 
later indications thereof than the statutes 
relied upon by Education. Corollary to this 
and entirely consistent with the idea that 
Examiners has rather broad powers in re-
spect to all of the departments of govern-
ment, including Education, is the further 
clearly expressed intent in that regard is 
shown in S e c 12 of each general appropria-
tion act since the 1949 Session of the Legis-
lature: 
T h e board of examiners shall pro-
mulgate and publish rules and regula-
tions regarding the conduct and em-. 
ployment of state officers and employ-
ees covering working hours, overtime, 
sick leave, vacations and other matters 
of personnel policy and enforce such 
rules and regulations uniformly in all 
state departments * * * shall adopt 
rules and regulations * * *, with 
regard to the establishment of salary 
schedules for all state departments and 
institutions * * *. No such salary 
schedule shall be put into effect until 
3*. Quoted ia See. 12. Ch. 194, 8XJM9W; 
•bftilar Sec*. 12 of Ch. 199, 8X.UJ953; 
Ch. 123, 8-101.1061; Ch. 98, SJUU.1949; 
•ame duties upon personnel officer See. 
12, Ch. 177, 8X.U.1967. 
approved by the board of 
[4] Nor do we see anything persuasive 
in the rule of statutory construction that as 
to conflicting statutes, the more specific 
takes precedence over the general,*9 which 
strangely enough, each party here contends 
favors its position. While It is true that 
the statutes purport to give Education spe-
cific powers within its own department, 
other statutes cited above give Examiners 
and Finance specific authority within the 
particular area relating to personnel, sal-
aries and expenditures. 
[5] Usually we are not concerned with 
questions of policy, nor with the wisdom 
of legislation. Yet where there is confu-
sion because of conflict between statutes, 
it is permissible to look to general govern-
mental policies and purpose to interpret the 
legislative intent In that vein there are 
some considerations which provide a rea-
sonable basis for concluding that the legis-
lature regarded it as desirable and mere-
fore intended that Education should be sub-
ject to the same regulations as other de-
partments of state government: It is in 
keeping with the fundamental policy of 
checks and balances which characterizes 
our entire system of government. It also 
tends to keep control close to the people, 
which is a touchstone of democracy. Ex-
aminers is made up of the three top execu-
tive officers of the state, who are directly 
elected by and responsible to the people. 
This is contrasted to the superintendent 
who is now appointed by the members of 
the Board of Education, whose measbers 
are elected from the various districts of the 
state, and whose terms are staggered to 
that in practical operation the superintend-
ent could exercise a relatively high i 
of control over them and himself be < 
paratively impervious to responsibiliry to 
the public. There are also advantages in 
99. Nehlen v. Clark, t note 28 aa***; 
University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 
407, 99 P. 90, 98. 
399 Utah S n *ACHTO EEPOBTEE, Sd SERIES 
having aonie common standards in refard 
to departmental budgets, personnel require-
ments, salary schedules, vacations, sick 
leave and other such matters in order to 
snwihnite difficulties which may arise be-
cause of lack of uniformity, or even compe-
tition in the various state departments.*1 
Were we interpreting; the statutes and 
constitutional provisions relating to the 
Board of Examiners for the first time we 
night be more impressed by arguments 
proposed by Education. However, history 
and experience have always been the very 
bone and sinew of the law. As stated by 
the great Justice Holmes: "The life of the 
law has not been logic; it has been ex-
perience." *• 
Looking at the problems here presented 
in broad perspective it is important to real-
ize that our legislature has met biennially 
and in special sessions for many years with 
both the statutory and decisional law of 
this state being so understood and applied 
mat in practical operation the Examiners 
and Finance have exercised general super-
visory powers over the fiscal and budgetary 
affairs of other departments of state gov-
ernment and no substantial changes have 
been made in the law in reference thereto. 
On the basis of the constitutional provi-
sions, legislative enactments and decisional 
law of our state as it has developed, we are 
constrained to reject the contention of Ed-
ucation that it is entirely free from control 
of or responsibility to Examiners. We do 
not desire to be understood as Maying that 
Examiners can go so far as to in effect 
exercise a veto power over legislation by 
arbitrarily refusing to make funds avail-
able which have been appropriated to Edu-
cation for either general or specific pur-
poses. Insofar as this has been done in 
certain instances which had considerable 
bearing upon precipitating this litigation, 
such actions were wrong. But inasmuch as 
the funds in question have reverted to the 
general fund, and the problems are sow 
SI. 800 report on Stat* Gorornaent to 
Tax Stndy Oommittoa by G. Homer Dur-
ham, p. 23. 
moot, there is no point in partknlariting 
them. 
Notwithstanding the powers conferred 
upon Examiners by the statutes herein-
above discussed, which must be recognized; 
oat does not mean that it can by arbitrary 
actions in budgetary matters intrude into 
the internal affairs of management or con-
trol of the functions of Education within 
the purview of its purpose as provided by 
law. The latter alone is given the author-
ity and charged with the duty of the "ad-
ministration of the system of public in-
struction'' in the schools of the state, In 
order to discharge that responsibility it is 
essential, and the law contemplates, that it 
have full control of the framing of policy 
and other aspects of the internal manage-
ment of that department in accordance with 
such purpose. 
[6] It is our conclusion mat, short of 
any such capricious or arbitrary actions, 
the Board of Examiners and its administra-
tive arm, the Commission of Finance, have 
the authority to examine into and approve 
or disapprove of proposed expenditures, to 
adopt regulations pertaining generally to 
salary schedules and personnel in accord-
ance with the statutes conferring such pow-
ers upon them, and that the Superintendent 
of Public Instruction and the Board of Ed-
ucation are subject thereto in a similar 
manner to other departments of state gov-
ernment. 
Respective counsel are commended for 
their able and thorough presentations of the 
issues involved in this case. 
No costs awarded. 
MCDONOUGH, C J, and WORTHEN, 
J., concur. 
WADE, Justice (concurring). 
I concur with the main opinion, but think 
h desirable to point out that in certain in-
stances in the past Examiners, Finance 
-sd/cr the Governor have, by arbitrary 
S2. Hotmea, Tha Common Law, (38ta Ed.) 
MOTZKUS v. OARROII, 
OtoaaSSSFJdSn 
actions, and contrary to the law as set forth 
in the opinion, infringed upon the preroga-
tives of the Superintendent of Public In-
struction and the Board of Education by 
unjustifiably interfering in their functions. 
A long list of such grievances are com-
plained of. I set out but a few by way of 
example: 
(a) Arbitrarily reduced the moneys ap-
propriated to Weber College for fiscal 
1953-54 by $79,027.91. 
(b) Refused to make available to U.S. 
A.C (now US.U.) $20,000.00 which had 
been appropriated and designated as a re-
search fund. 
(c) In April, 1953, reduced the appro-
priation to Weber College by $5,000.00 on 
the day the fund was expendable. 
(d) Arbitrarily refused to approve nu-
merous salary changes proposed by Educa-
tion for administrative and supervisory per-
m*h s n 
The sweeping statement of Mr. Justice 
WADE, if taken literal*/, would dispossess 
the Board of Examiners and Finance Com-
mission of any control whatsoever as to any 
and all existing or proposed salaries or per-
tonnd1 irrespective of budgetary control, 
statutory restriction, necessity, amount of 
compensation or number of personnel, since 
most of such grievances had to do with 
salaries and penonncL 
HENRIOD, Justice. 
I concur. However I cannot subscribe 
to the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
WADE where he says "in certain instances 
in the past. Examiners, Finance and/or 
Governor have, by arbitrary actions, and 
contrary to tht law as set forth in the 
opinion, infringed upon the prerogatives 
of the Superintendent of Public Instruction 
and the Board of Education by unjustifiably 
interfering in their functions. A long list 
of such grievances are complained of. I 
set out but a few by way of example." 
Such language assumes that each and 
every one of the grievances complained of 
by respondent was an unlawful usurpation 
of power, including the four instances 
pointed out by Mr. Justice WADE. Such 
assumption cannot be indulged, since most 
of the fifteen grievances which were 
claimed by respondent to have been unlaw-
ful usurpations of power represent factual 
situations giving rise to highly debatable 
legal questions, and most of which, in sim-
ilar situations, have been held by this Court 
«*f to have been any usurpation of power 
at all, but a proper exercise thereof. 
TUtahMMT 
Erwla MOTZKUS aai Laclllo Motokas, his 
wife, Plaintiffs aad Respeadsats, 
v. 
Marvta CARROLL aad Elva Dwasa Carroll, 
his wife, aad Mrs. Rath Kastptae, 
Dafasdaata aad Appellants, 
aad 
Zlos*s Savteas Bank * Trust Company, Trea-
ts* far Carl M. Hanson, Defeaiast 
aad Respondent 
No. 870ft. 
Supreme Court of Utah, 
March 10,1958. 
Proceeding to determine wnether 
boundary line by acquiescence had been 
established at fence between two tracts ol 
land. The Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, U 
held that boundary had not been established, 
and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, 
Wade, J, held that where for more than 
45 years mere was a fence between two 
tracts, respective owners and occupants 
of each tract recognized, acquiesced in, and 
treated such fence as marking boundary 
line between two tracts and claimed land 
up to such fence but did not claim any 
land beyond it, boundary line by 
cence was established at fence line. 
Reversed. 
Syllabus. 351 U.S. 
COLE v. YOUNG ET AL. 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. 
No. 442. Argued March 6, 1956.—Decided June 11, 1956. 
The Act of August 26, 1950, gave to the heads of certain departments 
and agencies of the Government summary suspension and unre-
viewable dismissal powers over their civilian employees, when 
deemed necessary "in the interest of the national security," and 
its provisions were extended to "all other departments and agencies 
of the Government" by Executive Order No. 10450. Petitioner, a 
preference-eligible veteran under the Veterans' Preference Act, was 
summarily suspended from his classified civil service position as a 
food and drug inspector for the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare on charges of close association with alleged Com-
munists and an allegedly subversive organization. Later, he was 
dismissed on the ground that his continued employment was not 
"clearly consistent with the interests of national security." His 
appeal to the Civil Service Commission under the Veterans' Pref-
erence Act was denied on the ground that that Act was inapplicable 
to such discharges. Held: His discharge was not authorized by 
the 1950 Act and hence it violated the Veterans' Preference Act. 
Pp. 538-558. 
1. The 1950 Act authorizes a dismissal only upon a determination 
that it is "necessary or advisable in the interest of the national 
security." Such a determination requires an evaluation of the 
risk to the "national security" that the employee's retention would 
create, which depends not only upon the character of the employee 
and the likelihood of his misconducting himself but also upon the 
nature of the position he occupies and its relationship to the 
"national security." P. 542. 
2. The 1950 Act is not the only, nor even the primary, source 
of authority to dismiss government employees, and the question 
in this case is not whether an employee can be dismissed on such 
grounds but only the extent to which the summary procedures 
authorized by the 1950 Act are available in such a case. Pp. 543-
544. 
3. This depends on the meaning of the term "national security," 
as used in the 1950 Act. Pp. 542-544. 
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4. The term "national security" is not defined in that Act, but 
it is clear from the statute as a whole that it was intended to com-
prehend only those activities of the Government that are directly 
concerned with the protection of the Nation from internal sub-
version or foreign aggression, and not those which contribute to 
the strength of the Nation only through their impact on the general 
welfare. Pp. 544-548. 
5. This conclusion is supported by the legislative history of the 
Act. Pp. 548-551. 
6. A condition precedent to the exercise of the dismissal authority 
conferred by the 1950 Act is a determination by the agency head 
that the position occupied is one affected with the "national secu-
rity," as that term is used in the Act. P. 551. 
7. No determination was made that petitioner's position was 
one in which he could adversely affect the "national security," as 
that term is used in the Act. Pp. 551-558. 
(a) Executive Order No. 10450 treats an adverse determina-
tion as to the loyalty of an employee as satisfying the statute, 
irrespective of the character of his job or the effect his continued 
employment might have upon the "national security." Pp. 551-
556. 
(b) The failure of the Executive Order to state explicitly 
what was meant is the fault of the Government, and any ambigui-
ties should be resolved against the Government. P. 556. 
(c) From the Secretary's determination that petitioner's em-
ployment was not "clearly consistent with the interests of national 
security," in the light of the Executive Order, it may be assumed 
only that the Secretary found the charges to be true and that they 
created reasonable doubt as to petitioner's loyalty. Pp. 556-557. 
96 U. S. App. D. C. 379, 226 F. 2d 337, reversed and remanded. 
David L Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With 
him on the brief were James H. Heller and Osmond K. 
Fraenkel. 
Donald B. MacGuineas argued the cause for respond-
ents. On the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, As-
sistant Attorney General Burger, Samuel D. Slade and 
Benjamin Forman. 
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Opinion of the Court by MH. JUSTICE HARLAV 
announced by MR. JUSTICE BURTON. *' 
This ease presents the question of the meaning of the 
Jenn National security" as used in the Act of August 26 
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S 2 S . •* "f?1 neCCSSary "in the *»*"»* of the national security of the United States."» 
A « ^ J S g ' S ' S f ^ P ^ o n s of ^ t i o n 6 of the Act 
* . **'
 i y i
^ I*7 s tat. 555), as amended (5 U S C fW> ™ *u 
mnm of any other law, the Secretary i t o t e ^ S i ^ ' S 
the A X S f^r^ the Navy; the T of 
mission Z Ah W t x f y of the Treasury; Atomic Energy Com-S S S t S ^ * ^ ^Urity ReS°UrCeS B - ^ h e 
a b s o i u * ' £ 5 £ and wT ^T^T ' " A e r M i < * > » V . in his 
national s S ^ ^ ^ ^ i n t h e ^™* of 
p lay iTaf^ ? T ' W l t h ° U t p a y ' a n y c i v i I i a n officer or em-
! t ° J i £ - 0 f fta* ^-lading the Foreign Serv£e 
Justice, S 2 S t ^ ? i £ ? a r t m e n n t ° f C°mmerce> Apartment of 
ment of t S N Z L ^ ^ ^ ^ r ^ ° f t h e A r m y ' ^ P ^ Atomic JtoL!!??9 1 * * a r t m « * of the Air Force, Coast Guard, 
their severT fil?7 ° 0 m m , t t f f o r Aeronautics, respectively, or of 
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Having completed his probationary or trial period, .vho is a ctizen 
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Petitioner, a preference-eligible veteran under § 2 of 
the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 387, as 
amended, 5 U. S. C. § 851, held a position in the classified 
civil service as a food and drug inspector for the New York 
of the United States whose employment is suspended under the 
authority of this Act, shall be given after his suspension and before 
his employment is terminated under the authority of this Act, (1) a 
written statement within thirty days after his suspension of the 
charges against him, which shall be subject to amendment within 
thirty days thereafter and which shall be stated as specifically as 
security considerations permit; (2) an opportunity within thirty 
days thereafter (plus an additional thirty days if the charges are 
amended) to answer such charges and to submit affidavits; (3) a 
hearing, at the employee's request, by a duly constituted agency 
authority for this purpose; (4) a review of his case by the agency 
head, or some official designated by him, before a decision adverse 
to the employee is made final; and (5) a written statement of the 
decision of the agency head: Provided further, That any person 
whose employment is so suspended or terminated under the authority 
of this Act may, in the discretion of the agency head concerned, be 
reinstated or restored to duty, and if so reinstated or restored shall 
be allowed compensation for all or any part of the period of such 
suspension or termination in an amount not to exceed the difference 
between the amount such person would normally have earned during 
the period of such suspension or termination, at the rate he was 
receiving on the date of suspension or termination, as appropriate, 
and the interim net earnings of such person: Provided further, That 
the termination of employment herein provided shall not affect the 
right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in 
any other department or agency of the Government: Provided 
further, That the head of any department or agency considering the 
appointment of any person whose employment has been terminated 
under the provisions of this Act may make such appointment only 
after consultation with the Civil Service Commission, which agency 
shall have the authority at the written request of either the head of 
such agency or such employee to determine whether any such person 
is eligible for employment by any other agency or department of 
the Government. 
"SEC. 3. The provisions of this Act shall apply to such other de-
partments and agencies of the Government as the President may, 
Opinion of the Court. 35! p
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Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed. 
96 U. S. App. D. C. 379, 226 F. 2d 337. Because of 
the importance of the questions involved in the field of 
Government employment, we granted certiorari. 350 
U. S. 900. 
Section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act, 58 Stat. 
390, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 863, provides that prefer-
ence eligibles may be discharged only "for such cause as 
will promote the efficiency of the service" and, among 
other procedural rights, "shall have the right to appeal 
to the Civil Service Commission," whose decision is made 
binding on the employing agency. Respondents concede 
that petitioner's discharge was invalid if that Act is con-
trolling. They contend, however, as was held by the 
courts below, that petitioner's discharge was authorized 
by the Act of August 26, 1950, supra, which eliminates 
the right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission. 
Thus the sole question for decision is whether petitioner's 
discharge was authorized by the 1950 Act. 
The 1950 Act provides in material part that, notwith-
standing any other personnel laws, the head of any 
agency to which the Act applies 
"may, in his absolute discretion and when deemed 
necessary in the interest of national security, sus-
pend, without pay, any civilian officer or employee 
of [his agency] . . . . The agency head concerned 
may, following such investigation and review as he 
deems necessary, terminate the employment of such 
suspended civilian officer or employee whenever he 
shall determine such termination necessary or ad-
visable in the interest of the national security of the 
United States, and such determination by the agency 
head concerned shall be conclusive and final: . . . ." 
The Act was expressly made applicable only to the De-
partments of State, Commerce, Justice, Defense, Army, 
Opinion of the Court. 351 U.S. 
Navy, and Air Force, the Coast Guard, the Atomic Energy 
Commission, the National Security Resources Board, and 
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Sec-
tion 3 of the Act provides, however, that the Act may be 
extended "to such other departments and agencies of the 
Government as the President may, from time to time, 
deem necessary in the best interests of national security," 
and the President has extended the Act under this author-
ity "to all other departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment" * While the validity of this extension of the Act 
depends upon questions which are in many respects com-
mon to those determining the validity of the Secretary's 
exercise of the authority thereby extended to her,3 we will 
restrict our consideration to the latter issue and assume, 
for purposes of this decision, that the Act has validly been 
extended to apply to the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare. 
The Act authorizes dismissals only upon a determina-
tion by the Secretary that the dismissal is "necessary or 
advisable in the interest of the national security." That 
determination requires an evaluation of the risk of injury 
to the "national security" that the employee's retention 
would create, which in turn would seem necessarily to be 
a function, not only of the character of the employee and 
the likelihood of his misconducting himself, but also of 
the nature of the position he occupies and its relationship 
to the "national security." That is, it must be deter-
mined whether the position is one in which the employee's 
misconduct would affect the "national security." That, of 
course, would not be necessary if "national security" were 
*§ 1, Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489, set forth in the Appendix, past, p. 558. 
8
 Secretary Folsom, the present Secretary of the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, has been substituted as respondent 
for the former Secretary Hobby. 
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used in the Act in a sense so broad as to be involved in all 
activities of the Government, for then the relationship to 
the "national security" would follow from the very fact of 
employment. For the reasons set forth below, however, 
we conclude (1) that the term "national security" is used 
in the Act in a definite and limited sense and relates only 
to those activities which are directly concerned with the 
Nation's safety, as distinguished from the general wel-
fare; and (2) that no determination has been made that 
petitioner's position was affected with the "national secu-
rity," as that term is used in the Act. It follows that his 
dismissal was not authorized by the 1950 Act and hence 
violated the Veterans' Preference Act. 
I. 
In interpreting the 1950 Act, it is important to note 
that that Act is not the only, nor even the primary, source 
of authority to dismiss Government employees. The 
general personnel laws—the Lloyd-LaFollette4 and Vet-
erans' Preference Acts5—authorize dismissals for "such 
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service," and 
the ground which we conclude was the basis for peti-
tioner's discharge here—a reasonable doubt as to his 
loyalty—was recognized as a "cause" for dismissal under 
those procedures as early as 1942.* Indeed, the Presi-
dent's so-called Loyalty Program, Exec. Order No. 9835, 
12 Fed. Reg. 1935, which prescribed an absolute standard 
of loyalty to be met by all employees regardless of posi-
tion, had been established pursuant to that general au-
thority three years prior to the 1950 Act and remained in 
4
 §6, 37 Stat. 555. as amended, 5 U. S. C. §652. 
5
 § 14, 58 Stat. 390, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 863. 
6
 Civil Service War Regulations, § 185 (c) (7), September 26, 1942, 
5 CFR, Cum. Supp., § 182 (c) (7). 
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relations, internal security, and the stock-piling of stra-
tegic materials. Nor is this conclusion vitiated by the 
grant of authority to the President, in § 3 of the Act, to 
extend the Act to such other agencies as he "may, from 
time to time, deem necessary in the best interests of 
national security." Rather, the character of the named 
agencies indicates the character of the determination 
required to be made to effect such an extension. Aware 
of the difficulties of attempting an exclusive enumera-
tion and of the undesirability of a rigid classification in 
the face of changing circumstances, Congress simply 
enumerated those agencies which it determined to be 
affected with the "national security" and authorized the 
President, by making a similar determination, to add 
any other agencies which were, or became, "sensitive." 
That it was contemplated that this power would be exer-
cised "from time to time" confirms the purpose to allow 
for changing circumstances and to require a selective 
judgment, necessarily implying that the standard to be 
applied is a less than all-inclusive one. 
The limitation of the Act to the enumerated agencies 
is particularly significant in the light of the fact that 
Exec. Order No. 9835, establishing the Loyalty Program, 
was in full effect at the time of the consideration and 
passage of the Act. In that Order, the President had ex-
pressed his view that it was of "vital importance" that oil 
employees of the Government be of "complete and 
unswerving loyalty" and had prescribed a minimum loy-
alty standard to be applied to all employees under the 
normal civil service procedures. Had Congress consid-
ered the objective of insuring the "unswerving loyalty" 
of all employees, regardless of position, as a matter of 
"national security" to be effectuated by the summary 
procedures authorized by the Act, rather than simply a 
desirable personnel policy to be implemented under the 
normal civil service procedures, it surely would not 
Opinion of the Court. 861 U.S. 
Wtanrtedtbe Act to adected agencies. Presumably, 
uaetore, Congress meant something more by the 
interest of the national security" than the general 
interest the Nation has in the loyalty of even "non-
aenative" employees. 
We can find no justification for rejecting this implica-
t e of the limited purpose of the Act or for inferring the 
«£umted power contended for by the Government. 
Where apphcable, the Act authorizes the agency head 
wnimanly to suspend an employee pending investiga-
tion and after charges and a hearing, finally to terminate 
e T T n e n t ' 8 u c h fetation not being subject to 
appeal. There is an obvious justification for the sum-
marysuspension power where the employee occupies a 
sensitive position in which he could cause serious 
damage to the national security during the delay inci-
dent to an investigation and the preparation of charges, 
likewise, there is a reasonable basis for the view that an 
agency head who must bear the responsibility for the pro-
tection of classified information committed to his custody 
should have the final say in deciding whether to repose 
hw trust ini an employee who has access to such informa-
tion. On the other hand, it is difficult to justify sum-
mary suspensions and unreviewable dismissals on loyalty 
grounds of employees who are not in "sensitive" positions 
and who are thus not situated where they could bring 
about any discernible adverse effects on the Nation's secu-
rity^ in the absence of an immediate threat of harm to 
the national security," the normal dismissal procedures 
seem fufly adequate and the justification for summary 
powers disappears. Indeed, in view of the stigma at-
fortrl^rT011,8 d k m i 8 s e d o n ***** grounds, the need 
F -ura. safeguards seems even greater than in other 
Z S L S V T t **" n o t H g h t l y a s s u m e * •* Congress intended to take away those safeguards in the absence of 
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some overriding necessity, such as exists in the case of 
employees handling defense secrets. 
The 1950 Act itself reflects Congress' concern for the 
procedural rights of employees and its desire to limit the 
unreviewable dismissal power to the minimum scope 
necessary to the purpose of protecting activities affected 
with the "national security." A proviso to § 1 of the Act 
provides that a dismissal by one agency under the power 
granted by the Act "shall not affect the right of such 
officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any 
other department or agency of the Government," if the 
Civil Service Commission determines that the employee 
is eligible for such other employment. That is, the 
unreviewable dismissal power was to be used only for 
the limited purpose of removing the employee from the 
position in which his presence had been determined to 
endanger the "national security"; it could affect his right 
to employment in other agencies only if the Civil Service 
Commission, after review, refused to clear him for such 
employment. This effort to preserve the employee's pro-
cedural rights to the maximum extent possible hardly 
seems consistent with an intent to define the scope of the 
dismissal power in terms of the indefinite and virtually 
unlimited meaning for which the respondents contend. 
Moreover, if Congress intended the term to have such 
a broad meaning that all positions in the Government 
could be said to be affected with the "national security," 
the result would be that the 1950 Act, though in form but 
an exception to the general personnel laws, could be 
utilized effectively to supersede those laws. For why 
could it not be said that national security in that sense 
requires not merely loyal and trustworthy employees but 
also those that are industrious and efficient? The rela-
tionship of the job to the national security being the 
same, its demonstrated inadequate performance because 
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of inefficiency or incompetence would seem to present a 
surer threat to national security, in the sense of the 
general welfare, than a mere doubt as to the employee's 
loyalty. 
Finally, the conclusion we draw from the face of the 
Act that "national security" was used in a limited and 
definite sense is amply supported by the legislative 
history of the Act. 
In the first place, it was constantly emphasized that 
the bill, first introduced as S. 1561 in the 80th Congress 
and passed as H. R. 7439 in the 81st Congress, was 
intended to apply, or to be extended, only to "sensitive" 
agencies, a term used to imply a close and immediate 
concern with the defense of the Nation.8 Thus the 
Senate Committee on Armed Services, in reporting out 
S. 1561, stated: 
"This bill provides authority to terminate employ-
ment of indiscreet or disloyal employees who are 
employed in areas of the Government which are 
sensitive from the standpoint of national security. 
"[Section 3 will permit] the President to deter-
mine additional sensitive areas and include such 
G o J e ^ S T »1 Ce,t° eXteDd mch P°Were t0 aU «*"<** of the 
duTtion L l S 8 m , k r J 8 U m m a 'T dismissal statutes, of limited 
andUhe Z ^ J ? ^ *P"tment* 56 Stat. 1053,63 Stat. 1023, 
" the J^l ^TT'' m ^  458- ^ 1 9 5° A c t * i n t ™ ^ the a u S r i ^ m e n t of Defense, was designed to make 
toSt*T' fleX,b,Hty b y penaitt iB« the P^dent toextend 
No ^081lc agC"CrcThich • * — "^«ve.» H. R. Rep. 
M j J 84l8t C ° n g ' 2 d ^ P- 3; S. Rep. No. 1155, 80th Cong., 
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areas in the scope of the authorities contained in 
this bill. 
. . . • • 
"Insofar as the [addition of § 3] is concerned, it 
was recognized by all witnesses that there were other 
sensitive areas within the various departments of the 
Government which are now, or might in the future 
become, deeply involved in national security. . . . 
In view . . . of the fact that there are now and will 
be in the future other sensitive areas of equal 
importance to the national security, it is believed 
that the President should have authority to make a 
finding concerning such areas and by Executive 
action place those areas under the authorities con-
tained in this act." 9 
The House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service 
reported that "The provisions of the bill extend only to 
departments and agencies which are concerned with vital 
matters affecting the national security of our Nation." 10 
The committee reports on H. R. 7439 in the next 
Congress similarly referred to the bill as granting the dis-
missal power only to the heads of the "sensitive" agen-
cies.11 While these references relate primarily to the agen-
cies to be covered by the Act, rather than to the exercise 
of the power within an agency, the standard for both is 
the same—in the "interests of the national security"—and 
the statements thus clearly indicate the restricted sense 
in which "national security" was used. In short, "na-
tional security" is affected only by "sensitive" activities. 
•S. Rep. No. 1155, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2-4. 
10
 H. R. Rep. No. 2264, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2. 
11
 H. R. Rep. No. 2330, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2-5; S. Rep. 
No. 2158,81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2. 
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Secondly, the history makes clear that the Act was 
intended to authorize the suspension and dismissal only 
of persons in sensitive positions. Throughout the hear-
ings, committee reports, and debates, the bill was de-
scribed as being designed to provide for the dismissal of 
"security risks." " In turn, the examples given of what 
might be a "security risk" always entailed employees 
having access to classified materials; they were security 
risks because of the risk they posed of intentional or 
inadvertent disclosure of confidential information.13 Mr. 
Larkin, a representative of the Department of Defense, 
which Department had requested and drafted the bill, 
made this consideration more explicit: 
"They are security risks because of their access to 
confidential and classified material. . . . But if 
they do not have classified material, why, there is no 
notion that they are security risks to the United 
States. They are security risks to the extent of 
having access to classified material." " 
"A person is accused of being disloyal, but is 
cleared by the loyalty board, because there is not 
12
 E. g., S. Rep. No. 215S, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2: "The purpose 
of the bill is to increase the authority of the heads of Government 
departments engaged in sensitive activities to summarily suspend 
employees considered to be bad security risks . . . ." 
18
 For example, Mr. Murray, the Chairman of the Committee on 
Post Office and Civil Service, which had reported the bill, gave the 
following illustration of the purpose of the bill in opening the debate 
in the House: "For instance, an employee who is working in some 
highly sensitive agency doing very confidential, secret defense work 
and who goes out and gets too much liquor may unintentionally or 
unwittingly, because of his condition, confide to someone who may 
be a subversive, secret military information about the character of 
work he is doing in that department. He is, by his conduct, a bad 
security risk and should be discharged." 96 Cong. Rec. 10017. 
14
 Hearings, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on 
H. R. 7439,81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 67. 
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enough evidence against him. If that person is not 
in a sensitive job, it is not of any further concern to 
us. We are willing to take the view, that while we 
might have misgivings aboin his loyalty, he can-
not prejudice our security because he does not 
have access to any of the classified or top secret 
material.,, 1S 
It is clear, therefore, both from ihe face of the Act and 
the legislative history, that "national security" was not 
used in the Act in an all-inclusive sense, but was intended 
to refer only to the protection of "sensitive" activities. 
It follows that an employee cac be dismissed "in the 
interest of the national security" mder the Act only if he 
occupies a "sensitive" position, ani thus that a condition 
precedent to the exercise of the csmissal authority is a 
determination by the agency head ihat the position occu-
pied is one affected with the "nidonal security." We 
now turn to an examination of tin Secretary's action to 
show that no such determination was made as to the 
position occupied by petitioner. 
II. 
The Secretary's action in dismisng the petitioner was 
expressly taken pursuant to EEC. Order No. 10450, 
18 Fed. Reg. 2489,16 promulgated in April 1953 to pro-
vide uniform standards and procedires for the exercise by 
agency heads of the suspension and dismissal powers 
under the 1950 Act. That Orier prescribes as the 
standard for dismissal, and the disnissal notice given to 
petitioner contained, a determinsion by the Secretary 
that the employee's retention in employment "is not 
clearly consistent with the interests of national secu-
M
 Id., at p. 72. 
l f
 The relevant portions of the Executive Order, as it stood at the 
time of petitioner's suspension and disaarge, are printed in the 
Appendix, post, p. 558. 
380673 0—56 39 
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rity." n Despite this verbal formula, however, it is our 
view that the Executive Order does not in fact require 
the agency head to make any determination whatever on 
the relationship of the employee's retention to the 
"national security1' if the charges against him are within 
the categories of the charges against petitioner—that is, 
charges which reflect on the employee's loyalty. Rather, 
as we read the Order, it enjoins upon the agency heads the 
duty of discharging any employee of doubtful loyalty, 
irrespective of the character of his job and its relation-
ship to the "national security." That is, the Executive 
Order deems an adverse determination as to loyalty to 
satisfy the requirements of the statute without more. 
The opening preamble to the Order recites, among 
other things, that "the interests of the national security 
require" that "all" Government employees be persons "of 
complete and unswerving loyalty." It would seem to 
follow that an employee's retention cannot be "clearly 
consistent" with the "interests of the national security" 
as thus defined unless he is "clearly" loyal—that is, unless 
there is no doubt as to his loyalty. And § 8 (a) indicates 
that that is in fact what was intended by the Order. That 
section provides that the investigation of an employee 
pursuant to the Order shall be designed to develop 
information "as to whether . . . [his employment] is 
1T
 Section 6 of the Order, which formally prescribes the standards 
for "termination," in terms adopts the very language of the statute, 
"necessary or advisable in the interests of the national security." 
Section 7, however, provides that a suspended employee "shall not 
be reinstated9' unless the agency head determines that reinstatement 
is "dearly consistent with the interests of the national security." 
Since nonreinstatement of a suspended employee is equivalent to 
the termination of bis employment, it is apparent that the "clearly 
consistent" standard of § 7 is the controlling one. See also §§ 2, 8, 
and 3 (a). In the view we take of the case, we need not determine 
whether the "clearly consistent" standard is, as petitioner contends, 
a more onerous one than the "necessary or advisable" standard. 
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clearly consistent with the interests of the national secu-
rity," and prescribes certain categories of facts to which 
"such" information shall relate. The first category, 
§8 (a)(1), includes nonloyalty-oriented facts which, in 
general, might reflect upon the employee's reliability, 
trustworthiness, or susceptibility to coercion, such as dis-
honesty, drunkenness, sexual perversion, mental defects, 
or other reasons to believe that he is subject to influence 
or coercion. Section 8 (a)(1) expressly provides, how-
ever, that such facts are relevant only "depending on the 
relation of the Government employment to the national 
security." The remaining categories include facts which, 
in general, reflect upon the employee's "loyalty," such as 
acts of espionage, advocacy of violent overthrow of the 
Government, sympathetic association with persons who 
so advocate, or sympathetic association with subversive 
organizations. §8 (a)(2)-(8). Significantly, there is 
wholly absent from these categories—under which the 
charges against petitioner were expressly framed—any 
qualification making their relevance dependent upon the 
relationship of the employee's position to the national 
security. The inference we draw is that in such cases 
the relationship to the national security is irrelevant, 
and that an adverse "loyalty" determination is sufficient 
ex propria vigor e to require discharge. 
Arguably, this inference can be avoided on the ground 
that § 8 (a) relates only to the scope of information to be 
developed in the investigation and not to the evaluation 
of it by the agency head. That is, while loyalty infor-
mation is to be developed in all cases regardless of the 
nature of the employment, that does not mean that 
the agency head should not consider the nature of the 
employment in determining whether the derogatory 
information is sufficient to make the employee's con-
tinued employment not "clearly consistent" with the 
"national security." No doubt that is true to the extent 
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that the greater the sensitivity of the position the smaller 
may be the doubts that would justify termination; the 
Order undoubtedly leaves it open to an agency head to 
apply a stricter standard in some cases than in others, 
depending on the nature of the employment. On the 
other hand, by making loyalty information relevant in all 
cases, regardless of the nature of the job, § 8 (a) seems 
strongly to imply that there is a minimum standard of 
loyalty that must be met by all employees. It would fol-
low that the agency head may terminate employment in 
cases where that minimum standard is not met without 
making any independent determination of the potential 
impact of the person's employment on the national 
security. 
Other provisions of the Order confirm the inferences 
that may be drawn from § 8 (a). Thus § 3 (b) directs 
each agency head to designate as "sensitive" those posi-
tions in his agency "the occupant of which could bring 
about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material 
adverse effect on the national security." By definition, 
therefore, some employees are admittedly not in a 
position to bring about such an effect. Nevertheless, the 
Order makes this distinction relevant only for purposes 
of determining the scope of the investigation to be 
conducted, not for purposes of limiting the dismissal 
power to such "sensitive" positions. Section 3 (a) is more 
explicit. That provides that the appointment of all 
employees shall be made subject to an investigation the 
scope of which shall depend upon the degree of adverse 
effect on the national security the occupant of the posi-
tion could bring about, but which "in no event" is to be 
less than a prescribed minimum. But the sole purpose of 
such an investigation is to provide a basis for a "clearly 
consistent7' determination. Thus the requirement of a 
minimum investigation of all persons appointed implies 
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that an adverse "clearly consistent7 determination may 
be made as to any such employee, regardless of the poten-
tial adverse effect he could cause to tie national security. 
Finally, the second "Whereas" claise of the preamble 
recites as a justification for the Crder that "all per-
sons . . . privileged to be employee . . . [by the Gov-
ernment should] be adjudged by mraially consistent and 
no less than minimum standards," this implying that the 
Order prescribes minimum standard? that all employees 
must meet irrespective of the chara;ter of the positions 
held, one of which is the "complete and unswerving 
loyalty" standard recited in the first "Whereas" clause of 
the preamble. 
Confirmation of this reading of tie Order is found in 
its history. Exec. Order No. 9835, sipra, as amended by 
Exec. Order No. 10241, 16 Fed. R*g. 3690, had estab-
lished the Loyalty Program under vhich all employees, 
regardless of their positions, were nade subject to dis-
charge if there was a "reasonable doibt" as to their loy-
alty. That Order was expressly revoked by § 12 of the 
present Executive Order. There in no indication, how-
ever, that it was intended thereby *o limit the scope of 
the persons subject to a loyalty stancard. And any such 
implication is negatived by the renurkable similarity in 
the preambles to the two Orders and JI the kinds of infor-
mation considered to be relevant to tie ultimate determi-
nations.18 In short, all employees ws-e still to be subject 
to at least a minimum loyalty staidard, though under 
18
 Executive Order No. 9835 recited that it was "of vital impor-
tance" that all employees be of "complete md unswerving loyalty"; 
Exec. Order No. 10450 recites that "the uterests of the national 
security require" that all employees be of * complete and unswerving 
loyalty." Executive Order No. 9835 HsteL six factors to be con-
sidered "in connection with the determinaxon of disloyalty" (Pt. V, 
§ 2); these are repeated in substantially idemcal form in §§ 8 (a) (2), 
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other finding was required to support the Secretary's 
action.1* 
From our holdings (1) that not all positions in the 
Government are affected with the "national security" as 
that term is used in the 1950 Act, and (2) that no deter-
mination has been made that petitioner's position was 
one in which he could adversely affect the "national secu-
rity," it necessarily follows that petitioner's discharge was 
not authorized by the 1950 Act. In reaching this conclu-
sion, we are not confronted with the problem of reviewing 
the Secretary's exercise of discretion, since the basis for 
our decision is simply that the standard prescribed by the 
Executive Order and applied by the Secretary is not in 
conformity with the Act.20 Since petitioner's discharge 
19
 That the Secretary similarly interpreted the Executive Order 
and did not in fact determine that petitioner's job was a "sensitive" 
one is confirmed by the respondents' concession that petitioner "did 
not have access to Government secrets or classified material and was 
not in a position to influence policy against the interests of the Gov-
ernment." Respondents' Brief, pp. 3-4; Record, p. 40. 
20
 No contention is made that the Executive Order might be sus-
tained under the President's executive power even though in violation 
of the Veterans' Preference Act. There is no basis for such an argu-
ment in any event, for it is clear from the face of the Executive 
Order that the President did not intend to override statutory limita-
tions on the dismissal of employees, and promulgated the Order 
solely as an implementation of the 1950 Act. Thus § 6 of the Order 
purports to authorize dismissals only "in accordance with the said 
Act of August 26, 1950," and similar references are made in §§ 4, 5, 
and 7. This explicit limitation in the substantive provisions of the 
Order is of course not weakened by the inclusion of the "Constitu-
tion," as well as the 1950 and other Acts, in the omnibus list of 
authorities recited in the Preamble to the Order; it is from the 
Constitution that the President derives any authority to implement 
the 1950 Act at all. When the President expressly confines his action 
to the limits of statutory authority, the validity of the action must be 
determined solely by the congressional limitations which the President 
sought to respect, whatever might be the result were the President 
ever to assert his independent power against that of Congress. 
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was not autiwmed by the 1950 Act and hence violated the 
Veterans Preference Act, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the Dis-
trict Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
[For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE CLARK, joined 
y
^t\ 8TICE R E E D a n d M R - J U S T I C E MINTON, see post, p. O05.J r ' 
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EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450. 
(18 Fed. Reg. 2489, as amended by Exec. Order No. 10491, Oct 13 
1953, 18 Fed. Reg. 6583.) ' ' 
WHEREAS the interests of the national security re-
quire that all persons privileged to be employed in the 
departments and agencies of the Government, shall be 
reliable trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and 
of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States-
and ' 
WHEREAS the American tradition that all persons 
should receive fair, impartial, and equitable treatment at 
the hands of the Government requires that all persons 
seeking the privilege of employment or privileged to be 
emp oyed in the departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment be adjudged by mutually consistent and no less 
than minimum standards and procedures among the de-
partments and agencies governing the employment and 
retention m employment of persons in the Federal service • 
i?W'uT^EREF0RE' b y V i r t u e o f t h e authority vested in 
me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States 
including section 1753 of the Revised Statutes of the 
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United States (5 U. S. C. 631); the Civil Service Act of 
1883 (22 Stat. 403; 5 U. S. C. 632, et seq.); section 9A of 
the act of August 2,1939, 53 Stat. 1148 (5 U. S. C. 118 j) ; 
and the act of August 26, 1950, 64 Stat. 476 (5 U. S. C. 
22-1, et seq.), and as President of the United States, and 
deeming such action necessary in the best interests of the 
national security, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
SECTION 1. In addition to the departments and agencies 
specified in the said act of August 26,1950, and Executive 
Order No. 10237 of April 26, 1951, the provisions of that 
act shall apply to all other departments and agencies of 
the Government. 
SEC. 2. The head of each department and agency of 
the Government shall be responsible for establishing and 
maintaining within his department or agency an effective 
program to insure that the employment and retention in 
employment of any civilian officer or employee within 
the department or agency is clearly consistent with the 
interests of the national security. 
SEC. 3. (a) The appointment of each civilian officer or 
employee in any department or agency of the Govern-
ment shall be made subject to investigation. The scope 
of the investigation shall be determined in the first in-
stance according to the degree of adverse effect the occu-
pant of the position sought to be filled could bring about, 
by virtue of the nature of the position, on the national 
security, but in no event shall the investigation include 
less than a national agency check (including a check of 
the fingerprint files of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion), and written inquiries to appropriate local law-
enforcement agencies, former employers and supervisors, 
references, and schools attended by the person under 
investigation: Provided, that upon request of the head 
of the department or agency concerned, the Civil Service 
Commission may, in its discretion, authorize such less 
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investigation as may meet the requirements of the 
national security with respect to per-diem, intermittent, 
temporary, or seasonal employees, or aliens employed 
outside the United States. Should there develop at any 
stage of investigation information indicating that the 
employment of any such person may not be clearly con-
sistent with the interests of the national security, there 
shall be conducted with respect to such person a full field 
investigation, or such less investigation as shall be suffi-
cient to enable the head of the department or agency 
concerned to determine whether retention of such person 
is clearly consistent with the interests of the national 
security. 
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been conducted a full field investigation under Executive 
Order No. 9835 of March 21,1947, and, after such further 
investigation as may be appropriate, shall re-adjudicate, 
or cause to be re-adjudicated, in accordance with the said 
act of August 26, 1950, such of those cases as have not 
been adjudicated under a security standard commensurate 
with that established under this order. 
SEC. 5. Whenever there is developed or received by 
any department or agency information indicating that 
the retention in employment of any officer or employee 
of the Government may not be clearly consistent with 
the interests of the national security, such information 
shall be forwarded to the head of the employing depart-
ment or agency or his representative, who, after such 
investigation as may be appropriate, shall review, or 
cause to be reviewed, and, where necessary, re-adjudicate, 
or cause to be re-adjudicated, in accordance with the said 
act of August 26,1950, the case of such officer or employee. 
SEC. 6. Should there develop at any stage of investiga-
tion information indicating that the employment of any 
officer or employee of the Government may not be clearly 
consistent with the interests of the national security, the 
head of the department or agency concerned or his repre-
sentative shall immediately suspend the employment of 
the person involved if he deems such suspension neces-
sary in the interests of the national security and, follow-
ing such investigation and review as he deems necessary, 
the head of the department or agency concerned shall 
terminate the employment of such suspended officer or 
employee whenever he shall determine such termination 
necessary or advisable in the interests of the national 
security, in accordance with the said act of August 26, 
1950. 
SEC. 7. Any person whose employment is suspended or 
terminated under the authority granted to heads of de-
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partments and agencies by or in accordance with the said 
act of August 26, 1950, or pursuant to the said Executive 
Order No. 9835 or any other security or loyalty program 
relating to officers or employees of the Government, shall 
not be reinstated or restored to duty or reemployed in 
the same department or agency and shall not be reem-
ployed in any other department or agency, unless the head 
of the department or agency concerned finds that such 
reinstatement, restoration, or reemployment is clearly 
consistent with the interests of the national security, 
which finding shall be made a part of the records of such 
department or agency: Provided, that no person whose 
employment has been terminated under such authority 
thereafter may be employed by any other department or 
agency except after a determination by the Civil Service 
Commission that such person is eligible for such 
employment. 
SEC. 8. (a) The investigations conducted pursuant to 
this order shall be designed to develop information as to 
whether the employment or retention in employment in 
the Federal service of the person being investigated is 
clearly consistent with the interests of the national secu-
rity. Such information shall relate, but shall not be 
limited, to the following: 
(1) Depending on the relation of the Government 
employment to the national security: 
(i) Any behavior, activities, or associations which 
tend to show that the individual is not reliable or 
trustworthy. 
(ii) Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifica-
tions, or omissions of material facts. 
(iii) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, 
or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use 
of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual 
perversion. 
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(iv) An adjudication of insanity, or treatment for 
serious mental or neurological disorder without satis-
factory evidence of cure.* 
(v) Any facts which furnish reason to believe 
that the individual may be subjected to coercion, 
influence, or pressure which may cause him to act 
contrary to the best interests of the national security. 
(2) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, 
treason, or sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation 
therefor, or conspiring with, or aiding or abetting, another 
to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, 
espionage, treason, or sedition. 
(3) Establishing or continuing a sympathetic associa-
tion with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, 
or revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret 
agent or representative of a foreign nation, or any rep-
resentative of a foreign nation whose interests may be 
inimical to the interests of the United States, or with 
any person who advocates the use of force or violence to 
overthrow the government of the United States or the 
alteration of the form of government of the United States 
by unconstitutional means. 
(4) Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow 
the government of the United States, or of the alteration 
of the form of government of the United States by uncon-
stitutional means. 
(5) Membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic 
association with, any foreign or domestic organization, 
•After the date of petitioner's discharge, this paragraph was 
amended, by Exec. Order No. 10548, Aug. 2, 1954, 19 Fed. Reg. 
4871, to read: 
"(iv) Any illness, including any mental condition, of a nature 
which in the opinion of competent medical authority may cause 
significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the employee, with 
due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and 
the medical findings in such case." 
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of this order, and the Department of Justice shall con-
tinue to furnish the information described in paragraph 3 
of Part III of the said Executive Order No. 9835, but 
directly to the head of each department and agency. 
• • • • • 
SEC. 15. This order shall become effective thirty days 
after the date hereof. 
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. 
THE WHITE HOUSE, 
April 27, J95S. 
MR. JUSTICE CLARK, with whom MR. JUSTICE REED and 
MR. JUSTICE MINTON join, dissenting. 
Believing that the Court should not strike down the 
President's Executive Order on employee security by an 
interpretation that admittedly "rests upon a chain of 
inferences," we cannot agree to the judgment of reversal. 
In our opinion, the clear purpose of the Congress in enact-
ing the Summary Suspension Act, 64 Stat. 476, is frus-
trated, and the Court's opinion raises a serious question 
of presidential power under Article II of the Constitution 
which it leaves entirely undecided. 
Petitioner, a food and drug inspector employed in the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, was 
charged with having "established and . . . continued a 
close association with individuals reliably reported to be 
Communists/' It was further charged that he had "main-
tained a continued and sympathetic association with the 
Nature Frienda of America, which organization" is on 
the Attorney General's list; and "by [his] own admis-
sion, donated funds" to that group, contributed services 
to it and attended social gatherings of the same. Peti-
tioner did not answer the charges but replied that they 
constituted an invasion of his private rights of associa-
CLARK, J., dissenting. 351 U.S. 
tion. Although advised that he could have a hearing, 
he requested none, and was thereafter dismissed. The 
Secretary made a formal determination that petitioner's 
continued employment was not "clearly consistent with 
the interests of the national security/' a determination 
entrusted to her by the Suspension Act. Although "such 
determination by the agency head concerned shall be 
conclusive and final" under the Act, the Court, by its 
interpretation, finds "that not all positions in the Gov-
ernment are affected with the 'national security' as that 
term is used . . . and that no determination has been 
made that petitioner's position was one in which he could 
adversely affect the 'national security.'" It, therefore, 
strikes down the President's Executive Order because 
"the standard prescribed by [it] and applied by the 
Secretary is not in conformity with the Act." This 
compels the restoration of the petitioner to Government 
service. We cannot agree. 
We have read the Act over and over again, but find no 
ground on which to infer such an interpretation. It flies 
directly in the face of the language of the Act and the 
legislative history. The plain words of § 1 make the Act 
applicable to "any civilian officer or employee," not, as 
the majority would have it, "any civilian officer or em-
ployee in a sensitive position." The Court would require 
not only a finding that a particular person is subversive, 
but also that he occupies a sensitive job. Obviously this 
might leave the Government honeycombed with subver-
sive employees. 
Although the Court assumes the validity of the Presi-
dent's action under § 3 extending the coverage of the Act 
to all Government agencies, the reasoning of the opinion 
makes that extension a fortiori unauthorized. The limi-
tation the Court imposes deprives the extension of any 
force, despite the fact that § 3 has no limiting words what-
ever. And this is done in the face of legislative history 
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showing that Congress clearly contemplated that the 
coverage might be extended without limitation "to such 
other departments and agencies of the Government" 
that the President thought advisable. Senator Byrd 
commented, "Section 3 gives the President the right to 
classify every agency as a sensitive agency . . . . He 
could take the whole Government." And Senator Chap-
man remarked, "I do not see why the whole Government 
is not sensitive as far as that is concerned." Hearings 
before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 81st 
Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. 7439, pp. 15-16. Also, Con-
gressman Holifield, during debates in the House, stated 
that the Act "applies potentially to every executive 
agency, not only the sensitive ones. . . . There is no 
distinction made in the bill between so-called sensitive 
employees, that is, employees who have access to 
confidential and secret information, and the regular 
employees." 96 Cong. Rec. 10023-10024. 
The President believed that the national security 
required the extension of the coverage of the Act to all 
employees. That was his judgment, not ours. He was 
given that power, not us. By this action the Court so 
interprets the Act as to intrude itself into presidential 
policy making. The Court should not do this, especially 
where Congress has ratified the President's action. As 
required by the Act, the Executive Order was reported to 
the Congress and soon thereafter it came up for discussion 
and action in both the House and the Senate. It was the 
sense of the Congress at that time that the Order properly 
carried out the standards of the Act and was in all 
respects an expression of the congressional will. 99 Cong. 
Rec. 4511-4543, 5818-5990. In addition, Congress has 
made appropriations each subsequent year for investiga-
tions, etc., under its provisions. This in itself "stands as 
confirmation and ratification of the action of the Chief 
380673 0-36 W 
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Executive." Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber 
Co., 331 U.S. I l l , 116. 
The President having extended the coverage of the 
Act to the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, it became the duty of the Secretary to dismiss any 
employee whenever she deemed it "necessary or advis-
able in the interests of national security." She made 
such a finding. It is implicit in her order of dismissal. 
Her "evaluation as to the effect which continuance of 
[petitioner's] employment might have upon the 'national 
security'" has been made. She decided that he should 
be dismissed. Under the Act this determination is "con-
clusive and final." 
There is still another reason why we should sustain the 
President's Executive Order. By striking it down, the 
Court raises a question as to the constitutional power 
of the President to authorize dismissal of executive 
employees whose further employment he believes to be 
inconsistent with national security. This power might 
arise from the grant of executive power in Article II of the 
Constitution, and not from the Congress. The opinion of 
the majority avoids this important point which must be 
faced by any decision holding an Executive Order inop-
erative.* It is the policy of the Court to avoid constitu-
*The majority excuses its failure to pass on this question by saying 
that no contention was made that the President's Order might be 
sustained under his executive powers. We cannot agree. The Gov-
ernment specifically asserted that "if Congress had meant to prohibit 
the President from acting in this respect under [the Act] a serious 
question as to the validity of that enactment would arise." It 
devoted eight pages of its brief to this point. Furthermore, the 
Court of Appeals noted that if it "thought the President's Order 
inconsistent with the act . . . [it] would have to decide the constitu-
tional question thus presented." 96 U. S. App. D. C. 379, 382, 226 
F. 2d 337, 340. As further justification, the majority contends 
that the President acted here only under the directions of the 
Act. In answer, we need quote only the enacting clause of the Presi-
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tional questions where possible, Peters v. Hobby, 349 
U. S. 331,338, not to create them. 
We believe the Court's order has stricken down the 
most effective weapon against subversive activity avail-
able to the Government. It is not realistic to say that 
the Government can be protected merely by applying the 
Act to sensitive jobs. One never knows just which job 
is sensitive. The janitor might prove to be in as impor-
tant a spot security-wise as the top employee in the build-
ing. The Congress decided that the most effective way 
to protect the Government was through the procedures 
laid down in the Act. The President implemented its 
purposes by requiring that Government employment be 
"clearly consistent" with the national security. The 
President's standard is "complete and unswerving loy-
alty" not only in sensitive places but throughout the Gov-
ernment. The President requires, and every employee 
should give, no less. This is all that the Act and the 
Order require. They should not be subverted by the 
technical interpretation the majority places on them 
today. We would affirm. 
dent's Order: "Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in 
me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States . . . and 
as President of the United States." Executive Order No. 10450, 
18 Fed. Reg. 2489. In issuing the Order, the President invoked 
all of his powers, and since his Order is voided by the majority 
as not being in conformity with the Act, the question of the scope 
of his other constitutional or statutory powers is presented. 
POWELL, J., dissenting 460 U.S. 
22A-23A. Although the instructions left the issue of intent 
to the jury, the plurality finds that neither we nor the state 
courts may assess the effect of the presumption on the jury's 
verdict. It imposes instead an automatic reversal rule that 
would be applicable even when proof of intent to murder is 
established beyond any doubt. See n. 6, supra. Such a rule 
is precisely what Chapman rejected. 
V 
For the reasons stated, I think this Court properly could 
decide the question of harmless error. Normally, however, 
this is a question more appropriately left to the courts below. 
Hie Connecticut Supreme Court did not address the ques-
tion, nor has it been briefed extensively here. There may be 
facts and circumstances not apparent from the record before 
is. I therefore would reverse the judgment and remand the 
:ase for consideration of whether the error was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 
Syllabus 
DICKERSON, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, 
TOBACCO AND FIREARMS v. NEW BANNER 
INSTITUTE, INC. 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
No. 81-1180. Argued November 29, 1982—Decided February 23, 1983 
Title IV of the Gun Control Act of 1968,18 U. S. C. §§ 922(g)(1) and (hXD, 
makes it unlawful for any person "who has been convicted . . . o f . . . a 
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" to 
ship, transport, or receive any firearm or ammunition in interstate com-
merce. Title IV also makes it unlawful to engage in the business of im-
porting, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms without a license from the 
Secretary of the Treasury. One ground for denial of a license is where 
the applicant is under the prohibitions imposed by §§ 922(g)(1) and (h)(1), 
and if the applicant is a corporation, a license will be denied if a person 
with power to direct the management of the corporation is under such 
prohibitions. One Kennison, the chairman of the board and a share-
holder of respondent corporation, after plea negotiations, pleaded guilty 
in an Iowa state court to the state crime of carrying a concealed hand-
gun. This crime was punishable by a fine or imprisonment for not more 
than five years, or both. The state court, however, pursuant to an Iowa 
statute, "deferred" entry of a formal judgment and placed Kennison on 
probation. At the completion of his probation term he was discharged, 
also pursuant to a state statute, and his record with respect to the de-
ferred judgment was expunged. Subsequently, respondent applied to 
the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
(Bureau) for licenses as a firearms and ammunition dealer and manufac-
turer, but did not disclose Kennison's plea of guilty to the Iowa concealed 
weapon charge. The licenses were issued but were later revoked when 
the Bureau learned of the Iowa charge. The District Court upheld the 
revocation, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that although 
Kennison had been "convicted" of an offense that triggered firearms dis-
abilities, that fact could not serve as a predicate for a Gun Control Act 
violation or license revocation because the conviction had been expunged 
under the Iowa deferred judgment procedure. 
Held: The firearms disabilities imposed by §§ 922(gXl) and (hXl) apply to 
Kennison and were not removed by the expunction of the record of his 
guilty plea to the concealed weapon charge. Pp. 110-122. 
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(a) For purposes of the federal gun control laws, a plea of guilty to a 
disqualifying crime and its notation by a state court, followed by a sen-
tence of probation, is equivalent to being "convicted" within the lan-
guage of §§ 922(gXD and (hXD. Pp. 111-114. 
(b) Iowa's expunction provisions, as carried out in Kennison's case 
prior to respondent's license applications, did not nullify his conviction 
for purposes of the federal statute. Expunction under state law does 
not alter the legality of the previous conviction, does not open the way to 
a license despite the conviction, and does not signify that the defendant 
was innocent of the crime to which he pleaded guilty. Expunction in 
Iowa means no more than that the State has provided a means for the 
trial court not to accord a conviction certain continuing effects under 
state law. Pp. 114-115. 
(c) Provisions of the federal gun control laws other than the provisions 
in question, as well as related federal statutes, support the conclusion 
that Congress did not intend expunction of a state conviction automat-
ically to remove the firearms disabilities imposed by §§ 922(g)(1) and 
(hXl). Pp. 115-118. 
(d) There is nothing in the legislative history of Title IV or related 
federal statutes to suggest an opposite intent. Title IV's purpose to 
curb crime by keeping firearms out of the hands of those not legally enti-
tled to possess them because of age, criminal background, or incom-
petency, would be frustrated by a ruling that gave effect to state expunc-
tions. In the absence of a plain indication to the contrary, it is assumed 
that Congress did not intend to make the application of Title IV depend-
ent on state law. Title IV is carefully constructed gun control legisla-
tion. Congress knew the significance and meaning of the language it 
employed. Pp. 118-121. 
(e) A rule that would give effect to expunction under varying state 
statutes would seriously hamper effective enforcement of Title IV. 
Pp. 121-122. 
649 F. 2d 216, reversed. 
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, 
C. J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, 
JJ., joined, post, p. 122. 
Deputy Solicitor General Geller argued the cause for peti-
tioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, 
Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., 
William Ranter, and Douglas Letter. 
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Lewis C. Lanier argued the cause for respondent. With 
him on the brief was Jack R. McGuinn.* 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the issue whether firearms disabilities 
imposed by 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(g) and (h) apply with respect 
to a person who pleads guilty to a state offense punishable by 
imprisonment for more than one year, when the record of the 
proceeding subsequently is expunged under state procedure 
following a successfully served term of probation. 
I 
Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 226, was amended by the Gun Control 
Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1214, and now appears as 18 U. S. C. 
§921 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V). Title IV makes it un-
lawful for any person "who is under indictment for, or who 
has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" * to ship, trans-
port, or receive any firearm or ammunition in interstate com-
merce. §§ 922(g) and (h). Title IV also makes it unlawful to 
engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or deal-
ing in firearms without a license from the Secretary of the 
Treasury. §§ 922(a) and 923(a). One ground, specified by 
the statute, for denial of a license is the fact that the appli-
cant is barred by §§ 922(g) and (h) from transporting, ship-
ping, or receiving firearms or ammunition. § 923(d)(1)(B). 
The same statute provides that where the applicant is a cor-
poration, partnership, or association, a license will be denied 
*David T. Hardy and Richard E. Gardiner filed a brief for the National 
Rifle Association of America as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 
1
 The Act provides exemptions from its proscriptions for certain business 
and commercial crimes, such as antitrust violations, punishable by impris-
onment for more than one year, and for nonfirearms and nonexplosives 
state offenses classified by the State as misdemeanors and punishable by 
imprisonment for two years or less. 18 U. S. C. § 921(a)(20). These ex-
emptions are of no relevance here. 
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an individual possessing, directly or indirectly, the power 
direct the management and policies of the entity is under 
e prohibitions imposed by §§ 922(g) and (h). Title IV also 
akes it a crime to violate any of its provisions or to make 
willful misrepresentation with respect to information re-
tired to be furnished. § 924(a). 
Although, as noted above, Title IV imposes disabilities 
ion any "person who has been convicted... of a crime pun-
lable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," it 
es permit certain persons in that category to apply to the 
eretary for relief from those disabilities. Under § 925(c), 
e Secretaiy may grant relief "if it is established to his sat-
action that the circumstances regarding the conviction, and 
B applicant's record and reputation, are such that the appli-
nt will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public 
fety and that the granting of the relief would not be con-
ury to the public interest." When the Secretary grants re-
f, he must publish notice of his action promptly in the Fed-
il Register, together with a statement of reasons. Ibid. 
II 
David F. Kennison, a resident of Columbia, S. C , is a di-
rtor, chairman of the board, and a shareholder of respond-
t New Banner Institute, Inc., a corporation. In Septem-
r 1974, when Kennison was in Iowa, he was arrested and 
urged with kidnaping his estranged wife. After plea nego-
tion, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 40-41, he pleaded guilty to the 
te crime of carrying a concealed handgun, and the kidnap-
charge was dismissed. The concealed weapon offense, 
ier then Iowa law, see Iowa Code §§695.2 and .3 (1977), 
s punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by 
)risonment for not more than five years, or both.2 In ac-
rhe court, however, in its discretion, in the case of a first offense, could 
ace that punishment. See Iowa Code §695.3 (1977). Sections 695.2 
.3 were repealed effective January 1, 1978, and are now replaced by 
a Code §§ 724.4 and 903.1 (1981). 
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cord with the provisions of Iowa Code §789A.l (1977), then 
in effect,8 the state court entered an order reciting that 
Kennison had "entered a plea of guilty to the charge of carry-
ing a concealed weapon," that "the defendant has consented 
to a deferment of sentence in this matter," that "he has 
stable employment," and that there were "unusual circum-
1
 Section 789A.1 then read in pertinent part: 
"The trial court may, upon a plea of guilty, verdict of guilty, or a special 
verdict upon which a judgment of conviction may be rendered, exercise 
either of the options contained in subsections 1 and 2. However, this sec-
tion shall not apply to the crimes of treason, murder, or violation of [other 
specified statutes]. 
"1. With the consent of the defendant, the court may defer judgment 
and place the defendant on probation upon such terms and conditions as it 
may require. Upon fulfillment of the terms of probation the defendant 
shall be discharged without entry of judgment. Upon violation of the 
terms, the court may enter an adjudication of guilt and proceed as other-
wise provided. 
"However, this subsection shall not be available if any of the following is 
true: 
"[Here are recited specific exceptions to the availability of the procedure 
outlined in subsection 1.] 
"2. By record entry at time of or after sentencing, the court may sus-
pend the sentence and place the defendant on probation upon such terms 
and conditions as it may require. 
"Before exercising either of the options contained in subsections 1 and 2, 
the court shall first determine which of them will provide maximum oppor-
tunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant and protection of the commu-
nity from further offenses by the defendant and others. In making this 
determination the court shall consider the age of the defendant, his prior 
record of convictions, if any, his employment circumstances, his family 
circumstances, the nature of the offense committed, whether a danger-
ous weapon or force was used in the commission of such offense, and such 
other factors as shall be appropriate. The court shall file a specific writ-
ten statement of its reasons for and the facts supporting its decision to 
defer judgment or to suspend sentence and its decision on the length of 
probation." 
Section 789A.1 was enacted by 1973 Iowa Acts, ch. 295, § 1. It was re-
pealed by 1976 Iowa Acts, ch. 1245, § 526, effective January 1,1978. The 
current replacement statutes are Iowa Code §§907.3, .4, and .5 (1981). 
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stances" in the case* The order then stated that the court 
'deferred" entry of a formal judgment and placed Kennison 
m probation. 
Kennison returned to South Carolina where he completed 
ds probation term. When that term expired in February 
976, he was discharged pursuant to Iowa Code §789A. 6 
1977), then in effect,4 and the Iowa court's record with refer-
nee to the deferred judgment was expunged. 
In May 1976, respondent filed three applications with the 
Veasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
rms (Bureau), for licenses as a dealer in firearms and ammu-
ition, as a manufacturer of ammunition, and as a collector 
f curios and relics. On the application forms, respond-
nt listed Kennison as a "responsible person," that is, an in-
ividual possessing direct or indirect power to control the 
lanagement and policies of respondent. See 18 U. S. C. 
923(d)(1)(B). In answering an inquiry on the forms as to 
hether such person had been convicted of a crime punish-
ile by a prison term exceeding one year, respondent did not 
sclose the Iowa events or Kennison's plea of guilty in that 
tate. The requested licenses were issued. 
The Bureau, however, subsequently learned of the Iowa 
•ncealed weapon charge and the plea of guilty. In conform-
f with the provisions of §§ 923(e) and (f)(1) and of 27 CFR 
'Section 789A.6 then read in pertinent part: 
t^mZ * !? the^0Ult d e^ r m i n e s t h a t the purposes of probation have 
m fulfilled, the court may order the discharge of any person from proba-
1 ; ^ K wf1*8011 °* * £ b e e n di8chaH?ed from probation shall no 
S L ^ i i ? ^ T / W ^ ° f f e i ^ - uPon dischai^e from probation, 
ord with reference to the deferred judgment shall be expunged. The 
ord maintained by the supreme court administrator required by section 
'A.1 shall not be expunged. . . ." 
7? ?Q7?f K '**?" **}naCted in i m a n d w a s "V*1"*' effective Jan-
y l, 1978, by the same Iowa statutes cited in the last paragraph of n. 3, jm. The current statute replacing §789A.6 is Iowa Code §907.9 
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§178.75 (1982), it mailed respondent Notices of Contem-
plated Revocation of Licenses. After an informal hearing, 
the Bureau's Regional Regulatory Administrator issued the 
revocation notices. Respondent, pursuant to § 923(f)(2), 
then requested and received a formal hearing before an Ad-
ministrative Law Judge. At that hearing, the Bureau con-
tended that respondent's licenses should be revoked because 
respondent had failed to reveal that Kennison had been con-
victed of a felony and also because respondent had not been 
entitled to the licenses in the first place. 
The Administrative Law Judge recommended against rev-
ocation. App to Pet. for Cert. 41a. Although he concluded 
that Kennison's plea of guilty "represented a conviction . . . 
within the meaning of Section 922(g) and (h)," id., at 47a, he 
also concluded that respondent's statements in the applica-
tions did not justify revocation because its representatives 
had a good-faith belief that Kennison had not been convicted 
within the meaning of the federal statute. 
On review, the Director of the Bureau, petitioner here, 
ruled that willful misrepresentation had not been shown; that 
Kennison, however, possessed the power to direct respond-
ent's management and policies; that Kennison had been con-
victed in Iowa of an offense that brought him within the pro-
hibitions of §§ 922(g) and (h); and that the licenses should be 
revoked because respondent was ineligible for them under 
§ 923(d)(1)(B). App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. The Director 
ordered the issuance of Final Notices of Revocation. Id., 
at 40a. 
Respondent then filed a timely petition for review in the 
United States District Court for the District of South Caro-
lina. See § 923(f)(3). On cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, the Director's motion was granted. On respondent's 
appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit reversed. 649 F. 2d 216 (1981). It con-
cluded, id.
 9 at 219, that although Kennison indeed had been 
"convicted" of an offense that triggered firearms disabilities, 
v w r - V A M U M . % J.JUJ.V1TJL, 1 9 0 6 
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t feet could not serve as a predicate for a Gun Control Act 
lation or license revocation because the conviction had 
in expunged under the Iowa deferred judgment proce-
•e. The court acknowledged, id., at 220, that other 
irts of Appeals entertained contrary views.5 Because of 
Importance of the issue and the obvious need for its reso-
on, we granted certiorari. 455 U. S. 1015 (1982). 
Ill 
his is not the first time the Court has examined firearms 
visions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
and of the Gun Control Act. See Lewis v. United States, 
U. S. 55 (1980); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S. 
(1977); Barrett v. United States, 423 U. S. 212 (1976); 
idleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814 (1974); United 
bs v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336 (1971). 
espite the fact that the slate on which we write is thus 
a clean one, we state once again the obvious when we 
j that, in determining the scope of a statute, one is to look 
at its language. Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S., at 
United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 580 (1981). If 
language is unambiguous, ordinarily it is to be regarded 
3nclusive unless there is "'a clearly expressed legislative 
it to the contrary.'" Ibid., quoting Consumer Product 
ty Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 
0). It would seem, therefore, from the clear words of 
statute ("any person . . . who has been convicted"), that, 
espondent to be deprived of its licenses, Kennison must 
i been "convicted" of the type of crime specified by the 
ite, and the Iowa deferred judgment procedure and "ex-
e United States v. Bergeman, 592 F. 2d 533 (CA9 1979); United 
> v. Mostaa\ 485 F. 2d 199 (CA8 1973), cert, denied, 415 U. S. 947 
I; United States v. Lehmann, 613 F. 2d 130 (CAS 1980). See also, 
United States v. Podia, 584 F. 2d 85 (CA5 1978); United States v. 
692 F. 2d 352 (CA5 1982); United States v. Nord, 586 F, 2d 1288 
1978); United States v. Kelly, 519 F. 2d 794 (CA8), cert, denied, 423 
926 (1975). 
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punction" must not have operated to nullify that conviction. 
If Kennison was not "convicted" in the first place, or if he was 
and that conviction somehow was rendered a nullity, re-
spondent should not be ineligible for licenses on the grounds 
asserted by the Bureau. 
A 
We turn first to the issue of conviction. The salient fact is 
Kennison's plea of guilty to a state charge punishable by 
more than a year's imprisonment. The usual entry of a for-
mal judgment upon a jury verdict or upon a court's specific 
finding of guilt after a bench trial is absent. Present, how-
ever, are (a) the charge of a crime of the disqualifying type, 
(b) the plea of guilty to that charge, and (c) the court's placing 
Kennison upon probation. 
In Lewis v. United States, supra, we had under consider-
ation § 1202(a)(1) of Title VII of the 1968 Act, 18 U. S. C. 
App. § 1202(a)(1), a gun control statute similar to and par-
tially overlapping §§ 922(g) and (h). The language of § 1202 
(a)(1) that is pertinent for present purposes is familiar, for it 
concerns any person who "has been convicted . . . of a fel-
ony." The Court there characterized the language of the 
statute as "sweeping." 445 U. S., at 60. Despite the fact 
that Lewis' conviction was subject to collateral attack on con-
stitutional grounds, the Court held that conviction to be dis-
abling. What was important to the Court was the presence 
or fact of the conviction. In speaking of Title VII, we said: 
"No modifier is present, and nothing suggests any restriction 
on the scope of the term 'convicted.'" Ibid. Still further: 
" 'Nothing on the face of the statute suggests a congressional 
intent to limit its coverage . . . . ' " Ibid., quoting United 
States v. Culbert, 435 U. S. 371, 373 (1978). And, finally: 
"Actually, . . . we detect little significant difference between 
Title IV and Title VII." 445 U. S., at 64. 
Whether one has been "convicted" within the language of 
the gun control statutes is necessarily, as the Court of Ap-
peals, in the present case correctly recognized, 649 F. 2d, at 
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219, a question of federal, not state, law, despite the fact that 
the predicate offense and its punishment are defined by the 
law of the State. United States v. Benson, 605 F. 2d 1093, 
1094 (CA91979). This makes for desirable national uniform-
ity unaffected by varying state laws, procedures, and defini-
tions of "conviction.1' 
In Lewis, the possible, and indeed probable, vulnerability 
of the predicate conviction to collateral attack on constitu-
tional grounds did not affect the disqualification. This fol-
lowed from the statute's plain language and from a legislative 
history that, as we have repeatedly observed, makes clear 
that "'Congress sought to rule broadly—to keep guns out of 
the hands of those who have demonstrated that "they may 
not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat 
to society."'" 445 U. S., at 63, quoting Scarborough v. 
United States, 431 U. S., at 572. Like considerations apply 
here with respect to whether Kennison was one who was 
"convicted" within the meaning of the federal statute.6 He 
voluntarily, in negotiation, entered a plea of guilty to a dis-
qualifying crime. In some circumstances, we have consid-
ered a guilty plea alone enough to constitute a "conviction": 
"A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere 
•To be sure, the terms "convicted* or "conviction" do not have the 
same meaning in every federal statute. In some statutes those terms 
specifically are made to apply to one whose guilty plea has been accepted 
whether or not a final judgment has been entered. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. 
$J 80*^2(10) and 80k-2(6). In other federal statutes, however, the term 
"convicted" is clearly limited to persons against whom a formal judgment 
has been entered. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 4251(e) and 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2901(f). 
The term "convicted" in |§ 922(g) and (h) is not there defined, but we 
have no reason whatsoever to suppose that Congress meant that term to 
apply only to one against whom a formal judgment has been entered. 
Congress' intent in enacting §§ 922(g) and (h) and § 1202 was to keep fire-
arms out of the hands of presumptively risky people. See United States v. 
Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 345 (1971). In this connection, it is significant that 
§§ 922(g) and (h) apply not only to a person convicted of a disqualifying 
offense but also to one who is merely under indictment for such a crime. 
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admission or an extrajudicial confession; it is itself a convic-
tion. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not 
required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment 
and sentence.n Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220, 
223 (1927). Accord, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242 
(1969).7 
Here, we do have more. The state judge who noted Ken-
nison's plea placed him on probation. To be sure, there 
was no written adjudication of guilt and there was no formal 
pronouncement of a sentence of imprisonment for a specified 
term. But that was due to special provisions of Iowa statu-
tory law and procedure. It was plainly irrelevant to Con-
gress whether the individual in question actually receives a 
prison term; the statute imposes disabilities on one convicted 
of "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year." § 922(g) (emphasis supplied). It is also plain 
that one cannot be placed on probation if the court does not 
7
 As noted in n. 6, supra, the meaning of the terms "convicted" and "con-
viction" vary from statute to statute. In Lott v. United States, 367 U. S. 
421 (1961), for example, the Court had under consideration Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 34 and a plea of nolo contendere, rather than a plea of 
guilty. The question was whether the time within which certain motions 
could be made began to run at the time the nolo plea was entered or at the 
time judgment was pronounced and sentence imposed. The Court spoke 
of the possibility of the plea's being withdrawn before sentence was im-
posed and therefore said that I t is the judgment of the court—not the 
plea—that constitutes the 'determination of guilt.'w Id., at 427. In con-
struing Rule 34, of course, the Court had before it no evidence of a congres-
sional intent to rule broadly to protect the public comparable to that ani-
mating Title IV. Moreover, in Lott the Court did not deal with the 
situation where probation is imposed on the basis of the plea. Under the 
Iowa expunction statute, one who has pleaded guilty is treated identically 
to one who has been found guilty by a jury. See n. 3. supra. There is no 
suggestion in the Iowa statutes, and respondent has not suggested, that 
once the plea was noted and probation imposed Kennison could withdraw 
his plea. Indeed, it was a negotiated plea accompanied by the dismissal of 
the kidnaping charge. 
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deem him to be miiltv nf *
 w , v . § • ±i* 
within the language of M E S ^ t h J6111?, >nvicted" 
^ S i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ , WestmmUst 
mt in Kennison's ^ r l , r ? n T f ° T 0 n s ' M " « " 
ions, nullified h i s ^ o n S - to,resPon<Ient's license applica-
itatute.' connctwn for purposes of the federal 
^ 7 ^ 9 ^ ^ t h a t a I * * * * * P^on, see 27 
W r y wo^d o f r a ^ ? " T * * ? ° m t h e S e C r e t a ry o f t h e t 6 0 ^ 1 " So 2 f ? ! * ° « ^ t h e disability. 446 U. S., 
IL b ° f a r M t h e f a c e of the statute is concerned 
>urt of Iowa has d f f i ^ T ? ? ^ ?everthe,eS8> th* Supreme 
eaning, and its use i n ^ ! f J * WOrd convi^ion' is of equivocal 
* A«£SS. *U^ of iegisiativeltent^ 
e Supreme Court of I o w a Z ^ ' J S l i °l ^ ^ ^ W y , therefore, if 
*ed" in a statu^TKke M S J J L S S ff? * C ° n 8 t r U e t h e term ^ n ' 
e intent." ^ g ) "*• ( h ) ' t h a t c o u r t would look to 4<legisla-
d s S ^ W ^ T ' - * * ~ not contn>, our 
stent case. * l 0 ° k t o f e d e r a I considerations in resolving the 
^T^Z'^ 5 3 2 ? £ i T ? i ? * ^ <-*** that par. 
reifying that L n ^ e ^ S t a t e S ° r a S t a t e • « « « . 
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however, expunction under state law does not alter the his-
torical fact of the conviction, and does not open the way to a 
license despite the conviction, as does positive or "affirmative 
action," ibid., by way of the Secretary's consent on the condi-
tions specified by § 925(c). In Lewis, it is true, we recog-
nized an obvious exception to the literal language of the stat-
ute for one whose predicate conviction had been vacated or 
reversed on direct appeal. 445 U. S., at 61, n. 5; see Note, 
Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968,76 Colum. 
L. Rev. 326, 334, n. 42 (1976). But, in contrast, expunction 
does not alter the legality of the previous conviction and does 
not signify that the defendant was innocent of the crime to 
which he pleaded guilty. Expunction in Iowa means no 
more than that the State has provided a means for the trial 
court not to accord a conviction certain continuing effects 
under state law. Clearly, firearms disabilities may be at-
tached constitutionally to an expunged conviction, see Lewis 
v. United States, 445 U. S., at 65-68, and an exception for 
such a conviction, unlike one reversed or vacated due to trial 
error, is far from obvious. In Lends we held that the excep-
tion for convictions reversed or vacated on direct appeal did 
not make ambiguous the statute's clear application to convic-
tions arguably vulnerable to collateral attack. We perceive 
no more ambiguity in the statute here than we did in Lewis. 
IV 
Other provisions of the federal gun control laws and re-
lated federal statutes fortify our conclusion that expunction 
of a state conviction was not intended by Congress automati-
cally to remove the federal firearms disability. 
1. Even conviction is not necessary for disqualification. 
The mere existence of an outstanding indictment is sufficient 
§ 1203(2). Except § 925(c), permitting the Secretary to remove the dis-
abilities in specified circumstances, there is no comparable provision in 
Title IV. By regulation, the Secretary has given Presidential pardons, 
but not gubernatorial pardons, automatic enabling effect under Title IV. 
27 CFR § 178.142 (1982). 
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under §§ 922(g) and (h). Congress was reaching far and was 
doing so intentionally. 
2. Sections 922(g) and (h) impose the same disabilities 
upon a person who "is under indictment" for certain crimes, 
or who "is a fugitive from justice," or who "is" a drug addict 
or an unlawful user of certain drugs, or who "has been con-
victed in any court" of certain crimes, or who "has been ad-
judicated as a mental defective," or who "has been committed 
to a mental institution" (emphasis supplied). This use of the 
respective tenses is significant and demonstrates that Con-
gress carefully distinguished between present status and a 
past event. We have noted this distinction in tenses in § 922, 
ind its significance, before: 
"Congress knew the significance and meaning of the lan-
guage it employed. It used the present perfect tense 
elsewhere in the same section . . . , in contrast to its use 
of the present tense ('who is') in §§ 922(h)(1), (2), and (3). 
The statute's pattern is consistent and no unintended 
misuse of language or of tense is apparent." Barrett v. 
United States, 423 U. S., at 217. 
\nd in Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S., at 570, we 
observed: "It is obvious that the tenses used throughout Title 
V were chosen with care." 
3. The imposition, by §§ 922(g)(4) and (h)(4), of continuing 
Usability on a person who "has been" adjudicated a mental 
lefective or committed to a mental institution is particularly 
nstructive. A person abdicated as a mental defective may 
stter be adjudged competent, and a person committed to a 
lental institution later may be deemed cured and released, 
fet Congress made no exception for subsequent curative 
vents. The past adjudication or commitment disqualifies. 
Congress obviously felt that such a person, though unfortu-
ate, was too much of a risk to be allowed firearms privi-
»ges. See United States v. Bass, 404 U. S., at 344-345. In 
lie face of this fact, we cannot believe that Congress in-
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tended to have a person convicted of a firearms felony under 
state law become eligible for firearms automatically because 
of a state expunction for whatever reason. 
4. Section 925(c) empowers the Secretary to grant relief 
from these disabilities in certain cases. The Secretary may 
not grant such relief, however, to one convicted of a crime 
involving the use of a firearm or of a federal firearms offense, 
and may not grant relief in any event unless specific condi-
tions are met to his satisfaction. Again, it is highly unlikely 
that Congress intended to permit its own circumscription of 
the ability of the Secretary to grant relief to be overcome by 
the vagaries of state law. That would be too easy a route 
to follow in order to circumvent the federal statute. See 
S. Rep. No. 666, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1965). 
5. Provisions of Title VII, enacted simultaneously with 
Title IV, are helpful to our analysis. We have treated Titles 
VII and IV as in pari materia in construing statutory lan-
guage identical to that at issue here. Lewis v. United 
States, 445 U. S., at 61-62. Title 18 U. S. C. App. § 1203(2) 
exempts from Title VII "any person who has been pardoned 
by the President of the United States or the chief executive 
of a State and has expressly been authorized by the President 
or such chief executive, as the case may be, to receive, pos-
sess, or transport in commerce a firearm." Thus, in that 
statute, even a pardon is not sufficient to remove the fire-
arms disabilities unless there is express authorization to have 
the firearm. It is inconceivable that Congress could have so 
provided and yet have intended, as the Court of Appeals con-
cluded, 649 F. 2d, at 220-221, to give a state expunction a 
contrary and unconditional effect. After all, expunction de-
vices were not unknown or unusual when Title IV came into 
being in 1968. See Comment, Expungement in California: 
Legislative Neglect and Judicial Abuse of the Statutory Miti-
gation of Felony Convictions, 12 U. San Fran. L. Rev. 155, 
161 (1977); 1909 Cal. Stats., ch. 232, §1. And the Federal 
V 
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fouth Corrections Act, in which Congress itself provided for 
junction in certain circumstances, see 18 U. S. C. §5021, 
ras enacted as far back as 1950. See 64 Stat. 1089. 
6. Title 21 U. S. C. § 844(b) is a federal expunction statute 
providing that a first offender found guilty of simple posses-
ion of a controlled substance may be placed on probation 
rithout entry of judgment, and that, upon successful eomple-
ion of the probation, the court shall discharge the defendant 
nd dismiss the proceeding against him. But Congress also 
pedfically provided in § 844(b)(1) that such discharge or dis-
ussal "shall not be deemed a conviction for purposes of dis-
ualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction 
f a crime . . . or for any other purpose." This provision 
ould be superfluous if Congress had believed that expunc-
on automatically removes the disqualification. Congress 
yriously knew the plain meaning of the terms it employed in 
atutes of this kind, and when it wished to create an excep-
on for an expunged conviction, it did so expressly. 
V 
"As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to in-
rpret the words of [the statute! in light of the purposes 
mgress sought to serve." Chapman v. Houston Welfare 
igkts Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 608 (1979). In our pre-
3us cases we have recognized and given weight to the Act's 
oad prophylactic purpose: 
"When Congress enacted [18 U. S. C. §921 et seq.] it 
was concerned with the widespread traffic in firearms 
and with their general availability to those whose posses-
sion thereof was contrary to the public interest. . . . 
The principal purpose of federal gun control legislation, 
therefore, was to curb crime by keeping 'firearms out of 
the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them 
because of age, criminal background, or incompetency/ " 
Ull/IUDIVOl/IN V. « r , W BAMINJ&K I N S l ' l ' l U l U , 1WU 115* 
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Hvddleston v. United States, 415 U. S., at 824, quoting 
S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 22 (1968). 
See also Barrett v. United States, 423 U. S., at 220-221. 
In order to accomplish this goal, Congress obviously deter-
mined that firearms must be kept away from persons, such as 
those convicted of serious crimes, who might be expected to 
misuse them. Such persons are also barred from obtaining 
licenses to deal in firearms or ammunition. This latter pro-
vision is particularly important because Title IV and federal 
gun laws generally funnel access to firearms almost exclu-
sively through dealers. See Hvddleston v. United States, 
415 U. S., at 825. "The principal agent of federal enforce-
ment is the dealer." Id., at 824. 
Although we have searched diligently, we have found noth-
ing in the legislative history of Title IV or related federal 
firearms statutes that suggests, even remotely, that a state 
expunction was intended automatically to remove the disabil-
ities imposed by §§ 922(g)(1) and (h)(1). See, e. g., S. Rep. 
No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1968); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1956,90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1968); H. R. Rep. No. 488, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
This lack of evidence is significant for several reasons. 
First, the purpose of the statute would be frustrated by a rul-
ing that gave effect to state expunctions; a state expunction 
typically does not focus upon the question with which Title 
IV is concerned, namely, whether the convicted person is fit 
to engage in the firearms business or to possess a firearm. 
Second, "'[i]n the absence of a plain indication to the con-
trary, , . . it is to be assumed when Congress enacts a statute 
that it does not intend to make its application dependent on 
state law.'" NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility Dist., 402 U. S. 
600, 603 (1971), quoting NLRB v. Randolph Electric Mem-
bership Corp., 343 F. 2d 60, 62-63 (CA4 1965). This is be-
cause the application of federal legislation is nationwide and 
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stances surrounding the expunction of his conviction provide 
little, if any, assurance that Kennison is a person who can be 
trusted with a dangerous weapon. 
VI 
Finally, a rule that would give effect to expunctions under 
varying state statutes would seriously hamper effective en-
forcement of Title IV. Over half the States have enacted 
one or more statutes that may be classified as expunction 
provisions that attempt to conceal prior convictions or to re-
move some of their collateral or residual effects. These stat-
utes differ, however, in almost every particular. Some are 
applicable only to young offenders, e. g., Mich. Comp. Laws 
§§780.621 and .622 (1982). Some are available only to per-
sons convicted of certain offenses, e. g.f N. J. Stat. Ann. 
§2C:52-2(b) (West 1982); others, however, permit expunc-
tion of a conviction for any crime including murder, e. g.t 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 276, §100A (West Supp. 1982-
1983). Some are confined to first offenders, e. g., Okla. 
Stat., Tit. 22, §991c (Supp. 1982-1983). Some are dis-
cretionary, e. g., Minn. Stat. §638.02(2) (Supp. 1982), while 
others provide for automatic expunction under certain cir-
cumstances, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. §13-912 (1978). 
The statutes vary in the language employed to describe what 
they do. Some speak of expunging the conviction, others of 
"sealing" the file or of causing the dismissal of the charge. 
The statutes also differ in their actual effect. Some are ab-
solute; others are limited. Only a minority address ques-
tions such as whether the expunged conviction may be con-
sidered in sentencing for a subsequent offense or in setting 
bail on a later charge, or whether the expunged conviction 
may be used for impeachment purposes, or whether the con-
vict may deny the fact of his conviction. Some statutes, 
too, clearly were not meant to prevent use of the conviction 
in a subsequent prosecution. See, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
§ 13-907 (1978); United States v. Herrell, 588 F. 2d 711 (CA9 
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1978), cert denied, 440 U. S. 964 (1979). These and other 
differences provide nothing less than a national patchwork. 
In this case, for example, although the Court of Appeals 
referred to Iowa's deferred judgment statute as "uncondi-
tional and absolute," 649 F. 2d, at 221, it is obvious from the 
face of the statute that that description is not entirely accu-
rate. At the time of expunction, a separate record is main-
tained, not destroyed, by the Supreme Court administrator. 
Iowa Code §907.4 (1981). See TV. of Oral Arg. 44. In addi-
tion, all "criminal history data" may be released to "criminal 
justice agencies.* Iowa Code §§692.1(5) and 692.2 (1981). 
In short, the record of a conviction expunged under Iowa law 
is not expunged completely. 
Under the decision below, perplexing problems would con-
front those required to enforce federal gun control laws as 
well as those bound by their provisions. Because, as we 
have noted, Title IV "is a carefully constructed package of 
gun control legislation," Scarborough v. United States, 431 
U. S., at 570, Congress, in framing it, took pains to avoid the 
very problems that the Court of Appeals' decision inevitably 
would create, such as individualized federal treatment of 
every expunction law. Congress used unambiguous lan-
guage in attaching gun control disabilities to any person "who 
has been convicted" of a qualifying offense. We give full ef-
fect to that language. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUS-
TICE STEVENS, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting. 
The Gun Control Act provides that any person "who has 
been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by impris-
onment for a term exceeding one year" is ineligible for a fed-
eral license to ship, transport, or receive any firearm or am-
munition in interstate commerce. 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(g) and 
(h). Thus, as the Court points out, "[i)f Kennison was not 
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'convicted9 in the first p lace . . . respondent should not be in-
eligible for licenses on the grounds asserted by the Bureau." 
Ante, at 111. Contrary to the conclusion reached by the 
Court, I do not believe that Kennison was "convicted." Ac-
cordingly, I dissent. 
I agree with the Court that whether one has been con-
victed within the meaning of the Gun Control Act is a ques-
tion of federal, rather than state, law. Ante, at 111-112. 
Congress did not, however, expressly define the term "con-
viction" in the Act. Where Congress has defined the term, 
the Court recognizes that it has given the term different 
meanings in different statutes. Ante, at 112, n. 6. In the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, Congress expressly pro-
vided that the term "convicted" includes "a verdict, judg-
ment, or plea of guilty, or a finding of guilt on a plea of nolo 
contendere, if such verdict, judgment, plea, or finding has 
not been reversed, set aside, or withdrawn, whether or not 
sentence has been imposed." 15 U. S. C. §80a-2(a)(10). 
The same definition was used in the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940. 15 U. S. C. §80b-2(a)(6). Congress used a more 
narrow definition in two sections of the Narcotic Addict Re-
habilitation Act of 1966, providing that "*[c]onviction' and 
'convicted' mean the final judgment on a verdict or finding of 
guilty, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere, and do 
not include a final judgment which has been expunged by par-
don, reversed, set aside, or otherwise rendered nugatory." 
18 U. S. C. § 4251(e); 28 U. S. C. § 2901(f). Finally, in the 
Federal Youth Corrections Act, Congress has provided that 
the term "'conviction* means the judgment on a verdict or 
finding of guilty, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo conten-
dere." 18 U. S. C. § 5006(g). 
Thus at the most, Congress has required the entry of a for-
mal judgment as the signpost of a "conviction." At the least, 
Congress has required the acceptance of a plea. In this case, 
we have neither. The Court relies on Kercheval v. United 
States, 274 U. S. 220 (1927), and BoyHn v. Alabama, 395 
REHNQUIST, J., dissenting 460 U. S. 
U. S. 238 (1969), for the proposition that "[i]n some circum-
stances, we have considered a guilty plea alone enough to 
constitute a 'conviction/" Ante, at 112. The Court con-
cludes that in this case "we . . . have more," because the state 
trial judge "noted" the plea and placed Kennison on proba-
tion. Ante, at 113. I cannot agree. 
Even if Kercheval and Boykin would otherwise be relevant 
to our interpretation of the Gun Control Act, both cases 
spoke of an accepted guilty plea. Whatever a trial court 
joes when it "notes" a plea, it is less, instead of more, than an 
acceptance of the plea which is preceded by an examination of 
ihe defendant to insure that the plea is voluntary. 
Where the Iowa deferred judgment statute can be used, 
'[t]he trial court may, upon a plea of guilty [and] fwjith the 
consent of the defendant . . . defer judgment and place the 
lefendant on probation." Iowa Code §789A.l (1977) (em-
)hasis added) (current version at Iowa Code §907.3 (1981)). 
Congress has never before considered such circumstances 
mfficient for a finding of a "conviction"; there is nothing in 
he Gun Control Act to infer that Congress has adopted such 
i standard now. It is likely that at the most Congress in-
ended that a "conviction" be represented by a formal entry 
>f judgment, or at the least an acceptance of a guilty plea. 
Jut in either case, such criteria are absent where, following a 
uilty plea, the Iowa deferred judgment statute is invoked.* 
•The Court points out that respondent acknowledged in oral argument 
lat during the period of Kennison's probation, respondent was disqualified 
r a license Ante, at 114, n. 8. This disqualification, if it existed, how-
'er, would be based on the provision of the Gun Control Act applying to 
iy person "who is under indictment," 18 U. S. C. §§ 922(g) and (h), rather 
an on a conviction." 
Syllabus 
CITY OF LOCKHART v. UNITED STATES ET AL. 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
No. 81-802. Argued November 3, 1982—Decided February 23, 1983 
Prior to 1973, appellant Texas city was a "general law" city governed by a 
commission consisting of a mayor and two commissioners, all serving the 
same 2-year terms. These offices were filled in even-numbered years 
through at-large elections using a "numbered post" system whereby the 
two commission posts were designated by number, and each candidate 
specified the post for which he or she sought election. In 1973, appel-
lant became a "home rule" city, and adopted a new charter whereby it 
would be governed by a mayor and four councilmen serving staggered 
2-year terms, with the mayor and two councilmen being elected in even-
numbered years through at-large elections using the numbered-post 
system and the other two councilmen being similarly elected in odd-
numbered years. Forty-seven percent of appellant's population are 
Mexican-American, but, as of 1977, less than 30% of the registered vot-
ers were Mexican-American. A Federal District Court in Texas, in a 
1979 suit by the individual appellee and other Mexican-Americans, en-
joined further elections under the new plan pending preclearance of elec-
toral changes in the charter under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
The Attorney General precleared the changes except to the extent that 
they incorporate at-large elections, the numbered-post system, and stag-
gered terms for councilmen. Appellant then filed suit under § 5 in the 
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the remaining changes did not have the purpose or 
effect of denying the voting rights guaranteed by § 5. The District 
Court compared the new plan to what the old practice would have been 
without numbered posts on the ground that under Texas law appellant as 
a general-law city was not entitled to use a numbered-post system. The 
court held that numbered posts and staggered terms each have the effect 
of discriminating against protected minorities, particularly in view of the 
history of racial bloc voting in the city. 
Held: 
1. Appellant's entire 1973 election plan is subject to preclearance 
under § 5. Appellant admits that the addition of two seats to its govern-
ing body and the introduction of staggered terms are subject to § 5. Ap-
pellant also changed the nature of the "continuing" seats, since council 
posts one and two are not identical to the old commission posts one and 
two. Moreover, the discriminatory effect of the new seats cannot be de-
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allegations in the complaint, taken as true, 
unambiguously exclude coverage/* Stated 
previously, National's insurance policy ex-
cludes coverage of any bodily injury to em-
ployees covered under workmen's compen-
sation. Sears & Singer's complaint, taken 
as true, specifically denies that Baughman 
was an employee of Berry. Such allega-
tion, taken as true, is sufficient to raise the 
issue concerning the duty of National to 
defend Berry against Sears & Singer's third 
party demand. Thus, National was under a 
duty to defend Berry since the allegations 
in the third party complaint, taken as true 
did not "unambiguously exclude coverage." 
This is true, even if it may ultimately be 
determined that coverage does not exist, 
since "the duty of an insurer to defend its 
insured under a policy of liability insurance 
is of greater scope than the insurer's duty 
to pay." Bandy at 903. In support of this 
holding, the court adopts the reasoning of 
the court in Bandy v. Avondale Shipyards, 
Inc.: 
The 'failure of an insurer to defend a suit 
is contemplated by the policy renders the 
insurer liable for all expenses incurred by 
an insured in defense of the action, in-
cluding reasonable attorney's fees.' 
Smith v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 
supra, 161 So.2d [903] at 918. The insurer 
may, if it chooses, refuse to defend the 
suit, relying on its own assessment of the 
allegations in the complaint It does so, 
however, at the risk of becoming liable to 
the insured for attorney's fees and ex-
penses incurred by the insured in his de-
fense in the event of an ultimate determi-
nation that the duty to defend was 
present 
The issue of coverage is related to the 
duty to defend in that . . . the allegations 
in the initial complaint, unless they un-
ambiguously exclude coverage, determine 
the duty to defend, thus necessitating a 
preliminary evaluation of coverage by the 
insurer or by the court in order to assess 
the duty to defend. The insurer may, of 
course, 'deny coverage [and preserve its 
options on that issue] and yet furnish its 
insured with a defense [thus fulfilling its 
duty to defend] without subjecting itself 
to liability' . . . *[T]he duty of an insurer 
to defend its insured under a policy of 
liability insurance is of greater scope than 
the insurer's duty to pay . . . Although 
it may ultimately be determined that cov-
erage does not exist, the duty to defend 
nevertheless exists if the allegations of 
the petition taken as true would result in 
liability which the insurer is obligated to 
discharge on behalf of the insured.' 
458 F.2d at 902-903. 
It is hereby decreed that National Surety 
Company is responsible for all expenses in-
curred by Berry in defense of Sears & Sing-
er's third party claim, including reasonable 
attorney's fees. Counsel for both National 
Surety Company and Berry shall submit to 
the Court within ten (10) days from the 
date of this Order Memoranda suggesting 
what amount would be an appropriate 
award in this case. 
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Delmas W. DIXON, Plaintiff, 
K. P. McMULLEN, Jr., et aL, 
Defendants. 
Civ. A. No. 4-80-443. 
United States District Court, 
N. D. Texas, 
Ft. Worth Division. 
Nov. 18, 1981. 
Convicted ex-felon brought civil rights 
case alleging abridgement of his constitu-
tional rights when he was denied certifica-
tion as police officer by State Commission 
on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and 
Education. The District Court, Belew, 
J., held that: (1) pardon granted to plaintiff 
by Governor removed some, but not all, 
legal disabilities, and (2) statute automati-
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catty excluding ex-felons from certification 
as police officers was constitutional. 
Order accordingly. 
L Municipal Corporations «~ 184(2) 
State Commission on Law Enforcement 
Officer Standards and Education is delegat-
ed responsibility by Legislature to establish 
minimum educational, training, physical, 
mental and moral standards for admission 
to employment and certification as reserve 
police officer. Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.St 
art 441* (29ua). 
2. Crril Rights *~ 13.4(1) 
Convicted ex-felon who challenged 
statute which automatically excluded ex-
felons from certification as police officers 
met applicable principles for federal district 
court to note probable jurisdiction over his 
civil rights action for denial of his certifica-
tion. 
3. Pardon and Parole *»9 
Undisputed legal effect of pardon is to 
restore civil rights to ex-felon. 
4. Constitutional Law *=»79 
Governor cannot overrule judgment of 
court of law; he has no "appellate" jurisdic-
tion. 
5. Pardon and Parole *»9 
Final conviction does not disappear 
upon grant of pardon. 
& Pardon and Parole «=»9 
Pardon implies guilt 
7. Pardon and Parole •=»$ 
Granting of pardon does not in any 
way indicate defect in process. 
8. Pardon and Parole *»9 
Granting of pardon may remove some 
disabilities, but does not change common-
law principle that conviction of infamous 
offense is evidence of bad character. 
9. Pardon and Parole *»9 
Prior conviction for which one has re-
ceived pardon, absent showing that such 
pardon was granted for subsequent proof of 
innocence, may be utilized for purposes of 
enhancement, impeachment, denial of ball 
to habitual offender, denial of probation, 
proving possession of firearm by convicted 
felon and proving possession of burglary 
tools by convicted felon. 
10. Pardon and Parole *»9 
Federal laws do not necessarily obey 
effect of state pardon. 
11. Constitutional Law «»252£ 
When statute affects everyone's rights, 
it » question of substantive due process 
under Fifth Amendment U.S.CAConst 
Amend. 5. 
12. Constitutional Law «a»2U(l) 
When statute treats some people dif-
ferently than others, it is matter of equal 
protection under Fourteenth Amendment 
U.S.CA.ConstAmend. 14. 
13. Constitutional Law «»25L3 
Fourteenth Amendment stands for 
proposition that Government must act, 
when it acts, in manner which is neither 
arbitrary nor unreasonable. U.S.C.A.Const 
Amend. 14. 
14. Constitutional Law <*=»213.I(1) 
Challenged classification is subject to 
strict scrutiny only if suspect class is disad-
vantaged or when it impermissibly inter-
feres with exercise of fundamental rights. 
U.S.CA.ConstAmend. 14. 
15. Constitutional Law *»213.1(l)f 224(1) 
If gender classification or illegitimacy 
is involved in governmental classification, 
there must be fair and substantia] relation 
to important government objectives. US-
C.A.ConstAmend. 14. 
16. Constitutional Law «B»213.1(2) 
Any designation in governmental clas-
sification other than gender or illegitimacy 
requires only rational relation to legitimate 
governmental interest U.S.CA.Const 
Amend. 14. 
17. Constitutional Law *=»240(6) 
State imay regulate professions which 
affect public interest as long as regulation 
rationally furthers legitimate state purpose 
or interest U.S.C.A.ConstAmend. 14. 
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18. Constitutional Law «»7<U(3) 
Courts do not sit as super-legislature to 
judge considerations of legislative policy 
made in areas that neither affect funda-
mental rights nor proceed along suspect 
lines. U.S.CA.ConstAmend. 14. 
19. Constitutional Law «=> 208(1) 
Legislature has great latitude in mak-
ing statutory classifications involving social 
or moral legislation. 
20. Municipal Corporations «=» 184(1) 
Officers and Public Employees *»8 
There is no constitutional right to pub-
lic employment, including employment as 
policeman. 
2L Officers and Public Employees «=»27 
Government, as vital part of state's 
police power, must have authority to scruti-
nize hiring of personnel based on conduct 
occurring prior to their employment, so as 
to insure that persons publicly employed in 
emergency or dangerous situations are so-
ber and alert and possess qualities such as 
honesty, integrity, reliability and obedience 
to the law. 
22. States *=»74 
State police are charged with enforce-
ment of law, not for themselves or their 
clients as in private practice, but for benefit 
and safety of people at large. 
23. Municipal Corporations «s» 184(2) 
Integrity and trust are prerequisites 
for employment as police officer. 
24. Municipal Corporations •=» 184(2) 
State's legitimate concern for main-
taining high standards of professional con-
duct extends far beyond initial licensing of 
Police officers. 
25. Constitutional Law *»23&S 
Municipal Corporations *» 176(3) 
There was no equal protection violation 
J* grounds of overbreadth or underbreadth 
m statute prohibiting certification of con-
victed ex-felons as police officers. Vernon's 
Ann.Tex.Civ.St art 4413(29aa); U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
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26. Constitutional Law *»25L3 
Fourteenth Amendment provides inde-
pendent right to demand that government 
act in nonarbitrary manner at all times. 
U.S.CA.ConstAmend 14. 
27. Constitutional Law *»27M(2) 
State cannot exclude person from occu-
pation in manner or for reasons which con-
travene due process clause. U.S.CA.Const 
Amend. 14. 
28. Constitutional Law *»318(1) 
Due process requires that action by 
state through any of its agencies must be 
consistent with fundamental principles of 
liberty and justice. U.S.CA.ConstAmend. 
14. * 
29. Constitutional Law *»274(1) 
Even though government purpose be 
legitimate and substantial, such purpose 
cannot be pursued by means which broadly 
stifle fundamental personal liberties when 
end can be more narrowly achieved. U.S.C. 
A.ConstAmend. 14. 
30. Constitutional Law *»251.1 
Due process is not technical concept 
with fixed content unrelated to time or 
circumstances, and its very nature negates 
any notion of inflexible procedures univer-
sally applicable to every imaginable situa-
tion. U-S.C.A.ConstAmend. 14. 
31. Constitutional Law *>274(1) 
Due process does not require hearing in 
every conceivable case of governmental im-
pairment of private interests. U.S.GA. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
32. Constitutional Law *»251.6 
Generally, there is no violation of due 
process if statute gives person of ordinary 
intelligence fair notice that his contemplat-
ed conduct is prohibited. U.S.CA.Const 
Amend. 14. 
33. Licenses *»20 
State can require high standards of 
qualification for profession such as good 
moral character as long as it has rational 
connection to applicant's fitness or capacity, 
especially when discussing "true" profes-
sion, like law, medicine, or law enforcement, 
SX7rs*pp~-l7 
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where ethics AouJd be most minimal of 
qualifications. 
M. CWftutka*! U w ««2KL5 
In action alleging deprivation of inter-
est without proper due process of law. it is 
first necessary to consider nature of inter-
est U&OA.GmstAmena\ 14. 
85. Constitutional U w e-254.1, 277(1) 
In delineating boundaries of interest 
alleged to have been deprived without prop-
er due process of taw. it is standard for 
court to ascertain whether interest invaded, 
if at all, k -liberty" or "property" interest 
U^.aA.ConstAmend. 14. 
36. Constitutional U w €»254.1 
Although there is no constitutionally 
Protected right to government employment 
there is liberty interest in right to engage 
in any of common occupations of life. U.S. 
C.A.ConstAmend. 14. 
37. Constitutional U w *»254.1 
Due^ process protection attaches to 
"generaT right to engage in chosen occupa-
tion, but not to specific right to particular 
position. U.S.OA.ConstAmend. 14. 
38. Constitutional U w «=» 287.2(5) 
Where state action denies person 
license or opportunity to practice his chosen 
profession, due process may require that he 
be given hearing and chance to respond to 
charges against him. particularly where ap-
plicant has no procedural due process rights 
apart from those which agency has chosen 
to create by its own regulations. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
39. Constitutional U w *»4<K1) 
Before convicted ex-felon could raise 
question of being denied procedural due 
process by failure of State Commission on 
U w Enforcement Officer Standards and 
Education to grant him hearing on his qual-
ifications to become certified as policeman, 
he was required to request hearing and 
have such request denied by Commission. 
Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.St art 4413(29aa); 
U.SXXA.ConstAmend. 14. 
40. Municipal Corporations • » 176(3) 
Statute which automatically excluded 
ex-felons from certification as police offi-
cers was constitutional. Vernon's AntiTex. 
Civ.St art. 4413(29aa). 
David R. Richards and Mary F. Keller, 
American Civil Liberties Union, Austin, 
Tex., for plaintiff. 
Mark White, Atty. Gen. of Tex^ Ann 
Kraatx, Asst Atty. Gen., Gerald C Caruth, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for defend-
ants. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
BELEW, District Judge. 
This is a civil rights case. Plaintiff, a 
convicted ex-felon, who was pardoned 
twenty years later by the Governor of the 
State of Texas, alleges that his constitution-
al rights were abridged because he was 
denied certification as a police officer by 
the Texas Commission on Uw Enforcement 
Officer Standards and Education. The trial 
was before this Court and lasted one day. 
The following findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law are entered according to Feder-
al Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a) and 58. 
/. Factual Background 
These material facts are not in dispute: 
1. Delmas W. Dixon was born on Octo-
ber 13, 1938 in Fort Worth, Texas. 
2. In 1957, Plaintiff was honorably dis-
charged from the United States Navy after 
two years of service. 
3. On November 14, 1960, Plaintiff pled 
guilty to a charge of robbery in Tarrant 
County, Texas, and was sentenced to con-
finement in the State Penitentiary for five 
(5) years. That sentence was probated. 
4. On March 10,1964, Delmas Dixon was 
discharged from probation. Consequently, 
Plaintiffs motion for new trial was grant* 
ed, and his case dismissed in accordance 
with Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art &' 
12(7XVernon 1979). 
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5. In 1975, Plaintiff entered the River 
Oaks Police Academy, and later completed 
the training. On either false or incomplete 
information submitted to the Texas Com-
mission on U w Enforcement Officer Stan-
dards and Education [hereinafter "the Com-
mission"] relating to his criminal record. 
Plaintiff was certified by the Commission. 
Thereafter, he began his duty with the City 
of River Oaks. Texas as a reserve police 
officer. 
6. From 1976 until 1979, Plaintiff 
worked as a full-time officer with the City 
of Axle, Texas, eventually rising to the rank 
of Patrol Sergeant In 1979, Mr. Dixon 
resigned and re-entered private business. 
7. On June 9,1980, Plaintiff was grant-
ed a general pardon by the Governor of the 
State of Texas. However, the pardon was 
not granted on the basis of subsequent 
proof of innocence. 
8. In approximately August, 1980, Plain-
tiff was re-hired by the City of River Oaks, 
Texas. He worked a couple of weeks and 
then resigned. On November 17, 1980, 
Plaintiff was denied a certification to be a 
reserve police officer for the City of Blue 
Mound, Texas. The denial was based on 
Plaintiffs prior felony conviction. 
[1] 9. The Commission is delegated the 
responsibility by the Texas Legislature to 
establish minimum educational, training, 
physical, mental, and moral standards for 
admission to employment and certification 
as a reserve police officer, pursuant to Tex. 
Rev.Civ.StatAnn. art 4413(29aaXSupp.l9-
80). 
10. Article 4413(29aa) provides that no 
Person convicted of a felony may be certi-
fied as a police officer.1 Article 4413(29aa) 
*lso provides that once certified, a police 
officer retains such certification, absent its 
revocation by the Commission. Should a 
police officer resign, be fired, or his ap-
t Sec 8A. (a) No person who has been con-
victed of a felony wider the laws of this state, 
or the United States may be certified by the 
ComattMkMi as qualified to be a peace officer, 
or a jailer or guard at a county jail. 
(b) Final conviction of a felony under the 
laws of this state, another state, or the United 
pointment be terminated for whatever rea-
son, his certification automatically would 
expire. If the officer sought appointment 
with another law enforcement agency, he 
would be required to once again seek certi-
fication. 
//. Parties 
Plaintiff Delmas A. Dixon is a citizen of 
Fort Worth, and Tarrant County, Texas. 
Defendant Ken P. McMullen, Jr., is the 
Chief of Police of Blue Mound, Tarrant 
County, Texas. He did not hire Plaintiff 
because he had been denied certification 
pursuant to the Texas Statute. Defendant 
McMullen is sued in his official capacity 
only. 
Defendant Fred Toler is the Executive 
Director of the Texas Commission on Law 
Enforcement Officer Standards and Educa-
tion, and as such, is responsible for the 
enforcement of its rules and regulations. 
He is sued in his official and individual 
capacity. 
Defendants Dewey Presley, Dan Saun-
ders, Walter Rankin, James Adams, Dr. 
Kenneth Ashworth, Allan Bowen, David 
Collier, Henry Gardner, Richard Ingram, 
Rex Kelly, Emil Peters, Mark White, and 
Louise Wing are responsible for establish-
ing rules and regulations for the certifica-
tion of police officers. They are sued in 
their individual and official capacities. 
Defendant State of Texas is sued as the 
Governmental entity responsible for depriv-
ing Plaintiff of his civil rights by enforcing 
a statute which automatically excludes any 
and all felons from consideration as police 
officers. 
Ill Plaintiff Allegations 
Plaintiff asserts he should be certified as 
a police officer because of the effect of his 
pardon. As a result of the denial, he alleg-
States disqualifies a person previously certified 
by the Commission as qualified to be a peace 
officer, or a jailer or guard at a county Jail, and 
the Commission shall immediately revoke the 
certification of a person so convicted. 
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**&*&** at ike tquMJ protection and due 
process daosea. Under the equal protection 
•TO"»tnt, Plaintiff contends (1) there is no 
rational relationship underlying his criminal 
»"«»rd a»d his ability to be an effective 
poKet officer, (2) he was rejected solely 
because of his felon status, and thus arbi-
trar i ,y *»<* irrationally treated differently; 
(8) that the statute is simultaneously over-
broad (not tuflicientJy specifically tailored 
to limit the statute to conform to a legiti-
mate state interest) and under broad (allow-
ing those with numerous misdemeanors to 
be police officers, while denying those with 
one felony); and (4) arbitrarily certifying 
those ex-felons before 1975, yet excluding 
those after 1976. 
quent proof of innocence is irrelevant; (5) 
there is no legal support for a right to a 
hearing and a case-by-case analysis; (6) 
there is no violation of the equal protection 
clause as Plaintiff is not a member of a 
suspect classification, and thus the concern 
for public health, safety, and morals under-
scores the rational relationship standard; 
(7) there is no procedural due process viola-
tion, as the statute is not an arbitrary and 
unreasonable exclusion; and (8) Defendants 
assert this is a frivolous lawsuit and request 
attorney's fees. 
V. Jurisdiction 
Under the due process argument, Plain-
tiff asserts his procedural due process rights 
were violated because no hearing was al-
lowed. Specifically, that such factors as 
the nature of the offense, recentness of the 
offense, subsequent dismissal from the 
court's docket, Plaintiffs involvement in 
the offense, any rehabilitation, i.e., his un-
blemished record for twenty years, public 
aervice as a police officer for four years, 
*nd a full pardon by the Governor of Texas, 
were not considered in order to provide for 
an individualized analysis. Thus, Plaintiff 
alleges there is no possibility of demonstrat-
ing that he now satisfies the underlying 
purposes of the statute. 
Plaintiff prays for this Court to assume 
jurisdiction, to restrain and permanently 
enjoin Defendants from enforcing the stat-
ute, to determine the statute unconstitu-
tional, and to award damages and attor-
ney s fees. 
JV. Defendants Response 
Defendants assert several contentions: 
(1) the Court should abstain to first permit 
Texas courts to consider the issues of state 
law; (2) the complaint fails to state a cause 
of action against these Defendants in their 
individual capacity; (3) the Court lacks jur-
isdiction to entertain a suit for damages 
against the State of Texas and the individu-
al Defendants in their official capacity; (4) 
a pardon based on anything besides subse-
[2] This case is brought under 42 U.S.C. 
S§ 1983, 1988, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343,2201, 
2202, and the Fourteenth (14th) Amend-
ment There was no request made for a 
three-judge panel, as possible under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284. Connor v. Hutto, 516 
F.2d 853, 855 (8th Cir. 1975); Mildner v. 
Gulotta, 405 F.Supp. 182, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 
1975), affirmed, 425 U.S. 901, 96 S.O. 1489 
47 L.Ed.2d 751 (1976). The Court will not 
abstain, see Railroad Commission v. Pull-
man Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.CL 643,85 L.EA 
971 (1941); Duncan v. Poythress, 657 R2d 
691 (5th Cir. 1981); High 01' Times v. Bus-
bee, 621 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1980); Younger 
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct 746, 27 
L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); U. S. v. Composite 
State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 656 F.2d 131 
(5th Cir. 1981), and regarding the exhaus-
tion doctrine, the Court is satisfied Plaintiff 
has met the applicable principles, see gener-
ally: Patsy v. Florida Eastern University, 
634 R2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981). This Court, 
therefore, notes probable jurisdiction. 
Issue I 
What is the legal effect, under Texas 
law, of a pardon granted by the Gover-
nor? 
VI. Pardon 
The Texas Constitution gives the Gover-
nor of Texas power to grant pardons in 
criminal matters. "In all criminal cases, 
except treason and impeachment, the Gov-
ernor shall have power, after conviction, on 
the written signed recommendation and ad-
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rice of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, 
. . . , to grant . . . pardons w Article 
Four, Section Eleven; see also: Tex.Code 
Crim.Pro.Ann. art 48.01 (Vernon 1979); 
Hsnkamer v. Tcmplin, 143 Tex. 572, 187 
&W.2d 549, 550 (1945). The only civil pow-
er he possesses is to remit fines and bond 
forfeitures. 
The meaning of a pardon is both interest-
ing and historical Originally, under Eng-
lish law, there were several kinds of par-
dons: general, special or particular, condi-
tional, absolute, and statutory. The King 
of England had the power to set aside or-
ders of the Court He alone could do so for 
the Court had no power over its final judg-
ment As Lord Coke once wrote, "A par-
don is a work of mercy, whereby the King, 
either before attainder, sentence, or convic-
tion, or after, forgiveth any crime, offense, 
punishment, execution, right title, debt or 
duty, temporal, or ecclesiastical.'* 3 Inst 
233. Prior to the Revolution, the American 
Colonies, being in effect under the laws of 
England, were accustomed to the exercise 
of it in various forms. Hence, when the 
words "to grant pardons" were used in the 
United States Constitution, they conveyed 
to mind the authority as had been exercised 
by the English Crown. See Article Two, 
Section Two, Clause One. No effort was 
made to define or change its meaning. 
Years passed and differing language in 
cases caused confusion among the courts as 
to the American effect of a pardon. Com-
2. In the year September 1. 197S to August 31. 
1979, the Board received 3906 requests, recom-
mended 162, and the Governor's office (Dolph 
Briscoe and William P. dements, Jr.. after Jan-
uary 1, 1979) approved 90. In the year Sep-
tember 1. 1979 to August 31. I960, the Board 
received 3311 requests, recommended 144, and 
the Governor's office approved 91. In the year 
September i, idSO, to August 31, 1381, the 
Board received 3142 requests, recommended 
137, and the Governor's office approved 118. 
Statistics courtesy of the Office of the Board of 
Pardons and Paroles, Mrs. Gladys Sommers, 
Austin, Texas and the Office of the Governor. 
Mr. John McCotlum, Assistant General Coun-
sel. Austin. Texas: October, 1961. 
*• In lobbying against a broad interpretation of 
* pardon, the Governor's office expressed fear 
that if the door was opened for one group of 
individuals (pardoned ex-fdonsX then all ex-fel-
pare: Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall 833,880, 71 
U.S. 333,380,18 L.Ed. 866 (1860) ("blots out 
the existence of guilt") with Burdick v. 
United States, 236 U.S. 79,91, 35 S.Ct 267, 
269,59 L.Ed. 476 (1914) ("confession of guilt 
implied in the acceptance of a pardon**); 
and Bennett v. State, 24 Tex.App. 78, 79, 5 
S.W. 527, 529 (1887) (stating a full pardon 
absolves the party from all legal conse-
quences of his crime) with Jones v. State, 
141 Tex.Crim. 70,147 S.W.2d 508,510 (1941) 
("does not obliterate the fact of the com-
mission of the crime"). 
Today, the offenses for which a pardon is 
usually requested are burglary, rape, rob-
bery, forgery, drugs, and occasionally even 
murder. The process generally works this 
way. After serving sentence (either full, 
probated, etc), anyone may make applica-
tion for a pardon. The' applicant forwards 
his request, along with letters of recommen-
dation, to the Board of Pardons and Pa-
roles. A decision is made; if the Board 
denies the request, the process is of course 
over, but the applicant may apply again. If 
the Board approves the request, it is for-
warded to the Governor's Clemency Staff.2 
The Staffs recommendation is then almost 
always approved by the Governor.1 
[3-8] The undisputed legal effect of a 
pardon is to restore the civil rights to an 
ex-felon (suffrage, jury service, and the 
chance to seek public office). See ISaster-
wood v. State, 34 Tex.Crim. 400, 31 S.W. 
on* might assert exceptions to the rule. The 
argument also has been raised that many ex-
felon*, who might seek a "tough-guy" line of 
work, now go into the Army. However, if 
exceptions to this statute were allowed, so goes 
the thinking, they might apply for police officer 
work. In fact, the Governor's office contended 
and strongly suggested that If they knew many 
of those now seekifig pardon status could in 
fact become police officer*, their percentage of 
approvals would significantly drop. That feel-
ing to mainly based on the belief that while 
many applicants might list their reasons for 
wanting a pardon as the right to vote, the 
desire to clear their family name, etc, at the 
time of the application; in two years or when-
ever, after they had been granted a pardon, 
circumstance* might have changed and they 
would then be eligible for officer certification. 
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»*• » • (1896); 44 TexJurJd Pardon, Re* 
pnew^EUL, §13(1968); TexJLtt'y Gen.Op^ 
No. MW-14S (I960). However, the Gover-
nor cannot overrule the judgment of a court 
of l*w. Re has no -appellate" jurisdiction. 
***** v. State, 672 S.W.2d 889,841 (Tex. 
CnnxApp.1978); Jones v. Stmte, supra, 141 
Tex.Crim. 70,147 S.W.2d at 511. There can 
be no doubt but that a final judgment was 
entered against the ex-felon. Regardless of 
the post-judgment procedural maneuver-
ing,4 a final conviction does not disappear. 
A pardon implies guilt Texas Courts may 
forgive, but they do not forget The fact is 
not obliterated1 and there is no "wash". 
Diaz v. Chasen, 642 F.2d 764, 765-66 (5th 
Cir. 1981); Gurleski v. United States, 405 
F.2d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 
895 US. 981, 89 S.Ct 2140, 23 L.Ed.2d 769, 
rehearing denied sub nom. Smith v. United 
States, 896 US. 869, 90 S.Ct 87, 24 L.Ed.2d 
124 (1969); Watkins v. State, supra, 572 
S.W.2d , t 341; Ex Parte Smith, 548 S.W.2d 
410, 414 (Tex.Oim.App.1977). Moreover, 
the granting of a pardon does not in any 
way indicate a defect in the process. It 
may remove some disabilities, but does not 
change the common-law principle that a 
*\_5?? Te*-Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art 42.12(7) 
which states: 
At any time, after the defendant has satis-
factorily completed one-third of the original 
fractionary period or two years of proba-
tion, whichever is the lesser, the period of 
Probation may be reduced or terminMted by 
We court Upon the satisfactory fulfillment 
OTthe conditions of probation, and the expi-
™**<* a* Period of probation, the court. 
*y orferjduly entered, shall amend or modify 
tnc original sentence imposed, if necessary, 
wcoworai to Che probation period and shall 
«*eharge the defendant. In case the defend, 
ant has been convicted or has entered a plea 
orguBty or a plea of nolo contendere, and the 
o°wt has discharged the defendant hereun-
oe^soch court may set aside the verdict or 
P*™* the defendant to withdraw his plea, 
and shall dismiss the accusation, complaint, 
information or indictment against such de-
««dant. who shall thereafter be released 
from aO penalties and disabilities resulting 
™ " U* offense or crime of which he has 
been convicted or to which he has pleaded 
gufity,except that proof of his said conviction 
or plea of guilty shall be made known to the 
court should the defendant again be convict-
ed of any criminal offense. 
conviction of an infamous offense it evi-
dence of bad character.* Bennett v. State, 
supra, 24 Tex.App. 79, 5 S.W. at 529. 
[9, It] The bottom line on the effect of 
a pardon is that it restores some civil rights, 
but not all.7 The following decisions estab-
lish that a prior conviction for which one 
has received a pardon absent a showing 
that such pardon was granted for subse-
quent proof of innocence, may be utilized 
for purposes of enhancement, Donald v. 
Jones, 445 F2A 601, 606 (5th Cir.X cert 
denied, 404 U.S. 992, 92 S.Ct 537, 80 
L.Ed.2d 548 (1971); Watkins v. State, su-
pra, 572 S.W.2d at 341; impeachment,* 
Gurleski v. United States, supra, 405 R2d 
at 266; Sipanek v. State, 100 Tex.Crim. 489, 
272 S.W. 141, 142 (1925); denial of bail to a 
habitual offender. Ex Parte Smith, supra, 
548 S.w\2d at 414; denial of probation, 
Watkins v. Thomas, 623 F.2d 387, 388 (5th 
Cir. 1980); proving possession of a firearm 
by a convicted felon, Runo v. State, 556 
S.W.2d 808, 809-10 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977); 
United States v. Castellana, 433 RSupp. 
1309,1316 (M.D.Fla.1977); and proving pos-
session of burglary tools by a convicted 
felon, Logan v. State, 448 S.W.2d 462, 463-
and the Tex.AUy Gen.Op., No. MW-148 (I960) 
analysis of it. 
S. An employee, for example, could not say to 
an employer during the hiring process that be 
had never been convicted of a felony. 
«. See Mho: Doe
 K Webster, 606 FJ2d 1226, 
1239 n.51 (D.C.Cir.1979) One must also con-
sider the liability exposure of the State. If It 
were commanded to clothe an ex-felon with the 
general authority a police officer carries, and 
he were to abuse that (i.e. as an example, s 
pardoned burglar or rapist), a private dtlren 
could turn around and sue the state claiming K 
knowingly allowed such to occur. 
7. Many ex-fekms may and should be able to 
vote, etc.; they Just cannot be certified as po-
lice officers. 
8. One of the most important assets a poHce 
officer possesses is his ability to testify about 
an event A )my will usually accord his testi-
mony significant credibility. However, an ex-
felon police officer loses that testimonial pow-
er. Although his pardon may be used to bol-
ster on re-direct, most likely the damaging im-
pression has set in. 
DIXON v. 
Cfc*a*S27F. 
64 (Tex.CriiiLApp.1969). Additionally, fed-
eral laws do not neoessarily obey the effect 
of a state pardon. See also: Diaz v. Cha-
wen, supra, 642 F.2d at 765, United States v. 
Padia,584F.2d85,86(5thCir.l978); raco-
vone v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 1028,1035-46 (D.C. 
Cir.1981); United States v. Castellana, su-
pra, 433 F.Supp. at 1317. 
The Court cites six cases as consistent 
with its reasoning, Barsky v. Board of Re* 
gents ofN.Y., 347 U.S. 442, 74 S.Ct 650,98 
L.EA 829 (1953) (New York statute stated a 
physician convicted of any crime would 
have his license suspended); Diaz v. Chasen, 
642 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1981) (A customhouse 
cartman's license was revoked as a result of 
bis felony conviction of possession of stolen 
goods, even though a Louisiana statute au-
tomatically pardoned a first offender upon 
completion of his sentence); Hankamer v. 
Templin, 143 Tex. 572,187 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 
1945) (Where an attorney had been dis-
barred following his conviction of a felony, 
a pardon by the Governor did not reinstate 
his privilege to practice law, nor restore his 
former office as an attorney); Cooper v. 
Texas Board of Medical Examiners, 489 
S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1973, 
writ refd n.r.e.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1072, 
94 S.O. 585, 88 L.Ed.2d 478 (1974) (Doctor 
was convicted of a felony offense; the 
Court found Tex.Rev.Civ.StatAnn. art. 
4505(2) (1976) gave sufficient power to the 
State Board of Medical Examiners to 
refuse, cancel, revoke, or suspend a license 
for such an offense); Jones v. State, 141 
Tex.Crim. 70, 147 S,W.2d 508 (1941); Dee 
Wayne Thompson v. Texas Commission on 
L*w Enforcement Officer Standards and 
Education, No. 311, 698 (DistCt of Travis 
County, 200th Judicial District of Texas, 
April 24,1981) (Plaintiff sought judicial re-
view of an administrative order entered by 
the Commission revoking his Police Officer 
Qualification certificate previously issued as 
* result of his felony conviction for the 
offense of arson); and one as distinguisha-
ble, Warren v. State, 121 Tex.Crim. 71, 74 
•. Until 1975. the Commission excluded SH fel-
ons except one who had pled guilty, served his 
in fact innocent, and had re-
ceived a full pardon. Plaintiff would not have 
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S.W.2d 1006 (1941) (In Jones, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals analyzed the earlier War-
ren decision and stated if that majority had 
desired to assert a pardon wiped out the 
existence of the fact, it easily could have 
clarified its opinion; undoubtedly, the ma-
jority did not disclose such a willingness.). 
In conclusion, this Court has to wonder if 
maybe there should not be categories of 
pardons. Those might include a conditional 
pardon (limited to any specific situation), a 
general pardon (everything but the earlier 
enumerated exceptions and police officer 
certification), and an unconditional pardon 
(i.e. a total elimination of any disability). 
Such a system would have prevented this 
problem, but more importantly, any future 
ones which could be far more delicate. 
Issue (2) 
Did the Texas Legislature, which auto-
matically excluded any convicted felon9 
from the possibility of being certified as a 
police officer, violate Plaintiffs Four-
teenth Amendment constitutional rights 
(equal protection under the laws and pro-
cedural due process)? 
VII. Equal Protection 
[11-131 This case involves the Four-
teenth Amendment constitutional rights. 
When a statute affects everyone's rights, it 
is a question of substantive due process 
(Fifth Amendment). When a statute treats 
some people differently than others, then it 
is a matter of equal protection. Thompson 
v. Gallagher, 489 F2d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 
1974); Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 
1188, 1190 nJ (1st Cir. 1970). The Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States provides, in pertinent 
part, " . . . nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, . . . ; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.** It stands 
for the proposition, therefore, the Govern-
ment must act, when it acts, in a manner 
which is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. 
been eligible for the exception as he pled guilty 
to a charge of robbery, and his sentence was 
probated, so that he never served any "time". 
(See Plaintiffs exhibits 14. IS. and 17). 
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[M-16] There exists three standards of 
****** »wkr traditional Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis. Seoane v. Ortho 
Pharmaceuticals, Jnc, 000 FJM 146 (5th Cir. 
1961). A challenged classification is subject 
to strict scrutiny only if a suspect class is 
disadvantaged, Graham v. Richardson, 403 
VS. 865, 91 &Ct 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 
(1*71) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 888 
U.S. 1,87 S.Ct 1817,18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) 
(race); Oyama r. California, 832 VS. 633, 
68 S.Ct 209, 92 UEd. 249 (1948) (naUonal 
origin); or, when it impermissibly inter-
feres with the exercise of a fundamental 
right, Shapiro v. Thompson, 894 VS. 618,89 
S.O. 1822, 22 LJ5a\2d 000 (1969) (right to 
travel); Bullock v. Cuter, 405 VS. 134, 92 
S.Ct 849, 81 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972) (right to 
vote); Zabhcki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 874, 98 
S.O. 678, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978) (marriage); 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct 
U63, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (freedom of 
association); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 
SCt 705, 85 L.EA2d 147 (1973) (right of 
privacy). If gender classification or illegiti-
macy is involved, then there must be a fair 
and substantial relation to important 
government objectives, Crafe v. Borent 429 
V.S. 190, 97 S.Ct 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 
(1976); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 
S.Ct 1509, 20 UEdL2d 486 (1968), respec-
tively. Any other designation would only 
require a rational relation to a legitimate 
governmental interest San Antonio School 
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct 
1278, 36 L.EdL2d 16 (1973). 
[17] The Supreme Court's standard of 
less than strict scrutiny " . . . has consist-
ently been applied to state legislation re-
stricting the availability of employment op-
portunities," Dandridge r. Williams, 897 
U.S. 471.485,90 S.Ct 1158,1161,25 L.Ed.2d 
491 (1970); Smith v. Fussenith, 440 F.Supp 
1077, 1079 (D.Comm.l977)f as well as to 
classifications based on a criminal record. 
Miller v. Carter, 547 FJM 1314, 1321 (7th 
Cir. 1977) (Campbell, concurring), affirmed 
by an equally divided court, 434 U.S. 356,98 
S.Ct 786, 54 L.Ed.2d 608 (1978); Kindem v. 
City of Alameda, 502 F.Supp. 1108, 1111 
(ND.Calif.1980). Thus, in the context of 
occupational licensing, the Supreme Court 
has formulated a test which requires that 
any qualification only "have a rational con-
nection with the applicant's fitness or ca-
pacity" to perform the job. Schware r. 
Board of Bar Examiners, 853 VS. 232, 239, 
77 S.Ct 752, 756, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957). In 
other words, a state may regulate profes-
sions which affect the public interest as 
long as the regulation rationally furthers a 
legitimate state purpose or interest 
[18,19] Turning to the facts and apply-
ing the minimal rationality standard, the 
question is: can one uphold the statute in a 
manner consistent with the equal protection 
clause? Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74, 92 
S.Ct 251, 253, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); An-
drews v. Drew Municipal Separate School 
District, 507 R2d 611, 614 (5th Cir. 1975), 
cert dismissed, 425 U.S. 559, 96 S.Ct 1752, 
48 L-Ed.2d 169 (1976). Some cases have 
struck down various statutes on the ground 
there was insufficient evidence presented to 
justify the classification. However, lest one 
forgets the late 1930's, Courts do not sit as 
a super-legislature to judge the considera-
tions of legislative policy made in areas that 
neither affect fundamental rights nor pro-
ceed along suspect lines. City of New Orle-
ans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 aCt 
2513, 2516,49 L.Ed2d 511 (1976); Ferguson 
v. Skrupa, 372 U.a 726, 729, 83 aCt 1028, 
1030, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963); West Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish, 800 U.S. 379,899, 57 aCt 
578, 585, 81 LEd. 703 (1937); Laketon As-
phalt and Refining, Inc. v. United States, 
476 RSupp. 668, 675 (N.D.Ind.1979). A 
Legislature has great latitude in making 
statutory classifications involving social or 
moral legislation. United States v. Neary, 
552 F.2d 1184, 1189 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 
434 U.S. 864, 98 S.Ct 197, 54 L.Ed.2d 189 
(1977); United States v. Weatherford, 471 
FJ2d 47, 51 (7th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 411 
U.S. 972, 93 a c t 2144, 36 L.Ed.2d 695 
(1973), Laketon Asphalt and Refining Inc. 
v. United States, supra, 476 F-Supp. at 675. 
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[20-121 There is no constitutional right 
to public employment1* AfcGarvey v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 468 F.Supp. 687,680 (D.C 
1979); Carlyh v. Sitterson, 438 F.Supp. 956, 
959 (D.N.C.1975). A Government must 
have authority to scrutinize the hiring of 
personnel based on conduct occurring prior 
to their employment Dew v. Halaby, 317 
YM 582, 586 (D.C.Cir.1963); Carlyle v. Sit-
terson, supra, 438 F-Supp. at 963. It is a 
vital part of the state's police power, Bar-
sky v. Board of Regents of N.Y., supra, 847 
U.S. at 449, 74 S.Ct at 654 (1953). The 
rationale is to insure that those persons 
publicly employed in emergency or danger-
ous situations are sober and alert, and pos-
sess qualities such as honesty, integrity, re-
liability and obedience to the law.11 After 
all, state police are charged with the en-
forcement of the law, not for themselves or 
their clients as in private practice, but for 
the benefit and safety of people at large. 
In Talent v. City of Abilene, 508 S.W.2d 
592, 597 (Tex.1974), regarding a fireman 
who was dismissed for failure to submit to 
a polygraph examination after he had been 
charged with a criminal offense. Justice 
Reavley in a five-four dissent said, 
'The Fire Chief had a responsibility to 
Fireman Talent: to respect the rules of 
job tenure and to treat Talent fairly. He 
also had a responsibility to the other 127 
people in his department when discipline 
and mutual trust are necessary. He had 
the people of Abilene to serve. Abilene's 
ordinances provide that its firemen and 
policemen must be persons of good moral 
character . . . 
[I] would say that the Legislature and 
City of Abilene recognized that policemen 
and firemen should be credible and trust-
worthy/*12 
requisites. The law clothes an officer with 
authority to handle many critical situations, 
including those that occur in a lightning 
moment and which never can be re-enacted 
or reversed. There are so many far-reach-
ing implications that the Legislature, in or-
der to exclude a majority of undesirable 
applicants, while acknowledging it might 
deny a minority of acceptable ones, simply 
had to draw a line. That line prevents 
ex-felons from being certified as police offi-
cers. It does not prevent them from other 
work; in fact in other areas, society encour-
ages their rehabilitation. Under the facts 
of this case, it is especially apparent as 
Plaintiffs felony conviction (robbery) 
would directly reflect on his qualifications 
for the job (investigating robberies, etc). 
Butts v. Nichols, 381 F.Supp. 573, 580 (&D. 
Iowa C.D.1974). A state's legitimate con-
cern for maintaining high standards of pro-
fessional conduct extends far beyond the 
initial licensing. Barsky v. Board of Re-
gents of NY., supra, 347 U.a at 451, 74 
S.Ct at 655. 
The Court cites two examples of cases 
which are consistent with its reasoning. Up-
shaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188 (1st Cir. 
1970) (action by a rejected ex-felon, who 
was later pardoned, for a police appoint-
ment); Foley v. Connelie, 419 F.Supp. 889 
(S.D.N.Y.1976) (Irish alien brought a class 
action for declaration that New York stat-
ute was unconstitutional, insofar as it ex-
cluded aliens from employment as New 
York State Troopers); and four which are 
distinguishable, Schware v. Board of Bar 
Examiners, 358 U.a 282, 77 S.Ct 752, 1 
LEd.2d 796 (1957) (applicant was excluded 
from the practice of law; in fact, appli-
cant's past criminal record included only 
[23,241 Policemen are just simply a spe- arrests, and he was never tried or convicted 
rial category. Integrity and trust are pre- for any single offense); Andrews v. Drew 
It, Or, as Judge (Uter Justice) Holmes once 
said, The petitioner may have a constitutional 
right to talk politic*, but he has no constitution, 
al right to be a policeman.*' McAuUffe v May-
or of City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216. 29 
N.E. 517 (1892). 
11. Compare: Better v. MkUcndorf. 632 ¥2d 
788, 812 (9th Cir. 1978): and Hankamer v. 
TempUn, supra, 143 Tex. 572, 187 S.W26 at 
551 (1945). 
12. See also: Richardson v. City of Pasadena, 
500 S.W.2d 175. 177 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 
(14th Dtst) 1973). reVd on other grounds. 513 
S.W.2d 1 (Tex.1974). afTd with orders. 523 
S.W^d 506 (Tex.Ov.App.—Houston (14th 
Dist.J 1975). 
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who have been convicted of serious crimes 
in the past have demonstrated a greater 
potential for abuse of their right to possess 
firearms. 
[25] The general principles enunciated 
in Giles under its facts bear a significant 
similarity to the facts and theories of this 
case. The Court, therefore, concludes there 
was no equal protection violation.11 
VIII. Procedural Due Process 
Plaintiff contends his due process rights 
were violated because there was no oppor-
tunity for any hearing to allow the Commis-
sion to evaluate his individual record. On a 
more theoretical level, Plaintiff would as-
sert he is now unable to demonstrate to the 
Commission he can satisfy the underlying 
purposes of the statute. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Unit-
ed States Constitution provides, in perti-
nent part, ". nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." After closely 
studying the issue, the following general 
principles seem applicable. 
[26-29] The Fourteenth Amendment 
provides an independent right to demand 
that the government act in a nonarbitrary 
manner at all times. Thompson v. Gallagh-
er, supra, 489 F.2d at 44G-47; Kindem v. 
City of Alameda, supra, 502 F.Supp. at 
1113. A state cannot exclude a person from 
an occupation in a manner or for reasons 
which contravene the due process clause. 
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra, 
353 U.S. at 238-39, 77 S.Ct at 755-56. 
Further, due process requires that action by 
a state through any of its agencies must be 
consistent with the fundamental principles 
of liberty and justice. Buchalter v. New 
York, 319 U.S. 427, 429. 63 S.O. 1129, 1130, 
87 LEd. 1492 (1942). Even though the 
but concealing the fact and obtaining a license, 
and still remaining eligible to keep the HcenseX 
the ordinance violated equal protection. How-
ever, those kinds of potential discrepancies are 
not possible under the Texas Statute as Article 
4413<29aaKftAXb) states a final conviction of » 
felony disqualifies any person previously certi-
fied. 
DIXON v. 
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government purpose be legitimate and sub-
stantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by 
means which broadly stifle fundamental 
personal liberties when the end can be more 
narrowly achieved. Police Department v. 
Mosky, 406 U.S. 92, 101 n.8, 92 S.Ct 2286, 
2293 1^ 8, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). 
[30-32] Due Process, unlike some legal 
rotes, is not a technical concept with a fixed 
content, unrelated to time or circumstances. 
Its very nature negates any notion of in-
flexible procedures universally applicable to 
every imaginable situation. Cafeteria 
Workers v. McElroy, 867 U.S. 886, 895, 81 
S.Ct 1748, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961); 
McDowell v. State of Texas, 465 F.2d 1342, 
1348 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert denied, 
410 U.S. 943, 93 S.Ct 1371, 85 L.Ed.2d 610 
(1978). It does not require a hearing in 
every conceivable case of governmental im-
pairment of private interests. Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 
S.Ct 2701, 2705, 33 LEdJM 548 (1972); 
McDowell v. State of Texas, supra, 465 F.2d 
at 1348. For example, generally, there is 
no violation of due process if a statute gives 
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice 
that his contemplated conduct is prohibited, 
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 
123, 99 S.Ct 2198, 2203, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 
(1979); United States v. Giles, supra, 640 
F.2d at G2&-29. 
[33] A state can require high standards 
of qualification for a profession such as 
good moral character, as long as it has a 
rational connection to the applicant's fitness 
or capacity (especially when discussing a 
H1rven profession, like law, medicine or law 
enforcement, where ethics should be the 
most minimal of qualifications). Schware 
v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra, 858 U.S. 
*t 239, 77 S.Ct at 756. When a state 
exercises such a right, the question often 
•rises: does due process require any kind of 
* hearing? M In answering that, Courts no 
longer can rely on a privilege-right distinc-
tion, Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 
!*» Compare Occupations, Profession* and U» 
cwsfs Pteisom with Criminai Background*, 
Vernon's Texas Session Law Service- 1961 
TenSessXaw Serv.. ch. 267. § 13(c), at €84. 
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U.S. at 571, 92 S.Ct at 2705; Thompson v. 
Gallagher, supra, 489 F.2d at 446, but rath-
er fall on a "life, liberty, or property'* anal-
ysis. Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 406 
U.S. at 569, 92 S.Ct at 2705. 
[34-38] In an action alleging a depriva-
tion of an interest without proper due proc-
ess of law, it is first necessary to consider 
the nature of that interest Lindsey v. 
NormeU 405 U.S. 56, 74, 92 S.Ct 862, 874, 
31 L.Ed.2d 86 (1972). Delineating those 
boundaries, it is standard for a Court to 
ascertain whether the interest invaded, if at 
all, is a "liberty," or uprope^ty,, interest? 
While there is no constitutionally protected 
right to government employment, Orr v. 
Trinter, 444 FAI 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1971), 
cert denied, 408 U^. 943, 92 S.Ct 2847, 88 
L.Ed.2d 767 (1973); Roseboro v. Fayette-
ville City Bd. of Ed., 491 F.Supp. 113, 117 
(E.D.Tenn.1978), there is a liberty interest 
in the right "to engage in any of common 
occupations of life ** Board of Regents 
v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 572, 92 S.Ct at 
2706; Giordano v. Roudebush, 448 F.Supp. 
899,904 (S.D.Iowa 1977), affirmed, 617 F.2d 
511 (8th Cir. 1980). In Roth, the court 
distinguished between a "general** right to 
engage in a chosen occupation, and a specif-
ic right to a particular position, and deter-
mined due process protection only attaches 
to the former interest See also: Orr v. 
Trinter, supra, 444 FJ2d at 133. Therefore, 
it would seem that where state action de-
nies a person a license or opportunity1S to 
practice his chosen profession, due process 
may require that he be given a hearing and 
a chance to respond to the charges against 
him. See, e^., Greene v. McElroy, 860 U.S. 
474, 79 S.Ct 1400, 8 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1957); 
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra, 
353 U.S. at 232, 77 S.Ct at 752, 1 L.Ed2d 
796. This may be especially relevant when 
the applicant "has no procedural due proc-
ess rights apart from those which the agen-
cy has chosen to create by its own regula-
tions.** Schwartz v. Fed. Energy Reg. 
Com'n., 578 F.2d 417, 420 (D.C.Cir.1978). 
la. See Gosnty v. Sonora Independent School 
District, 603 F.2d 522. 825 (5th Or. 1979); 
Thorn** v. Bd. of Trustees, Etc, 515 F.Supp. 
280. 287 (S.D.Tex.1981). 
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• » » Ftofatiff has never requested . hear-
» » b M w i h p d that the lost opportu-
l % CM«d him humiliation or embarrass 
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 mmplaintd of 
• » « t U e h e d t o h l , r e p i l t a t j 0 n l , u £ 
I ™ L « i « * • »>» question of being 
d«fed procedure due process, he must re! 
STs! «?7* ",d have *uch re^uest de-
•">d °y » e Commission." 
O. Cbacftafon 
t J ' S J i ' 1 "* Court', hoW,',« f»t (i) 
IT9**** ****** «o the Plaintiff by the 
£ * * • * «w<*»w tome, but not all, legal 
* * « " ' « * (2) the statute automatfcal-
* £ * * • * ^-felons from certification as 
pence officers is constitutional. 
rfiSi!'?1.1"*'? "* follo»i'W station sue 
«*t |y ttate. tlu. Court's position in regard 
to ewe, .uch as this being filed in federal 
court, 
" . . . we note that the issues involved in 
thta case might have best been raised in 
« ^ e r forum The rights with which 
nghtsof pardoned felons under [Texas] 
taw Federal tasues are at best secondary 
and hinge upon our interpretation of 
•Utelaw. Since there is only one Massa-
chuaetts.case, [a. was the number of Tex-
• r i T E 1 ! * * ****** thi» "••* «** then 
only briefly, we are handicapped in our 
mterpretotion; |„
 f u t u r e e ^ ^ ^ 
mfeht expand the rights of pardoned fel-
•WortI [PlamUff] more procedural protec-
tion than we think the federal Constitu-
» « ^ u i r « . I„ the future we would be 
tempted * abstain from deciding similar 
« * » in whfch the federal right, were 
«*«Ktory and baaed on rights granted by 
,
^ t ^ H ^ 5 T 5 > e C o a r t htm *•*«• that a liberty 
SO^im tZJ^ ^ U S 693' 701/96 
i£<£um' **"IU,C' Wl FJd »• » 
o f ^ ™ f h S ? ^ ^ 8 k > n Both are matter, 
of great public concern This Court note, that 
the state, particularly if an alternative 
state forum were available to the plain-
tiff." 
Upshaw v. McNaman, supra, 485 F.2d at 
1192. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
<(fj?£ wwrnctsrsTof *s> 
Lloyd MORRIS, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Tk* CITY OF NEW YORK PARKING 
VIOLATIONS BUREAU, Defendant 
No. 80 Civ. 0012 (PNL). 
United States District Court, 
S. D. New York. 
Nov. 18, 1981. 
Nonresident automobile owner brought 
action claiming to have been denied due 
process and equal protection by seizure of 
his automobile after a default judgment for 
unpaid parking violations. Cross motions 
for summary judgment were filed. The 
District Court, Leval, J, held that (1) plain-
tiff was not denied due process by failure of 
Parking ticket to warn of possibility of exe-
cution after a default judgment had been 
taken for parking violations, and (2) there 
was no equal protection violation by virtue 
of fact that those individuals who reside in 
a state which does not provide New York 
with a computer tape identifying the auto-
the statute which once autoiiiatically barred a 
convicted felon from continuing to practice as 
an attorney has been abolished, Tex.Rev.Ov. 
Stat.Ann. art 311 (repealed 1979) Thus. It 
•**«• «ny convicted felon who may be an 
applicant for the bar or an attorney who ha. 
been disbarred because of a felony conviction 
and seeks reinstatement after serving his sen-
tence and being pardoned will probably be giv-
en a hearing 
MORRIS r. CITY OP NEW YORK PARKING VIOLATIONS BUR. 
Ot«ttS27F.Sa»p.724 (1M1) 
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mobile registrants do not receive preexecu-
tkm notice that default can result in execu-
tion. 
Defendant's motion granted; plain-
tiff, motion denied. 
L Automobiles *»349 
Constitutional Law «=»315 
Although original summons left on a 
motor vehicle does not state that default 
judgment can result in execution on the 
vehicle for failure to pay parking violations 
and although no additional notices are sent 
to residents of states that do not provide 
New York with a computer tape identifying 
automobile registrants until seizure is ef-
fected, such procedure does not deny due 
process to a resident of a noncooperating 
state as at least three parking tickets must 
be collected before seizure, postseizure no-
tice is given in time to allow a hearing prior 
to sale and to require earlier notice to regis-
trants of noncooperating states would im-
pose such costs as would exceed revenues 
from enforcement 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; 
U.S.C.A.ConstAmends. 5, 14; N.Y.Vehicle 
and Traffic Law § 241. 
2. Constitutional Law *=» 249(8) 
There is no equal protection violation in 
New York's dividing parking violators into 
two classes, with one class being New York 
residents and residents of states which pro-
vided New York with computer tapes iden-
tifying automobile registrants and second 
class being residents of ten states which do 
not provide computer tape, as any differ-
ence in treatment, i.e., residents of noncoop-
erating states not receiving preaeizure no-
tice that default can result in execution of 
the vehicle, is rationally related to securing 
compliance with parking laws and there is 
no animus toward nonresidents. 42 VS. 
C.A. § 1983; U.S.C.A.ConstAmends. 5, 14; 
N.Y.Vehicle and Traffic Law § 241. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
James I. Meyeraon, Thomas Hoffman, 
New York City, for plaintiff. 
Carl Sanders and Judah Harris, Corp. 
Counsel, New York City, for defendant 
LEVAL, District Judge. 
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, claiming to have been denied 
due process and equal protection of the laws 
by the seizure of his automobile after a 
default judgment for unpaid parking viola-
tions under § 241 of the New York Vehicle 
and Traffic law and the regulations promul-
gated thereunder. 
Plaintiff claims to be a resident of North 
Carolina. Although plaintiffs residence is 
disputed, it is not disputed that his car was 
registered in North Carolina. North Caroli-
na is one of ten states that do not provide 
New York with a computer tape identifying 
their automobile registrants. Plaintiff was 
issued and did not respond to several park-
ing summonses in New York City. A de-
fault judgment was obtained against him. 
The judgment was executed upon by the 
Marshal, who seized plaintiffs car. The car 
was released to him when he paid the 
amount of the judgment, plus fees and im-
pounding charges. 
Plaintiff claims not to have received any 
of his many original summonses. Plaintiff 
claims also that the original summonses, 
even if received, would not provide suffi-
cient notice, because, while they do say 
Failure to answer this summons within 7 
days will be deemed an admission of lia-
bility. Additional penalties will be added 
and may lead to a default judgment 
they do not mention that a default judg-
ment could result in execution upon proper-
ty. 
Each party moves for summary judg-
ment; plaintiff also moves for class certifi-
cation. 
Section 241 provides as follows: When 
the operator or owner of a car has failed to 
plead or appear in response to a parking 
violation, a default judgment may be en-
tered. If the owner is a New York resi-
dent, he or she must be notified, by first-
class mail, of the violations charged, of the 
impending default judgment, where the de-
fault would be entered, and that it could be 
MEYER v. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS 
ClU M i06 P Jld 10S6 
CaL 1085 
an exception to the rule relied on". Funk against him. Health and Safety Code, § 
v. Campbell, 15 Cal.2d 250, 251, 100 P2d 11164; Government Code, § 11512; Pen. 
762; California Delta Farms v. Chinese Code, §§ 1203.3, 1203.4; Business and 
American Farms, 201 Cal. 201, 255 P. 1097. Professions Code, § 2383. 
[3,4] Section 663a provides that a mo-
tion utider section 663 must be made "with-
in ten days after notice of the entry of 
judgment, served upon the adverse party". 
There is no limitation, as suggested by the 
respondent, that such motion be made with-
in 60 days after entry of judgment. Nor 
does this rule allow "every unsuccessful 
litigant to set his own time for appeal", for 
the prevailing party by serving notice of 
entry of the judgment may limit the time 
within which his adversary is entitled to 
proceed under section 663. An order deny-
ing a motion made under that section is ap-
pealable, Funk v. Campbell, supra; Cali-
fornia Delta Farms v. Chinese American 
Farms, supra, and the record in the present 
action shows that the notice of appeal was 
timely filed. 
The motion to dismiss the appeal is de-
nied. 
GIBSON, C. J., and SHENK, CARTER, 
TRAYNOR, SCHAUER, and SPENCE, 
JJ.f concur. 
34 Cal.2d 62 
MEYER v. BOARD OF MEDICAL 
EXAMINERS et al. 
L. A. 20929. 
Supreme Court of California, in Bank. 
June 15, 1949. 
Rehearing Denied July 14,1948. 
I. Physicians and surgeons $=>ll(2) 
An order of State Board of Medical 
Examiners, suspending physician's license 
for unprofessional conduct by reason of his 
conviction of offense involving moral turpi-
tude in unlawfully selling morphine prepara-
tion, was not improper as imposing penalty 
for such offense, in violation of statute, 
after superior court discharged physician 
frxi I'rcbation and dismissed accusations 
2. Criminal law @=»998 
Physicians and surgeons $=>ll(2) 
The trial court's action in setting aside 
verdict of conviction and dismissing prose-
cution after discharging convict from pro-
bation mitigates his punishment by restoring 
certain rights and removing certain disa-
bilities, but does not obliterate fact that he 
was finally adjudged guilty of crime, so that 
State Board of Medical Examiners is not 
precluded from suspending license of physi-
cian convicted of crime involving moral 
turpitude and discharged, from probation, 
with such accompanying statutory relief, 
whether before or after such disciplinary 
order. Pen.Code, §§ 1203 et seq., 1203.3, 
1203.4; Business and Professions Code, § 
2383. 
CARTER, SHENK and SCHAUER, JJ., 
dissenting. 
» 
Appeal from Superior Court, Los Angeles 
County; Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. 
Proceeding by Paul Oliver Meyer against 
the Board of Medical Examiners of the 
State of California, its secretary and mem* 
bers, for a writ of mandate to review thf 
board's action in ordering suspension oi 
plaintiff's license as a physician and sur-
geon. From a judgment denying a peremp-
tory writ, plaintiff appeals. 
Affirmed. 
Prior opinion, Cal.App., 200 P.2d 128. 
French & Indovina and F. Walter 
French, Santa Monica, for appellant. 
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and 
Bayard Rhone, Deputy Attorney General, 
for respondents. 
SPENCE, Justice. 
This is an appeal from a judgment deny-
ing a peremptory writ of mandate in a 
proceeding brought to review the action of 
the respondent Board of Medical Exam-
iners of the State of California in ordering 
the suspension of appellant's license as a 
physician and surgeon. Appellant chal-
lenges the propriety of the respondent 
board's order, but his position cannot be 
sustained in the light of applicable statutory 
law as construed in relation to the problem 
at hand. 
So far as here material, the facts in 
chronological order appear as follows: On 
February 17, 1947, appellant, a licensed 
physician and surgeon, upon entry of a 
plea of guilty, was conricted of a violation 
of section 11164 of the Health and Safety 
Code (furnishing narcotics "to an addict, 
or to any person representing himself as 
such, except as permitted**). A sentence 
of six months' imprisonment is the county 
ja3 was imposed, but the execution thereof 
was suspended and appellant was placed 
on probation for a period of two years up-
on condition that he pay a $500.00 fine. On 
August 5, 1947, respondent board filed an 
accusation against appellant for his crimi-
nal dereliction, and on August 22, 1947, the 
matter was tried before a hearing officer as 
provided by statute. Gov.Code, sec 11512. 
On January 23,1948, respondent board made 
an order rejecting the hearing officer's pro-
posed decision of December 4, 1947, and 
specifying it would consider the matter 
"upon the record, including the transcript, 
without taking additional evidence, and up-
on written argument presented to" it. 
Upon completion of one-half of the pro-
bationary period theretofore prescribed and 
in response to appellant's motion made on 
February 20, 1948* the superior court or-
dered that his "probation be terminated and 
[he be] discharged therefrom under Sec-
tion 1203J Penal Code, that plea of 'Guilty* 
be changed to 'Not Guilty* and that cause 
be dismissed under Section 1203.4 Penal 
Code" On March 2, 1948, appellant pre-
sented to respondent board at its regularly 
scheduled meeting a certified copy of the 
court's order. However, said board con-
cluded that such order "terminating proba-
tion and dismissing the information" did 
not in the disciplinary proceeding before 
it "remove or wipe out the conviction 
suffered by" appellant; and upon reciting 
the facts "resulting in the conviction*— 
that appellant had made a sale of "two vials 
containing forty tablets of a preparation of 
morphine" to a state narcotic officer for 
-$125.00 in marked money"—said board de-
termined that appellant had been convicted 
of "an offense involving moral turpitude" 
and by reason of such conviction was 
"guilty of unprofessional conduct* Ac-
cordingly, respondent board as of March 
15, 1948, ordered the suspension of appel-
lant's license for ninety days and placed 
him on probation for three years. Appel-
lant thereupon applied to the superior court 
for a writ of mandate to compel respond-
ent board to set aside its order and deci-
sion. Argument was had upon respondent 
board's demurrer filed in return to appel-
lant's petition, and it was sustained without 
leave to amend. The court then entered 
its judgment denying relief to appellant. 
From such judgment this appeal is taken. 
[1] The sole question to be determined 
is the effect of section 1203.4 of the Penal 
Code upon the authority of respondent 
board to order the suspension of appellant's 
license. As here material, said section pro-
rides: "Every defendant • * * who 
shall have been discharged from probation 
prior to the termination of the period there-
of, shall at any time thereafter be permit-
ted by the court to withdraw his plea of 
guilty and enter a plea of not guilty; * * * 
and * • * the court shall thereupon 
dismiss the accusations or information 
against such defendant, who shall there-
after be released from all penalties and dis-
abilities resulting from tlte offense or crime 
of which he has been convicted." (Em-
phasis added.) Appellant concedes that re-
spondent board could have found him guilty 
of unprofessional conduct without reference 
to the criminal proceeding, but he contends 
that inasmuch as said board elected to base 
its decision wholly upon appellant's prior 
conviction, its action was an improper im-
position of a penalty contrary to the ital-
icized language of the statute, following the 
dismissal of the criminal charge against 
him under the prescribed procedure. But 
such contention cannot be sustained in 
challenge of respondent board's order as a 
disciplinary measure reflecting considera-
tions of appropriate punishment by rea-
son of the adjudication of appellant's guilt, 
and so without the scope of the so-called 
"expunging of penafty" premise of the cited 
statute. 
[2] Respondent board has authority to 
suspend the license of a physician who is 
found to be guilty of unprofessional con-
duct, and it b expressly provided by stat-
ute that "conviction * * * of any of-
fense involving moral turpitude constitutes 
unprofessional conduct," with the "record 
of the conviction" serving as "conclusive 
evidence" thereof. Bus. & Prof. Code, sec 
2383. There is no question here but that 
appellant's violation of section 11164 of the 
Health and Safety Code was an offense in-
volving moral turpitude. So pertinent is 
the case of In re Phillips, 17 Csl2d 55, 109 
P2d 344,132 AXJt 644, holding that an at-
torney disbarred after his conviction of a 
crime involving moral turpitude was not en-
titled to have his name restored to the roll 
of practicing attorneys upon dismissal of 
the criminal proceeding against him in pur-
suance of section 1203.4 of the Penal Code. 
After noting that "the order granting prob-
ation is based upon the premise of the de-
fendant's guilt," this court discussed the ef-
fect of the probation procedure as follows, 
17 Cal.2d at page 61, 109 P2d at page 347, 
132 A.UR. 644: "The powers possessed by 
the trial courts under the probation statutes, 
Penal Code, § 1203 et seq., are concerned 
with mitigation of punishment and confer 
discretion upon the courts in dealing with 
a convicted defendant The power of the 
court to reward a convicted defendant who 
satisfactorily completes his period of proba-
tion by setting aside the verdict and dis-
missing the action operates to mitigate his 
punishment by restoring certain rights and 
removing certain disabilities. But it cannot 
be assumed that the legislature intended 
that such action by the trial court under sec-
tion 1203.4 should be considered as obliterat-
ing die fact that the defendant had been 
finally adjudged guilty of a crime. This is 
made dear by the provision that the fact of 
the defendant's conviction can be used 
against him in any later prosecution, despite 
dismissal of the action under section 1203.4 
In brief, action in mitigation of the defend-
ant's punishment should not affect the fact 
chat his guiit has been finally determined 
according to law. Such a final determina-
tion of guilt is the basis for the order of 
disbarment in tins case. That final judg-
ment of conviction is a fact; and its ef-
fect cannot be nullified for the purpose here 
involved, either by the order of probation 
or by the later order dismissing the action 
after judgment." 
The rationale of the Phillips case is sig-
nificant in that it was decided at a time 
when the State Bar Act referable to con-
viction of a crime involving moral turpitude 
as cause for suspension or disbarment (Bus. 
& Prof. Code, tecs. 6101-6102, Stats. 1939, 
ch. 34, sec 1, p. 357) was essentially the 
same as the present provisions of the Med-
ical Practice Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, sec. 
2383, Stats.1937, ch. 399, p. 1275), and the 
plea or verdict of guilty was deemed the 
"record of the conviction" in "conclusive 
evidence" of the unprofessional conduct. 
After the date of the Phillips decision, sec-
tion 6102 of the Business and Professions 
Code was amended (Stats.1941, ch. 1183, 
sec 1, p. 2942) to provide for the disbar-
ment "irrespective of a subsequent order 
under the provisions of Section 1203.4 of 
the Penal Code." Such amendment served 
to settle the question of legislative intent 
in conformity with what this court had 
held was the proper construction of the 
probation statute as a nonoperative factor 
in relation to a disbarment order as the out-
growth of a disciplinary proceeding. 
Appellant argues that the Phillips case-
involving an attorney—does not present 
parallel considerations to the instant case-
involving a physician—because this court in 
the exercise of its inherent judicial power 
may discipline its own officers without inter-
ference from the legislature, while respond-
ent board as an administrative agency 
created by the legislature is not likewise 
free from legislative restraint; so that its 
suspension of a physician's license could 
properly be construed as a "penalty" or "dis-
ability" released under the probation stat-
ute. But such consideration in connection 
with the Phillips case was simply "noticed" 
as a "preliminary point" of observation, 17 
CaL2d pages 59-40, 109 P^d 344, 132 A. 
L i t 644, citing In re Lavine, 2 CaL2d 324, 
41 P-Zd 161,42 PJSd 311, and did not consti-
tute the premise of the decision—that the 
discharge from probation and the dismissal 
of the criminal proceeding could not obliter-
ate the fact of adjudication of guilt in sup-
port of a disciplinary order, 17 Cal.2d page 
61,109 P.2d 344, 132 A.LR. 644. Nor is the 
Phillips case, as appellant maintains, "in-
validated as an authority" in this case in 
that the disbarment there antedated the dis-
missal of the criminal proceeding against 
the attorney under the provisions of the 
probation statute, while here the reverse sit-
uation prevails in that respondent board, 
though having had the disciplinary action 
against appellant pending before it for 
some time, did not make its order of sus-
pension against him until after he had been 
accorded the statutory relief in question. 
Such variant course in the chronology of 
the proceedings is an immaterial considera-
tion, for whether the discharge from proba-
tion and the accompanying relief granted 
by the trial court precede or follow the dis-
ciplinary order, its propriety stems from the 
adjudication of guilt constituting the basis 
of the "conviction" and, as such, it is not 
a "penalty" or "disability" within the con-
templated release of the probation statute. 
As so analyzed, the Phillips case in prin-
ciple of decision is determinative of this 
case, and appellant's effort to distinguish it 
allegedly upon "two separate grounds," one 
legal and the other factual, is of no avail. 
Like views have prevailed in other situ-
ation's limiting the effect of a dismissal 
after conviction, insofar as the existence 
of guilt by reason of commission of the 
criminal act is recognized, despite the bene-
fits accorded by the probation statute. 
Thus (1) an express proviso in section 
121)3.4 of the Penal Code makes the convic-
tion count against the defendant under the 
prior conviction statutes if he is subse-
quently convicted, People v. Hainline, 219 
Cat. 532, 535, 28 P 2 d 16; People v. Bar-
wick, 7 CaUd 696, 699, 62 P.2d 590, or if 
it is offered for impeachment purposes in 
a subsequent prosecution, People v. James, 
40 Cal.App.2d 740, 746, 105 P2d 947; (2) 
the conviction must be considered for the 
purpose of suspending or revoking a driv-
er's license. Veh.Code, sec. 309, nullifying 
the rule of Sherry v. Ingels, 34 Cal.App.2d 
632, 635, 94 P.2d 77; see Ellis v. Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles, 51 Cal.App.2d 753, 
757-758, 125 P.2d 521); and>(3) not only 
the fact of previous conviction was prop-
erly raised in a second prosecution for 
failure to provide for a minor child (Pen. 
Code, sec 270) after dismissal of the 
first upon satisfactory completion of pro-
bation, but all matters inherent in such 
conviction were admissible in evidence— 
the adjudication that the defendant was 
the father of the child as conclusive on 
the issue of parentage. People v. Ma-
jado, 22 CaI.App.2d 323, 324, 325, 70 P.2d 
1015. As the release of the "penalties 
and disabilities" clause of the proba-
tion statute has been so qualified in its ap-
plication, it does not appear that k was 
thereby intended to obliterate the record 
of conviction against a defendant and purge 
him of the guilt inherent therein (cf. 
Sherry v. Ingels, supra, 34 Ca!.App.2d 632, 
94 P.2d 77) or to "wipe out absolutely" and 
for all purposes the dismissed proceeding as 
a relevant consideration and "to place the 
defendant in the position which he would 
have occupied in all respects as a citizen if 
no accusation or information had ever 
been presented against him." People r . 
Mackey, 58 CaLApp. 123, 130, 208 P. 135, 
138. From this standpoint, appellant's the-
ory that the import of the probation statute 
and the dismissal proceeding is to expunge 
the record of the crime, Sherry v. Ingels, 
supra; People v. Mackey, supra, cannot 
prevail. 
Consistent with the foregoing considera-
tions, it is our conclusion that the respond-
ent board was clearly acting in the premises 
pursuant to its statutory authority, and that 
appellant's subjection to such disciplinary 
proceeding and the consequences thereof 
cannot be construed as a "penalty" or "dis-
ability" which was released under the pro-
bation statute. In re Phillips, supra, 17 
Cal.2d 55, 61, 109 P2d 344, 132 A.L.R. 644. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
GIBSON, C J„ and EDMONDS and 
TRAYNOR, JJ., concur. 
CARTER, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. 
The construction placed upon section 
1203.4 of the Penal Code by the majority of 
MEYER v. BOARD OF 
CltoMtM 
this Court is wholly unwarranted and is, 
furthermore, directly opposed to the rea-
son for the enactment of the section. 
Section 1203.3 of the Penal Code reads, 
in part : "The court shall have authority 
a t any time during the term of probation 
to revoke, modify, or change its order of 
suspension of imposition or execution of 
sentence. / / may at any time when the 
ends of justice will be subserved thereby, 
and when the good conduct and reform of 
the person so held on probation shall war-
rant it, terminate the period of probation 
and discharge the person so held * * *." 
[Emphasis added.] 
Section 1203.4 of the Penal Code pro-
vides: "Every defendant who has fulfilled 
the conditions of his probation for the en-
tire period thereof, or who shall have been 
discharged from probation prior to the ter-
mination of the period thereof, shall at any 
time thereafter be permitted by the court 
to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter 
a plea of not guilty; or if he has been con-
victed after a plea of not guilty, the court 
shall set aside the verdict of guilty; and 
in either case the court shall thereupon 
dismiss the accusations or information 
against such defendant, who shall there-
after be released from all penalties and dis-
abilities resulting from the offense or crime 
of which tie has been convicted. The pro-
bationer shall be informed of this right and 
privilege in his probation papers. The pro-
bationer may make such application and 
change of plea in person or by attorney au-
thorizing [authorized] in writing; provid-
ed, that in any subsequent prosecution of 
such defendant for any other offense, such 
prior conviction may be pleaded and proved 
and shall have the same effect as if pro-
bation had not been granted or the accusa-
tion or information dismissed." 
The Superior Court, on February 20, 
1948, pursuant to the above provisions, or-
dered that appellant's probation be termi-
nated and that he be discharged therefrom, 
that his plea of guilty be changed to one 
of "not guilty" and that the cause be dis-
missed. Thereafter, respondent Board, re-
lying solely on the record of conviction, 
pursuant to Section 2383 of the Business 
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and Professions Code, ordered the suspen-
sion of appellant's license for ninety days, 
and placed him on probation for three 
years. Section 2383, Bus. & Prof. Code, 
provides tha t : "The conviction of a felony 
or of any offense involving moral turpitude 
constitutes unprofessional conduct within 
the meaning of this chapter. The record 
of the conviction is conclusive evidence of 
such unprofessional conduct" 
The majority rely heavily on the case of 
In re Phillips, 17 Cal.2d 55, 109 P2d 344, 
132 A.L.R. 644. I did not agree with the 
majority in that case, and I most certainly 
am not in favor of extending the harsh 
rule there laid down so that it may be ap-
plied to a factual situation such as is here 
presented. In the Phillips case, the order 
of disbursement was made before the con-
viction had been set aside. In the instan: 
case, the Board made the order of suspen-
sion and probation after the conviction 
had been set aside. Not only that, but the 
action was based on a judgment of convic-
tion which was no longer in existence 
except for the exception made in the stat-
ute. That exception has no application 
here. Appellant concedes that the Board 
could have taken disciplinary measures 
against him because of his prior conduct, 
but contends that all of the counts of the 
accusation filed against him, with the ex-
ception of the one based on the judgment 
of conviction, were dismissed. 
In the Phillips case, the majority opin-
ion stated [17 Cal.2d 55, 109 P.2d 348]: 
" * * * action in mitigation of the de-
fendant's punishment should not affect the 
fact that his guilt has been finally deter-
mined according to law." This holding, 
which is approved by the majority in this 
case, nullifies the effect of the proceeding 
had in the Superior Court under section 
1203.4 of the Penal Code, and, in effect, 
obliterates the section. In the original ac-
tion, appellant was fined, sentenced and 
placed on probation for two years. This 
conviction was set aside under the section 
providing that he be released from all 
"penalties and disabilities." Notwithstand-
ing this action, this Court allows the re-
spondent Board to impose even greater 
penalties and disabilities upon appellant 
tha* those to which he had been subjected 
by reason of his convktis*. 
The •Decision" of respondent Board 
states that it is based upon "the record, tn-
cmding the transcript, without taking addi-
tional evidence, and upas written argu-
ment presented to the Board." [Emphasis 
added.] Since die accusations or informa-
tion against the defendant bad been dis-
missed by the Superior Court prior to the 
decision of the Board, how could the rec-
ord of die original trial be used as the 
basis for die Board's decision? The statute 
(Penal Code, sec 1203.4) makes one ex-
ception, and only one, where the subse-
quently dismiised conviction may be used 
against a defendant. This Court has added 
another. 
Mr. Justice Shenk, in his dissenting opin-
ion in the Phillips case, pointed out that 
the majority had deviated from the rule 
laid down in a number of previous cases. 
At the present time, the Business and Pro-
fessions Code, section 6102; is in line with 
the decision in that case, but the Code has 
not been so amended with respect to phy-
sicians and surgeons. 
The majority point out that the Legisla-
ture could not have intended that the pro-
ceeding under Section 1203.4 of the Penal 
Code was to wipe out the defendant's guilt 
because (1) of the express proviso con-
tained in the section; (2) because the con-
viction may be used for impeachment pur-
poses, People v. James, 40 Cal.App.2d 740, 
746, 105 V2d 947; (3) because it may be 
used for the purpose of suspending or re-
voking a driver's license (Vehicle Code, 
sec 309); (4) because it may be used in a 
second prosecution for failure to provide 
for a minor child, and because all matters 
inherent in the conviction (that is, the ad-
judication on the issue of parentage) were 
admissible in evidence. People v. Majado, 
22 CaLAppJZd 323, 70 PJ2d 1015. 
I would like to point out, in this con-
nection, that in People v. James, supra, 
the defendant was charged with the crime 
of grand theft The fact that he had been 
previously convicted and the conviction 
dismissed pursuant to section 1203.4 of the 
Penal Code was used to impeach him. This 
case does not add another exception to the 
statute, but falls squarely within the one 
there contained. The Court in the James 
case said [40 CaLAppJM 740,105 P.2d 951]: 
I t seems highly probable that by the 
amendment to this section (the exception) 
after the decision in People v. Mackey, 
supra, the legislature intended to broaden 
the section in its application and particular-
ly provided that in any subsequent prosecu-
tion of the defendant prior convictions 
may be pleaded and proved." [Emphasis 
that of die court] It was also said that 
"We therefore conclude that where a de-
fendant who has been previously convicted 
of a felony and granted probation and a 
dismissal obtained as in die instant case, 
and is subsequently prosecuted for another 
offense, in becoming a witness in his own 
behalf, he subjects himself to impeachment 
upon the ground that he has been convict-
ed of a felony.* [Emphasis that of the 
Court] 
And in People v. Majado, supra, the de-
fendant was found guilty, under section 
270 of the Penal Code, of failure to pro-
vide for a minor child. The only question 
raised there was whether the Court erred in 
admitting in evidence the record of a prior 
conviction which had been subsequently dis-
missed pursuant to section 12014 of the 
Penal Code. Note that this case, too, falls 
squarely within the exception to the sec-
tion and is not additional thereto. Both 
People v. James, and People v. Majado, 
supra, cite with approval statements made 
in the case of People v. Hainline, 219 Cat 
532, 28 P2d 16. In that case it was said, 
219 CaL at page 534, 28 P.2d at page 17: 
"If, prior to the 1927 amendment, any doubt 
existed in the minds of lawyers, judges, 
and laymen as to the status of those who 
committed a second felony, such doubt was 
removed by said amendment (St 1927, p. 
1493), which strips them of all the privi-
leges and rights which were restored to 
them by the provisions of the original act 
upon the completion of their probationary 
term. * * * 
The concluding portion of the act which 
provides that if the probationer commits a 
second offense he shall forfeit all the rights 
with which he was clothed at the time 
the court ordered the information dismissed, 
constitutes the amendment of 1927. * * * 
Said amendment simply and justly provides 
that persons who have refused to profit by 
the grace extended to them upon the first 
offense shall, upon conviction of a subse-
quent felony, suffer the penalty of the law 
as prescribed for the punishment of all 
other offenders." [Emphasis added.] 
Section 309 of the Vehicle Code is an 
express additional statutory exception to 
the Penal Code section under consideration. 
It reads as follows: MA termination of 
probation and dismissal of charges pur-
suant to Section 1203.4 of the Penal Code 
shall not affect any revocation or suspension 
of any license of the probationer under the 
provisions of this chapter. The probation-
er's prior conviction shall he considered a 
conviction for the purpose of revoking or 
suspending any license issued to him on 
the ground of two or more convictions.'* 
If appellant's suspension and probation 
is to be based upon die dismissed convic-
tion, it would seem that he had gained no 
rights and no privileges of which he could 
be stripped. If the defendant is to be 
considered guilty for ail purposes, despite 
the fact that there are only two statutory 
provisions whereby he may be so consid-
ered, it would seem that section 1203.4 of 
the Penal Code makes provision for a use-
less procedure. 
It appears to me to be obvious that the 
Legislature intended that a person whose 
conviction has been set aside, and the ac-
cusation against him dismissed, should not 
suffer the stigma usually attached to such 
a conviction unless he is later prosecuted 
for another offense. If the Legislature did 
not so intend, why is the defendant per-
mitted to withdraw his plea of guilty and 
enter one of not guilty? The section clear-
ly contemplates giving the offender a sec-
ond chance to take his place in the com-
munity. Inherent in this contemplation is 
the thought that he shall not be branded 
a pariah, having paid his debt to the satis-
faction of the Court In holding to the 
contrary, the majority appear to be oblivi-
ous to the broad and liberal humanitarian 
concept embraced within the above quoted 
sections of our Penal Code 
SHENK and SCHAUEK, JJ„ concur. 
ttOnUL»>SIS» 
Ex parte MEAD. 
Or. 2147. 
District Court of Appeal, 
Third District California, 
June 21, lftift. 
1. CrlaUaal law «=M 202(1) 
Where conviction in another state was 
of larceny, and property taken was of value 
of $20, and California statute then defined 
grand larceny as the taking of property of 
value of more than $50, the conviction 
could not be considered as a felony con-
viction within statute prescribing punish-
ment for habitual criminals. Pen.Code, § 
644. 
2. Pardon *=* 
Statutory provision that persons pre-
viously adjudged to be an habitual criminal 
under section 644 of the Penal Code, as 
that section read prior to effective date of 
statutory provision, shall be eligible for re-
lease on parole after serving seven years of 
prison term, is not applicable to a person 
convicted of primary offenses enumerated 
in section 644 as it read prior to 1945, and 
as amended in 1945, PenCode, & 644, 
304a5. 
3. Ceastltatloaal law *>»2fS 
Since allegation, in information under 
which defendant was sentenced as an hab-
itual criminal, that defendant was an hab-
itual criminal would have been but the al-
legation of a conclusion, failure of infor-
mation to charge defendant with having 
been an habitual criminal was not a denial 
to defendant of due process of law. Pen. 
Code, § 644. 
Proceeding in the matter of the applica-
tion of Elzia Edward Mead for a writ of 
habeas corpus. 
Writ discharged with direction to Adult 
Authority. 
Elzia Edward Mead, Represa, for ap-
pellant 
Fred N. Howser, Arty. Gou, Gail A. 
Strader, Sacramento, for respondent 
PATT v. NEVADA STATE BD. OF ACCOUNTANCY 
Cite «s 571 PJd 105 
OPINION 
Nev. 105 
PER CURIAM: 
On the authority of, and for the same 
reasons stated in, Sheriff v. Byron, 93 Nev. 
— , 571 ?2d 103 (1977 Adv. Opn. No. 
179, filed today), the order of the trial court 
which granted respondent's petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus is reversed. 
Seymour Harold PATT, Appellant, 
v. 
NEVADA STATE BOARD OF 
ACCOUNTANCY, Respondent 
No. 9758. 
Supreme Court of Nevada. 
Nov. 16, 1977. 
<°§ KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 5YSTEM> 
SHERIFF, CLARK COUNTY, Appellant, 
v. 
Betty BYRON, Respondent 
No. 9948. 
Supreme Court of Nevada. 
Nov. 16, 1977. 
Appeal from Eighth Judicial District 
Court, Clark County; Paul S. Goldman, 
Judge. 
Robert List, Atty. Gen., Carson City, 
George E. Holt, Dist. Atty., and H. Douglas 
Clark, Deputy Dist. Atty., Las Vegas, for 
ippellant. 
Morgan D. Harris, Public Defender and 
lobert D. Amundson, Deputy Public De-
tender, Las Vegas, for respondent. 
OPINION 
PER CURIAM: 
On the authority of, and for the same 
rasons stated in, Sheriff v. Byron, 93 Nev. 
- , 571 P.2d 103 (1977 Adv. Opn. No. 
IB, filed today), the order of the trial court 
Aich granted respondent's petition for a 
vrit of habeas corpus is reversed. 
Appeal was taken from an order of the 
Second Judicial District Court, Washoe 
County, William N. Forman, J., dismissing 
an accountant's petition requesting judicial 
review of the State Board of Accountancy's 
revocation of his certified public account-
ant's certificate based upon his conviction 
of embezzlement. The Supreme Court held 
that the propriety of the disciplinary action 
stemmed from the adjudication of guilt 
constituting the basis of the conviction and 
as such was not a "penalty" or "disability" 
which would be released by the account-
ant's honorable discharge from probation. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Licenses «=»38 
Propriety of proceedings to suspend or 
revoke business or professional license 
stems from adjudication of guilt constitut-
ing basis of conviction and as such it is not 
a "penalty" or "disability" which is released 
by honorable discharge from probation. 
N.R.S. 176.225, subd. 1, 628.390, subds. 5, 6. 
David Dean, Reno, for appellant. 
Laxalt, Berry & Allison, Carson City, for 
respondent. 
OPINION 
PER CURIAM: 
Appellant was convicted of embezzlement 
(NRS 205.300) and placed on probation for a 
term of one year. Upon the satisfactory 
completion of probation, the district court 
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set aside the verdict of guilty and dismissed 
the information against him pursuant to 
NRS 176*225(1).1 Based on the embezzle-
ment conviction, the Nevada State Board of 
Accountancy revoked appellant's certified 
public accountant's certificate pursuant to 
NRS 628.890(5) & (6).' 
A petition, requesting judicial review of 
the revocation, was dismissed by the district 
court and in this appeal the central conten-
tion is that the honorable discharge from 
probation released appellant from "all pen-
alties and disabilities resulting from the 
offense" and, thus, the Board is precluded 
from considering the conviction as grounds 
for disciplinary action. Respondent, argu-
ing the disciplinary proceeding and conse-
quences thereof cannot be construed as a 
penalty or disability which was released 
under NRS 176.225(1), has moved to dis-
miss. 
Although we have not had occasion to so 
construe NRS 176.225(1), sister state deci-
sions involving virtually an identical statute 
are legion. Those cases, which we find to 
be well reasoned, hold that proceedings to 
suspend or revoke business or professional 
licenses are not included among the penal-
ties and disabilities that are released by an 
honorable discharge from probation. See, 
& gu Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners, 
84 Cal^d 62, 206 P.2d 1085 (1949), and its 
progeny. See alao In re Phillips, 17 CaL2d 
55, 109 ?M 844 (1941). 
We elect to adopt, as appropriate and 
applicable here, that portion of the Meyer 
opinion where the court wrote that the 
1. NRS 176.225(1) provides: 
Ml. Every defendant who: 
**(») Has fulfilled the conditions of his proba-
tion for the entire period thereof; or 
"(b) Is recommended for earlier discharge by 
the chief parole and probation officer, or 
*'(c) Has demonstrated his fitness for honor-
able discharge but because of economic hard-
ship, verified by a parole and probation officer, 
has been unable to make restitution as ordered 
by the court, may at any time thereafter be 
permitted by the court to withdraw his plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere and enter a plea of 
not guilty; or, if he has been convicted after a 
plea of not guilty, the court may set aside the 
verdict of guilty; and in either case, the court 
shall thereupon dismiss the indictment or infor-
"propriety [of the disciplinary action] stems 
from the adjudication of guilt constituting 
the basis of the 'conviction* and, as such, it 
is not a 'penalty' or 'disability1 within the 
contemplated release of the probation stat-
ute." 206 ?M at 1088. Accordingly, we 
grant respondent's motion and 
ORDER this appeal dismissed. 
(o IKCYN WNUMBtft SYSTEMS 
Connie SHIELDS, Appellant, 
v. 
The STATE of Nevada, Respondent 
No. 9856. 
Supreme Court of Nevada. 
Nov. 16, 1977. 
The First Judicial District Court, Car-
son City, Frank B. Gregory, J., entered 
judgment of conviction and defendant ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court held that sen-
tence was not subject to being disturbed on 
claim that parole and probation report con-
tained unsubstantiated information so long 
as record did not demonstrate prejudice re-
sulting from consideration of information 
or accusations founded on facts supported 
only by impalpable or highly suspect evi-
dence. 
Affirmed. 
mation against such defendant, who shall 
thereafter be released from all penalties and 
disabilities resulting from the offense or crime 
of which he has been convicted." (Emphasis 
added.) 
2. NRS 628.390(5) & (6) provide in pertinent 
part: 
"After notice and hearing . . . , the 
board may revoke . . . any certificate is-
sued . . . for any one or any combination 
of the following causes: 
«< 
"5. Conviction of a feiony under the laws of 
any state or of the United States. 
"6. Conviction of any crime, an element of 
which is dishonesty or fraud, under the iaws of 
any state or of the United States." 
STATE 
ate as 51 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
leggie Lyndon JONES, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 15450. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 6, 1978. 
Defendant was convicted in the Sev-
i District Court, Carbon County, Ed-
i Sheya, J., of possession of marijuana 
he appealed. The Supreme Court, 
ikett, J., held that: (1) affidavit in 
A narcotics enforcement officer swore 
., based upon information from three 
irate sources, he had knowledge that 
tndant was cultivating and/or selling 
ijuana and which described defendant's 
ience as white over blue trailer with 
ain license number, located near desig-
sd place gave sufficient facts concerning 
ience of evidence of crime and described 
* to be searched with reasonable partic-
ity, and (2) expungement of record of 
less* crime precluded impeaching wit-
i for conviction of the offense. 
Affirmed. 
:riminal Law *=» 394.4(6) 
Affidavit in which narcotics enforce-
it officer swore that, based upon inf or-
ion from three separate sources, he had 
wledge that defendant was cultivating 
/or selling marijuana and which describ-
lefendant's residence as white over blue 
ler with certain license number, located 
r designated place, gave sufficient facts 
serning presence of evidence of crime 
described place to be searched with 
jonable particularity; thus defendant 
» not entitled to suppression of marijua-
seized on theory that there had been no 
ification for issuance of warrant for 
rch of defendant's residence. U.C.A. 
3, 58-37-8(lXaXi), 77-54-7. 
. JONES Utah 141 
I P.2d 141 
2. Criminal Law <*»5 
It is prerogative of Legislature to pre-
scribe what shall be penalties and burdens 
for commission of crime, as well as for any 
amelioration thereof. 
3. Witnesses <*=>345(4) 
Expungement of record of witness' 
crime precluded impeaching witness for 
conviction of the offense. U.C.A.1953, 77-
35-17.5, 77-35-17.5(lXc), 78-24-9; Rules 
of Evidence, rule 21. 
Marlynn B. Lema, Price, for defendant 
and appellant. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Craig L. 
Barlow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and respondent. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
Defendant Reggie L. Jones appeals from 
his conviction by a jury of possession of 
marijuana.1 He was sentenced to five 
years in prison, with the sentence to be 
suspended on condition that he participate 
in a probation and rehabilitation program 
at Halfway House in Salt Lake City. 
Defendant contends that the trial court 
committed error in (1) its denial of his 
motion to suppress the seized marijuana 
because there had been no justification for 
the issuance of a warrant for the search of 
defendant's residence; (2) refusing to allow 
cross examination of a witness for the state 
regarding his prior conviction of crime 
which conviction had been expunged. 
On January 21, 1977, Everett Johnson, a 
narcotics enforcement officer, went to a 
magistrate to procure a search warrant. 
He swore to an affidavit stating that based 
upon information from three separate 
sources he had knowledge that the defend-
ant was cultivating and/or selling marijua-
na. It described the defendant's residence 
as a white over blue trailer with a certain 
license number, located near the Mountain-
eer Club in Wellington. 
1. Sec. 58-37-8(1 )(a)(i), U.C.A., 1953. 
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[1] That the affidavit met the require-
ments of giving sufficient facts concerning 
the presence of evidence of crime and of 
describing the place with reasonable partic-
ularity,* la so obvious as to hardly justify 
comment on defendant's contention to the 
contrary.1 
Defendant's other claim of error relates 
to the court's refusal to permit impeach-
ment of one Barry Becker, who was called 
as a state's witness at the hearing on the 
motion to suppress the evidence. On ques-
tioning it was brought out that he had 
previously been a police officer in San Jose, 
California, and he admitted that he had 
been discharged and had been convicted of 
providing false information to the police. 
But he had served a probationary period, 
consequent to which the record of his crime 
had been expunged as permitted by Califor-
nia law.4 Thereupon, the trial court sus-
tained the prosecutor's objection and refus-
ed to allow further questioning on that 
matter. We do not deal with the question 
of the propriety of impeaching a witness for 
conviction of that particular offense, if it 
had not been expunged.1 The question here 
confronted is as to the effect of the ex-
pungement 
[2,3] It is the prerogative of the legisla-
ture to prescribe what shall be the penalties 
and burdens for the commission of crime, as 
well as for any amelioration thereof.1 It 
has provided that under certain circum-
stances convictions for crime may be ex-
punged; 7 and it further provides that when 
that is accomplished: 
Upon the entry of the order in those 
proceedings, the petitioner shall be 
deemed judicially pardoned and the peti-
2. Sec. 77-54-7, U.GA., 1953. 
3. The affidavit contained sufficient facts such 
that a neutral and detached magistrate could 
independently make a determination that prob-
able cause existed to believe that there was 
marijuana at the defendant's residence. 
4. California has an expungement statute simi-
lar to our own in parts material here, and we 
assume that the laws of sister states are the 
same as our own unless the contrary is shown; 
See California Penal Code Ann. (West) Sec 
1203.4. 1973. 
tioner may thereafter respond to any in-
quiries relating to convictions of crimes 
as though that conviction never oc-
curred.1 
The purpose of that statute is obvious and 
its intent is clearly stated: that even after 
a person is convicted of a crime, in appro-
priate circumstances he may comply with 
prescribed procedures which shall have the 
effect of a judicial pardon; and that there-
after he may respond to any inquiry con-
cerning his record as though that conviction 
had never occurred.9 What was done in 
this case is in conformity with the express 
provisions of that statute; and therefore no 
error was committed in that procedure. 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
ELLBTT, C. J., and HALL and WIL-
KINS, JJ., concur. 
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in result 
( o I KEVIttNI8EtSYSTtM> 
8TATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v, 
Michael Jeffrey LIMB, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 15438, 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 12, 197& 
Defendant was convicted before the 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, J. Rob-
5. Sec 78-24-9, U.C.A., 1933; Rule 21 Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
6. 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, Section 577. 
7. See Sec 77-35-17.5 which in part states 
"Any person who has been convicted of any 
crime within this state may petition the con-
victing court for a judicial pardon and for the 
expungement of his record in that court." 
S. Sec 77-3o-17.5()Xc), U.CJL, 1953. 
9, Id 
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STATE v. SCHREIBER. 
No. 7737. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 6, 1052, 
Proceeding to »et aside order setting aside 
conviction for abortion, on the ground that 
defendant had violated a condition. The 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Ray Van Cott, Jr., Jn revoked the 
order setting aside conviction and defendant 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Wade, J., 
held that evidence was Insufficient to sup-
port court's finding that a fraud had been 
practiced on court because the order bad 
been procured on representation that defend-
ant would permanently leave the State on 
account of bis ill health, but that defendant 
never had any intention of so doing. 
Judgment reversed. 
I. Criminal Law «=»998 
In proceeding- to revoke order setting 
aside conviction for abortion, evidence was 
insufficient to support finding that a fraud 
had been practiced on court because the or-
der had been procured on representation 
that defendant would permanently leave the 
state on account of his ill health, but that 
defendant never had any intention of so do-
ing. U.C.A.1943, 105-36-17. 
2. Criminal Law €=»998 
The court has the power to vacate an 
order or judgment procured by extrinsic 
fraud.1 
3. Criminal Law e=*98 
In absence of proof of fraud either ex-
trinsic or intrinsic, the court could not prop-
erly vacate an order setting aside conviction 
for abortion merely because of court's be-
lief that fraud had been practiced. U.CA. 
1943,105-36-17. 
Grant Macfarlane, Clifford L. Ashton, 
Leonard J. Lewis, Salt Lake City, for ap-
pellant. 
Clinton D. Vernon, Atty. Gen., Mark K. 
Boyle, Allen B. Sorensen, Asst. Attys. Gen., 
for respondent 
f. Ctintwcll v. Thatcher Bros. Banking 
Co., 47 Utah 150, 151 P. 088; Anderson 
WADE, Justice. 
August Schreiber, appellant herein, who 
had been for some years a practicing natur-
opath, was on March 18, 1949, convicted of 
the crime of abortion on a young woman. 
On May 14, 1949, he was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than two 
nor more than ten years in the state prison. 
This sentence was suspended and appel-
lant placed on probation the same day. In 
October, 1949, appellant, through his attor-
ney made an application to the court for an 
order setting aside his conviction, dismiss-
ing the action and discharging him from 
custody. After a hearing on this applica-
tion at which evidence was introduced to 
the effect that appellant and his young son 
were very ill and that a removal to a warm-
er climate would be beneficial to both and 
that appellant who was a naturopathic phy-
sician licensed to practice in Florida intend-
ed to move there permanently and practice 
there as much as his health would permit, 
and it also appearing that there was a re-
port from the Utah Adult Probation and 
Parole Department that appellant had fully 
complied with the conditions of his proba-
tion and that it would support any action 
the court might take in setting aside the 
conviction, the court ordered the conviction 
set aside and the appellant discharged from 
further supervision of the parole depart-
ment. 
On May 29,1951, the district attorney for 
the Third Judicial District Court filed a pe-
tition to vacate and set aside this order be-
cause the order had been made on the con-
dition that appellant permanently remove 
from the state of Utah and appellant had 
violated this condition by returning to re-
side and practicing in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
At the hearing of the district attorney's 
petition to vacate the order it appeared that 
appellant had failed to move -from Utah im-
mediately as the court had understood he 
would do and that he actually did not leave 
until the latter part of December, 1949, aft-
er the court had repeatedly told appellant's 
attorney that it was being advised of his 
continued presence in the state and finally 
v. 8tate, 65 Utah 512, 238 P. 557; Rice 
v. Rice, Utah, 212 P.2d 085. 
STATE T. SCHREIBER 
Cite as 245 P.2d 232 
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told the attorney to warn him to get out of and therefore had practiced a fraud on the 
the state by Christmas or he would revoke court in procuring the order. 
the order. There was no evidence this 
warning was related to appellant Appel-
lant testified that his reasons for failing to 
leave the state sooner was the necessity of 
disposing of his practice and his illness 
which caused him to be bedridden during 
most of that period. After appellant and 
his family moved to Florida they remained 
there about eight months but his health 
failed to improve and they decided to go to 
California. On his way to California he 
passed through Salt Lake City and while 
there he consulted one of the judges of the 
Thhrd Judicial District on the legality of 
passing through Utah. This judge advised 
him that there was nothing in the order of 
the court which prohibited him from pass-
ing through or remaining in Utah, if he so 
chose. Appellant went to California but 
finding that his health did not improve 
there, he came back to Salt Lake where his 
wife bought a home and he intended to re-
sume his practice. 
[1] The court revoked the order on the 
ground that a fraud had been practiced on 
it because the order had been procured on 
the representation that appellant would per-
manently leave the state on account of his 
ill health, but that appellant never had any 
intention of so doing. This may well have 
been the fact but there is insufficient evi-
dence in the record upon which to base such 
a finding. 
The order of the court was: "That the 
conviction of the defendant, August Schrei-
ber, * * * be set aside and that the 
said action against said defendant be dis-
missed and that the said defendant be dis-
charged from further supervision of the 
parole department of the State of Utah." 
This order was final and unconditional. Al-
though the preamble states that it was 
granted because appellant, on account of ill 
health, desired to move permanently from 
the state the order was not conditioned on 
that premise. The order was not revoked 
for failure to comply with a condition but 
because the cOurt found from the facts and 
circumstances of appellant's late departure 
and early return to Utah that appellant had 
[2] It is well established that the court 
has the power to vacate an order or judg-
ment procured by extrinsic fraud, 31 Am. 
Jur., Judgments, Sec. 735; Cantwell v. 
Thatcher Bros. Banking Co., 47 Utah 150, 
151 P. 986; Anderson v. State, 65 Utah 512, 
238 P. 557; and Rice v. Rice, Utah, 212 P. 
2d 685. 
Under the provisions of Sec. 105-36-17, 
U.C.A.1943, as amended in S.L/43, c. 24, to 
terminate appellant's sentence the court was 
required to find that he had complied with 
the conditions of his probation and such ter-
mination was compatible with the public in-
terest. The probation officer's report indi-
cated that the conditions of his probation 
had been complied with and the evidence 
showed that appellant and his young son 
were both ill and their physician recom-
mended a different climate and appellant 
expressed a desire to remove from Utah 
permanently. On this evidence the court 
concluded that the termination would be 
compatible with the public interest. 
[3] At the hearing to vacate the order 
which had previously been made setting 
aside the sentence, the only evidence before 
the court was that of appellant. It was to 
the effect that he had not left Utah sooner 
because of delay in disposing of his practice 
and the fact that he claimed that he was too 
ill to travel; and further that the Florida 
climate had not proved beneficial to his 
health because of which he had returned to 
Utah. While the trial court apparently be-
lieved that he did not intend to leave Utah 
permanently at the time the sentence was 
vacated, so far as the record is concerned, 
this belief is apparently based upon suspi-
cion rather than an affirmative showing in 
the evidence. From an examination of the 
record, taken in the light most favorable to 
the finding of the trial court, we are com-
pelled to conclude that there is a failure to 
prove fraud either extrinsic or intrinsic. 
In the absence of such proof, the court 
could not properly vacate the order merely 
because of its belief that fraud had been 
practiced. The instant case is an example 
never intended to permanently leave Utah of misuse of Sec 105-36-17, U.C.A.1943, as 
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amende* In S.L.U. Chap. 24, 1943, which 
was enacted for the purpose of permitting 
the court under unusual circumstances and 
for good cause to expunge the record of 
crime. It should be observed that the fact 
that the record was so changed does not in 
any way gainsay the fact that the accused 
was convicted of the crime of abortion nor 
the fact that the crime was actually com-
mitted even though by his representations 
and tht procedure above indicated, he suc-
ceeded in getting the record expunged. 
Judgment reversed. 
WOLFE. C. J.f and McDONOUGH, 
CROCKETT and HENRIOD, JJ., concur. 
»^» */***** ' * * ** 
I. In re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 
85, 200 P. 103; In re Rafciaha Estate, 
48 Utah 128, 141, 158 P. 705. 
hich at all times been under the control of the de-
ting fendant and not available to plaintiff for In-
a n d spectfon, showing was sufficient for granting 
, . of motion for discovery. 
fact Case remanded for farther proceedings. 
)t i n Wolfe, C. J., dissented, 
ised |# T r J a | «s>388(2) -
n o r
 Findings of fact are required In equity 
o m
" as well as in law cases.1 
*°"* 2. Appeal and Error *=*3I(4) 
Where findings of facts were not made 
for interlocutory order which allowed a 
discovery, Supreme Court was not pro-
-._. hibited from reviewing order but would 
' assume trier of facts found them in 
u
 * accord with its decision and would affirm 
decision if from evidence it would be rea-
sonable to find facts to support it. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rules 49(a), 52(a); Const 
art 8, § 9.* 
% In re Gibhs, 4 Utah 97, 6 P. 525; Wright 
v. Union P. R. Co., 22 Utah 838, 02 P. 
317. 
MOWER v. MCCARTHY et a t 
NO. 7478. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 5, 1952. 
Action by Amy 11 Mower, Adm'x of the 
estate of Amasa N. Mower, deceased, against 
Wilson McCarthy and another, trustees of 
The Denver and Rio Grande Western Ball-
road Company, and another. The Third Ju-
dicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Roald A. Hogenson, J., granted interlocu-
tory order directing defendant railroad com-
pany to produce and to permit plaintiff to In-
spect and copy a transcript of testimony tak-
en by railroad In Its investigation of acci-
dent in which plaintiff's decedent was killed, 
and defendant appealed. The Snpreme 
Court, Wade, J., held that, although plain-
tiff's showing on motion for discovery was 
that her case was weak and was not neces-
sarily that she had been unable to obtain 
evidence of the cause of the accident yet 
in view of the fact that witnesses who knew 
the facts were employed by defendant and 
that until recently many of them bad been 
unknown to plaintiff, and that the facilities 
and equipment involved in the accident had 
3. Discovery <*=>90 
In Rules of Gvil Procedure relating to 
discovery of "any part of the writing** that 
reflects on attorney's mental impressions, 
conclusions, opinions or legal theories, the 
absolute prohibition on discovery of all such 
matters is clear, positive and without ex-
ception. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
30(b). 
4. Dlseovtry $=>90 
Railroad's records of conclusions stated 
by its experts as to cause of railroad acci-
dent in which plaintiffs husband was killed 
were not discoverable even though denial 
of discovery would cause prejudice, hard-
ship or injustice. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rules 26(b), 30(b), 34. 
5. Discovery 4»9Q 
In Rules oi Civil Procedure which 
allow discovery of various documents but 
which prohibit discovery of "any part of 
the writing" which is attorney's work 
product, use of the words "the writing" was 
proper and correct to refer to the writing of 
which discovery is sought, the reference 
being to a definite writing, and prohibi-
tion would be so construed to be in harmony 
with the purpose of protecting the work 
product of the attorney. 
Procedure, rules 26(b), 30(b), 34. 
6. Discovery *=HK) 
Under Rules of Civil Procedure, writ-
ing which reflects the conclusions of an ex-
pert based on assumed facts, but not con-
taining evidence of events, conditions, cir-
cumstances and similar matters, is not dis-
coverable. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 
26(b), 30(b), 34. 
7. Discovery <t=>97(6) 
Question whether portions of writings 
sought by discovery come within prohibi-
tions protecting attorney's work product and 
expert's conclusions should be determined 
without permitting opposing counsel to see 
the questioned matter and, to do this, the 
parts of the transcript which it is claimed 
are not discoverable should be submitted 
to the court for it to decide. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rules 26(b), 30(b), 34. 
& Discovery «=»90 
Where denial of discovery of document 
would have caused prejudice, hardship and 
injustice, document was discoverable with-
out regard to whether it was prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or in preparation 
for trial. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 
26(b), 30(b), 34. 
9. Discovery <S=>97(I) 
Elements of prejudice, hardship, or in-
justice necessary to the discovery of doc-
uments prepared in anticipation of litigation 
or in preparation for trial are sufficiently 
shown where party seeking discovery is, 
with due diligence, unable to obtain evidence 
of some material facts, events, conditions 
and circumstances which the discovery will 
probably reveal, and where, because of this 
situation, the party is unable to adequately 
prepare the case for trial. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rules 26(b), 30(b), 34. 
«0. Discovery *=>»?( i ) 
On motion for production of transcript 
of testimony by railroad employees given in 
railroad's investigation of 1944 accident, al-
though plaintiff's showing on motion was 
only that her case was weak and was not 
necessarily that she had been unable to ob-
tain evidence of the cause of the accident, 
in view of fact that witnesses who knew 
l « P.Jd—15 
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Rules of Gvil facts were employed by defendant and that 
until recently many of them were unknown 
to plaintiff and that facilities and equipment 
involved in the accident had at all times 
been under control of defendant and had not 
been available to plaintiff for inspection, 
showing was sufficient for granting of mo-
tion. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 26(b), 
30(b), 34. 
11. Discovery <3=28 
The objects and purposes of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure concerning discovery 
are to develop the truth and prevent 
surprise. Rules of Gvil Procedure, rules 
26(b), 30(b), 34. 
12. Disco very <£=>90 
Where transcript of testimony given by 
railroad employees in railroad's own in-
vestigation of railroad accident did not 
constitute the reports of railroad accidents 
required by Federal statutes, discovery of 
transcript under Rules of Civil Procedure 
was not prohibited by those Federal stat-
utes. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 26(b), 
30(b), 34; 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 38, 40, 41. 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 
Gilford L. Ashton, Salt Lake Gty, for 
appellant. 
Rawlings, Wallace, Black, Roberts & 
Black, Dwight L. King, King Be. Anderson, 
Emmett L. Brown, Salt Lake City, for re-
spondent 
WADE, Justice. 
The defendant, The Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company, ap-
peals from an interlocutory order directing 
it to produce and permit plaintiff to inspect 
and copy a transcript of the testimony of 
witnesses taken by it while investigating a 
derailment accident by which plaintiffs de-
cedent was killed. Because of the im-
portance of the question and once the in-
spection and copying was made a reversal 
on appeal would not restore the parties to 
their present status, we granted the appeal. 
It involves a construction of the discovery 
provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, especially Rules 26, 30 and 34. 
Hereafter, the term °Rnlen or "Rules" un-
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STATE v. 20LANTAKIS. (No 4458.) 
Supreme Court of Utah. Sept 15, 1927. 
1. Criminal law <§=» 1001—District courts have 
Inherent power to suspend sentences only for 
definite period and specifio temporary pur-
pose. 
In absence of statutory authority, district 
courts do not have inherent' power to suspend 
sentences except for definite period and for 
some specific temporary purpose.! 
2. Criminal law <@=> 1001—Statute does not au-
thorize suspension of sentence as matter of 
favor or grace (Laws 1923, c. 74)f 
Laws 1923, c. 74, gives trial court authority 
to suspend sentences, not as matter of favor 
or grace, but only when compatible with public 
interest. 
3. Criminal law $=»1001—Judgments of courts 
of competent jurisdiction, including suspen-
sions of sentence, determine parties' rights. 
Judgments rendered by courts of competent jurisdiction, including suspensions of sentence, fix and determine rights of parties to proceed-
ings. 
4. Criminal law <§=>I00I—One whose sentence 
is suspended during good behavior, without 
reservations, has vested right to rely thereon 
during good behavior (Laws 1923, c. 74). 
One whose sentence is suspended during 
good behavior, without reservations, has Vest-
ed right to rely thereon, so long as such condi-
tion is complied with; purpose of Laws 1923, 
c. 74, permitting suspension of sentence, be-
ing reformatory. 
5. Constitutional law <£=>83(I)—Personal lib-
erty may not be alternately granted and de-
nied as by granting and revoking suspension 
of sentencef without just cause. 
The right to personal liberty may no£ be 
alternately granted and denied, as by granting 
and revoking suspension of sentence, without just cause. 
6. Criminal law $=>10OI«—One granted sus-
pended sentence during good behavior, with-
out limitation, is entitled to judicial hearing 
on question of his compliance with oonditlon 
before revocation of sentence. 
One whose sentence is suspended during 
good behavior, without any limitation, is en-
titled to hearing on question whether he has 
complied with conditions imposed, in accordance 
with established rules of judicial procedure, 
after filing of affidavit, motion, or other writ-
ten pleading, setting forth facts relied on for 
revocation of suspension, with opportunity to 
answer or plead to charge made, and right of 
cross-examination. 
7. Witnesses <$=»266, 267—Right of cross-ex-
amination is absolute, and becomes discre-
tionary only after it has been substantially 
and fairly exercised. 
In judicial investigation, the right of cross-
examination is absolute right, not a mere priv-
ilege of party against whom witness is called, 
and allowance of further cross-examination be-
RBPORTER (Utah 
comes discretionary only after such right has 
been substantially and fairly exercised. 
8. Criminal law $=>l 1701/2(5)—Refusal to per-
mit cross-examination of state's witnesses, st 
hearing on question of revoking suspension of 
sentence, held prejudicial error. 
Trial court's refusal to permit defendant 
to cross-examine state's witnesses, at hearing 
on question of revoking suspension of sentence 
during good behavior, held prejudicial error. 
9. Criminal law • » ! 177—Overruling of objec-
tions that defendant was arrested before 
service of oitation to show cause why sus-
pension of sentenoe should not be revoked, 
and was not advised of facts relied on be-
fore hearing, held prejudicial error. 
Overruling of timely objection to proceed-
ings to revoke suspension of sentence, on 
grounds that defendant was arrested before 
citation to show cause was served upon him 
and was not advised of facts relied on by state 
until evidence was offered at hearing, held 
prejudicial error. 
Cherry and Gideon, JJ., dissenting. 
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake 
County; W. S. Marks, Judge. 
Peter Zolantakis pleaded guilty of, and 
was given a suspended sentence for, being 
a persistent violator of the Prohibition Act 
From a judgment vacating the suspension 
and ordering defendant's commitment to the 
state prison, he appeals. Reversed, and de-
fendant ordered discharged. 
P. W. James, of Salt Lake City, for ap-
pellant. 
Harvey H. Cluff, Atty. Gen., and L. A. 
Miner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State. 
HANSEN, J. The defendant prosecutes 
this appeal from a judgment of the district 
court of Salt Lake county whereby a sus-
pension of a sentence was vacated and the 
defendant ordered committed to the state 
prison for the crime of being a persistent 
violator of the prohibition law of the state. 
The case was heretofore argued and sub-
mitted to this court and an opinion ren-
dered by a divided court affirming the judg-
ment. Thereafter defendant filed a petition 
for rehearing, which was granted. The ma-
jority of the court at the time the rehearing 
was granted, and as now constituted, are 
not in accord with the conclusions reached 
by the majority of the court in the original 
opinion. 
On July 28, 1925, Peter Zolantakis pleaded 
guilty to a charge of being a persistent vio-
lator of an act prohibiting the manufacture 
and use of intoxicating liquors and regulat-
ing the sale and traffic therein, and particu-
larly sections 8343,
 % and 3345 of title 54, 
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, as amended by Laws 
. Utah, 1919, c. 66. Thereupon the court pro-
[nounced judgment and sentence "that the 
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defendant, Peter Zolantakls, be confined and 
imprisoned in the state prison in and for the 
state of Utah, for an indeterminate term, as 
provided by section 9062, Compiled Laws 
Utah 1917, and that said sentence be, and 
the same hereby is, suspended during the 
good behavior of said defendant." The crime 
to which defendant pleaded guilty is a 
felony. 
The power of trial courts to suspend sen-
tences is expressly granted by the provisions 
vt chapter 74, Laws Utah 1923, which reads 
as follows: 
"Upon conviction of any crime or offense if 
It appears compatible with the public interest 
the court having jurisdiction may suspend the 
imposition or the execution of sentence and may 
place the defendant on probation for such pe-
riod of time as the court shall determine. The 
court may subsequently increase or decrease 
the probation period and may revoke or modify 
any condition of probation. While on probation 
the defendant may be required to pay in one 
or several sums any fine imposed at the time 
of being placed on probation; may be required 
to make restitution or reparation to the ag-
grieved party or parties for the actual damages 
or losses caused by the offense for which con-
viction was had; and may be required to pro-
vide for the support of his wife and others for 
whose support he may be legally liable." 
Under date ot March 5, 1926, a citation 
waa issued under the seal and signature of 
the clerk of the district court of Salt Lake 
county whereby the defendant was cited and 
required to appear before said district court 
of Salt Lake county on Saturday, the 6th 
day of March, A. D. 1926, at 10 o'clock a. m. 
of that day, then and there to show cause 
why the suspended sentence dated July 23, 
1924, should not be canceled, vacated, and 
set aside. This citation was returned with-
out having been served because, as stated 
in the sheriff's return, the defendant was 
absent from the state. On April 5, 1926, 
a bench warrant was issued directing the 
sheriff of Salt Lake county to attach the 
body of the defendant and bring him before 
the court forthwith. The bench warrant 
was served upon the defendant on the date 
of its issuance and the defendant was arrest-
ed. Under date ot April 6, 1926, another 
citation was issued under the seal and sig-
nature of the clerk of the district court of 
Salt Lake county whereby defendant was 
cited and required to appear before said 
court "on Saturday, the 10th day of April, 
A. D. 1296, at 10 o'clock a. m. of that day 
then and there to show cause, if any you 
have, why your suspended sentence should 
not be vacated and set aside." Both of 
these citations and the bench warrant were 
issued without any affidavit, complaint, in-
formation, motion, or other writing having 
been made or filed charging the defendant 
with any lack of good behavior or otherwise, 
and were made returnable before a Judge 
other than the judge who passed sentence 
and suspended the same. 
When the case was called for hearing, the 
following proceedings were had: 
D. H. Clayton, a witness called by the 
state, testified, in substance, that during the 
month of February, 1926, he went to a point 
a little south of or bpposite the place where 
Mr. Zolantakls resided, and while there saw 
Zolantakls come out of the rear door of the 
house and walk to the back of the lot, then 
back into the house, and, after remaining in 
the house for a few minutes, he came out of 
the side gate into an alley. 
Reed Billings, a witness called by the 
state, testified that he was, and for a num-
ber of years had been, a police officer of 
Salt Lake City; that he was and had been 
acquainted with Peter Zolantakls for the 
past 7 or 8 years; that defendant resided 
at 47 South Fifth West street with his fam-
ily, consisting of a wife and at least two 
children; that on March 2, 1926, while 
crossing the street from the residence of de-
fendant, he saw Mr. Zolantakls come out of 
the side door of the house and go down to-
wards the garage, then turn around and go 
back into the house; that about 3 or 4 min-
utes later defendant came out of the house 
again and went south on Fifth West street 
to Second South street, then east on Second 
South street; that this occurred about 6 or 
6:30 o'clock; in the morning. 
A. A. Reese, called by the state, testified 
that he has known the defendant, Peter Zo-
lantakls, by sight for about 2 years; that 
defendant resided at 47 South Fifth West 
street; that the wife and children of the de-
fendant resided in his house; than on March 
2, 1926, witness went to the house of the 
defendant in company with Officers *feve, 
O'Brien, and Black; that they had a search 
and seizure warrant and made a search of 
defendant's premises; that as a result of 
such search they found about 30 pints of in-
toxicating liquors, consisting of moonshine 
whisky and mestika; that some of the liq-
uor was found in a cupboard in a cache on 
the side of the wall, and some under the 
floor; that the wife and daughter of the 
defendant were at the house at the time of 
the search; that defendant's wife said that 
Mr. Zolantakls had gone up town, but would 
be back again for supper; that the witness 
told defendant's wife to tell her husband to 
report at the office of Lieutenant Clayton 
the next morning at 10 o'clock; and that 
she said she would so inform her husband. 
Two of the bottles which were found by 
the officers in the home of defendant were 
received in evidence. 
Neither at the time of the hearing nor 
prior thereto was defendant asked to plead, 
answer, or admit, or deny any charge made 
against him. Nor was the defendant advised 
of any charge against him, nor of what the 
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court was about to investigate. Soon after | 
the hearing began defendant's counsel moved 
that the citation be dismissed for the rea-
son no affidavit or complaint had been filed 
and defendant was not apprised of any fact 
or facts or charge that he was expected to] 
meet The objection was overruled. The at-
torney for the state asKed leave to amend 
the citation, but the request was denied. 
Defendant, through his attorney, attempted 
to cross-examine each of the witnesses called 
by the state, but the court, upon its own mo-
tion, denied the right of cross-examination 
for the reason, as stated by the court, it did 
not wish the proceedings to "savor of the 
dignity of a trial." 
'Peter Zolantakis was sworn and testified 
that be was not the defendant in this ac-
tion, and that he did not reside on Fifth 
West street in Salt Lake City, on March 2 
and 3, 1926. No attempt was made on the 
part of the attorney for the state to cross-
examine the witness Peter Zolantakis. 
At the conclusion of the proceedings the 
court ordered the suspension of sentence va-
cated and set aside and the defendant, Pe-
ter Zolantakis, Imprisoned in the state prison 
as hereinbefore indicated. 
The defendant assigns as error, among 
others (a) the refusal of the trial court to 
dismiss the citation for the reason that there 
was no affidavit or other basis apprising de-
fendant of what facts he was to meet or 
what charge was made against him; (b) 
that the court erred in denying defendant 
the right to cross-examine the witnesses 
called for the state. 
That the trial court had power to sus-
pend sentence, under the provisions of chap-
ter 74, Laws Utah 1923, is clear and is not 
questioned. The statute above quoted, it 
will be observed, grants to the trial court 
broad and comprehensive discretionary pow-
ers as to the terms and conditions upon 
which It may suspend sentence. In the in-
Instant case, it will further be observed, the 
sentence vfas suspended during the good be-
havior of the defendant without any reser-
vations. In 16 a J. 1335, | 4141, the law is 
stated thus: 
"A court having power to make an order sus-
pending the execution of its judgment in crim-
inal cases, necessarily, upon violation of such 
order, has the power to revoke the same and to 
enforce the original judgment by commitment; 
and such right is not impaired or limited by 
the passing of the term in which such suspen-
sion is made. Where, however, the suspension 
is upon conditions expressed in the judgment i 
the prisoner has the right to rely upon such 
conditions, and so long as he complies there-
with the suspension will stand." 
The case of Weber v. State, 58 Ohio St. 
,616, 51 N, E. U6, 41 L. E. A, 472, cited in 
'the footnote, sustains the text 
Similar results are reached in the follow-
ing cases: State v. Hemler, 157 La. 227,102 
So. 816; Ex parte Selig, 29 N. M. 430, 223 P. 
97; State v. Miller, 122 S. 0. 468, 115 S. E. 
742; Ex parte Hamm, 24 N. M. 33, 172 P. 
190, L. B. A. 1918D, 694. , < 
Courts of some jurisdictions seem to tako 
the view that the suspension of sentence is 
a mere favor or matter of grace and may 
bey revoked by the court at will. 
/[I-3] In the absence of statutory authority, 
in this jurisdiction, district courts do not" 
have inherent power to suspend sentences 
except for some definite period and for some 
specific temporary purpose. People v. 
Blackburn, 6 Utah, 847, 23 P. 759. Under 
the statute above quoted trial courts are not 
given authority to suspend sentences as a 
matter of favor or grace, but only when "it 
appears compatible with the public inter-
est" Judgments rendered! by courts of com* 
potent jurisdiction are almost uniformly 
held to fix and determine the rights of the 
parties to proceedings. Indeed, that is the 
I very purpose of a judgment The writer is 
unable to find any good reason why an ex-
I caption should be made in the case of a sus-
pension of sentence.' It must be assumed 
that when the trial court stated the sen-
tence should be suspended during good be-
havior it meant just what was said, when, 
as in the instant case, nothing in the sen-
tence indicates otherwise. 
[4, S] The purpose of the law permitting 
the suspension of sentence is clearly re-
formatory. If those who are to be reformed 
cannot implicitly rely upon promises or or-
ders contained in the suspension of sentence, 
then we may well expect the law to fail in 
its purpose. Beformation can certainly best 
be accomplished by fair, consistent, and 
straightforward treatment of the person 
sought to be reformed. It would therefore 
seem, both upon authority and principal, 
that when a sentence is suspended during 
good behavior, without reservations, the 
person whose sentence is thus suspended has 
a vested right to rely thereon so long as 
such condition is complied with. The right 
to personal liberty is one of the most sacred 
and valuable rights of a citizen, and should 
not be regarded lightly. The right to per-
sonal liberty may be as valuable to one con-
victed of crime as to one not so convicted, 
and so long as one complies with the condi-
tions upon which such right is assured by 
judicial declaration, he may not be deprived 
of the same. Such right may not be alter-
natively granted and denied without just 
cause. 
The next question presented and to be de-
termined is whether or not the record in the 
instant case justifies the conclusions reached 
in the judgment rendered. It is not contend-
ed on behalf of appellant that he is entitled 
to a jury trial, and it is clear that the pro-
visions of chapter 74, supra, do not contem-
plate a. Jury trial to determine whether or 
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not the suspension of a sentence should be 
vacated. It may well be that where the per-
son sought- to be imprisoned denies that he 
is the defendant in the original action, such 
person is entitled to a Jury trial upon that 
issue. In this case the person before the 
court did deny that he was the defendant in 
the action, but as no point is made upon 
that ground on this appeal we are not called 
upon to consider this phase of the case, 
[6] In some jurisdictions it is held that a 
court having jurisdiction is empowered to 
revoke the suspension of sentence without 
granting a trial to determine whether or not 
the condition of the suspension of sentence 
has been violated. Such, in substance, is 
the statement of the law in 16 C. J. 1335, § 
8142. In the state of New York, where sus-
pension of sentence is regarded as a matter 
of favor or grace, the court may at will order 
the suspension of sentence revoked. People 
v. Trombly, 173 App. Div. 497, 160 N. Y. S. 
67. In Texas, as stated in the syllabus, 
which reflects the opinion in Ex parte Law-
son, 76 Tex. Cr. R. 419, 175 S. W. 698, "it 
is only on final judgment of conviction in an-
other case that suspension of sentence dur-
ing good behavior can be set aside, and it 
cannot be done pending appeal from such 
conviction." In Louisiana, under the provi-
sions of the statutes of that state, the court 
reached the same result as was reached in 
the case of Ex parte Lawson, supra, in State 
v. Hemler, 157 La. 227, 102 So. 316. Other 
courts have reached conclusions between 
those two extremes. In this state the ques-
tion here involved is one of first impression. 
The statute involved does not point out a 
method of procedure. ' The majority of this 
court are of the opinion that a person who 
has a sentence suspended during good be-
havior, without any limitation, is entitled to 
a hearing upon the question of whether or 
not he has complied with the conditions im-
posed; that such hearing must be accord-
ing to some well recognized and established 
rules of judicial procedure; that defendant 
is entitled to have filed either an affidavit, 
motion, or other written pleading setting 
forth the facts relied upon for a revocation 
of the suspension of sentence; that the de-
fendant should be given an opportunity to 
answer or plead to the charge made; that a 
hearing should be had upon the issags 
joined; and that the defendant as well as 
the state be given the right of cross-examina-
tion. If we are correct in our conclusion 
that the defendant has a vested right to his 
personal liberty during good behavior when 
so ordered without reservation in the origi-
nal sentence, any proceeding failing in these 
essentials is error. 
[7, B] It is contended on behalf of the state 
that the evidence in this case justifies the 
revocation of the suspension of sentence. 
Conceding such to be true upon the record 
before us, still how are we to determine, a£ 
a matter of law, what the evidence would 
have been, had defendant, through his at-
torney, been given an opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses for the state? In a 
judicial investigation the right of cross-ex-
amination is an absolute right and not a 
mere privilege of the party against whom the 
witness is called. It is only after such right 
has been substantially and fairly exercised 
that the allowance of further cross-examina-
tion becomes discretionary. 5 Jones, Comm. 
Ev. S 821. The reason for the rule is doubt-
less the fact that the cross-examination of a 
witness may not only modify and explain, 
but it may destroy the evidence in chief. A 
court is unable in advance to determine what 
will be the result of cross-examination in a 
given case. Legal procedure requires that 
the court hears before it condemns, and in 
such hearing cross-examination is often as 
enlightening as is the examination in chief. 
We are therefore of the opinion that the 
refusal of the trial court to permit cross-ex-
amination of the state's witness was preju-
dicial to the rights of the defendant. 
[9] The record in this case shows that de-
fendant was arrested before the citation to 
show cause why the suspension of his sen-
tence should not be revoked was served upon 
him. It is not made to appear that defendant 
was advised of any facts relied upon by the 
state for such revocation until evidence was 
offered at the time of the hearing. No issue 
of any fact was before the court for deter-
mination. It is therefore difficult to see how 
the defendant could have been expected to 
properly resist the revocation of the suspen-
sion of sentence, even though he may have 
had a good defense to any charge of wrong-
doing since the sentence was suspended. 
Timely objection was made to the proceed-
ings, and we are of the opinion that the 
failure of the trial court to sustain the ob-
jections was prejudicial to the rights of de-
fendant. 
We are therefore of the opinion that the 
judgment appealed from should be and the 
same is hereby reversed, and the defendant 
is ordered discharged so far as these pro-
ceedings are concerned. 
THORMAN, C. J.f and STRAUP, J., 
cur. 
con-
CHERRY, J. (dissenting). When the exe-
cution of a sentence is suspended, it is not 
vacated. The judgment itself is not impaired 
or limited. The time for its execution is 
merely deferred. While under a suspended 
sentence, a duly convicted person is not freed 
from the legal consequences of his guilt. He 
is merely enjoying a conditional favor, post-
poning his punishment, which may be with-
drawn. When the suspension is revoked the 
convict is punished for the crime of which 
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he was convicted, and not for violating the i 
terms of his parole. The suspension of a 
sentence can never be demanded as a matter 
of legal right It is granted at the mere will 
of the court When granted, it is not held as 
a vested right, but as a matter of favor or 
grace. The statute confers upon courts a 
discretionary power designed to aid in the 
reformation and reclamation of convicted 
persons. By impressing upon tbe convicted 
person that he is enjoying a contingent fa-
vor, which may be withdrawn or revoked at 
any time, it is sought to induce or coerce him 
to amend his ways. The whole force and 
virtue of the expedient lies in the reserved 
power of the court to revoke the favor and 
inflict the penalty. And if this is hedged] 
about with limitations which substantially 
destroy it, the whole scheme is defeated. 
The suspension of the sentence is not a fixed 
and final adjustment amounting to a right to 
be revoked only upon a violation of the con-
dition upon which it is granted, because the 
statute expressly declares that "the court 
may subsequently increase or decrease the 
probation period and may revoke or modify 
any condition of probation/1 Clearly, this 
precludes the claim that the Judgment is un-
enforceable until, after due process of law, 
it is adjudged that the condition of probation 
has been violated. The power of the court 
to revoke is not limited to when the condi-
tions have been violated, but extends to the 
modification or revocation of the condition 
itself. 
There is nothing in the statute suggesting 
that the compliance with any condition, or 
the proof of any grounds, are necessary to 
authorise the revocation of on order sus-
pending sentence. From the nature of the 
subject, the whole matter of granting and re-
voking suspensions must rest in the discre-
tion of the court. This view of the matter 
finds support in People ex rel., etc, v. Court 
of Sessions, etc., 141 N. Y. 288, 86 N. E. 886, 
28 L. R. A. 856, where O'Brien, J., speaking 
for the court, says: 
"The power to suspend the Judgment during 
good behavior, if understood as expressing a 
condition, upon the compliance with which the 
offender would be absolutely relieved from all 
punishment and freed from the power of the 
court to pass sentence, Is open to more doubt 
The Legislature cannot authorize the court* to 
abdicate their own powers and duties or to tie 
their own hands In such a way that after sen-
tence has been suspended they cannot when 
deemed proper, and in the interest of Justice, 
Inflict the proper punishment in the exercise of 
a sound discretion. Nor can the free and un-
trammeled exercise of this power or the right to 
pass sentence according to the discretion of 
the court be made dependent upon compliance 
with some condition that would require the 
court to try a question of fact before it could 
render the Judgment which the law prescribes. 
The statute must not be understood as con-
ferring any new power. The court may sus-
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pend sentence as before, but it can do nothing 
to preclude itself or its successor from passing 
the proper sentence whenever such a course ap-
pears to be proper. This, we think, is all that 
the statute intends, and that was the only effect 
of the Judgment It is a power which the court 
should possess in furtherance of Justice, to be 
used wisely and discreetly, and it is perhaps 
creditable to the administration of Justice in 
such cases that while the power has always 
existed no complaint has been heard of its 
abuse." 
In 16 a J. 1886, It is said: 
"When sentence has been suspended during 
good behavior of the defendant either with or 
without statutory authority, the court has pow-
er to revoke such order and to impose the sen-
tence without granting defendant a trial as to 
whether or not he has violated such condition.1* 
In People v. Goodrich (Sup.) 149 N. 7. S. 
406, the court ia dealing with a revocation 
of a suspended sentence, and after holding 
that the trial court did not err in not trying 
as an issue of fact the question whether the 
defendant has violated the condition of her 
discharge, said: 
"I think the suspension of Judgment in this 
case was a matter of grace, not of right to tbe 
defendant that she thereby acquired no vested 
rights, and the court had the right in its dis-
cretion to cancel and revoke tbe same. In any 
event, all that was required was to call to its 
attention facts that satisfied the conscience 
of the court that the defendant had violated the 
terms of her parole." 
In People v. Trombly, 178 App. Dlv. 497,160 
N. 7. S. 67, the suspension of a sentence was | revoked when the court "received informa-
tion" that the conditions of the suspension 
had not been complied with. In sustaining 
the revocation the court said: 
"It was proper at any time to revoke the or-
der suspending the execution of the sentence, 
and neither the Legislature nor the courts have 
ever attempted to limit this power, except to 
the discretion of the court" 
In State v. Miller, 122 S. a 468,115 S. E. 
742, it was decided in a proceeding similar 
to this that the fact that a rule to show 
cause was issued without information under 
oath to support it did not affect the court's 
Jurisdiction to enforce the original sentence.^  
when defendant made formal return aud was 
heard by counsel, and that the order suspend-
ing sentence might be revoked without grant-
ing the defendant a trial. ' 
In the case before us it is not claimed 
that tbe court abused its discretion or acted 
capriciously or arbitrarily by slaking the 
order complained of without sufficient 
grounds, nor that on the merits the defend-
ant has suffered any substantial injustice. 
In view of the facts proved, which were not 
even denied by the appellant, that claim could 
I not be successfully made. Tbe complaint 
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is merely that the court committed error in 
Its procedure. 
In exercising the powers conferred by the 
statute in question from the nature of the 
subject, courts must necessarily have a large 
discretion not only in respect of the grounds 
upon which they act, but in the method or 
procedure by which they ascertain facts and 
arrive at conclusions. They are not dealing 
with specific legal rights and are not bound 
by the standards of legal procedure which 
usually control judicial proceedings. This is 
comprehended within the very generally ap-
proved rule that an order suspending sen-
tence may be revoked without granting the 
defendant a trial upon the facts., It logically 
follows that courts may ascertain facts 
upon which to act in any manner they see 
fit, and act upon them, provided only that 
their proceedings and conduct on the whole 
are not capricious or arbitrary or a manifest 
abuse of discretion. I think the orders ap-
pealed from should be affirmed. 
GIDEON, J. I concur in the views ex-
pressed by Mr. Justice CHERRY. 
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1. Master and servant $=>87—Right of action, 
under Employers' Liability Law, Is not govern-
ed by rules of common-law actions for dam-
ages or to action as modified by statute. 
Right of action, provided in Employers' 
liability Law (Civ. Code 1913, pars. 3153-3162, 
as amended by Laws 1919, c. 15) is not gov-
erned by rules applicable to common-law ac-
tions for damages or to that action as modified 
by statute. 
2. Master and servant $=»107(8)— Employer's 
negllgenoe Is not involved In action under Em-
ployers' Liability Law (Ctv. Code 1913, par. 
3154). 
In action under Employers' Liability Law 
(Civ. Code 1913, par. 3154), negligence of em-
ployer is not involved, in view of Const art 
18, { 7. 
3. Master and servant <@=>204(I)—Assumed 
risk is not Involved in action undqr Employers' 
Liability Law (Civ. Code 1913, par. 3154). 
In actions under Employers' Liability Law 
(Civ. Code 1913, par. 3154), assumed risk is not 
involved, in view of Const art 18, 8 7. 
4. Master and servant $=»228(I)—Employee's 
sole negligence defeats recovery, but contrib-
utory negligence is no defense, under Employ-
ers' Liability Law (Civ. Code 1913, par. 3154). 
Under Employers' Liability Law (Civ. Code 
1913, par. 3154), negligence of plaintiff, defeat-
ing right of recovery, must be bis sole negli-
gence, and contributory negligence is no defense, 
v. SABIN 1049 
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and in such action refusal to instruct on contrib-
utory negligence was not error. 
5. Master and servant $=»228(I)—Employee In-jured by accident due to conditions of employ-
ment can recover, under Employers' Liability 
Law, though not free from negligence, and dan-
ger was known. 
In action under Employers' Liability Law 
(Civ. Code 1913, pars. 3153-3162, as amended 
by Laws 1919, c 15) for accidental injury to 
employee due to conditions of occupation, wheth-
er good or bad, plaintiff is entitled to recover, 
even if through exposing himself to bad condi-
tions he was not free from negligence, and fact 
that he knew conditions were dangerous or bad 
will not defeat right to compensation, in view 
of Const art 18, § 7. 
6. Master and servant 4=»228(I)—Employee's 
negligence, defeating recovery under Employ-
ers' Liability Law, must be superimposed on 
conditions by his positive aot but for which he 
would not have been Injured. 
Employee's negligence, to defeat action un-
der Employers' Liability Law (Civ. Code 1913, 
pars. 3153-3162, as amended by Laws 1919, c. 
15), must be superimposed on conditions of his 
occupation by some positive act of his but for 
which he would not have been injured. 
7. Trial $=»253(9)—Instruction, denying em-
ployee's recovery If failing to replace guard 
covering gears, held properly refused, as ig-
norlng concurring cause of greasy floor on 
whioh he slipped. 
In action under Employers' liability Law 
(Civ. Code 1913, pars. 8153-3162, as amended 
by Laws 1919, c 15) for injuries to mechanic 
when slipping on wet greasy floor and catching 
hand in gear meshes of pump from which guard 
had been temporarily removed for purposes of 
repair, instruction denying recovery, if em-
ployee neglected to correct the dangerous con-
dition by replacing the cover before undertak-
ing to do the work, held properly refused, as ig-
noring concurring cause of greasy floor on which 
he slipped. 
8. Appeal and error «=»l033(5) — Instruction, 
denying employee recovery if he failed to re-
place guard on pump, unless acting under em-
ployers' instructions, held favorable to em-
ployers. 
In action under Employers' Liability Low 
(Civ. Code 1913, pars. 8153-3162, as amended 
by Laws 1919, c. 15), when mechanic was injured 
by slipping on wet greasy floor and catching 
hand in gear meshes of pump from which guard 
had been removed for purposes of repair, in-
struction that if employee took guard off pump 
and failed to replace i t he could not recover, 
unless he was acting under employers' instruc-
tions, held more favorable to employers than 
they were entitled to, since it ignored the con-
curring cause of the greasy floor which mani-
festly contributed to the accident 
Appeal from Superior Court, Gila County; 
C. C. Falres, Judge. 
Action under the Employers' Liability Law 
by Byron Sabin against B. O. Grasty and an-
other, partners doing business under the firm 
€=>For othtr casta ••• same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Kty-Numbered Digests and Indexes 
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£ g *?m**k»» diieriMin.tkm In statu-
^ ^ f a u o m and other governmental 
^ 1 0 0 SO. 2871 2891, 85 LEA2d 784 
*• » «*«> «f denial of due process. 
J ^ * « d go no further.
 N o n e the. 
£ * ^ * * « » « infringement of any 
'J™?**" rifht nor use of a suspect da* 
w o u K Z^Ttl *?*»»»»««? impact 
n ^ t « n ? f a l t h e Pourtee»«> Amend-
J f e J f l S l • "eptimate state interert. 
&Ct 2618.2516-2517,49 L.EA2d 511 (1976? 
•PP™«. without seeking a change in the 
****** **lands classification s i 
&*»«*» ofJUbert Francini fi^f? 
» « y Judgment at 4. In contrast UhZ 
L T 1 ? it. .ubdivudon appHcaon. 
J E J ? ? ? ? OPP^tion to Summary 
Judgment at t On the basis of this J3L 
ed difference between the two propoX 
the Commia«o» could rationally h W ^ t e 
D ! " n t , ^ t r a 5 » u * "« FVandnT.^ l l 
JEZJE^ST ,.Sin0e * » * " . '» hi. N^nAer 1979 application, sought only ap-
^ w^LTf P7^y Within • **«* 
ti^SSL? LV,°Iatk>n °f ^^ P"*~ 
nSTL£Jf° ^ ^ ^ ^ «V Per-
CG.S. § 22a-42a(a). On the facto of ihfc 
case, in which Francini has made no such 
contention, the court declines to make such 
a finding. 
It cannot be said that the distinction 
made between Francini'a and Libron's ap-
plications was irrational, nor that it fur-
thered no reasonable governmental purpose. 
Equal protection has not been denied mere-
ly because a particular discrimination works 
a hardship on a given individual. See, e.g.f 
Slavin v. Secretary of Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare, 486 RSupp. 
204, 207 (S.D.N.Y.1980). 
Accordingly, defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment must be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize: defendants' motion to dis-
miss the Amended Complaint, pursuant to 
Rule 12(bX6), Fed.RXiv.R, insofar as the 
Amended Complaint states a claim of denial 
of due process, is granted; defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, 
pursuant to Rule 12(bX6), FedR.Civ.P., inso-
far as the Amended Complaint states a 
claim of a taking without just compensa-
tion, is granted; and defendants' motion for 
summary judgment in their favor, pursuant 
to Rule 56(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., insofar as the 
Amended Complaint states a claim of denial 
of equal protection of the laws, is granted. 
It is so ordered. 
(o tgrnnnuiuiuO 
Michael C. THOMPSON, Petitioner, 
v. 
The DEPARTMENT OF THE TREA-
SURY, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TO-
BACCO AND FIREARMS, Respondent 
No. C-61-0095A. 
United States District Court, 
D. Utah, CD. 
Dec 29, 1982. 
An action was filed seeking relief from 
the federal firearms disability. Onthepeti-
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tkmers motion for summary judgment, the 
District Court, Aldon J. Anderson, Chief 
Judge, held that: (1) the district court 
would exercise subject-matter jurisdiction 
over the claim; (2) the action was not 
barred by sovereign immunity; (3) a justici-
able controversy was prevented; and (4) a 
judicial pardon and expungement granted 
to the petitioner under Utah law did not 
erase completely the prior convictions so as 
to relieve the petitioner of the federal fire-
arms disability. 
Ordered accordingly. 
See also D.C., 533 F.Supp. 90. 
1. Weapons *»4 
District court would exercise jurisdic-
tion over action seeking expungement of 
federal firearms disability where three 
years had elapsed since petitioner first 
sought expungement, petitioner would face 
choice of either abandoning his business or 
subjecting himself and perhaps his employ-
ees to potential prosecution for violation of 
federal firearms control statute and further 
pursuit of remedy through administrative 
channels would be futile. 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 922; 18 U.S.OA.App. § 1202; 28 U.& 
OA. | 1331; 5 U.S.OA. § 702; 28 U.S.C. 
(1976 Ed.) § 1331(a). 
2. United States *»12$(9) 
An action seeking expungement of fed-
eral firearms disability was not barred by 
sovereign immunity in that Administrative 
Procedure Act has been amended to waive 
sovereign immunity over review of agency 
decision. 5 U&OA. § 551 et seq.; 28 U.S. 
OA.f 1331. 
3. Federal Courts *»13 
Action seeking expungement of federal 
fireanm disability presented justiciable 
controversy in that petitioner was not re-
1. Hue 18 US.C | 922(gHh) provides as fol-
lows: 
(g) It shad be unlawful for any person— 
(1) who is under indictment for, or who 
has been convicted in any court of, a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term ex-
ceeding one year, 
Q) who is a fugitive from justice; 
quired to face risk of prosecution and con-
viction under federal statutes in order to 
obtain adjudication of his claim. 18 U.S. 
C.A. § 922; 18 U.S.C.AApp. § 1202; 28 
U.S.OA. § 1331; 5 U.S.C.A. § 702; 28 
U.S.C. (1976 Ed.) § 1831(a). 
4. Weapons «=»4 
Judicial pardon and expungement 
granted to petitioner was not executive par-
don and, therefore, did not relieve previous-
ly convicted felon of federal firearms dis-
ability. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922; 18 U.S.GA. 
App. §§ 1202, 1203. 
5. Weapons =^>4 
Judicial pardon and expungement 
granted to petitioner under Utah statutes 
did not completely erase prior convictions 
and, therefore, petitioner was not entitled 
to relief from federal firearms disability. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-18-2, 77-18-2(3); 18 U.S. 
C.A. § 922; 18 U.S.C.A.App. §§ 1202,1203. 
Robert B. Sykes, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for petitioner. 
D. Brent Ward, U.S. Atty., Barbara W. 
Richman, Charles William Ryan, Asst U.S. 
Attys., Salt Lake City, Utah, for respon-
dent. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ALDON J. ANDERSON, Chief Judge. 
In 1968, at the age of 21, petitioner Mi-
chael Carty Thompson pled guilty to 
charges of fraudulent use of credit cards 
and obtaining merchandise by false pre-
tenses. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922 and 18 U.& 
CApp. f 1202, Thompson's conviction made 
it illegal for him to receive, transport, or 
possess firearms.1 Since 1968, he has not 
been convicted nor arrested on any criminal 
charges. 
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addfcted 
to marihuana or any depressant or sthnutant 
drug (as defined in section 201(v) of the Fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) or nar-
cotic drug (as defined in section 4731(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954); or 
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental 
defective or who has been committed to a 
mental institution; 
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Since MT4 Thompson has been the presi-
dent and majority shareholder of a security 
guard contracting company which employs 
many security guards, some of whom carry 
firearms. As part of his responsibility in 
his company, Thompson was certified in 
1980 by the State of Utah as a firearms 
trainer for private security guards. He also 
is often called upon to render "executive 
protection services" for his clients, which 
requires his personal use of firearms. 
On January 5,1979, Thompson's attorney 
secured a judicial pardon and expungement 
to ship or transport any firearm or ammuni-
tion hi interstate or foreign commerce, 
(h) K shall be unlawful for any person— 
(1) who is under Indictment for, or who 
has been convicted in any court of, a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term ex-
ceeding one year; 
(2) who is a fugitive from justice; 
(3) who is an unlawful user cf or addicted 
to marihuana or any depressant or stimulant 
drug (as defined in section 201(v) of the Fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) or nar-
cotic drug (as defined in section 4731(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954); or 
(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental 
defective or who has been committed to any 
mental institution; 
to receive any firearm or ammunition which 
has been shipped or transported in interstate 
or foreign commerce. 
Title 18 US.CApp. § 1202(a) provides as fol-
lows: 
I 1202. Receipt, Possession, or Transporta-
tion of firearms Persons liable; penalties 
for violations 
(a) Any person who— 
(1) has been convicted by a court of the 
United States or of a State or any political 
subdivision thereof of a felony, or 
(?) has been discharged from the Armed 
Forces under dishonorable conditions, or 
(3) has been adjudged by a court of the 
United States or of a State or any political 
subdivision thereof of being mentally incom-
petent, or 
(4) having been a citizen of the United 
States has renounced his citizenship, or 
(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully 
fat the United States, and who receives, pos-
sesses, or transports in commerce or affect-
ing commerce, after the date of enactment of 
this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more 
than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 
two years, or both. 
2. Title 18 U.S.C f 825(c) provides as follows: 
of the 1968 misdemeanor criminal charges, 
but by mistake failed to secure pardon and 
expungement of the felony charges. This 
was corrected on April 9, 1982. 
On October 2, 1979, Thompson filed an 
application for relief from his federal fire-
arms disabilities pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 925(c).1 One year later, in October, 1980, 
respondent Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms (BATF) denied his application on 
the grounds that they were "not presently 
satisfied that the . . . statutory require-
ments for granting relief have been met" * 
Thompson sought judicial review of that 
(c) A person who has been convicted of a 
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year (other than a crime in-
volving the use of a firearm or other weapon 
or a violation of tills chapter or of the Nation-
al Firearms Act) may make application to the 
Secretary for relief from the disabilities im-
posed by Federal laws with respect to the 
acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, or 
possession of firearms and incurred by rea-
son of such conviction, and the Secretary 
may grant such relief if it is established to his 
satisfaction that the circumstances regarding 
the conviction, and the applicant's record and 
reputation, are such that the applicant wiU 
not be likely to act In a manner dangerous to 
public safety and that the granting of the 
relief would not be contrary to the public 
interest A licensed importer, licensed manu-
facturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector 
conducting operations under this chapter, 
who makes application for relief from the 
disabilities Incurred under this chapter by 
reason of such a conviction, shall not be 
barred by such conviction from further oper-
atioins under his Hcense pending final action 
on an application for relief filed pursuant to 
this section. Whenever the Secretary grants 
relief to any person pursuant to this section 
he shall promptly publish in the Federal Reg-
ister notice of such action, together with the 
reasons therefor. 
t. The "statutory requirements" apparently re-
ferred to are the requirements that tt must be 
established to the satisfaction of the Secretary 
of the Treasury "that the circumstances regard-
ing the conviction, and the applicant's record 
and reputation, are such that the applicant wiU 
not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to 
public safety snd that the granting of the relief 
would not be contrary to the public interest" 
18 US.G, f 925(c). See note 2, supra, for the 
entire text of this subsection. 
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trary and capricious abuse of discretion.4 
In April, 1982, Thompson filed a motion 
to amend the complaint and for summary 
judgment The amended complaint adds 
three new claims to the prior claim of abuse 
of discretion: (1) a claim for declaratory 
judgment that, as a result of his judicial 
pardon and expungement, Thompson is free 
from any firearms disabilities under federal 
law; (2) a claim that there has been an 
impermissible sub-delegation of authority 
from the Secretary of the Treasury to the 
chief of investigations with respect to the 
decision denying Thompson the relief that 
he requested; (3) a claim for declaratory 
judgment that Title 18 U.S.C. § 922 and 
Title 18 U.S.OApp. § 1202 are unconstitu-
tional as applied to Thompson because they 
violate his rights of due process of law. 
Upon stipulation by the parties, leave to 
amend the complaint was granted on May 
24,1982. The motion that is the subject of 
this order seeks summary judgment on the 
amended complaint's first additional claim 
that the judicial pardon and expungement 
relieve Thompson from any federal fire-
arms disability. 
In the course of its consideration of this 
motion the court advised counsel that it had 
serious questions about (1) its subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to hear the expungement 
claim and (2) the government's possible sov-
ereign immunity from that claim. Counsel 
have responded with memoranda address-
ing these issues and have further presented 
their arguments in a hearing held October 
18, 1962. In addition to the above two 
procedural issues, respondent has raised the 
additional one of whether an actual contro-
versy exists between the parties regarding 
the expungement chum. Having read the 
memoranda and the authorities cited and 
having considered fully these procedural is-
sues as well as the merits of the expunge-
ment claim, the court is ready to rule on the 
4. Shortly after the petition for review was fued, 
respondents fued a motion for summary judg-
ment which was denied. Thompson v. Depart-
ment of the 7>*asury, 533 F.Supp. 90 (D.Utah 
1981). 
In doing 
so, the court must decide four issues: (I) 
whether the court has subject matter juris-
diction to hear the expungement claim; (II) 
whether the government is not protected 
from that claim by sovereign immunity; 
(III) whether an actual case and controver-
sy exists, as to this claim, between the 
petitioner and respondent; and (IV) if the 
procedural issues are answered affirmative-
ly, whether the judicial pardon and ex-
pungement of petitioner's 1968 conviction 
relieve him of the federal firearms disabili-
ty under 18 U.S.C. § 922 and 18 U.S.OApp. 
§ 1202. 
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
[1] Counsel for respondent has cited 
many reasons why subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the expungement claim does not 
exist in this court, and counsel for petition-
er has responded with what he believes to 
be several grounds for appropriate subject 
matter jurisdiction, all of which has been 
very helpful. However, the court is not 
required to reach many of the grounds and 
arguments of counsel, as it believes that 
subject matter jurisdiction over the ex-
pungement claim exists at the discretion of 
the court under 5 U.S.C. § 702, 28 U.&C. 
§ 1331, and NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 67 S.Ct 1274, 91 
LJtf. 1575 (1947). 
Clearly the court has subject matter jur-
isdiction over the original petition; Le., it 
has authority to review the agency action 
denying relief from federal firearms dis-
ability. When Congress amended Title 28 
U.S.C. | 1331(a) in 1976 to eliminate the 
amount in controversy requirement for 
maintenance of "any [1331] action brought 
against the United States, any agency 
thereof, or any officer or employee thereof 
in his official capacity," Pub.L. 94-^ 674, § 2, 
90 Stat 2721 (1976),* M[t]he obvious effect 
of this modification, subject only to preclu-
8. In 1980 f 1331 was further amended to elimi-
nate the amount in controversy requirement for 
all federal question cases. Pub.L. 96-486, 
f 2(a). 94 Stat. 2369 (1980). 
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sion-of-review statutes created or retained 
by Congrats, [was] to confer jurisdiction on 
federal courts to review agency action." 
Gs/flaao r. Sanders, 480 U.S. 99, 105, 97 
&Ct 980,984,61 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). How-
ever, the original concern of this court, 
when it requested counsel to address the 
jurisdiction question, was whether its sub-
ject matter jurisdiction extended to the ex-
pungement issue, in light of the fact that 
the agency below did not consider that issue 
in making its determination.* Indeed, the 
expungement of petitioner's felony convic-
tions did not take place until well after the 
Bureau denied his application for relief. 
The court's concern has been answered by 
NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp^ 
881 U.S. 416, 67 S.Ct 1274, 91 L.Ed. 1575 
(1947). In that case the Supreme Court 
held that when circumstances "arise after 
the Board's order has been issued which 
may affect the propriety of enforcement of 
the order, the reviewing court has discre-
tion to decide the matter itself or to remand 
it to the Board for further consideration." 
831 U.S. at 428, 67 S.Ct at 1281. That is a 
sound rule for review of all administrative 
decisions. 
In this case, petitioner's application for 
relief from disability was denied in October, 
1980. The judicial pardon and expunge-
ment of his conviction occurred in April, 
1982. Thus, the pardon and expungement 
comprise a new circumstance arising after 
the administrative decision, and whether 
the court will consider the effect of that 
circumstance on the BATF's decision is left 
C Although the expungement Issue was not 
considered In connection with the review of 
Thompson's application for relief, since then 
the respondents have steadfastly maintained 
that the state expungement has no effect on 
petitioner's firearms disability. 
7. Thompson's employees may be subject to lia-
bility pursuant to 18 U.S.CApp. f 1202(b), 
which provides: 
(b) Any individual who to his knowledge and 
while being employed by any person who— 
(1) has been convicted by m court of the 
United States or of a State or any political 
subdivision thereof of a felony, or 
(2) has been discharged from the Armed 
Forces under dishonorable conditions, or 
to the court's discretion. In exercising that 
discretion, the court concludes that it ought 
to consider the matter now rather than 
remand it for another lengthy cycle in the 
administrative process. There are several 
factors contributing to this conclusion. 
First, it has already been three years since 
Thompson first applied for relief from the 
federal firearms disability. If the history 
of this case is any guide, it will be at least 
another year before he would receive a re-
sponse from the BATF regarding a re-
newed application. In the meantime, he 
must make the choice between either aban-
doning his business or subjecting himself 
and perhaps his employees to potential pros-
ecution for violation of the federal firearms 
control statutes.7 Second, the BATF has 
informed the petitioner that it does not 
consider the judicial pardon and expunge-
ment to affect his disability; hence further 
pursuit of a remedy through administrative 
channels would be futile. Third, though 
petitioner may re-apply for relief two years 
after the original denial (October, 1980), the 
Bureau has refused to send him the neces-
sary forms for re-application, citing the 
pending litigation as a reason. Finally, 
there is no factual dispute involved in the 
expungement claim; the sole issue is a 
question of law, of statutory interpretation, 
which this court is competent to decide. 
Under these circumstances, justice is best 
served by presently considering the effect 
of the petitioner's judicial pardon and ex-
pungement on his federal firearms disabili-
ty, without waiting for a formal determina-
tion by the Bureau. 
(3) has been adjudged by a court of the 
United States or of a State or any political 
subdivision thereof of being mentally incom-
petent, or 
(4) having been a citizen of the United 
States has renounced his citizenship, or 
(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully 
in the United States, and who, in the course 
of such employment, receives, possesses, or 
transports in commerce or affecting com-
merce, after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, any firearm shall be fined not more than 
$10,000 or Imprisoned for not more than two 
years, or both. 
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IL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
[2] ID a letter to counsel dated June 25, 
1962, the court raised another question of 
Jurisdiction, expressing the view that "the 
suit may be barred by the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity.** Upon reviewing the mem-
oranda in response to that letter, the stat-
utes and the cases cited, the court is satis-
fied that the United States has waived its 
immunity in cases such as this. 
The same statute that amended 28 U.S.C. 
{ 1881 to grant federal courts jurisdiction 
to review agency decisions also amended 
the Administrative Procedure Act to waive 
sovereign immunity for such a review: 
An action in a court of the United States 
seeking relief other than money damages 
and stating a claim that an agency or an 
officer or employee thereof acted or 
failed to act in an official capacity or 
under color of legal authority shall not be 
dismissed nor relief therein be denied on 
the ground that it is against the United 
States or that the United States is an 
indispensible party. 
5 U.S.C. § 702. Though at least one Court 
of Appeals has determined, under unique 
circumstances, that this amendment did not 
waive the defense of sovereign immunity 
under Section 1831, Watson v. Blumenthal, 
586 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.1978), courts from oth-
er circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, 
have recognized that the plain intent of the 
clear statutory language supported by the 
legislative history is to waive sovereign im-
munity in actions brought to review the 
decisions of administrative agencies. Wa-
rm F. Director, Department of the Trea-
*ury, 672 F.2d 590 (6th C'ir.1982); Carpet, 
Linoleum and Resilient Tile Layers, Local 
* 419 r. Brown, 656 FAi 664 (10th Cir. 
1961); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F^d 788 
(9th Gr.1980), cert denied, 452 U.S. 905,101 
S.O. 8030, 69 L.Ed.2d 405 (1981); Jaffee v. 
United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3rd Cir.1979); 
Sheehan v. Army A Air Force Exch. Serv-
ices, 619 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.1979), rev. on 
*fcer grounds, — U.S. , 102 S.Ct 
2118,72 LEd^d 520 (1982). On the basis of 
this authority and the plain wording of the 
statute, the court concludes that this action 
is not barred by the defense of sovereign 
immunity. 
in. CASE OR CONTROVERSY 
[3] Respondent's Opposition to Plain-
tiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as-
serts that petitioner's claim regarding ex-
pungement fails to state an actual contro-
versy, since the amended complaint alleges 
only that the Bureau "could recommend 
prosecution,** and that "[t]his could apply to 
any number of individuals in Plaintiffs 
company.** Respondent insists that peti-
tioner has no standing to assert the rights 
of his employees, and as to both himself and 
his employees he has not alleged sufficient 
threatened or actual injury to bring this 
case within the actual controversy require-
ment 
This assertion is answered by the holding 
of the Supreme Court in Doe v. Bolton, 410 
U.S. 179,93 S.Ct.739,35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973). 
There physicians who would have been sub-
ject to prosecution under the state anti-
abortion statute were they to perform an 
abortion were allowed to challenge the stat-
ute in spite of the fact that they had not 
yet performed an abortion and were not yet 
even subject to prosecution. The Court 
noted that the doctors "should not be re-
quired to await and undergo a criminal 
prosecution as the sole means of seeking 
relief.** 410 U.S. at 188, 93 S.O. at 745. 
Petitioner's case is stronger for adjudication 
than Bolton was. Thompson is presently 
subject to prosecution for violation of the 
federal firearms statutes. Furthermore, 
here there are none of the federalism issues 
present in Bolton, where the challenged 
statute was a state statute. To rule that 
Thompson's expungement claim is not a 
ripe controversy would force him to face 
the risks of prosecution and conviction un-
der the federal statutes in order to obtain 
an adjudication of his claim. It would be 
manifestly unjust to do so. 
Having determined that the court has 
jurisdiction over the expungement claim, 
that the claim is not barred by sovereign 
immunity, and that it presents a justiciable 
controversy, the court must now address 
the merits of petitioner's claim. 
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IT. RELIEF FROM FEDERAL 
FIREARMS DISABILITY 
Abaeat the judicial pardon and expunge-
ment, Thompson's 1968 felony conviction 
clearly places him under the federal fire-
arms disability imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 922 
and 18 U&CApp. § 1202. Both § 922 and 
§ 1202 proscribe the receipt of firearms by 
convicted felons.9 Section 1202 reaches pos-
session as well. 
Sectioa 922 was enacted as part of Title 
IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Art of 1968, PubX. 90-351, 82 Stat 
197 (hereinafter referred to as "Omnibus 
Crime Act"), as amended by the Gun Con-
trol Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-618, 82 Stat 
1213. That title also contains a provision, 
at 18 UJB.C. § 925(c), for administrative 
relief from the firearms disability.9 No 
other express provision for relief or exemp-
tion from the disability is contained in the 
statute. 
S. For the ftiD text of the relevant provisions of 
I 922 and f 1202, see note 1 supra. 
9. For the text of | 925(c), see note 2, supra. 
If. The full text of 18 U.S.CApp. f 1203 is as 
fbDowr 
§ 1203. Exemptions 
This title shall not apply to— 
(1) any prisoner who by reason of duties 
connected with law enforcement has express' 
ly been entrusted with a firearm by compe-
tent suthority of th« prison; and 
(2) any person who has been pardoned by 
the President cf the United States or the 
chief executive of a State and has expressly 
been authorized by the President or such 
chief executive, as the case may be, to re-
ceive, possess, or transport in commerce a 
firearm. 
11. The text of the Utah Statute is as follows: 
T7-1S-2. Expungement and sealing of court 
and arrest records.— 
(IX*) Any person who has been convicted of 
any crime within this state may petition the 
convicting court for a judicial pardon and for 
•eattag of his record to that court At the 
time the petition is filed and served upon the 
prosecuting attorney, the court shall set a 
date for a hearing and notify the prosecuting 
attorney for the jurisdiction of the date set 
for hearing. Any person who may have rele-
vant information about the petitioner may 
testify at the hearing and the court » its 
discretion, may request a written evaluation 
of the adult, parole and probation section of 
the state division of corrections. 
Section 1202 was enacted as part of Title 
VII of the Omnibus Crime Act which was 
added as a floor amendment and enacted 
without committee consideration. Title VII 
also contains a provision, at 18 U.S.CApp. 
§ 1203, exempting from the § 1202 disabili-
ty any person who, inter alia, "has been 
pardoned by the chief executive of a State 
and has expressly been authorized by . . . 
such chief executive . . . to receive, possess, 
or transport in commerce a firearm." N In 
addition to this exemption, it is apparent 
that the § 925 administrative relief may 
also be applied to remove the § 1202 dis-
ability. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 
55, 64, 100 S.Ct 915, 920, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 
(1980); United States v. Kelly, 519 FJ2d 794 
(8th Cir.1975). 
Petitioner claims that the judicial pardon 
and expungement granted to him in April, 
1982, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18-2 (1981 Supp. to Replacement Vol. 8Q " 
(b) If the court finds the petitioner for a 
period of five years in the case of a class A 
misdemeanor or felony, or for a period of 
three years in the case of other misdemean-
ors or infractions, after bis release from in-
carceration, parole or probation whichever 
occurs last has not been convicted of a felo-
ny or of a misdemeanor involving moral tur-
pitude and that no proceeding involving such 
a crime is pending or being instituted against 
the petitioner and further finds that the reha-
bilitation of petitioner has been attained to 
the satisfaction of the court it shall enter an 
order that all records in petitioner's case in 
the custody of that court or in the custody of 
any other court, agency or official be seated 
The provisions of this subsection shall not 
apply to violations for the operation of motor 
vehicle under title 41. The court shall also 
issue to the petitioner a certificate stating the 
court's finding that be has satisfied the court 
of his rehabilitation. 
(2X«) In any case in which a person has been 
arrested with or without a warrant that indi-
vidual titer 12 months provided there have 
been no Intervening arrests, may petition the 
court hi which the proceeding occurred, or, if 
there were no court proceedings, any court in 
the jurisdiction where the arrest occurred, 
for an order expunging any and all records of 
arrest and detention which may have been 
made, if any of the following occurred: 
0) He was released without the filing of 
formal charges; 
01) Proceedings against him were dis-
missed, be was discharged without a convk-
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fulfill the requirements of § 1208 and, fur- § 1202. See, a?., United States v. Kelly, 
ther, erase completely his prior convictions 519 Y2A 794 (8th Cir.1975); United States 
to that he is removed from the strictures of v. Matassini, 565 F2d 1297 (5th Cir.1978); 
§ 922 as well as § 1202. Upon analysis of United States v. Sutton, 521 F.2d 1885 (7th 
the statute under which petitioner's convic- Cir.1975); United States v. Allen, 699 F.2d 
tion was expunged, the court cannot agree. 453 (9th Cir.1982). The judicial pardon of 
[4] First, it is dear that the expunge- Thompson in April, 1982, was not an execu-
ment does not meet the requirements of tive pardon," and the court has searched 
§ 1208. That section requires an executive both the state expungement statute and the 
pardon, plus express authorization from the state court's orders of judicial pardon and 
executive to receive, possess, or transport expungement without finding anything 
firearms. The specificity of the statute, that could be construed as express autho-
supported by its legislative history,12 seems rization to receive, possess, or transport 
to admit no exceptions or substitutions for firearms. Hence Thompson does not quali-
these exemption requirements. The courts fy for the § 1203 exemption, 
have been unanimous in holding that state 
action other than an executive pardon with [5] Petitioner's second assertion, that 
express authorization to receive, possess, or his expungement completely erased his pri-
transport firearms is insufficient to fulfill or conviction so that the conviction can no 
the requirements of the § 1203 exemption longer serve as a basis for either a § 922 or 
and hence relieve a previously convicted a § 1202 disability, is somewhat more diffi-
felon of a federal firearms disability under cult The courts are in disagreement on 
tion and no charges were refDed against him 
within 30 days thereafter, or he was acquit-
ted at trial; or 
Oil) The record of any proceedings against 
him has been sealed pursuant to subsection 
(1). 
(b) If the court finds that the petitioner is 
eligible for relief under this subsection, it 
shall issue its order granting the relief prayed 
for and further directing the law enforcement 
agency making the initial arrest to retrieve 
any record of that arrest which may have 
been forwarded to the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and the Utah Bureau of Criminal 
Identification. 
(c) This subsection shall apply to all ar-
rests and any proceedings which occurred 
before, as wefl as those which may occur 
after, the effective date of this act 
(3) Employers may inquire concerning ar-
rests or convictions only to the extent that 
the arrests have not been expunged or the 
record of convictions sealed under this provi-
sion. In the event an employer asks concern-
ing arrests which have been expunged or 
convictions the records of which have been 
seated, the person who has received expunge-
ment of arrest or judicial pardon may answer 
as though the arrest or conviction had not 
occurred. 
(4) Inspection of the sealed records shall be 
permitted by the court only upon petition by 
the person who Is the subject of those rec-
ords and only to the persons named in the 
petition. 
12. The legislative history of Title v n of the 
Omnibus Crime Act which contains | 1203, 
consists of remarks on the floor of the Senate 
and on the floor of the House. A copy of the 
entire legislative history is published as an ap-
pendix in Stevens v. United States, 440 R2d 
144 (6th Or. 1971) 
IS. The State of Utah presents a special circum-
stance which may distinguish this case from 
those dted above. Unlike the states in those 
cases, Utah has no provision for a "pardon by 
. . . the chief executive" of the State, as re-
quired by § 1203. See, Constitution of Utah. 
Art VII, | 12. In Utah's unique circumstance, 
where the governor does not have the power to 
grant pardons, ft is impossible to discern what 
Congress intended should be the procedure for 
exempting persons from the f 1202 firearms 
disability. It may be reasonable to conclude 
that Congress, had It considered this circum-
stance, would have intended that the functional 
equivalent of a governor's pardon, coupled with 
the express authorization to possess firearms, 
would be sufficient to exempt a person from 
the disability. However, since the judicial par-
don and expungement based on an analysis of 
the Utah expungement statute, could not be 
considered the functional equivalent of an exec-
utive pardon, and since the petitioner has not 
received express authorization to possess fire-
arms, he would not meet this modified exemp-
tion requirement under § 1203. Hence, It is 
not necessary to determine whether, in Utah, 
the functional equivalent of an executive par-
don is sufficient to meet that requirement of 
§ 1203. 
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whether a state expungement relieves a 
former eowrict«f the §922 disability. On 
the one hand, the Ninth Circuit and appar-
ently the Seventh Circuit have concluded 
that state expungement statutes have no 
effect on the firearms disability. United 
States v. Bergeman, 592 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 
W79); Thrall r. Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313 (7th 
Cir.1974). On the other hand, the Fourth 
Cfrcuit and arguably the Fifth Circuit hold 
that a complete and total expungement 
«"•** the prior conviction that would oth-
«wise trigger the federal firearms disabili-
ty. Hew Banner Institute, Inc. v. Dicker-
•on, 649 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.1981). cert grant-
ed, 456 U.8.1018.102 S.Ct 1708.72 L.Ed.2d 
H2 (1982);" United States v. Matassini 
665 F.2d 1297. 1309. n. 26 (5th Cir.1978)." 
There has been no similar disagreement 
•s to the § 1202 disability. To this date no 
court has held that a state expungement 
relieves a former convict of this disability. 
See United States v. Kelly, 519 F.2d 794 
(8th Cir.1975); United States v. Sutton, 521 
R2d 1385 (7th Cir.1975); United States v. 
Allen, 699 F^d 453 (9th Cir.1982). How-
ever, the courts have been unanimous in 
holding that a federal expungement under 
^ / f B d e r d Y o u t h Corrections Act. 18 
U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026. provides relief from 
both § 922 and § 1202. United States v 
Arnngton, 618 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir.1980). 
cert denied, 449 U.S. 1086.101 S.Ct 876.66 
L.Ed\2d 812 (1981); United States v. Purga-
son, 565 F^d 1279 (4th Or.1977); United 
States v. Fryer, 545 F.2d 11 (6th Cir.1976). 
The rationale of JVew Banner and the 
Youth Correction Act cases is persuasive,f; 
14. In New Burner, the court based its decision 
» part on language from two Tenth Circuit 
%!£ £?!£?*"* * Bnoticky» 588 F^d 773 
I S ? . ? * * 1 9 7 8 * ***** v- Unit** States, 579 
F.2d 1219 (10th Or.1978). Brzoticky involved 
UVT^! UD<ter * * * t h a t W M Predicated 
on a conviction that had been expunged after 
hULS^1^ *** c**0™**** The court 
S ^ d j E J L * ? * • * «*"**«» had been 
«*pungea before the commencement of the fed-
« ? T J ? . / ! ? C r «>• court held that "once 
onei . convicted of a felony he Is within the 
P^wJP^n against possession of firearms un-
til that prior conviction is actually overturned 
and if Thompson had received his expunge-
ment under a statute providing for a com-
plete erasure of the prior conviction, he 
might have been granted the relief he re-
quests. However, this court need not reach 
the question of whether an expungement 
under a statute providing for complete era-
sure of conviction would furnish relief from 
the federal firearms disabilities, because the 
Utah statute in effect at the time of 
Thompson's expungement. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-2 (1981 Supp. to Replacement Vol. 
8C), did not provide such complete erasure. 
Perhaps the predecessor to § 77-18-2 
would have furnished Thompson with the 
relief he seeks. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
17.5 (1978 Replacement Vol. 8C). It appar-
ently provided a complete erasure of the 
prior conviction. Subsection 1 provided 
that upon a petitioner's meeting the requi-
sites of the statute, the court would enter 
an order sealing all the records of the peti-
tioner's case. It further provided: 
(c) Upon the entry of the order in those 
proceedings, the petitioner shall be 
deemed judicially pardoned and the peti-
tioner may thereafter respond to any in-
quiries relating to convictions of crimes 
as though that conviction never occurred. 
Subsection 2 provided that if the record of 
conviction were expunged pursuant to sub-
section 1. then all records of arrest and 
detention may also be expunged. It fur-
ther provided: 
Thereafter, the arrest, detention, and any 
further proceedings in the case shall be 
deemed not to have occurred, and a peti-
or expunged.'* 579 FJZd at 1226 (emphasis In 
original). Though these references are certain-
ly not conclusive, it may be inferred from them 
that the Tenth Circuit would align itself with 
the Fourth. 
IS. In Matassini, the court considered the effect 
of a governor's pardon on § 922. However, the 
rationale provided there applies equally well to 
a judicial pardon and expungement 565 F2d 
at 1309, n. 26. 
IS. A shnflar, and likewise persuasive, rationale 
is set forth In the dissent to United States v. 
Bergcman. 592 F2d 533. 538-42 (9th Or. 1979) 
(Takasugl, J., dissenting). 
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tloner may answer accordingly any ques-
tion relating to their existence. 
(Emphasis added). Subsection 4 provided 
that once the records were sealed, inspec-
tion would be permitted only upon petition 
by "the person who is the subject of those 
records." 
A single Utah case construing the prede-
cessor statute exists, which supports the 
conclusion that the statute provided a full 
and complete expungement, legally erasing 
the prior conviction. The Utah Supreme 
Court, quoting the language of subsection 
1(c), above, held that a felon whose convic-
tion had been expunged could not be 
impeached as a witness on account of his 
prior conviction. State v. Jones, 581 P.2d 
141 (Utah 1978). 
However, in 1980 the expungement stat-
ute was amended as part of the process of 
recodifying the Utah Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure. Eliminated from the new statute is 
the language stating that "the petitioner 
shall be deemed judicially pardoned." 
Eliminated also is the language stating that 
"the arrest, detention, and any further pro-
ceedings shall be deemed not to have oc-
curred.'' In place of subsection 1(c) giving 
the petitioner the right to answer "any 
inquiries relating to convictions of crimes as 
though that conviction never occurred,** 
(emphasis added) is the following provision: 
(8) Employers may inquire concerning ar-
rests or convictions only to the extent 
that the arrests have not been expunged 
or the record of the convictions sealed 
under this provision. In the event an 
employer asks concerning arrests which 
have been expunged or convictions the 
records of which have been sealed, the 
person who has received expungement of 
arrest or judicial pardon may answer as 
though the arrest or conviction had not 
occurred. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-l&-2(8) (1981 Supp. 
to Replacement Vol. 8C). Still included in 
,7
- The amendment to the expungement statute 
was enacted on February 1. 1980, as part of 
Route Bill 32. which consisted of the entire 
oode of criminal procedure for the State of 
Utah. The BUI was hastily enacted In a Budget 
Session of the Legislature, and consequently 
the statute is the provision that the records 
of the conviction may be sealed and that 
inspection of the records thereby sealed 
may be permitted only upon petition of the 
person who is the subject of the records. 
There is no explanation in the legislative 
history for the changes in the amended 
statute,17 nor have there been any cases 
construing the new statute. The new lan-
guage, especially when construed in light of 
the former language, seems to place a limi-
tation on the effect of the judicial pardon 
and expungement Though the legislative 
intent is not entirely clear, the court must 
conclude that the statute was changed for a 
purpose; and that purpose, from the sub-
stance of the change, evidently was to limit 
the effect of a judicial pardon and expunge-
ment Hence, since 1980 a judicial pardon 
and expungement under section 77-18-2 is 
not a complete and unqualified expunge-
ment that erases the prior conviction suffi-
ciently to relieve petitioner Thompson from 
his firearms disabilities. 
In an attempt to resolve the court's con-
cerns about subject matter jurisdiction and 
sovereign immunity. Thompson filed a 
second Motion to Amend Complaint on Au-
gust 6. 1982. Since the jurisdiction and 
sovereign immunity issues have been re-
solved in favor of Thompson, the court does 
not see the necessity of granting the second 
motion to amend. A pre-trial scheduling 
conference would be helpful at this point to 
enable the court to discuss with counsel 
means of expediting resolution of the re-
maining claims not disposed of by this or-
der. 
Accordingly. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petition-
er's Motion for Summary Judgment be de-
nied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 
second Motion to Amend Complaint be pres-
ently denied. 
little attention was given to the individual pro-
visions of the BUL There were no comments 
on the floor of either house regarding the ex-
pungement provision, which was enacted by 
L.1980. ch. 15. | 2. 
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IT IS FUBTHER ORDERED that a pre-
trial seheduBag conference be set for Moo-
day, January 24, 1968, at UtiO turn. 
«ETw5a$TSToT> 
AJU ADAMS CONSTRUCTION 
CO, Plaintiff, 
T. 
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, 
Defendant 
CK A. No. CV 181-SL 
United States District Court, 
S.D. Georgia, 
Augusta Division. 
Jan. 3, 1983. 
Nonunion contractor brought action 
against power company, challenging compa-
ny's refusal to hire contractor for construc-
tion of administration building for nuclear-
powered generating facility as violation of 
antitrust laws and breach of contract On 
cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
District Court, Alaimo, Chief Judge, held 
that: (1) power company was employer en-
gaged in construction industry qualified to 
negotiate valid prehire agreement in con-
text of collective bargaining relationship 
and therefore entitled to invoke exemption 
from antitrust penalties under construction 
industry proviso of National Labor Rela-
tions Act and nonstatutory labor exemption 
from antitrust sanctions, and (2) genuine 
issues of material fact precluded summary 
judgment on breach of contract claim. 
Ordered accordingly. 
L Monopolies *»12(8) 
When agreement with union forms ba-
sis of antitrust claim against employer, em-
ployer may assert nonstatutory labor ex-
emption from antitrust sanctions if exemp-
tion would have been available to union. 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, § 1, 15 U.S.CJL 
§ 1; Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.GA. § 15. 
2. Labor Relations «=>S80 
Valid prehire agreement satisfies re-
quirement of collective bargaining relation-
ship as prerequisite to application of con-
struction industry proviso to section of Na-
tional Labor Relations Act declaring it un-
fair labor practice for labor organization 
and employer to enter into agreement to 
refrain from using products of any other 
employer or to cease doing business with 
any other person. National Labor Rela-
tions Act, § 8(e, f), as amended, 29 U.S.OA. 
§ 158(e,f). 
3. Monopolies *»28(8) 
Whether court in antitrust action 
should consider power company's agree-
ment with trades council, setting terms and 
conditions of employment for craft workers 
employed in construction of nuclear-pow-
ered generating facility, part of collective 
bargaining context as prerequisite to appli-
cation of construction industry proviso to 
section of National Labor Relations Act de-
claring it unfair labor practice for labor 
organization and employer to enter into 
agreement to refrain from using products 
of any other employer or to cease doing 
business with any other person is question 
of law, and whether parties apply legally 
correct label to agreement is irrelevant 
National Labor Relations Act, § 8(e, f)> as 
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(e, f). 
4. Monopolies *»12(9) 
Power company, which acted as own 
construction manager, foregoing employing 
general contractor in connection with con-
struction of nuclear-powered generating fa-
cility, was an "employer engaged in the 
construction industry," within meaning of 
section of National Labor Relations Act de-
claring it not to be unfair labor practice for 
employer engaged primarily in building and 
construction industry to make agreement 
with labor organization despite lack of ma-
jority status, qualified to negotiate valid 
prehire agreement under such provision in 
context of "collective bargaining relation-
AJL ADAMS CONST. CO. 
CHcMtS7F.S« 
ship" and therefore was entitled to invoke 
exemption from antitrust penalties under 
Act's construction industry proviso and non-
statutory labor exemption. Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, § 1, 15 U.S.CA. § 1; National 
Labor Relations Act, § 8(e, f), as amended, 
29 U-S.OA. § 158(e, f). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Federal Civil Procedure *=»2497 
On nonunion contractor's breach of 
contract claim against power company, 
which acted as own construction manager 
in connection with construction of nuclear-
powered generating facility, challenging re-
fusal to hire contractor for construction of 
facility's administration building, genuine 
issues of material fact existed as to whether 
parties had reached binding agreement on 
all crucial terms and especially as to wheth-
er sufficient agreement had been reached 
on manner in which contractor would meet 
power company's requirements regarding 
union status, precluding summary judg-
ment 
Ira Genberg, Atlanta, Ga., Wiley S. Oben-
shain, III, Augusta, Ga., for plaintiff. 
Michael C. Murphy, Atlanta, Ga., Wyck 
A. Knox, Jr., Augusta, Ga., for defendant 
ORDER 
ALAIMO, Chief Judge. 
On February 16, 1981, A.L. Adams Con-
struction Company filed a civil complaint in 
this Court against Georgia Power Company. 
The plaintiff alleged that it was refused a 
job as building contractor at defendant's 
construction site in Burke County, Georgia, 
because plaintiff was a nonunion contrac-
1. Plaintiff argues that, under the terms of an 
Order entered by this Court on May 10, 1982, 
all motions to dismiss or for summary judg-
ment were required to be filed by October 12, 
1982, and that, since defendant's summary 
Judgment motion was not filed until October 
13, 1982, the motion was untimely and should 
be denied. See Plaintiff's Brief in Response to 
Defendant Georgia Power Company's Motion 
tor Summary Judgment 1-4 (November 10, 
v. GEORGIA POWER CO. 169 
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tor. In Count 1 of the complaint, plaintiff 
contends that defendant's refusal to hire 
plaintiff was the result of a combination 
and conspiracy between defendant and oth-
ers to exclude nonunion contractors from 
working at the Burke County construction 
site. Count 1 alleges that such a combina-
tion and conspiracy violated § 1 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U&C. § 1; 
plaintiff, therefore, seeks to recover treble 
damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 15, for injuries to its business and 
property caused by defendant's antitrust 
violation. In Count 2, plaintiff contends 
that the refusal to hire it constituted a 
breach of contract by defendant 
This case is presently before the Court on 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment 
filed October 12, 1982, and defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment filed October 
13, 1982.1 For the reasons stated below, 
plaintiffs motion is DENIED, and defend-
ant's motion is GRANTED as to Count 1 
(the antitrust claim) but DENIED as to 
Count 2 (the contract claim). 
ANTITRUST CLAIM 
A. Agreement with Trades Council 
1. Facts 
The following facts pertinent to plain-
tiffs antitrust claim are either undisputed, 
are disputed without reasonable justifica-
tion in the record, or may be assumed in 
plaintiffs favor for purposes of defendant's 
motion for summary judgment with regard 
to the antitrust claim: 
(a) A.L. Adams Construction Company 
("Adams") is a nonunion contractor operat-
ing in the building and construction indus-
try. 
(b) Georgia Power Company ("Georgia 
Power") is an investor-owned electric utility 
1982). Since plaintiff claims no prejudice to it 
resulting from the alleged late filing (plaintiff, 
in fact, admits being served with a copy of 
defendant's summary judgment motion on Oc-
tober 12) and since the Court finds considera-
ble merit In defendant's motion, the Court be-
lieves that the purposes of justice are better 
served by considering the merits of defendant's 
motion than by rigidly enforcing a rather com-
plicated series of filing requirements. 
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WILLIAMS v. HARRIS, Wardea. 
No. $689. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 16,1944. 
I. Ciimhnl law «=»982 
Prior to enactment of statute author-
king courts to suspend the imposition or 
execution of sentence and to place a de-
fendant on probation, the courts had in-
herent power to suspend sentence only for 
some definite period and for some specific 
temporary purpose.1 Utah Code 1943, 
105—36-17. 
2. Crlmlaaf law <S=>982 
Statute authorizing courts to suspend 
imposition of sentence and to place defend-
ant on probation gives the trial courts much 
greater latitude in suspending imposition of 
sentence than was previously had, but the 
courts are not thereby given authority to 
suspend sentences as a matter of grace, but 
only when it appears compatible with public 
interest. Utah Code 1943. 105—36—17. 
3. Criminal | a w «=»982 
The right of personal liberty and sus-
pended sentence may not be alternately 
granted and denied without just cause, and, 
when a sentence is suspended during good 
behavior without reservations, the person 
whose sentence is thus suspended has a 
a vested right to rely thereon so long as such 
condition is complied with.* Utah Code 
1943, 105-36—17. 
4. Criminal law <£=982 
The right to suspend imposition of sen-
tence and to place one on probation is a 
discretionary right, and one placed on pro-
bation has a right to be heard as to whether 
he has violated the conditions upon which 
suspension was based. Utah Code 1943. 
105—36—17. 
5. Criminal law e=*82 
Upon a hearing on question whether a 
defendant has violated conditions upon 
which suspended sentence was based, the 
court has discretionary power to continue 
probation or impose sentence, but to au-
thorize termination of probation there must 
1 People v. Blackburn, 6 Utah 847, 23 
P. 769; In t/ic Matter of Flint, 25 Utah 
338, 71 P. 531, 95 Am.St.IUp. 853; Reese 
r. Olaen, 44 Utah 318,130 P. 041. 
be tome competent evidence of violation of 
the terms of probation.1 Utah Code 1943, 
105-36—17. 
6. Criminal law «=*82 
Violation of the terms and conditions 
of suspension or probation is usually a 
ground for revocation and imposition of 
sentence. Utah Code 1943, 105—36—17. 
7. Criminal law «=*82 
Where trial court has exercised dis-
cretion in suspending imposition of sen-
tence or in revoking probation and in im-
posing sentence, after a hearing, the judg-
ment should not be molested. Utah Code 
1943, 105—36—17. 
8. Criminal law €=982 
Where trial court's first order suspend-
ing imposition of sentence was made for a 
definite time and defendant was placed on 
probation for purpose of reformation, and 
court made further orders suspending sen-
tence from time to time, the court had 
power to revoke suspension of sentence 
and impose sentence upon a showing that 
during the probation period defendant com-
mitted another crime in another jurisdic-
tion. Utah Code 1943, 105—36—17. 
Appeal from District Court, Third Dis-
trict, Salt Lake County; Clarence E. 
Baker, Judge. 
Habeas corpus proceeding by Gwen 
Williams against John E. Harris, Warden 
of Utah State Prison. From a judgment 
denying the writ and remanding petitioner 
to defendant's custody, petitioner appeals. 
Affirmed. 
Duncan & Duncan, of Salt Lake City, 
for appellant. 
Grover A. Giles, Atty. Gen., and Herbert 
F. Smart, Ass t Atty. Gen., for respondent. 
TURNER, District Judge. 
This is an appeal from the judgment of 
the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District for Salt Lake County. The trial 
court, after admitting evidence in support 
of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
denied the writ and remanded the peti-
* State v. Zolimtakis, 70 Utah 200, 250 
P. 1044, 54 A.L.R. 1463. 
* State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 290, 290 
P. 1044, 54 A.LJI. 1403; Thompson 
T. Harris, Warden, Utah, 144 P.2d 761. 
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doner, the appellant here, back into the 
custody of John E. Harris, Warden of the 
Utah State Prison, defendant in the ori-
ginal action and the respondent here. 
The facts with which the court is con-
cerned, as shown by the transcript, are 
neither complicated nor in dispute. The 
appellant, with three other young men, was 
charged with the crime of burglary in the 
second degree in the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District in and for Weber 
County. On the 12th day of December, 
1932, plaintiff herein, one of the defendants 
in the above case, entered a plea of guilty. 
He waived time for passing of sentence 
and the court then stated: 
"Well, the Court will suspend the imposi-
tion of sentence in the case of the four of 
you, who have entered a plea of guilty, 
until Monday, February 6th, 1933, at which 
time you will report back here, or Mr. 
Quids can report for you, as to your con-
duct. I will place you in custody of Mr. 
Quids and it is up to you gentlemen to 
straighten up. If you don't straighten out 
you will have to come in and be sent to the 
penitentiary, where they will straighten you 
out" 
On the 6th day of February, 1933, appel-
lant appeared in court with Mr. Childs and 
the latter made a favorable report regard-
ing the boy's conduct. At this time the Dis-
trict Attorney stated to the court: "I do 
not want your Honor to lose jurisdiction 
of the boys." The court then made another 
order suspending imposition of sentence 
until April 24, 1933, and on that date made 
a similar order. Several of these were 
made from a definite date to a definite date. 
From the record it also appears that after 
making the first report with Mr. Childs, 
this young man was released upon his own 
recognizance. 
The last time appellant was before the 
court prior to the revocation of the order 
of probation was September 25, 1933, at 
which time the court made a further order 
of suspension of imposition of sentence 
until December 18, 1933. On the 22nd of 
October, 1933, appellant was brought before 
the court in Weber County and appeared 
before the judge who had made the pre-
vious orders. Then the court asked appel-
lant regarding his plea to the charge of 
burglary and if he had not been sentenced 
to the Utah State Prison recently for a 
crime committed in Utah County while 
under the court's order of probation. Ap-
149 F.2<1—41 
pellant admitted that this was correct The 
judge then sentenced appellant to be im-
prisoned for a term of not less than one 
nor more than twenty years. 
In this action appellant contends that the 
trial court in Salt Lake County which re-
fused to release him upon the hearing on 
the writ of habeas corpus erred for the 
reason that the court in Weber County 
was without jurisdiction when it imposed 
the sentence of imprisonment as stated 
above; that the trial court was without 
jurisdiction, it having suspended imposition 
of sentence and having placed the appellant 
on probation for a definite period, and ap-
pellant having complied with all the con-
ditions of this probation, was entitled to 
his discharge, and that orders of the court 
of Weber County were made after the 
expiration of the term of appellant's pro-
bation, and were without any specific pur-
pose or object and without any reference 
or relation to appellant's further probation, 
and void. 
We readily accept the proposition that if 
the District Court of Weber County had no 
jurisdiction to pronounce sentence, the 
Court of Salt Lake County entertaining the 
writ of habeas corpus should have sustained 
the writ and released appellant from the 
State Prison. 
The statute, which was in force and 
effect, and which is now controlling in 
105—36—17, U.C.A. 1943, is as follows: 
"Upon conviction of any crime or of-
fense, if it appears compatible with the 
public interest, the court having jurisdiction 
may suspend the imposition or the execu-
tion of sentence and may place the defend-
ant on probation for such period of time 
as the court shall determine. The court 
may subsequently increase or decrease the 
probation period and may revoke or modify 
any condition of probation. While on pro-
bation the defendant may be required to 
pay, in one or several sums, any fine im-
posed at the time of being placed on proba-
tion; may be required to make restitution 
or reparation to the aggrieved party or 
parties for the actual damages or losses 
caused by the offense for which conviction 
was had; and may be required to provide 
for the support of his wife or others for 
whose support he may be legally liable." 
[1] This statute was enacted by the 
Legislature in 1923. Prior to the enactment 
of this statute, the courts in this jurisdic-
tion had inherent power to suspend sen-
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tencet only lor tome definite period and 
for some specific temporary purpose. Long 
before the passage of the present statute, 
this court held that trial courts could sus-
pend sentence temporarily for stated period 
from time to time. See People v. Black-
burn, 6 Utah 347, 23 P. 759. In this latter 
case the court held that trial courts have 
no power wholly to relieve convicted per-
sons from sentence; that only the pardon-
ing power can do that In the Matter of 
Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531, 95 Am.St.Rep. 
853, this court held that a suspension of 
sentence for an indefinite period is in effect 
an exercise of the functions of the pardon-
ing power which belongs exclusively to the 
Board of Pardons, a separate and distinct 
department of the State government This 
principle of law was again stated in the 
case of Reese v. Olsen, 44 Utah 318, 139 
P. 941. 
[2,3] It is apparent that 105—36—17, 
supra, gives the court much greater lati-
tude and power in suspending imposition 
of sentence than was previously had. No-
tice the following provision of the statute, 
"The court may subsequently increase or 
decrease the probation period and may re-
voke or modify any condition of proba-
tion." The purpose of this section is clear-
ly reformatory. Since the enactment of the 
statute this court has held that "trial courts 
are not given authority to suspend sen-
tences as a matter of favor or grace, but 
only 'when it appears compatible with pub-
lic interest'" Also, it announced that the 
right of personal liberty and suspended 
sentence "may not be alternatively granted 
and denied without just cause." Also, that 
"when a sentence is suspended during good 
behavior, without reservations, the person 
whose sentence is thus suspended has a 
vested right to rely thereon so long as such 
condition is complied with." State v. 
Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044, 1046, 
54 A.LJL 1463. 
[4-7] We think It advisable to analyze 
the present matter, bearing in mind the 
holdings of this court in the Zolantakis 
case, supra. From the construction of the 
statute it is evident that the legislature in-
tended trial courts should have considerable 
authority to reform wrongdoers. It never 
intended that trial courts should implant 
hope and faith into one with the right to 
destroy this as a whim, without just cause. 
The right to suspend imposition of sentence 
and the right to place one on probation is 
a discretionary right One placed upon 
probation has a right to be heard as to 
whether he has violated the conditions upon 
which suspended sentence was based. State 
v. Zolantakis, supra; Thompson v. Harris, 
Warden, Utah, 144 P.2d 761, at page 767. 
Upon such a hearing, the trial court has 
discretionary power to continue probation 
or impose sentence, but to authorize ter-
mination of probation there must be some 
competent evidence of violation of the 
terms of probation. Violation of the terms 
and conditions of suspension or probation is 
usually a ground for revocation and the 
imposition of sentence. 24 GJ.S., Criminal 
Law, $ 1572, p. 72; People v. Lippner, 219 
Cal. 395, 26 P.2d 457. When it appears 
that a trial judge has exercised discretion 
in suspending imposition of sentence or in 
revoking probation and imposing sentence, 
after a hearing as heretofore mentioned, 
the judgment of the trial court should not 
be molested. 
[8] The record discloses that when the 
first order of suspension of sentence was 
made is was made for a definite time. The 
boys, including appellant, were told to 
straighten up, that if they did not straighten 
up they would be sent to the penitentiary. 
From the record we believe the boys were 
placed on probation for the purpose of 
reformation. The trial judge was a man 
of experience. He knew he was dealing 
with boys, guilty of a serious offense, who 
had previously been in the reformatory. 
We do not believe that the judge when he 
placed the boys in the custody of Mr. Childs 
expected the time fixed then to be a full 
period of probation. The trial judge was 
carefully feeling his way with these boys. 
He was endeavoring to save the youths 
from the stigma of prison. From what 
was said and done, we must conclude that 
this appellant and the other boys were re-
leased from time to time under the condi-
tion that they straighten up, that they do 
not violate the law. Experience tells us 
that we cannot expect to change a youth 
from bad habits and lawlessness to one of 
good conduct and dependable worthiness in 
a few days or a few weeks. Youth when 
badly damaged by disease or bad influence 
must have time to recover. That often 
there can be recovery is justification for 
suspension of sentence and probation. 
We are of the opinion that the court 
purposefully continued suspension of sen-
tence from a day certain to a day certain. 
It was dealing with juveniles; boys the 
OTAH POULTRY PROD. COOP. A88*N v. UTAH LAB. BEL. BD. 
lefFJMtfS 
ing their activity is no 
Board. Laws 1937, c 55. 
court hoped to keep out of the penitentiary; 
doubtful cases, but worthy of care and 
consideration in the opinion of the trial 
judge. Before the time last fixed for him 
to appear, this appellant committed another 
crime in another jurisdiction. He had al-
ready admitted his guilt and had been sen-
tenced to the State Prison when brought 
before the court in Weber County for re-
vocation of suspension. He had failed to 
straighten up and was brought back, just 
as he had been told, for sentence in the 
event he did not straighten up. 
We are of the opinion the trial court 
acted within the powers granted by the 
statute, and that it had jurisdiction to pro-
nounce sentence to the State Prison as was 
done. 
The judgment of the lower court in this 
case is affirmed. 
WOLFE, C J., and LARSON, Mc-
DONOUGH, and WADE, JJ., concur. 
MOFFAT, J., deceased. 
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UTAH POULTRY PRODUCERS COOPER-
ATIVE ASS'N v. UTAH LABOR RELA-
TIONS BOARD tt at 
No. 6659. 
Supreme Court of Utah, , 
June 16,1944. 
1. Master and servant *=> 15(122) 
The State Labor Relations Board's 
finding that independent union was domi-
nated and controlled by employer was not 
sustained by substantial evidence. Laws 
1937, c 55. 
2. Master ass servant *=»I5<88) 
The function of State Labor Relations 
Board is not to provide leadership for a 
union, and unless there is evidence of em-
ployer interference in selection of union 
leadership, action of union membership in 
making choice of their officers and direct-
3. Master and servaat <t=»(5(l22) 
If State Labor Relations Board's find-
ing that employee was discharged because 
of union activity was supported by sub-
stantial evidence, finding must be upheld. 
Laws 1937, c 55.1 
4. Master and servant «=>I5(I22) 
The Utah Labor Relations Board's 
finding that an employee was discharged 
because of union activity was not sus-
tained by substantial evidence, so that or-
der requiring his reinstatement was not 
warranted. Laws 1937, c 55. 
Original proceeding by the Utah Poultry 
Producers Cooperative Association to va-
cate and set aside the order of the Utah 
Labor Relations Board which found that 
the petitioner was guilty of unfair labor 
practice under Laws 1937, c 55, by dis-
charging from its employment the com-
plainant Willis L. Jacobson. The Board 
sought enforcement of its order. 
Order of Board set aside, and applica-
tion of Board for enforcement thereof de-
nied. 
Harry Pugsley and Elias Hansen, both 
of Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Grover A. Giles, Atty. Gen., Herbert F. 
Smart, Asst Atty. Gen., and Clarence M. 
Beck, of Salt Lake Gty, for defendants. 
McDONOUGH, Justice. 
By writ of review, petitioner seeks to 
vacate and set aside the order of the Utah 
Labor Relations Board dated September 
8, 1943. A petition of the Labor Board 
for an order of enforcement is also be-
fore us. The Board found that petitioner 
Utah Poultry Producers Cooperative As-
sociation, hereinafter referred to as the 
Association, was guilty of an unfair labor 
practice by discharging from its employ-
ment the complainant Willis L. Jacobson. 
It concluded that his dismissal was due to 
his activity in behalf of the Independent 
Union of Poultry Employees; that the As-
sociation was guilty of interfering with 
and restraining employees in the exercise 
of their rights, and of dominating and in-
terfering with the administration of said 
l Building Service Employee* v. New-
house Realty Co. et ah, 97 Utah 662, 96 
P.2d 607; American Foundry ft Ma-
chine Co. v. Utah Labor Relation* Board, 
141P.2d390. 
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, jr-j. article "New Legislation of New Legislation Relating to Criminal 
mMZJZm^he Mentally Disabled", see 11 Law", see 11 Colo. Law. 2148(1982). 
£ ' u T 2131 U982). For article, "Review 
16,7-403. Deferred sentencing of defendant. (1) In any case in which the 
feodaat has entered a plea of guilty, the court accepting the plea has the 
>wer. with the written consent of the defendant and his attorney of record 
d the district attorney, to continue the case for a period not to exceed 
o years from the date of entry of such plea for the purpose of entering 
Jgment and sentence upon such plea of guilty; except that such two-year 
nod may be extended for an additional time up to one hundred eighty days 
the failure to pay restitution is the sole condition of supervision which 
s not been fulfilled, because of inability to pay, and the defendant has 
own a future ability to pay. During such time, the court may place the 
fendant under the supervision of the probation department. 
(2) Prior to entry of a plea of guilty to be followed by deferred judgment 
id sentence, the district attorney, in the course of plea discussion as pro • 
ded in sections 16-7-301 and 16-7-302, is authorized to enter into a written 
ipulation, to be signed by the defendant, his attorney of record, and the 
strict attorney, under which the defendant obligates himself to adhere to 
tch stipulation. The conditions imposed in the stipulation shall be similar 
all respects to conditions permitted as part of probation. In addition, the 
ipulation may require the defendant to perform community or charitable 
ork service projects or make donations thereto. Upon full compliance with 
ich conditions by the defendant, the plea of guilty previously entered shall 
e withdrawn and the action against the defendant dismissed with prejudice. \ 
uch stipulation shall specifically provide that, upon a breach by the defend-, 
nt of any condition regulating the conduct of the defendant, the court shalT 
nter judgment and impose sentence upon such guilty plea. When, as a condi-i 
ion of the deferred sentence, the court orders the defendant to make restitu-i 
ion and finds that he has the ability to pay, evidence of failure to pay thei 
aid restitution shall constitute prima facie evidence of a violation. Whether! 
. breach of condition has occurred shall be determined by the court without! 
L jury upon application of the district attorney and upon notice of hearing.;] 
hereon of not less than five days to the defendant or his attorney of record J 
Application for entry of judgment and imposition of sentence may be madei 
>y the district attorney at any time within the term of the deferred judgment! 
>r within thirty days thereafter. The burden of proof at such hearing shall 
>e by a preponderance of the evidence, and the procedural safeguards! 
•equired in a revocation of probation hearing shall apply. 
Source: (2) amended, L. 83, p. 664, § 4; (1) amended, L. 85, pp. 617, 13711 
§ § 8, 50. 
Editor's note: Subsection (1) is amended by chapters 135 and 342, Session Laws of Colorado! 
1985. Section 56 of chapter 342 provides that section 50 of the act set out in that chapter is effectivej 
July 1,1985, and section J4 of chapter 135 provides that section 8 of the act set out in that chaptei] 
is effective July 1,1985, and applies to acts committed on or after said date. 
Law reviews. For article, "Colorado Felony Purpose of the written stipulation is to ensurfl 
Sentencing", see 11 Colo. Law. 1478 (1982). that the defendant knows prior to the entry ofl 
a guilty plea the consequences of violating t h j 
67-13-1^ State Officers and Employees UTAH CODE 1MM9M 
section? shall be eonstrued to relieve the state or the 
political subdivision thereof in which such property 
on any r part thereof is situated from its duty to 
.furnish for such property or part thereof such 
normal police protection as it ordinarily and custo-
marily provides, for other property situated therein* 
iff) 
Chapter 13. Merit Systems 
f]-l>i tarputh *7rtt-15. Repealed. ir» 
Chapter 14 Operator and Chauffeur ,r 
license Examiners Civil Service Act " »<>^  
^7-14.1 through 67-14-21. Repealed.' *w? .»*::l tm 
Chapter 1$. Peace Officer Training ™»\y* 
vs*rw m-:;^  •!•.•/. ! +:•*.• \r,-- ;•:• J.*.1 -.*•:• ;?' /•<. M; < jFMM. Dtyistoa of peace officer seaadards .aedJralalBg-^  
;vCreattoa rParpoee... . , / . .,'t- *.../.,.',.• ,f.. >».;„-,• j^*,: 
€7454. Dliwtor of AyWea - Appouunwat- Tana of ^  V-; 
47-15-3. Director to he fafl-thae state officer • D i r tc to f ' i ' r 
47-15-4. Powtn ead daties of director/ V'^ •* <W 
« M S 4 . Bask tndaiag coarse • Saaject ar ter ia l» iBftra-U >, 
ycetors-Scaedaks-Miaiaiaaikafth-CoBipkdoa iii>t^-
tt-reaajree' • Aaaaal traialag -Froaibitioa froai exarcJelag ;: 
'
 n\ aoweti 9 RaiattattaMBt. ' 
47-15^. Applicaatt for adaUssloB to tralaiag prograai or ,)•, 
' fef waiter fiiiaJailloa • QaallncatloBS. 
47-15-6.5. Haw for apptfcatioa for adatierfoa to tralaiag * 
¥ iwofraaK4'^'-- ':: "':" , " "• 
47-15-7. Coaaktfoa of tralalBg'coarse or aaniag of * v ' ' -" 
tirwahrar cxaaUaaUoa fooalrai - Pereoas affected.* v'-'- S *• 
47-154. Wahrer of traialaf coone reqatreawet. •: i" 
4745-f. Maaidpatttiaf saay att aigaer BOaianiai staadardt. 
47-15-10. Lapse of certificate ^BdastattaMtat. t • • • - , . , 
^7-15*10 J . Revocatioa, suspeesloa or rtfaial of certifkat-^ 
'." tea • Groaadi • Notice to eaqtoyer. 
67-15-11. Coaadl oa ptacc officer staaaardi aad traialaf - ; 
f
'Otatloi- fFarpo« • Meiabenajp. ' "'"" 
47-15-12. Coaadl - Terau of office of Bmabert - Vacaa- ,<r 
i . e k a . ' < > ^ r o - ' y . i . "- «.- = *. »••••,«;,,/>.<• w i , . ,»;--;n 
47-15-13. Coaadl - TtnaiaatloB of certaia saeaiberf • 
'4 FtUtagfacaade*. • ."<.\-.-i-\.-*n V ; »;'!«£ . V j V M i * 
47-15-14. Coaadl • Officers • Qaoraai • M e e t i a f s ^ , ^ ,x\,_,n 
47-15-15. Coaadl • Coiapeasatioa of saesrters, 
47r14-14. CoeaeU . Members nay hold other Mask office 
^orcaploymeat, " "'' v w,i" •'** " ",c 
•MM7. Coaactt. Detkt. : '»r W ^ r,<, *<• to *« 
CMM7J. Ceeadl - Recoauatedadoaf tad reports. > •' ^ 
47-15-1S, Coaadl - Addltkmal aowert. ' '"" «:' u;rr^O£ 
47-15-lf. Reoiatod. .i-iw 
€7-1540: DoaaOooj, coBtribBtloas, graaU, gifts',r w i 
boqaests; dettees or aadowaaasts • Aataority to * {l 
accept. Diapodtioa. ^ ^ - ' 1>T ^ ^ » - , - a<.:.wv-Jt^ 
47-15-21. reaalty aatataawat - AaMvat of'tralatag fee*- t v i K 
w DepoaU wita aoH • Saspeadoa of floe or forfdtarc - , : l 
IcWalter of aaMBBBwat • Depoait to stale geaeral faad.* -,;->-
4745-1. Diylsloa of peace officer ataadaitls aad j - ^ \ 
' (ralaiag -Oeatloo • Parpose. <^  - ^«,-,.:'• VY -.•. -^, 
., To better». promote and insure the. safety, and 
welfare of t)te citizens of this state in their, respect-
ive,communities* and to provide for more efficient 
and professional law enforcement •* by establishing 
minimum standards and,training for peace officers 
(hrOMghout ;the state, there is hereby created a 
division of the state department of public safety to 
be known u the .division of peace officer standards 
and, training which shall be administered. by a 
director appointed by and acting tinder the supervi-
sioi^ ^andricontrol of the commissioner of public 
ltloty«if:bini**»>;,: ;•»;..•'- f '.< :j:'i-)r: *I^ ;K a<BS3 
47-15-2; Director of dhiiloB - Appoiatment i-tu.m • t 
Terai of office.' ^« - WJVIW'JM'&O::. ,i *>*/*" ^  
'• The commissioner of public safetyi t^ pon recom-
mendation pf the council on peace officer standards 
and training and with* the approval of the; governor 
shall appoint a director of the state division of 
peace of fleer standards and training who shall serve 
at the pleasure of the commissioner* ^ ^ u -,Ju r.i jgn 
47-15-3. Director to he fall-time state officer -
Director's staff. -.alnamo'.)/• *?M t^f.-«* :.^r^r)l 
. .The director'^ hall be a'full-time officer of the 
state and1 shall have the authority to appoint sues 
deputies, consultants, clerks 'and other employees« 
may be authorized from eligible lists supplied by the 
state office of personnel management* • .^?* 'fov MB 
' - '>'» -i';, *v? ••""i••v.viii'o r*'-:ti---fi«--Vi/ *fifflo ;f';jt 
47-15-4. Powers as^ a t^tes of director. < ^ 0 , , v ; 
the powers and duties of the director of the 
division or^peace^ffker! standards^  and tnining, 
which'shall bc'^  exercised wWi^  the advice' of the 
council oh'pete?* officer "standards and 'training, 
shall include the followingr:^Wi:-.il.^ ^iol a%v m 
i (i) To promulgate standards1 for the certificatka 
of a-peace officer-training;,academy; to certify u 
, academy meeting the- prescribed requirements;-aad 
to subsequently revpkecertifKadon for cause. ^ : - > (2) To prescribe minimum qualifications for cert-
ification ,of peace; officers appointed, or elected to 
enforce the Jaw of this state and the subdivision* 
thereof and prescribe, standards /or j revocation of 
certification for cause, u i ^ ^ "{,U v!-i/:,/>jn^' >* 
(3) To
 fesUblish} minimum requirement! for. the 
certification of training
 (instructors ,andr, standards 
for revocation of certification. irf :)r -iy •*..,& „f' •,,• v (4) To provide,jfof the; issuance^of appropriile 
certificates to those peace, officers completing the 
basic
 f training programs j offered} by a ; certifW 
academy or to those persons who pa*»"» /waiver* 
examination as provided for in this chapter,. >/.,,, 
V(5) To consult and co-operate with academy ad-
ministrators and instructors for .the continued deve-
lopment and improvement of the' basic trainini 
programs'! provided' by^  thei academy cahd for; the 
further 'development^ and'- implementation' of 
advanced in-servi<x timining programs:1 j hns .^ifcjx, 
' (6) To consult and cooperate wth sWe instituti-
ons of higher learning to develop specialized couno 
of study for peace officers' m the" areas of crimiai 
justice,KipoUce adniinistration; c r m ^ soda* 
sciences and other rela^o^pliiies:^^ f\\ ** 
(7) To consult and'co^perau with" othef oepirt-
Fi!fptfftj^ ffffKfot']and*{k>ca| • govey^ wefitf* conceroei 
with • peace officer' training! and in his discretios, 
make training' aids' and materials'available to ioai 
; law enforcement agencies.'Ul ?**' W-> U»; **•-
* (8) • To^perfonn'5 such^ other ^ acts ^ as may; ke 
necessary' "or appropriate ^  to' develop peace officer 
training programs wUhin the 6ate)f;'f<u \ v>:'y 
'"
;
 (9) To report' to the1 council' on peace office 
standards ,and training. at jpgular meetings of; the 
council and a^t suchuPther^rljmes.as he may st 
required/
 xrf.,i 
, (10) To make, recommendations to the commit* 
oner, governor,«d the. legislature frpm»(ime to hat 
concerning peace officer standards and training.;, 
i(ll) With, the permission of the commissioner of 
public safcty^to contract on. behalf of the diviska 
with criminal justice .agencies to provide training fa 
employees of. those agencies on condition .(hat tk 
employees or theu^eniploying agency pay a registn> 
tion fee equivalent to the cost of the training aai 
on condition that the contract does not reduce * 
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established, by the director. The director may. in hit 
discretion, require •ucb a reemployed or reengaged 
peace officer to successfully complete the bask 
training course before reissuing or reinstating certi-
fication, <\ u i J M \ \ h ' J * J r * ISO 
67-15-10.5. Revocation, suspension or refusal of ' 
certification . Grounds - Notice to employer. 
(1) The director may, upon the concurrence o f 
the majority of the council, and after the person or 
peace officer involved has been afforded 'prior 
notice and an opportunity for a full hearing before 
the council, revoke, refuse, or suspend certification 
of a person as a peace officer for cause. Any of the 
following shall constitute cause for such action: 
1
 (a) WUJfuJ falsification of any information to 
obtain certified status; \ 
',< (MjEhysfcal or' mental, disability affecting the 
employee's ability fo perform his or her duties; ' ; 
>v
, (c) '^Addiction to or the unlawful
 L use o f 
mucotoor'drugs; , , IM . ' % 
u
 (d)' Conviction o f a felony or any crime 
involving" dishonesty, unlawful sexual conduct, or 
physical violence; or ; ' 
t (e) Any conduct or pattern of conduct that 
would tend to disrupt, diminish or otherwise jeopa-
rdize public trust and fidelity with regard to law 
enforcement!" ; ^ • l • tJf " i • ' «M 
' (2) The 'director shall not suspend or revoke cert** 
lficatlonsof any peace officer prior to sending notice1 
to the'governing .body of the political subdivision 
employing4 the peace officer and receiving informat-
ion or comments concerning the peace officer from 
such governing body or the agency employing such 
officer. '>);* ( i •>t*f»» » v/2. > 
< (3) Denial, suspension, or revocation procedures 
shall, not, be initiated by the council in cases In 
which an officer,is terminated for infraction of his 
agency's policies, general orders, or similar guideli-
nes of operation which do not amount to any of the 
causes for denial,, suspension, or revocation enume-
rated In fubscaion (I). , • ,^ >' v « 
(4) ^Termination of a peace officer, whether 
voluntary or Involuntary, does not preclude rcvoca-, 
tioq or subsequent denial of peace officer certificat-
ion status by .the .council *if termination was for any 
of the reasons enumerated in subsection (1). Empl-. 
oyment by another, agency or reinstatement of a 
peace officer by his parent agency after termination, 
whether Jb*. termination was voluntary or involunt-
arytAdoes^not^preclude,revocation or subsequent 
denial of peace, officer certification status by the 
council, Ik termination was for-any of the reasons 
enumerated in subsection (1). ; t„ vm 
67-15-1}* .Council on peace officer standards and M ^ 
training t Creadon«Purpose • Membership, t- <t 
A council on peace officer standards and training 
Is hereby established to serve as an advisory board 
to, the, director of the 'division of. peace officer 
training >onr matters 'relating i to, peace officer 
standards and training. The council shall Include tne 
attorney general or his designated representative, the 
superintendent of the highway patrol, and 14 addit-
ional members appointed ,by the governor having 
qualifications, experience, or education in the field, 
of law enforcement as follows:, „ t ,;i i ,, ?,. (a) One Incumbent mayors <> . '.^ , 
i(b) One incumbent county commissioner; ,-, 
,(c)rThreeJncurobent sheriffs,,one of whom shall 
be a representative of the Utah Sheriff! Association, 
one of whom shall be from a county baving a pop-
ulation of 100,000 or more and one of whom shall 
be from a county having a population of less than 
100,000; . wrti in a \ Mint hut a/from 
I (d) Three incumbent polke chiefs^one of whom 
shall be a representative of' the
 % Utah Chiefs-oJ 
Police Association, one of .whom shall be from s 
city o f the first or second class, and one of whoa 
shall be from a city of the third class or town; /r
 H ; (e) < W officer from the Federal pureau of Inve-
stigation appointed by the governor upon the race-
mmendatlon of said agency; , i < l i ^' ' • v » • 
( 0 A representative, o f the Utah Peace Officers 
Association; i *! ' * *iiu fri#, ' ""'* * ' 1" 
(g) An educator in the field o f public administra-
tion, oiniiiuU justice, or related area; and ^ .* ""-r'' 
(h) Three persons.,selected' at large by tbt 
•°
vw,
 t X\< il:...;i-/df.ic *.» 
67-15-12. Council .Terms of office of members* vf 
Vacancies. • * s wa,V>. iur *dti\ 
: The 14 members of the ^council appointed by (be 
governor shall be appointed for terms of four yean* 
Any member may- be< reappointed; for additions! 
terms. A vacancy in any of these'categories caused 
by the expiration of a term»of office.oriotherwfae 
shall»be»filled by the
 t governor < from A the sane 
category in which the vacancy occurs.'; W / . U . J L I W 
I My member, o f the council shall, Jmrncdfsttfr 
upon the termination of his holding the officer* 
employment specified In section ,67-1 $-11 which wi 
the basis for his/eligibility*to, membership on ftf 
council, or, upon two unexcused absences in oat 
year from regularly scheduled council, mcctiapi 
cease to be a member;of the council, A vacancy 
created in pne of these ways shall be filled by the 
governor from ,the! category in which the vacancy 
occurs. The council
 k shall remain as i}'is composed 
upon the effec^ve.date^f-this^act, Qf/the 1913 
genera) session until the expiration of any Individual 
member's term.,If a vacancy occurs In the council, 
appointmentrto fill that,vacancy shall be'ecccjmpti* 
67-15-14. Council - Officers -^Quorum * Meetings,' 
• The council shall select a chairman and vie* 
chairman from among Its members.- Nine memben 
of the advisory council shall constitute a'quanta 
Meetings may "be* called by the chairman or, A 
commissioner of publk safety or the director, sai 
shall be called byv the ?chairroan Upon [the writtei 
request of nine members, but to no event shall then 
be leu than two meetings per jear,. Meetings sail 
be held at,such tiincs (a^ peaces as'arc determine J>y the director,*
 {/* u^^^n^tmjff 
67-15-15. Council - Compensation of numbers: ftt 
! Members of the council shall'receive per'am 
allowance as approved by the department of adtf-
nistrative services.0 All members shall be reimbursed 
for their ** actual » and - necessary ^travel ^  expeoia 
incurred in the performance of their official duties.*'' 
67-15-16: Council -Members may hold other {] 4 * 
publk office or employment.^ 7 ^* 1 ^ nvin^m^t^ 
; Membership^on itheMccniiv^' ,shall not^disquiWj 
any member from'holding any^public o f f l a orL em-
ployment nor shall he forfeit any'such office Ja 
employment by'^reason >Kof bJiis^ apppintmea 
hereunder"notwithstiuidinjf the*provisions of MJ 
general, special or local UwVordinance or dtj 
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04-9. Effect OB suits and prosecutions pending. 
No suit or prosecution, pending when this repeal 
takes effect, for an offense committed, or for the 
itomry of a penalty or forfeiture incurred, shall be 
affected by the repeal, but the proceedings may be 
conformed to the provisions of these revised statutes 
at far as consistent. aso 
94-10. "Heretofore9 and 'hereafter" defined. 
The terms "heretofore" and "hereafter" as used 
k these revised statutes, have relation to the time 
men the same take effect. < aso 
Chapter 3. Construction 
& I . Gemmae law adopt**, 
^gtatstame^regel ioaof 
isistrasd • Rales ef tqeity tftvatt* 
944. sfevlstd statutes ael retroactive. 
044. Qvg tad criminal remain sot auras*1. 
044 . Iffoct ef rtpseMag a statate. 
O f l \ Moafkal provirio- sfcossed a 
Statutes \ 68-3-12 
04-7. Ttet, how CMpattd. 
044 . Wbta a da? appelated is a bolder. 
044.ftt i ,e#waf!lMd. 
04-lt. Jeiat authority It Mteoritjr to aujority. 
04-11. Inlet ef eoastractlea as to words aid states. 
n-3-n, Kakt of coastroctloa at to these tttfottti 
04-1. Common law adopted. 
The common law of England so far as it is not 
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution 
or laws of the United States, or the Constitution or 
mvs'of this state, and so far only as it is consistent 
with and adapted to the natural and physical condi-
tions of this state and the necessities of the people 
hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of 
decision in all courts of this state. » aso 
0 4 4 . Statutes la derogation of common law 
Reran? construed • Raies of equity prevail. 
The rule of the common law that statutes in der-
ogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no 
application to the statutes of this state. The statutes 
establish the laws of this state respecting the 
subjects to which they relate, and their provisions 
sad all proceedings under them are to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect the objects of the 
astutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is 
say variance between the rules of equity and the 
rales of common law in reference to the same 
natter the rules of equity shall prevail. n o 
0 4 4 . Revised statutes not retroactive. \ 
i No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, 
taless expressly so declared. tf» 
04-4. Qvil and criminal remedies not merged. 
vWhen /the violation of a right admits of both a 
dvfl and criminal remedy, the right to prosecute the 
one is not merged in the other. tto 
0 4 4 . Effect of repealing a statute. 
Jhe repeal of a statute does not revive a statute 
previously repealed, or affect any right which has 
accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or 
say action or proceeding commenced under or by 
virtue of the statute repealed. * n o 
0 4 4 . Identical provisions 
tot new enactment. 
The provisions of any statute, so far as they are 
aw.same,as woe* of any prior statute, shall be 
construed as a continuation of such provisions, and 
aot as a new enactment. , t so 
6S-3-7. Time, how computed. 
The time in which any act provided by law Is to 
be done is computed by excluding the first day and 
including the last, unless the last is a holiday, and 
then it also is excluded. ' '
 ( , , 'iso 
O-3-t. Whan a day appointed is a holiday. 
Whenever any act of a secular nature, other than 
a work of necessity or mercy, is appointed by law 
or contract to be performed upon a particular day, 
which day falls upon a holiday, such act may be 
performed upon the next succeeding business day 
with the same affect as if it had been performed 
upon the day appointed. < r aso 
6 1 4 * . Seal, how affixed. 
When the seal of a court or public officer is 
required by law to be affixed to any paper, the 
word "seal" includes an impression pf such seal 
upon the paper alone, as well as upon wax or a 
wafer affixed thereto. In all other cases the word 
•seal" may include a scroll printed or written. , aso 
IfcVMt. Joint authority Is authority to majority. 
Words giving a Joint authority to three or more 
public officers, < or other persons, are to • be 
construed as giving such authority to a majority of 
them, unless it is: otherwise expressed in the act 
giving the authority/' 1J *^< *~* ' j * smV 
O ^ i l . Rnka of conttrnctioa as to words and \ j 
phrases. 
f
 Words and phrases are to<be construed according 
to the, context and the approved usage of the 
language; but technical words and phrases, and such 
others as have acquired a peculiar, and appropriate 
meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to be 
construed according to such peculiar and appropri-
ate meaning or definition.
 U i w i; .„ Vt s aso 
SJS-3-12. Rake of construction as to these statutes. <• 
In the construction of these statutes the following 
rules shall be observed,' unless such construction 
would be inconsistent'with the manifest intent of 
the Legislature or repugnant to the context of the 
statute.f * s " *'•* fc*%& *, * .I*"** y 
(1) "Month" means ' a'/calendar month, unless 
otherwise expressed, and the word "year," or'the 
abbreviation "A.D." Is equivalent to the expression 
•year of our Lord/ .* u n •>-«"! <» .* i i 
(2) "Oath" includes "affirmation," and the word 
"swear* includes "affirm."' Every oral statement 
under oath or affirmation is embraced In the term 
'testify,"* and every written one. In the term 
0) "Signature*'includes any name, mark, or sign 
written with the intent to authenticate any instrum* • 
ent or writing. *< *. » 1 * r« ' 
(4) "Writing* includes printing, handwriting, and 
typewriting.' 
(5) 'Person* includes individuals, bodies politic 
and corporate, partnerships/associations, and com 
panies. »* * f«' »» ***• ' s *% 
(6) The singular number includes the plural, and 
the plural the singular.' - -h 
(7) Words used in one gender comprehend the 
other* i'' ' > i " r ^ ^ )v»< i
 t 
(8) Words used in the present tense include the 
future.1 '» V'»-1- -•fl>m* ** » ' * 
(9) 'Property' includes'both real and persona) 
property. V*^ **** J»JJ.T«V»«* *> •*«*» • • 
< (10) "Land," 'real estate,' mad "real property" 
include land, tenements/ hereditaments, water 
rights, possessory rights, and claims, ' 
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THE JUDGMENT 77-18-2 
ant's probation or refuse to grant a further remain in custody and supervision of his 
stay of execution when he had abided by the bondsman, that he remain outside a certain 
terms of his agreement with the court and county, that he report to the court on a eer-
the probation department Ex parte FoUett tain date and that he "make every effort to 
(1950) 119 U 98,225 P 2d 16. ^ e
 e n t i r e l y g ^ ^ o r d e r contained 
In the absence of proof of fraud, a court
 t e r m g 8 o m e w h a t mt variance with usual 
could not properly vacate an order setting ^
 b t | t indefinite and uncer-
aside a conviction, merely because of its " . ' " " «mWu.u«u. .wiuuMuw» 
belief that fraud was practiced. State v. **>* ** ?> ** ^enforceab e and the trial 
Schreiber (1952) 121 U 653,245 P 2d 222. J ^ t e •**» a heanng, could terminate the 
Where the probation order imposed condi- probation. State v. Chesnut (1960) 11 U 2d 
tions upon the defendant which were that he 142,356 P 2d 86. 
77-18-2. Expungement and sealing of records. (1) (a) Any person who 
has been convicted of any crime within this state may petition the convict-
ing court for a judicial pardon and for sealing of his record in that court 
At the time the petition is filed and served upon the prosecuting attorney, 
the court shall set a date for a hearing and notify the prosecuting attorney 
for the jurisdiction of the date set for hearing. Any person who may have 
relevant information about the petitioner may testify at the hearing and 
the court, in its discretion, may request a written evaluation of the adult 
parole and probation section of the state division of corrections. 
(b) If the court finds the petitioner for a period of five years in the case 
of a class A misdemeanor or felony, or for a period of three years in the 
case of other misdemeanors or infractions, after his release from incarcer-
ation, parole or probation whichever occurs last, has not been convicted 
of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that no 
proceeding involving such a crime is pending or being instituted against 
the petitioner and further finds that the rehabilitation of petitioner has 
been attained to the satisfaction of the court, it shall enter an order that 
all records in petitioner's case in the custody of that court or in the custody 
of any other court, agency or official be sealed. The provisions of this sub-
section shall not apply to violations for the operation of motor vehicle 
under title 41. The court shall also issue to the petitioner a certificate stat-
ing the court's finding that he has satisfied the court of his rehabilitation. 
(2) (a) In any case in which a person has been arrested with or without 
a warrant, that individual after 12 months, provided there have been no 
intervening arrests, may petition the court in which the proceeding 
occurred, or, if there were no court proceedings, any court in the jurisdic-
tion where the arrest occurred, for an order expunging any and all records 
of arrest and detention which may have been made, if any of the following 
occurred: 
(i) He was released without the filing of formal charges; 
(ii) Proceedings against him were dismissed, he was discharged without 
a conviction and no charges were refiled against him within 30 days there-
after, or he was acquitted at trial; or 
(iii) The record of any proceedings against him has been sealed pursu-
ant to subsection (1). 
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(b) If the court finds that the petitioner is eligible for relief under thi 
subsection, it shall issue its order granting the relief prayed for and fur 
ther directing the law enforcement agency making the initial arrest U 
retrieve any record of that arrest which may have been forwarded to th< 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Utah Bureau of Criminal Identifi 
cation. 
(c) This subsection shall apply to all arrests and any proceedings which 
occurred before, as well as those which may occur after, the effective date 
of this act 
(8) Employers may inquire concerning arrests or convictions only to the 
extent that the arrests have not been expunged or the record of convictions 
sealed under this provision. In the event an employer asks concerning 
arrests which have been expunged or convictions the records of which have 
been sealed, the person who has received expungement of arrest or judicial 
pardon may answer as though the arrest or conviction had not occurred. 
(4) Inspection of the sealed records shall be permitted by the court only 
upon petition by the person who is the subject of those records and only 
to the persons named in the petition. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-2, enacted by L. Judicial expunction of criminal record of 
1980, ch. 15, i 2. convicted adult, 11ALR 4th 956. 
Right of exonerated arrestee to have fin-
d-oat-Keierenceft. gerprints, photographs or other criminal 
Criminal identification, 77-26. identification or arrest records expunged or 
Expungement of juvenile court record, restricted, 46 ALR 3d 900. 
Law Reviews. 
Collateral References. .Comment, Arrest Record Expungement — 
21A AmJur 2d 561, Criminal Law (1020; 62 A Function of the Criminal Court, 1971 Utah 
AmJur 2d 701, Privacy § 17. L. Rev. 881. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Effect of expungement. conviction of a crime where the record of the 
Witness may not be impeached on a prior conviction has been expunged. State v. Jones witness may not oe imp**«!«i on » prior
 ( i m ) m ? 2 d m . 
77-18-3. Disposition of fines. (1) Fines imposed by the district court 
shall be turned into the county treasury, except such fines as are imposed 
by the district court in cases appealed from a municipal justice's court, 
which fines, when collected, shall be by the county clerk covered, one-half 
into the county treasury and one-half into the treasury of the city or town 
from which the case was appealed; and except further, such fines as are 
imposed by the district court in cases appealed from precinct justices' 
courts, which fines, when collected, shall be covered by the county clerk 
into the county treasury, and except further as otherwise specifically pro-
vided by law. 
(2) Fines imposed by the district court in cases appealed from a circuit 
court shall be paid in their entirety to the state treasury. 
History: C. 1953, 77-184, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. 
1980, eh. 15. { 2; L. 1981, ch. 90, f 4. the 1981 amendment inserted the subsec 
(1) designation; deleted "a circuit court or" 
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date set for the hearing. Any person who may have relevant information 
about the petitioner may testify at the hearing and the court, in its dis-
creation, may request a written evaluation of the adult parole and pro-
bation section of the Utah division of corrections. 
(2) If the court finds that the petitioner, for a period of five years in 
the case of an indictable misdemeanor or felony, or for a period of one 
year in the case of a misdemeanor, since his release from incarceration or 
probation, has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor in-
volving moral turpitude and that no proceeding involving such a crime is 
pending or being insituted against the petitioner and, further, finds that 
the rehabilitation of the petitioner has been attained to the satisfaction 
of the court, it shall enter an order that all records in the petitioner's 
case in the custody of that court or in the custody of any other court, 
agency or official, be sealed. 
(3) Upon the entry of the order in those proceedings, the petitioner 
shall be deemed judicially pardoned and the petitioner may thereafter 
respond to any inquiries relating to convictions of crimes as though that 
conviction never occured. 
(4) Copies of that order shall be sent to each court, agency or official 
named in the order. 
(5) Inspection of the records shall thereafter be permitted by the 
court only upon petition by the person who is the subject of those records 
and only to the persons named in that petition. 
Approved March 6,1973. 
CHAPTER 199 
H. B. No. 69 (Passed February 2, 1973. In effect February 22, 1973) 
POWERS OF BOARDS OF PARDONS 
An Act Amending Section 77-45-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, As 
Amended By Chapter 197, Laws of Utah 1971, Relating to the Powers 
of the Board o! Pardons; Providing That It Shall Have the Power 
to Issue Subpoenas, Compel the Attendance of Witnesses and the Pro-
duction of Books, Papers and Other Documents, and Take the Testi-
mony of Witnesses Under Oath; Providing That the Board of Pardons 
Shall Appoint A Certified Shorthand Reporter, Establishing That 
Reporter's Duties and the Manner and Extent of His Compensation; 
Providing That the Act Shall Not Be Applied Retroactively; Provid-
ing a Severability Clause; and Providing That the Act Shall Take 
Effect Upon Approval. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
[693] Code of Criminal Procedures Ch. 198 
Section 14. Section amended. 
Section 77-15-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is amended to read: 
77-15-13. Closed examinations. 
The magistrate must also, upon the request of the defendant, exclude 
from the examination every person except his clerk, the prosecutor and his 
counsel, the attorney general, the county attorney, the defendant and his 
counsel, and the officer having the defendant in custody. 
Section 15. Effective date. 
This act shall take effect upon approval. 
Approved March 19,1973. 
CHAPTER 198 
H. B. No. 129 (Passed March 2, 1973. In effect May 8, 1973) 
EXPUNGEMENT 
An Act Enacting Section 77-35-17.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953; Pro-
viding for the Expungement of Court Records After a Hearing in the 
District Court Under Certain Circumstances; Providing for Notifica-
tion to other Courts, Agencies and Officials; Providing that After the 
Expungement, that Person May Respond to Inquiries as Though the 
Conviction had not Occurred; and Providing that, After that Expunge-
ment, Records May Be Inspected Only Upon That Person's Petition. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section enacted. 
Section 77-35-17.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read: 
77-35-17.5. Petition for judicial pardon and expungement—Hearing 
-—Requirement of expungement—Copy of order—Inspection 
of records. 
(1) Any person who has been convicted of any crime within this 
state may petition the convicting court for a judicial pardon and for the 
expungement of his record in that court. At the time the petition is filed, 
the court ahall art a date for a hearing and notify the prosecuting at-
torney for the jurisdiction of the pendency of the petition and of the 
[25] Code of Criminal Procedure Chs. 23,24 
CHAPTER 23 
H. B. No. 64. (Passed March 11,1943. In effect May 11, 1943.) 
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
An Act Amending Sections 103-22-1 and 103-22-2, Utah Code Annotated 
1943, Relating to Exposing to Fire or the Firing of Trees, Shrubs, 
Brush, Grass, Undergrowth or Crops on Another's Land, Including 
Livestock and Livestock Products, and Providing That it is a Felony 
to Intentionally or Maliciously Set Fire to Trees, Shrubs, Brush, Grass, 
Undergrowth, Livestock, Livestock Products or Crops; Penalties. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Sections 103-22-1 and 103-22-2, Utah Code Annotated 1943, are 
amended to read as follows: 
103-22-1. Exposing Trees, Grass or Crops to Danger by Fire—Penalty. 
Any person who negligently or willfully exposes any growing trees, 
shrubs, brush, grass, undergrowth, cultivated crops, livestock, or live-
stock products on any lands, public or private, not his own property, to 
danger of destruction by fire is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
103-22-2. Firing Trees, Grass or Crops on Another's Land—Penalty. 
Any person who negligently or willfully sets on fire, or causes or pro-
cures to be set on fire, any growing trees, shrubs, brush, grass, under-
growth, cultivated crops, livestock or livestock products on any land, 
public or private, not his own property, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Pro-
vided, however, that any person who willfully or maliciously commits 
the aforesaid acts as contained and described in this section, is guilty of 
a felony. 
Approved March 17,1948. 
CHAPTER 24 
S. B. No. 47. (Passed March 11,1943. In affect March 17, 1943.) 
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
An Act Amending Section 105-36-17, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Pro-
viding for the Suspension of Sentences and the Suspension of the Im-
position of Execution of Sentences, and the Placing of Defendants in 
Criminal Cases on Probation, and Providing for the Manner of Ter-
minating Such Suspension or Probation. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 106-36-17, Utah Code Annotated 1943, is amended to read: 
105-36-17. Suspension of Sentence—Vacate Plea—Dismissal. 
Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any crime or offense, if it ap-
pears compatible with the public interest, the court having jurisdiction 
may suspend the imposition or the execution of sentence and may place 
Chs. 24,25,26 Code of Criminal Procedure—Corporations [26] 
the defendant on probation for such period of time as the court shall 
determine. 
The court may subsequently increase or decrease the probation period, 
and may revoke or modify any condition of probation. While on proba-
tion, the defendant may be required to pay, in one or several sums, any 
fine imposed at the time of being placed on probation; may be required 
to make restitution or reparation to the aggrieved party or parties for 
the actual damages or losses caused by the offense to which the defen-
dant has pleaded guilty or for which conviction was had; and may be 
required to provide for the support of his wife or others for whose sup-
port he may be legally liable. Where it appears to the court from the 
report of the probation agent in charge of the defendant, or otherwise, 
that the defendant has complied with the conditions of such probation, 
the court may if it be compatible with the public interest either upon 
motion of the district attorney or of its own motion terminate the sen-
tence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and 
dismiss the action and discharge the defendant. 
Section 2. Effective Date of Act. 
This act shall take effect upon approval. 
Approved March 17,1943. 
CHAPTER 25 
H. B. No. 106. (Passed March 11, 1943. In effect March 17, 1948.) 
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
An Act Amending Section 103-51-18, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Relat-
ing to the Crime of Rape and Prescribing the Penalty Thereof. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 103-51-18, Utah Code Annotated 1943, is amended to read: 
103-51-18. Penalty for Rape. 
Rape is punishable as follows: 
(a) When the female upon whom the act is committed is under the 
age of thirteen years, by imprisonment in the state prison, for a term 
which shall not be less than twenty years and which may be for life. 
(b) In all other cases by imprisonment in the state prison not less 
than ten years. 
Section 2. Effective Dale of Act. 
This act shall take effect upon approval. 
Approved March 17, 1943. 
CHAPTER 26 
S. B. No. 9. (Passed February 24, 194S. In effect May 11, 1943.) 
CORPORATIONS 
An Act Amending Section 18-2-17, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Relating 
to Redemption and Purchase of Preferred Stock of Corporations* 
APPENDIX C 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD N. BOYCE 
PROFESSOR OF LAW 
I, Ronald N. Boyce, member of the Supreme Court and 
Utah State Bar Code of Criminal Procedure Committee, hereby 
declare and affirm that the following is a true and accurate 
statement of ray opinion and recollection of the intent of the 
Committee which drafted the present Utah Statute on "Expungement 
and sealing of records", U.C.A. Section 77-18-2 (1980): 
The Committee fully intended to overrule State v. 
Chambers, 533 P. 2d 876 (Utah 1975), which limited the scope of 
the expungement statute by its somewhat confusing discussion. 
Our major concern was with the past offenders1 ability to 
rehabilitate and assimilate back into society by providing 
employment opportunities for them. Using the Model Rules as a 
reference, we wanted to remove the attendant disabilities 
associated with a past conviction, to a certain extent. While 
we recognized the state's interest in providing security in 
sensitive government positions, we felt that the decision to re-
open sealed records should be made on the basis of what the 
interest was that motivated the inquiry concerning the prior 
expunged convictions. 
DATED this day of July, 1986. 
Ronald M. Boyce 
#<^gag/^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before ne this 3o day of 
July, 1986. 
^ 
. 'j^^i^q /^•7shC74k+y* <#-?<-£-y 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
§§ 309-311 STATUTES 82 C.J.S. 
and an attempt to revive an act is invalid in the 
absence of compliance with such requirements.64 
Such provisions are not violated by statutes which 
do not fall within the scope of the evil intended 
to be prevented/5 and are not violated by a separate, 
distinct, original, and complete legislative enact-
ment,66 which does not revive, or attempt or purport 
to revive, another act67 It has been held that such 
constitutional provisions apply only to express stat-
utory revivals and not to revivals by operation of 
law,66 or by implication only ;69 but other authorities 
take the view that such a provision is effective to 
prohibit the revival of a statute by the repeal of 
a statute repealing it70 
§ 310. Effect 
A statute revived by a subsequent act it revived In 
that form and with that effect which It had when it 
expired. 
Where an act is revived by a subsequent act, 
it is revived precisely in that form and with that 
effect which it had at the time when it expired71 
Where a statute, reviving a statute which has been 
repealed, is itself repealed, the statute which was 
revived stands as it did before the revival.71 The 
effect of repeal of a proviso in a statute and the 
enactment of a new proviso in a later statute is i 
clear expression of a legislative intention that the 
proviso in the later statute shall remain in force.73 
IX. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION 
A. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION 
1, IN GENERAL 
§ 311. In General 
The purpoee of all rules as to the construction of 
statutes Is to discover the true intention of the law. 
8uch rules are useful only In case of doubt, and are 
never to be used to create doubt but only to remove It. 
The purpose of all rules or maxims as to the 
construction or interpretation of statutes is to dis-
cover the true intention of the law,74 and the rules 
or canons of construction are merely aids for as-
64. Tex.—Thomas v. Groebl, 212 8. 
W.2d 626. 147 Tex. 70. 
69 OJ. p 943 notes 19-21. 
Bevival by reference 
A repealed law cannot be revived 
by reference.—Airey v. Tugwell, 2 
8o.2d 99, 197 La. 982. 
•5 . Ark.—Hollia & Co. v. McCarroll. 
140 S.W.2d 420, 200 Ark. 623—Tay-
lor v. J. A. Riggs Tractor Co., 122 
8.W.24 608, 197 Ark. 383. 
Mo.—State ex rel. and to Use of 
Bair v. Producers Gravel Co., I l l 
8.W.2d 621, 341 Mo. 1106. 
Pa.—In re Kadley, 6 A.2d 874, 236 
Pa, 100. 
Tex.—Thompson v. United Gas Corp., 
Civ.App., 190 S.W.2d 604, error re-
fused—Teal v. State, Civ.App., 90 
S.W.2d 651. 
Va.—Town of Falls Church v. Ar-
lington County Board, 184 S.E. 469, 
166 Va. 192. 
Purpoee of provision 
(1) Constitutional p r o h i b i t i o n 
against a statute being revived by 
reference to its title only, and requir-
ing that the statute revived be in-
serted at length, is Intended to pre-
vent covert, JncautJoua, and fraudu-
lent legislation. 
Ark.—Taylor v. J. A. Riggs Tractor 
Co., 122 S.W.2d 608, 197 Ark. 383. 
N.J.—Baldwin Lumber-Junction Mill-
ing v. Moskowitx, 192 A. 229, 15 N. 
J J i i s c 438. 
(2) Purpose of provision is to give 
aetioe to members of the legislature 
of the subject to be affected by the] 
proposed act—Ex parte Brck. 122 8. 
W.2d 1174, 137 Tex.Cr. 67. 
(3) Such provision is designed to 
forbid the joining of diverse or un-
connected subjects in one and the 
same act.—state ex rel. Oklahoma 
State Highway Commission v. Horn, 
105 P.2d 234, 187 Okl. 605. 
(4) Purpoee of provision is to pre-
vent blind legislation.-Hollis & Co. 
v. McCarroll, 140 S.W.2d 420. 200 Ark. 
523. 
(5) Provision does not require that 
every act which amends the statu-
tory law shall set out at length the 
entire law as amended, but was in-
tended to prohibit practice of amend-
ing a statute by referring to its title, 
and by providing that it should be 
amended by adding to or striking out 
certain words, or by omitting certain 
language and Inserting in lieu thereof 
certain other words.—Ellison v. Tex-
as Liquor Control Board, Tex.Civ. 
App., 154 &W.2d 322, error refused. 
(6) Provision was not designed 
to embarrass legislation or defeat 
beneficial purpose for which it was 
adopted.—Chumbley v. People's Bank 
& Trust Co., 60 S.W.2d 164, 166 Tenn. 
35. 
66. Ark.—arable r. Blackwood, 22 
S.W.2d 41» 180 Ark. 311. 
59 C.J. p 943 note 25. 
Statute imposing death penalty for 
robbery with dangerous weapon un-
der certain conditions not only in-
creased the penalty for robbery but 
also created a new and distinct crime 
of robbery with a dangerous weapon 
and. therefore, it did not fall within 
the constitutional prohibition against 
reviving a statute by reference to 
its title only.—Hall v. State, 148 So 
793. 166 Miss. 331. 
•7. La.—Campagna v. City of Baton 
Rouge, 116 So. 403, 165 La. 974. 
59 CJ. p 943 note 26. 
bearing terms of original aot tatact 
The constitutional provision does 
not apply to statute repealing exist-
ing act or definite portion or section 
thereof or to statute leaving term* 
of original act intact and merely add 
ing sections thereto or extending, re 
stricting. or postponing its operation 
—Thompson v. United Gas Corp., Tex 
Civ.App., 190 S.W.2d 504. error re 
fused. 
68. Pa.—In re Hadley. 6 A i d 67* 
336 Pa. 100. 
59 C.J. p 943 note 23. 
69. Ark.—Faucette v. Patterson, 21' 
S.W. 300, 140 Ark. 628. 
70. Kan.—Renter v. Bauer, 3 Ear 
503. 
Tex.—State Bank of Barksdale \ 
Cloudt, Civ.App., 268 S.W. 248. 
72. U.S.—The Aurora, La., 7 Graac 
882, 3 L.Ed. 878. 
59 CJ. p 943 note 27. 
72. Ind.—Calvert v. M a k e p e a c e 
Smith 86. 
73. Md.—Department of Tidewate 
Fisheries v. Catlin, 77 A.2d 131. 
74. U.S.—Utah Junk Co. v. Porte 
fim.App^ 66 S.CL 889, 328 UJSL 3 
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ccrtaining legislative intent.75 The rules of con-
struction are neither ironclad76 nor inflexible,77 and 
must yield to manifestations of a contrary in-
tent79 Such rules are useful only in cases, of 
doubt;79 they are never to be used to create 
doubt, but only to remove i t1 0 
ft L.E& 1071—Lambur r. Yates, a 
C.A.MO., 148 F.2d 137. 
Cal.—Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California 
Employment Commission, 109 P.2d ! 
935,17 Cal.2d S21. i 
Del.—Potter v. Potter. I A.2d 93, 
• W.W.Harr. 487. 
Fla.-American Bakeries Co. v. 
Haines City. 180 So. 524, 131 Fla. 
790—Corpus Juris quoted in State 
ex rel. Andrews v. Gray. 169 So. 
SOI, 618, 125 Fla. 1—State ex rel. 
Landis v. De Witt a Jones. 147 
So. S30, 108 Fla. 613. 
Idaho.—Corpus Juris cited in Le-
brecht v. Union Indemnity Co., 22 
P.2d 1066, 1069, 53 Idaho 228. 
111.—Corpus Juris cited in Illinois 
Cent R. Co. v. Franklin County, 
56 N.E.2d 775. 781, 387 111. 301. 
Ky.—Barnes v. Anderson Nat. Bank 
or Lawrenceburg, 169 S.W.2d 833, 
293 Ky. 592, 145 A.L.R. 1066. 
Md.—Corpus Juris cited in. Powell v. 
State, 18 A.2d 587, 589, 175 Md. 
899. 
Minn.—Arlandson v. Humphrey, 27 N. 
W.ld 819, 224 Minn. 49. 
Mo.—State ex rel. Crutcher v. Koeln, 
f l 8.W.2d 750. 332 Mo. 1229. 
NT.—Higbee v. Schwartz, 56 N.Y.S. 
2d 160, 186 Misc. 28. 
Pa.—Rich y. Meadville Park Theatre 
Corp. 62 A,2d 1. 360 Pa. 338. 
69 OJ. p 948 note 29—32 C.J. P 814 
note 2—60 C.J. p 1038 note 89-p 
1140 note 17. 
Purpose of statutory construction ist 
(1) To ascertain the sense of stat-
utory language and not to put sense 
into i t 
U.S.—& C. Schroeder Co. r. Clifton, 
C.OA.Okl., 163 F.2d 385, certiorari 
denied 66 S.Ct 1351 and 66 S.Ct. 
1353, 828 U.S. 858, 90 L.Ed. 1629. 
rehearing denied 67 S.Ct. 33, 329 
U.S. 821, 91 L.Ed. 699. 
NT.—Meltxer v. Koenigsberg, 99 N.E. 
2d 679, 302 N.Y. 523. 
Okl.—In re Assessment of Champlin 
Refining Co., 99 P.2d 880, 186 Okl. 
626. 
(2) To expound and not to im-
prove the statute.—Gibbs v. State, 
192 So. 514, 29 Ala.App. 113, certio-
rari denied 192 So. 515, 238 Ala. 692. 
TS» U.S.—Poison Logging Co. v. U. 
8L, C.C.A.Wash., 160 F.2d 712—U. 
S. r, McMenamin. D.CPa* 68 F. 
Supp. 478. 
lad.—State ex rel. Milligan v. Ra-
ter's Estate, 48 N.E.2d 993. 221 
Ind. 456. 
Minn.—Arlandson v. Humphrey, 27 
N.W.24 819, 224 Minn. 49—Roman-
chuk v. Piotkin, 9 N.W.2d 421, 215 
Minn. 166—Board of Education of 
City of Duluth v. Borgen, 256 N.\Y\ 
894, 192 Minn. 367. 
Miss—Craig v. Walker, 2 So.2d 806, 
191 Miss. 424. 
Mo.—Noberg v. Montgomery. 173 S. 
W.2d 387. 361 Mo. 180. 
Nev.—Ronnow v. City of Las Vegas, 
65 P.2d 133. 57 Nev. 332. 
N.M.—Janney v. Full roe, Ine* 144 P. 
2d 145, 47 KM. 423. 
N.Y.—People v. Koch, 294 N.Y.S. 987. 
250 App.Div. 623. 
Or.—Hoi man Transfer Co. v. City of 
Portland, 249 P.2d 176, rehearing 
denied 250 P.2d 929. 
Pa.—Rich v. Meadville Park Theatre 
Corp.. 62 A.2d 1, 360 Pa. 338. 
Ascertainment of legislative intent 
see infra § 322. 
"General guide1* 
•'General rules of statutory con-
struction are at best but a very gen-
eral guide to be used in attempting 
to ascertain that intent.**—Kenney v. 
Wolff. 227 P.2d 285. 290, 102 Cal.App. 
2d 132. 
"Proliferating a purpose*9 
Interpretation of a statute has been 
said to be "the art of proliferating 
a purpose."—Universal Camera Corp. 
v. N. L. R. B., 71 S.Ct 456. 465, 340 
U.S. 474. 95 L.Ed. 456—Brooklyn 
Xat. Corp. v. C. I. R.. C.C.A.2. 157 
F.2d 450, 451, certiorari denied 67 S. 
Ct 96. 329 U.S. 733. 91 L.Ed. 634. 
76. Minn.—Romanchuk v. Piotkin, 9 
N.W.2d 421. 215 Minn. 156. 
77. Minn.—Romanchuk v, Piotkin. 
supra—Board of Education of City 
of Duluth v. Borgen, 256 N.W. 894, 
192 Minn. 367. 
78. Minn.—Romanchuk • . Piotkin, 
9 N.W.2d 421, 215 Minn. 156. 
79. U.S.—Helvering v. Northwest-
ern Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Min-
neapolis. C.C.A.8. 89 F.2d 553—In 
re Boggs-Rice Co., C.CA.Va., 66 F. 
2d 855—U. S. v. McMenamin, D.C. 
Pa., 58 F.Supp. 478. 
Del.—Delaware Steeplechase & Race 
Ass'n v. Wise, 27 A.2d 357. 2 Terry 
687—Potter v. Potter, 2 A.2d 93, 
9 W.W.Harr. 487. 
Fla.—Corpus Juris quoted in State ex 
rel. Andrews v. Gray, 169 So. 501, 
518, 125 Fla. 1. 
111.—Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Franklin 
County, 56 N.E.2d 775, 387 111. 301. 
Mo.—Zinn v. City of Steelvllle, 173 
S.W.2d 398, 351 Mo. 413. 
59 C.J. p 944 note 30. 
"Xt is fundamental that the prov-
ince of construction of statutes lies 
wholly within the domain of ambig-
uity."—Santa Monica Mountain Park 
Co. v. U. S.. CC.A.Cal.. 99 F.2d 460, 
455, certiorari dismissed 69 S.Ct 647, 
306 U.S. 666. 83 L.Ed. 1062. 
"An ambiguous statute calls for 
%very source of interpretative assist* 
ance."—Santa Monica Mountain Park 
Co. v. U. S., supra. 
Meanlsg of words 
(1) A court will not refuse to con* 
sider persuasive evidence of legisla-
tive intention on the ground that 
reasonable men could not differ as to 
the meaning of the words used la the 
statute.—U. S. v. Dickerson. CtCl.. 
60 S.Ct 1034. S10 U.S. 654. 84 LEd. 
1356, rehearing denied 61 S.Ct 63, 311 
U.a 724, 85 L.Ed. 472. 
(2) When aid to construction of 
meaning of words is available, there 
can be no rule of law which forbids 
its use, however clear the words may 
appear on superficial examination.— 
U. S. v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 
App.D.C, 60 S.Ct 1059, 310 U.S. 534. 
84 L.Ed. 1345. rehearing denied 61 
S.Ct. 53, 311 U.S. 724. 85 LJEBd. 472. 
(3) Danger that courts' conclusion 
concerning legislative purpose will be 
unconsciously influenced by Judges* 
own views or by factors not consider-
ed by enacting body does not justify 
acceptance of literal interpretation 
dogma which withholds from courts 
available information for reaching 
correct conclusion.—U. S. v. Ameri-
can Trucking Ass'ns, supra. 
80. U.S.—U. S. v. Rice. Okl., 66 S. 
Ct 835. 327 U.S. 742. 90 L.Sd. 982— 
Mead Corporation v, C L R., CC. 
A.3. 116 F.2d 187—Santa Monica 
Mountain Park Co. v. U. S., C.CA. 
Cal.. 99 F.2d 450, certiorari dis-
missed 69 S.Ct 647, 206 U.S. 666, 
63 LEd. 1062—Helvering v. North-
western N a t Bank & Trust Co. of 
Minneapolis, CCA.8. 89 F.2d 553— 
In re Boggs-Rlce Co., CCA-Va., 66 
F.2d 855. 
Del.—Delaware Steeplechase & Race 
Ass'n v. Wise. 27 A.2d 367, 2 Terry 
587—Potter v. Potter. 2 A.2d 93. 9 
W.W.Harr. 487. 
D.C.—Potomac Electric Power Co. v. 
Hazen. 90 F.2d 406. 67 App.D.C 161, 
certiorari denied 58 S.Ct 11, 302 U. 
a 692, 82 LEd. 635—Wilbur v. U. 
8. ex rel. C L. Wold Co.. 30 F.2d 
871, 58 App.D.C. 347. 
Fla.—State ex rel. Bie v. Swope, 30 
So.2d 748. 159 Fla. 18—Corpus Juris 
quoted in State ex rel. Andrews v. 
Gray. 169 So. 501. 518. 125 Fla. 1. 
111.—Corpus Juris cited la Illinois 
Cent R. Co, v. Franklin County, 
56 N.E.2d 775. 781, 387 111. 301— 
People's Gas Light & Coke Co. v. 
Ames, 194 N.E. 260. 359 111. 152. 
Mo.—Corpus Juris cited la State v. 
Hallenberg-Wagner Motor Co., 108 
S.W.2d 398. 400. 341 Mo. 771. 
Okl.—Smith v. Langston, 230 P.2d 
736, 204 Okl. 444. 
Importing ambiguity 
They cannot be employed for the 
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Rules as to the construction of statutes cannot be 
invoked to defeat or destroy natural justice or sub-
stantial equities,81 to impair an existing right,82 
to work a fraud,83 or to leave a party without a 
remedy.84 A rational, rather than an arbitrary, con-
struction is to be accorded all statutes;85 they are 
not to be £iven a tortuous or illogical construc-
tion,86 and the plain, obvious, and rational mean-
ing of a statute is always to be preferred to any 
curious, narrow, or hidden sense.87 Statutes should 
be given a practical,88 and not a technical,89 con-
struction. All statutes are to be construed as v 
tending to favor the public interest.90 An intrica 
and complicated statute should be construed wi: 
caution,91 and nothing decided beyond what 
necessary to a determination of the particul; 
case.92 Generally a statute will not be construe 
unless its proper construction is involved in tl 
case.98 
All the rules should be considered when it is nc 
essary to construe a statute,94 and no particular ru 
purpose of importing: ambiguity into 
language where no ambiguity exists. 
—In wall v. Transpacific Lumber Co., 
108 P.2d 622, 165 Or. 660. 
81. Fla.—Corpus Juris quoted in 
State ex rel. Andrews v. Gray, 169 
So. 501, 518, 125 Fla. 1. 
Ind.—Crowe v. Board of ConYrs of 
S t Joseph County, 3 N.E.2d 76, 
210 Ind. 404. 
Ohio.—State v. Stone, 110 N.E. 627, 
92 Ohio S t 63. 
Effect and consequences of statute as 
element in determining intention 
see infra I 22 6. 
82. Cal.—In re Jacobs' Estate, 223 P. 
2d 898, 100 Col.App.2d 452. 
N.Y.—Federal Land Bank of Spring-
field V. Pickard, 9 N.Y.S.2d 636, 169 
Misc. 753. 
8.D.—Messersmith v. Stanga, 21 N.W. 
2d 321, 71 S.D. 88. 
Technicality in form should not be 
used to avoid a substantive right— 
Dillard v. Kern County, 144 P.2d 365, 
23 Cal.2d 271, 150 A.L.R. 1048. 
Xiegal or constitutional rights of ac-
cused 
Statutes should be interpreted so as 
not to sacrifice the legal or constitu-
tional rights of accused.—U, S. v. 
Oanaposkl, D.CPa., 72 F.Supp. 982. 
83. Wis.—Jones v. Preferred Acci-
dent Ins. Co. of New York* 286 
N.W. 698, 282 Wis. 102. 
84. N.T.—Hay v. Town of Onondaga, 
87 N.Y.S.2d 473, 194 Misc. 773. 
86. Ark.—Corpus Juris quoted in 
Ledbetter v. Hall, 87 S.W.2d 996, 
998. 191 Ark. 791. 
Fla.—Corpus Juris quoted in State ex 
- rel. Andrews v. Gray, 169 So. 501, 
518. 125 Fla. 1. 
Mo.—State ex rel. Spriggs v. Robin-
son, 161 S.W. 1169, 253 Mo. 271. 
86. N.Y.—Neddo v. State, 85 N.Y.S. 
2d 64. 194 Misc. 379, affirmed 90 N. 
Y.S.2d 650, 276 App.Div. 492. af-
firmed 91 N.Y.S.2d 515. 275 App.Div. 
982, affirmed '29 N.E.2d 253, 300 
N.Y. 583. 
87. U.S.—Payne v. Ostrus, CCA. 
. Iowa, 50 F.2d 1039, 77 A.L.R. 531 
—Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 
C.C.A.8, 294 F. 190. 
Xnd,—State v. Griffin, 79 N.E.2d 537, 
826 Ind. 279, followed in State v. 
Harvey, 79 N.E.2d 544, 226 Ind. 292, 
and State v. Beavers, 79 N.E.2d 
544. 226 Ind. 293. 
Mo.—Norberg v. Montgomery* 173 S. 
W.2d 387. 351 Mo. 180. 
60 C.J. p 1038 note 96. 
88. Cal.—California Employment 
Stabilization Commission v. Mu-
nicipal Court of City and County 
of San Francisco, 145 P.2d 361, 62 
Cal.App.2d 781. 
111.—People ex rel. Schaefer v. New 
York, C & S t L. R. Co., 187 N.E. 
443, 353 111. 618. 
Ky.—Gillie v. Anderson, 76 S.W.2d 
279, 256 Ky. 472. 
89. Cal.—California Employment 
Stabilization Commission v. Mu-
nicipal Court of City and County 
of San Francisco, 145 P.2d 361, 62 
Cal.App.2d 781. 
N.Y.—Astor v. Watson, 71 N.Y.S.2d 
332. affirmed 75 N.Y.S.2d 291, 272 
App.Div. 1052. and 75 N.Y.S. 2d 
296, 272 App.Div. 1052. 
Okl.—Vandeventer v. State. 79 P.2d 
1032. 64 Okl.Cr. 317, reheard 84 P. 
2d 819. 65 Okl.Cr. 239—Staley v. 
State, 79 P.2d 818, 64 Okl.Cr. 302, 
reheard 84 P.2d 813, 65 Okl.Cr. 227. 
Where statute is susceptible of two 
interpretations, particularly in re-
spect to directory or administrative 
features, less technical construction 
should be adopted to end of making 
it possible to obviate unnecessary 
hardships.—In re Tartaglione, D.C.R. 
I., 8 F.Supp. 212. 
80. Ind.—Miller v. Barton School Tp. 
of Gibson County, 20 N.E.2d 967, 
215 Ind. 510. 
Pa.—Commonwealth ex rel. Shuma-
ker v. New York & Pennsylvania 
Co.. 79 A.2d 439, 367 Pa. 40. 
S.D.—Messersmith v. Stanga, 21 N.W. 
• 2d 321. 71 S.D. 88. 
81. Mo.—State v. Public Service 
Commission, 168 S.W. 1156, 259 Mo. 
704. 
An unscientific and bungling stat-
ute cannot be construed and inter-
preted by the same strict scientific 
rules as a consistent and scientific 
one.—Reynolds v. Bingham, 86 N.E. 
1131, 193 N.Y. 601—59 CJ. p 944 note 
48. 
82. Mo.—State v. Public Service 
Commission. 168 S.W. 1156, 259 M 
704. 
83. Tenn.—Saylor • . Trotter, 255 
W. 590, 257 S.W. 93, 148 Tenn. 35 
59 CJ. p 944 note 35. 
94. Ark.—Corpus Juris cited i 
Holt v. Howard, 175 S.W.2d 38 
385. 206 Ark. 337. 
Tenn.—O. H. May Co. v. Anderso: 
300 S.W. 12. 156 Tenn. 216. 
Wash.—Corpus Juris quoted in In r 
Horse Heaven Irr. Dist, 118 P. 2 
972, 976. 11 Wash.2d 218—Corpu 
Juris cited in. Procter & Gamb' 
Co. v. King County, 115 P.2d 96 
966, 9 Wash.2d 655—Corpus Juri 
quoted in State ex rel. Adjustmen 
Department of Olympia Credit Bu 
reau v. Ayer, 114 P.2d 168, 9 Was) 
2d 188. 
Boles of evidence relating to bur 
den of proof are inapplicable to th 
interpretation of statutes.—Wallin 
v. California Conserving Co., DX 
Cal.. 74 F.Supp. 182. affirmed, CCA 
McComb v. Hunt Foods. 167 F.2< 
905, certiorari denied 69 S.Ct 69, 33 
U.S. 845, 93 L.Ed. 395. 
Bules existing at time of enactmtn 
Statute will be interpreted to ac 
cord as nearly as possible with rule 
existing at time of enactment-
Heaney v. Borough of Mauch Chunk 
185 A. 732, 322 Pa. 487. 
• o t of oongress 
(1) The meaning to be ascribed tr 
an act of congress can only be de 
rived from a considered weighing o* 
every relevant aid to construction.-
U. S. v. Dickerson. CtCl.. 60 S.Ct 
1034. 310 U.S. 564, 84 L.Ed. 1356, re-
hearing denied 61 S.Ct 53, 311 U.S 
724. 86 L.Ed. 472—U. S. v. Tot D.C 
N.J., 42 F.Supp. 252, affirmed, CCA 
131 F.2d 261, reversed on other 
grounds 63 S.Ct 1241, 319 U.S. 463 
87 L.Ed. 1519. 
(2) The custom of resorting to 
state statutes and decisions to give 
meaning and content to federal stat-
utes is too old, and its use too di-
versified, to permit the court to aa> 
that considerations of nation-wide 
uniformity must prevail in a particu-
lar case over the court's judgment 
that it is out of harmony with oth-
er objectives more important to the 
legislative purpose.—Davie* Ware* 
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E. 0 .10449 Title a—The President 
shall be approved by the Secretary of 
Defense. The regulations prescribed by 
the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant 
to paragraph 1 hereof shall, so far as 
practicable, be uniform with the regula-
tions prescribed for the other armed 
forces. 
3. No person shall be entitled to more 
than one award of the National Defense 
Service Medal 
4. The National Defense Service Medal 
may be awarded posthumously. 
DWIGHT D. ElSENHOWEE 
T m WHITE HOUSE. 
April 22,1953. 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10449 
CtiATXNG AN EMERGENCY BOARD TO INVES-
TIGATE A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE NEW 
YORK, CHICAGO k ST. LOUIS RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY AND CERTAIN OP ITS 
EMPLOYEES 
WHEREAS a dispute exists between 
the New York, Chicago k St. Louis Rail-
road Company, a carrier, and certain of 
its employees represented by the Broth-
erhood of Railroad Trainmen, a labor 
organization; and 
WHEREAS this dispute has not here-
tofore been adjusted under the provisions 
of the Railway Labor Act, as amended; 
and 
WHEREAS this dispute, in the judg-
ment of the National Mediation Board, 
threatens substantially to interrupt in-
terstate commerce to a degree such as 
to deprive a section of the country of 
essential transportation service: 
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the 
authority vested in me by section 10 of 
the Railway Labor Act, as amended (45 
U. S. C. 160), I hereby create a board of 
three members, to be appointed by me, 
to investigate the said dispute. No 
member of the said board shall be 
pecuniarily or otherwise interested in 
any organization of employees or any 
carrier. 
The board shall report its findings to 
the President with respect to the said 
dispute within thirty days from the date 
of this order. 
As provided by section 10 of the Rail-
way Labor Act, as amended, from this 
date and for thirty days after the board 
has made its report to the President, no 
change, except by agreement, shall be 
made by the New York, Chicago k St. 
Louis Railroad Company or its employees 
in the conditions out of which the said 
dispute arose. 
DWICHTD. EBENHOWE* 
THE WHITE HOUSE, 
April 24,1953. 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450 
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT 
WHEREAS the Interests of the na-
tional security require that all persons 
privileged to be employed in the depart* 
ments and agencies of the Government, 
shall be reliable, trustworthy, of good 
conduct and character, and of complete 
and unswerving loyalty to the United 
States, and 
WHEREAS the American tradition 
that all persons should receive fair, im-
partial, and equitable treatment at the 
hands of the Government requires that 
all persons seeking the privilege of em-
ployment or privileged to be employed in 
the departments and agencies of the 
Government be adjudged by mutually 
consistent and no less than minimum 
standards and procedures among the 
departments and agencies governing the 
employment and retention in employ-
ment of persons in the Federal service: 
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the 
authority vested in me by the Constitu-
tion and statutes of the United States, 
including section 1753 of the Revised 
Statutes of the United States (5 U. 8. C. 
631); the Civil Service Act of 1883 (22 
Stat 403; 5 U. S C 632, et $eq.); section 
9A of the act of August 2, 1939, 63 Stat 
1148 (5 U. S C. 118 j ) ; and the act of 
August 26. 1950, 64 Stat 476 (5 U. a C. 
22-1, et tea.), and as President of the 
United States, and deeming such action 
necessary in the best Interests of the 
national security, it is hereby ordered as 
follows: * *" 
SECTION 1 In addition to the depart-
ments and agencies specified in the said 
act of August 26, 1950, and Executive 
Order No 10237' of April 26, 1951. the 
provisions of that act shall apply to all 
other departments and agencies of the 
Government. 
SEC. 2. The head of each department 
and agency of the Government shall be 
responsible for establishing and main-
taining within his department or agency 
an effective program to insure that the 
»8 CFR, 1951 Supp.. p. 4SO. 
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employment and retention in employ-
ment of any civilian officer or employee 
within the department or agency is 
clearly consistent with the interests of 
the national security. 
BEC. 3. (a) The appointment of each 
civilian officer or employee in any depart-
ment or agency of the Government shall 
be made subject to investigation. The 
scope of the investigation shall be deter-
mined in the first instance according to 
the degree of adverse effect the occupant 
of the position sought to be filled could 
bring about, by virtue of the nature of 
the position, on the national security, but 
in no event shall the investigation in-
clude less than a national agency check (including a check of the fingerprint files 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation), 
and written inquiries to appropriate lo-
cal law-enforcement agencies, former 
employers and supervisors, references, 
and schools attended by the person under 
investigation: Provided, that upon re-
quest of the head of the department or 
agency concerned, the Civil Service Com-
mission may, in its discretion, authorize 
such less investigation as iftay meet the 
requirements of the national security 
with respect to per-diem, intermittent, 
temporary, or seasonal employees, or 
aliens employed outside the United 
States. Should there develop at any 
stage of investigation information indi-
cating that the employment of any such 
person may not be clearly consistent with 
the interests of the national security, 
there shall be conducted with respect to 
such person a full field investigation, or 
such less investigation as shall be suffi-
cient to enable the head of the depart-
ment or agency concerned to determine 
whether retention of such person is 
dearly consistent with the interests of 
the national security. 
(b) The head of any department or 
agency shall designate, or cause to be 
designated, any position within his de-
partment or agency the occupant of 
which could bring about, by virtue of 
the nature of the position, a material 
adverse effect on the national security 
as a sensitive position. Any position so 
designated shall be filled or occupied 
only by a person with respect to whom a 
full field investigation has been con-
ducted: Provided, that a person occupy-
ing a sensitive position at the time it is 
designated as such may continue to oc-
cupy such position pending the comple-
tion of a full field investigation, subject 
to the other provisions of this order: 
And provided further, that in case of 
emergency a sensitive position may be 
filled for a limited period by a person 
with respect to whom a full field r e -
appointment investigation has not been 
completed if the head of the department 
or agency concerned finds that such ac-
tion is necessary in the national in-
terest, which finding shall be made a 
part of the records of such department 
or agency. 
Sic. 4. The head of each department 
and agency shall review, or cause to be 
reviewed, the cases of all civilian officers 
and employees with respect to whom 
there has been conducted a full field in-
vestigation under Executive Order No. 
8835' of March 21,1947, and, after such 
further investigation as may be appro-
priate, shall re-adjudicate, or cause to 
be re-adjudicated, in accordance with 
the said act of August 26, 1950, such of 
those cases as have not been adjudicated 
under a security standard commensurate 
with that established under this order. 
SEC. 5. Whenever there is developed or 
received by any department or agency 
information indicating that the reten-
tion in employment of any officer or em-
ployee of the Government toay not be 
clearly consistent with the interests of 
the national security, such information 
shall be forwarded to the head of the 
employing department or agency or his 
representative, who, after such investi-
gation as may be appropriate, shall re-
view, or cause to be reviewed, and. where 
necessary, re-adjudicate, or cause to be 
re-adjudic%ted, in accordance with the 
raid act of August 26, 1950, the case of 
such officer or employee. 
Sic. 6. Should there develop at any 
stage of investigation information indi-
cating that the employment of any of-
ficer or employee of the Government 
may not be clearly consistent with the 
interests of the national security, the 
head of the department or agency con-
cerned or his representative shall im-
mediately suspend the employment of 
the person involved if he deems such 
suspension necessary in the interests of 
the national security and, following such 
investigation and review as he deems 
necessary, the bead of the department 
or agency concerned shall terminate 
the employment of such suspended of-
ficer or employee whenever he shall de-
termine such termination necessary or 
•S OFR. 1947 Supp. 
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advisable in the interests of the national 
security, in accordance with the said act 
of August 26.1950. 
SEC. 7. Any person whose employ-
ment is suspended or terminated under 
the authority granted to heads of de-
partments and agencies by or in accord-
ance with the said act of August 26,1950, 
or pursuant to the said Executive Order 
No. 9835 or any other security or loyalty 
program relating to officers or employ-
ees of the Government, shall not be 
reinstated or restored to duty or reenw 
ployed In the same department or 
agency and shall not be reemployed in 
any other department or agency, unless 
the head of the department or agency 
concerned finds that such reinstatement, 
restoration, or reemployment is clearly 
consistent with the interests of the 
national security, which finding shall be 
made a part of the records of such de-
partment or agency: Provided, that no 
person whose employment has been ter-
minated under such authority there-
after may be employed by any other 
department or agency except after a 
determination by the Civil Service Com-
mission that such person is eligible for 
such employment 
Sic. 8. (a) The investigations con-
ducted pursuant to this order shall be 
designed to develop information as to 
whether the employment or retention in 
employment in the Federal service of the 
person being investigated is clearly con-
sistent with the interests of the national 
security. Such information shall relate, 
but shall not be limited, to the following: 
(1) Depending on the relation of the 
Government employment to the national 
security: 
(i) Any behavior, activities, or as-
sociations which tend to show that the 
individual is not reliable or trustworthy. 
(ii) Any deliberate misrepresenta-
tions, falsifications, or omissions of 
material facts. 
(iii) Any criminal, infamous, dishon-
est, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful 
conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to 
excess, drug addiction, sexual perversion, 
or financial irresponsibility. 
(iv) An adjudication of insanity, or 
treatment for serious mental or neuro-
logical disorder without satisfactory 
evidence of cure. 
(v) Any facts which furnish reason to 
believe that the individual may be sub-jected to coercion, influence, or pressure 
which may cause him to act contrary to 
the best interests of the national 
security. 
(2) Commission of any act of sabo-
tage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or 
attempts thereat or preparation there-
for, or conspiring with, or aiding or 
abetting, another to commit or attempt 
to commit any act of sabotage, espion-
age, treason, or sedition. 
(3) Establishing or continuing a sym-
pathetic association with a saboteur, spy, 
traitor, seditionist, anarchist, or revolu-
tionist, or with an espionage or other 
secret agent or representative of a for-
eign nation, or any representative of a 
foreign nation whose interests may be 
inimical to the interests of the United 
States, or with any person who advocates 
the use of force or violence to overthrow 
the government of the United States or 
the alteration of the form of government 
of the United States by unconstitutional 
means. 
(4) Advocacy of use of force or vio-
lence to overthrow the government of 
the United States, or of the alteration of 
the form of government of the United 
States by unconstitutional means. 
(5) Membership in. or affiliation or 
sympathetic association with, any for-
eign or domestic organization, associa-
tion, movement, group, or combination 
of persons which is totalitarian. Fascist, 
Communist, or subversive, or which has 
adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating 
or approving the commission of acts of 
force or violence to deny other persons 
their rights under the Constitution of 
the United States, or which seeks to alter 
the form of government of the United 
States by unconstitutional means. 
(6) Intentional, unauthorized disclos-
ure to any person of security informa-
tion, or of other information disclosure 
of which is prohibited by law. or willful 
violation or disregard of security regula-
tions. 
(7) Performing or attempting to per-
form his duties, or otherwise acting, so 
as to serve the interests of another gov-
ernment in preference to the interests 
of the United States. 
(b) The investigation of persons en-
tering or employed in the competitive 
service shall primarily be the responsi-
bility of the Civil Service Commission, 
except in cases in which the head of a 
department or agency assumes that re-
sponsibility pursuant to law or by agree-
ment with the Commission. The Com-
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mission shall furnish a full Investigative 
report to the department or agency con-
cerned. 
(c) The Investigation of persons (in-
cluding consultants, however employed), 
entering employment of, or employed by, 
the Government other than in the com-
petitive service shall primarily be the 
responsibility of the employing depart-
ment or agency. Departments and 
agencies without investigative facilities 
may use the investigative facilities of the 
Civil Service Commission, and other de-
partments and agencies may use such 
facilities under agreement with the Com-
mission. 
id) There shall be referred promptly 
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
all investigations being conducted by any 
other agencies which develop informa-
tion indicating that an individual may 
have been subjected to coercion, influ-
ence, or pressure to act contrary to the 
Interests of the national security, or in-
formation relating to any of the matters 
described in subdivisions (2) through (7) 
of subsection (a) of this section. In 
eases so referred to it, the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation shall make a full 
field investigation. 
8cc. 9. (a) There shall be established 
and maintained in the Civil Service Com-
mission a security-investigations index 
covering all persons as to whom security 
investigations have been conducted by 
any department or agency of the Gov-
ernment under this order. The central 
index established and maintained by 
the Commission under Executive Order 
No. 9835 of March 21,1947, shall be made 
a part of the security-investigations in-
dex. The security-investigations index 
shall contain the name of each person 
investigated, adequate identifying infor-
mation concerning each such person, and 
a reference to each department and 
agency which has conducted an investi-
gation concerning the person involved 
or has suspended or terminated the em-
ployment of such person under the au-
thority granted to heads of departments 
and agencies by or in accordance with 
the said act of August 26,1950. 
(b) The heads of all departments and 
agencies shall furnish promptly to the 
Civil 8ervicc Commission Information 
appropriate for the establishment and 
maintenance of the security-investiga-
tions index. 
(c) The reports and other investiga-
tive material and information developed 
by investigations conducted pursuant 
to any statute, order, or program de-
scribed in section 7 of this order shall 
remain the property of the investigative 
agencies conducting the investigations, 
but may, subject to considerations of the 
national security, be retained by the de-
partment or agency concerned. 8uch 
reports and other investigative material 
and information shall be maintained in 
confidence, and no access shall be given 
thereto except, with the consent of the 
investigative agency concerned, to other 
departments and agencies conducting 
security programs under the authority 
granted by or in accordance with the said 
act of August 26,1950, as may be required 
for the efficient conduct of Government 
business. 
SEC. 10. Nothing in this order shall 
be construed as eliminating or modifying 
in any way the requirement for any in-
vestigation or any determination as to 
security which may be required by law. 
SEC. 11. On and after the effective date 
of this order the Loyalty Review Board 
established by Executive Order No. 9835 
of March 21, 1947, shall not accept 
agency findings for review, upon appeal 
or otherwise. Appeals pending before 
the Loyalty Review Board on such date 
shall be heard to final determination in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
said Executive Order No. 9835. as 
amended. Agency determinations favor-
able to the officer or employee concerned 
pending before the Loyalty Review Board 
on such date shall be acted upon by such 
Board, and whenever the Board is not 
in agreement with such favorable deter-
mination the case shall be remanded to 
the department or agency concerned for 
determination in accordance with the 
standards and procedures established 
pursuant to this order. Cases pending 
before the regional loyalty boards of the 
Civil Service Commission on which hear-
ings have not been initiated on such date 
shall be referred to the department or 
agency concerned. Cases being heard 
by regional loyalty boards on such date 
shall be heard to conclusion, and the 
determination of the board shall be 
forwarded to the head of the depart-
ment or agency concerned: Provided, 
that if no specific department or agency 
is involved, the case shall be dismissed 
without prejudice to the applicant In-
vestigations pending In the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation or the Civil Service 
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Commission on such date shall be com-
pleted, and the reports thereon shall be 
made to the appropriate department or 
agency. 
SEC. 12. Executive Order No. 9835 of 
March 21, 1947, as amended, is hereby 
revoked. For the purposes described in 
section 11 hereof the Loyalty Review 
Board and the regional loyalty boards of 
the Civil Service Commission shall con-
tinue to exist and function for a period 
of one hundred and twenty days from 
the effective date of this order, and the 
Department of Justice shall continue to 
furnish the information described in 
paragraph 3 of Part m of the said Ex-
ecutive Order No. 9835, but directly to the 
head of each department and agency. 
SEC. 13. The Attorney General Is re-
quested to render to the heads of depart-
ments and agencies such advice as may 
be requisite to enable them to establish 
and maintain an appropriate employee-
security program. 
SEC. 14. (a) The Civil Service Com-
mission, with the continuing advice and 
collaboration of representatives of such 
departments and agencies as the Na-
tional Security Council may designate, 
shall make a continuing study of the 
manner in which this order is being im-
plemented by the departments and 
agencies of the Government for the pur-
pose of determining: 
(1) Deficiencies in the department and 
agency security programs established 
under this order which are inconsistent 
with the interests of, or directly or indi-
rectly weaken, the national security. 
(2) Tendencies in such programs to 
deny to individual employees fair, im-
partial, and equitable treatment at the 
hands of the Government, or rights un-
der the Constitution and laws of the 
United States or this order. 
Information affecting any department 
or agency developed or received during 
the course of such continuing study 
shall be furnished immediately to the 
head of the department or agency con-
cerned. The Civil Service Commission 
shall report to the National Security 
Council, at least semiannually, on the 
results of such study, and shall recom-
mend means to correct any such defi-
ciencies or tendencies. 
(b) All departments and agencies of 
the Government are directed to cooper-
ate with the Civil Service Commission 
to facilitate the accomplishment of the 
responsibilities assigned to it by subsec-
tion (a) of this section. 
S E C 15. This order shall become effec-
tive thirty days after the date hereof. 
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 
THE WHITE HOUSE, 
April 27, 1953. 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10451 
INSPECTION OF CERTAIN RETURNS BY THE 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE or 
REPRESENTATIVES 
By virtue of the authority vested in me 
by sections 55 (a), 508, 603, 729 (a), and 
1204 of the Internal Revenue Code (53 
Stat. 29, 111, 171, 54 Stat. 989, 1008, 55 
Stat. 722; 26 U. S. C. 55 (a), 508. 603, 
729 (a), and 1204), it is hereby ordered 
that until June 30, 1953, any income, 
excess-profits, declared value excess-
profits, capital stock, estate, or gift tax 
return for any period to and including 
1952 shall be open to inspection by the 
Committee on the Judiciary, House of 
Representatives, or any duly authorized 
subcommittee thereof, in connection 
with the inquiry authorized by the reso-
lution of the Committee adopted Janu-
uary 27, 1953, with reference to the 
administration of the Department of 
Justice and the Office of the Attorney 
General of the United States, subject to 
the conditions stated in the Treasury 
decision1 relating to the inspection of 
such returns by that Committee, ap-
proved by me this date. 
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 
THE WHITE HOUSE, 
AprU 28,1953. 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10452 
PROVIDING FOR THE PERFORMANCE BY THE 
CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COM-
MISSION OF CERTAIN FUNCTIONS RELAT-
ING TO PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
By virtue of the authority vested in 
me by the laws of the United States, in-
cluding section 1753 of the Revised Stat-
utes (5 U. S. C. 631) and the Civil 
Service Act of January 16,1883 (22 Stat 
403), and as President of the United 
States, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
SECTION 1. The Chairman of the 
United States Civil Service Commission 
shall, in addition to the functions con-
ferred upon him by statute and by 
'26 CFE, Part 458. 
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THE EXPUNGEMENT OF ADJUDICATION RECORDS 
OF JUVENJLE AND ADULT OFFENDERS: 
A PROBLEM OF STATUS* 
AIDAN R. SOUGH** 
Over the past half-century, American correctional law has focused in-
creasingly on the rehabilitation of the individual offender and the develop-
ment of means and practices appropriate to that end.1 Realistic appraisal 
compels the conclusion that the system of penal law must fulfill a complex 
of functions pointed toward a single ultimate goal: the ordering of society 
in such a manner that each member has the fullest opportunity to realize 
his human dignity through community life.1 The law must at once serve 
the reconstruction of the offender, the incapacitation of the intractable 
criminal, the deterrence of others from criminal conduct, and the exaction 
of retribution and expiation for the offense.8 (Though often decried in 
theory and rather less often disavowed in practice, the punitive aspects of 
correctional policy remain an obvious reality.)4 If the offender reoffends, 
none of the purposes is served. 
It is clear that any program for reform must create the institutions 
necessary for its realization, and that the sanctions it imposes must be 
functionally apposite to the end it seeks.5 There has been surprisingly little 
#
 The author is indebted to Professor Lloyd L. Weinreb of the Harvard Law School 
for his helpful commentary on this article. 
# #
 Associate Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara. 
1. For a critical appraisal see Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Re-
habilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 226 (1959-60). 
2. Snee, Leviathan at the Bar of Justice, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 96 (Suther-
land ed. 1956). See also Laswell & Donnelly, The Continuing Debate Over Responsi-
bility: An Introduction to Isolating the Condemnation Sanction, 68 YALE L.J. 869, 876 
(1959). 
S. TAP PAN, CONTEMPORARY CORRECTION 4-13 (1951). 
4. The imposition of punishment by the state is frequently justified as the political 
counterpart of individual vengeance. Sir James Stephen is quoted as remarking that 
"criminal procedure is to resentment what marriage is to affection: namely, the legal 
provision for an inevitable impulse of human beings." SUTHERLAND & CRESS EY, PRIN-
CIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 287 (5th ed. 1955); see BLOCK & GEIS, MAN, CRIME, AND 
SOCIETY 568-71 (1962). 
For an articulation of unconscious motivations operative in our treatment of law-
breakers see Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"—Why Not?, 72 YALE L. 
J. 854, 856 n.ll (1963). 
5. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 166 (1964). 
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recognition of the fact that our system of penal law is largely flawed in 
one of its most basic aspects: it fails to provide accessible or effective meant 
of fully restoring the social status of the reformed offender. We sentence, 
we coerce, wc incarcerate, we counsel, we grant probation and parole, 
and wc treat—not infrcquentiy with success—but wc never forgive.* The 
late Paul Tappan has observed that when the juvenile or adult offender 
has "paid his debt to society," he "neither receives a receipt nor is free of 
his account"* His status is that of "ex-offender"—an anomalous position 
lying somewhere between the poles of social acceptance and social con-
demnation, though obviously closer to the latter. There is considerable 
evidence to indicate that the failure of the criminal law to clarify the 
status of the reformed offender impedes the objective of reintegrating him 
with the society from which he has become estranged.* The more heavily 
he bears the mark of his former offense, the more likely he is to reoffend 
Despite relatively widespread judicial recognition of the perdurabifitjr 
and disabling effects of a criminal record,9 scant attention has been given 
by lawmakers and behavioral scientists to means whereby the law might in 
a proper case relieve the first offender or juvenile miscreant from this 
handicap. In recent years, a handful of jurisdictions have enacted legisla-
tion allowing the expungement of an adjudication record of a juvenile or 
a conviction record of an adult first offender. This paper will attempt to 
6. RUBIN, WEIHOFEN, EDWARDS ft ROSENZWEIO, THE LAW OP CRIMINAL COR-
RECTION 694 (1963) [hereinafter cited as RUBIN et al.]. 
7. Tappan, Loss and Restoration of the Civil Rights of Offenders, in NATIONAL 
PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION 1952 YEARBOOK 86, 87. 
Professors Schwartz and Skolnkk have shown that conviction works a degradation 
ot status which "continues to operate after the time when, according to the generalised 
theory of justice underlying punishment in our society, the individual's *debt' has been 
paid." Schwartz ft Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 133, 
136 (1962). Aaron Nussbaum, Assistant District Attorney of Kings County (New 
York), has written that Ma theory of law which withholds the finality of forgiveness after 
punishment is ended is as indefensible in logic as it is on moral grounds." NUSSBAUM, 
FDIST OFFENDERS, A SECOND CHANCE 24 (1956). 
8. Goldstein, Polite Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Vis&ititf 
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960). 
9. E.g., United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1»5); 
cf. Parker v. Ellis, 362 VS. 574, 593-94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); United 
States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954) (Minton, J., dissenting). 
Of course the record of a conviction for a serious crime is often a lifelong handicap. 
There are a dozen ways in which even a person who has reformed, never of-
fended again, and constantly endeavored to lead an upright life may be prejudiced 
thereby. The stain on his reputation may at any tune threaten his social standing 
or affect his job opportunities . . . . Id. at 519. 
On the effect of juvenile court adjudication see In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 
789-90, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952); Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 341-42, 
38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946). 
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sorvey the need for such legislation, to examine existing and proposed 
statutes on both adult and juvenile court levels, and to make some evalua-
tion of their effectiveness. It is the writer's view that providing institutional 
means of restoring status after reformation is an appropriate way to har-
monize "the sanctioning activities of the democratic body politic with the 
ultimate value—human dignity."10 
At the outset, it is necessary to limn with some particularity what ex-
pungement is and what it is not. By an expungement statute is meant a 
legislative provision for the eradication of a record of conviction or ad-
judication upon fulfillment of prescribed conditions, usually the successful 
discharge of the offender from probation and the passage of a period oi 
time without further offense. It is not simply a lifting of disabilities at-
tendant upon conviction and a restoration of civil rights, though this is a 
significant part of its effect.11 It is rather a redefinition of status, a process 
of erasing the legal event of conviction or adjudication, and thereby re-
storing to the regenerate offender his status quo ante. 
The systematic study of expungement acts is hindered by the extreme 
lack of uniform terminology, even within a single jurisdiction. The func-
tional process of deleting the adjudication of guilt upon proof of reformation 
b variously designated expungement;" record sealing;" record destruc-
tion;14 obliteration;15 setting aside of conviction;1* annulment of convic-
10. Laswcll & Donnelly, supra note 2, at 876. "~ 
11. Civil right* lost on conviction are usually regained, if at all, by pardon or by 
statutes providing automatic restoration upon completion of sentence. Extensive 
analysis of these restorative mechanisms will be found in RUBIN et al. 613, 632; RUBIN, 
CWME & JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 152 (2d ed. 1961); Tappan, supra note 7, at 96-104. 
For a thorough discussion of the particular disabilities attendant upon conviction 
tee Green, Post-Conviction Disabilities Imposed or Authorized by Law, 1960 (unpub-
fished honor paper on file in Harvard Law Library). 
12. CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE | 781; UTAH CODE ANN. f 55-10-117 (Supp. 
1965). 
13. CAL. PEN. CODE | 1203.45; CAL. WELFARE ft INST'NS CODE | 781. Technically, 
expungement imports physical destruction of the records rather than sealing. Andrews 
v. Police Court, 123 P.2d 128 (Cal. App. 1942), affd, 21 Cal. 2d 479, 133 P.2d 398 
(1943); 40 CAL. OPS. ATT'Y. GEN. 50 (1962). As used in this paper, the term ex-
pungement includes both destruction and sealing unless otherwise specified. 
14. IND. ANN. STAT. | 9-3215a (1956). 
15. Ibid. 
16. MICH. STAT. ANN. i f 28.1274(101), (102) (Supp. 1965). Statutes permitting 
&e setting aside of convictions are not true expungement acts, and have much more 
Waited effect than the latter. See text accompanying notes 30-34 infra. The Michigan 
enactment would appear to be of the tormer type, save for the provision of f 28.1274 
(102) that upon entry of an order setting aside a conviction, the person "for purposes 
°» the law** shall be deemed not to have suffered any previous conviction. Because of 
"> uncertain scope and the possibility that the broad language may reach the status of 
"• conviction, it is included here as an expungement act, albeit a deficient one. 
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tion;" amnesty;19 nullification of conviction, purging, and pardon extta. 
ordinary.1* Because many of these terms have wider use in other legal 
contexts, it is suggested that the term expungement be adopted to avoid 
confusion. 
In particular, the usual denotations of amnesty and pardon must be 
distinguished from expungement The former are exceptional and specific 
acts of grace, usually granted by executive power, rather than processes of 
regular and widespread application available through legislative provision.* 
Despite confusion engendered by murky decisional language, it seems dear 
—and has been widely held—that a pardon remits punishment and it-
moves some disabilities, but does not erase the legal event determinative of 
the offender's status qua offender, i.e., the conviction itself." It is the statu 
resulting from the adjudication of guilt, more than any punishment imposed, 
which is characteristic of conviction; if the disabilities of conviction are 
to be removed effectively and the reformed offender restored to society, the 
remedy chosen must reach the genesis of the status." * 
I. AN EXAMINATION OF NEED 
The consequences of conviction are wide in form, some authorized ex-
pressly or implicitly by law, others attached by subtle attitudes of com-
munity rejection. Commonly, the law provides for the deprivation or 
17. National Council on Crime ft Delinquency, Annulment of a Conviction of 
Crime; A Model Act, 8 CRIME ft DELINQUENCY 97 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 
N.C.C.D. MODEL ACT]. 
18. State of N.V. Ass> Bill, InL No. 233 (3d Rdg. 547, Print 5363, Rec 703) 
(1965). 
19. MINN. STAT. ANN. ftj 242.31, 638.02 (Supp. 1965). 
20. KORN ft MoCoRKLS, CKXMINOLOOY ft PENOLOOY 600-04 (1959); SUTHERLAND 
ft CHESSEY, op. tit. supra note 4, at 544-49. 
21. Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914) (state mar charge at prior crinse 
offense pardoned by President); People v. Bigy*, 9 Cal. 2d 508, 71 P.2d 214 (1937) 
(offense in sister state deemed prior conviction despite pardon); In re Lavine, 2 Cal 
2d 324, 329, 41 P.2d 161, 163 (1935) (pardon "implies guilt, and does not wash «* 
the moral stain** or restore the offender's character); People ex rel. Jobissy v. Murpfcy. 
224 App. Div. 834, 279 N.Y. Supp. 762 (1935); State v. Edelstein, 146 Wash. 221, 
62 Pac 622 (1927). See also Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915). For 
language to the contrary aee Ex parts Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380-81 (1867). 
On the general history and scope of executive clemency aee Weihofen, Effect of * 
Pardon, 88 U. PA. L. RET. 177 (1939); Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out GuiUh & 
HAKV. L. REV. 647 (1915). For a discussion of pardon in its modern context aee 
Lavinslcy, Executive Clemency: Study of a Decisional Problem Arising in the Term*** 
Stages of the Criminal Process, 42 CHL-KENT L. REV. 13 (1965). 
22. RUBIN et aL 690. One who has received a pardon must nevertheless disclose ft* 
conviction upon inquiry. 1953 N.J. Or a. ATT*Y GEN. 206. 
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mspenston of political and civil rights upon conviction of a certain class 
of crimes, usually felonies. These explicit disabilities include the loss of 
the right to hold any public office or trust, to serve as a juryman, and to 
practice various occupations and professions.** In at least forty-six states, 
conviction of crime may serve as a ground for divorce.*4 Many of these 
disabilities persist beyond the termination of sentence. 
Every state and the federal system has some means of restoring civil and 
political rights.** Usually this takes the form of a pardon granted at the dis-
cretion of the governor or the board of pardons appointed by him.** In 
tome states, the courts are empowered to restore civil rights.*7 A number 
of states provide for the automatic restoration of civil rights either upon 
completion of a term of probation or parole or upon termination of a prison 
sentence.** Both pardon and automatic restoration revive the more formal 
dvfl rights, but they are unable to remove the stigmatic disabilities attach-
ing in such crucial social areas as employment.** 
Some nine states have statutes providing that upon satisfactory com-
pletion of probation and "evidence of reformation," the offender may 
petition the court to have his conviction and the plea or verdict of guilty 
**set aside"; he is thenceforth released from all "penalties and disabilities" 
attendant upon the conviction.*0 The Federal Youth Offender Act contains 
23. RUBIN et al. 611-32; Tappan, supra note 7. 
24. A tabulation of states which regard conviction as a ground for divorce is con-
tained in Green, op. cit. supra note 11, at 64-66. See also RUBIN et aL 614-15. 
25. RUBIN et al. 632-37; Green, op. cit. supra note 11, at 75-77. 
26. There is wide variation in practices from state to state. For example, Rhode 
bland reserves the restoration of dvil rights apart from a grant of pardon to the 
legislature, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. f 13-6-2 (1956), and Mississippi permits it alter-
natively to the governor or legislature, Miaa. CONST, art. 5, | 124; art. 13, | 253 (restc-
»«km of suffrage by legislature only); cf. Miaa. CODE ANN. | 4004-27 (1956) (governor 
may restore civil rights on completion of probation). 
27. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. SI 13*1 *> -*° (1953); TBNN. CODE ANN. If 16-504, 
*0-*701 (1955). 
28. See the tabulation and discussion in RUBIN et al. 633-34. The archetypal auto-
matic restoration statute appears to be 9 Geo. 4, c 32, f 3 (1828), which provides that 
"BBpfetion of sentence in case of a felony conviction shall have the same effect as a 
Pardon **... to prevent all doubts respecting the Civil Rights of Persons convicted. . . .** 
29. See authorities cited note 23 supra. 
W. CAL. PEN. CODE if 1203.4, 1203.4a; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, | 4332(i) (1953); 
&**<> CODE ANN. | 19-2604 (Supp. 1965); NEV. REV. STAT. | 176.340 (1959); NJ>. 
Cwr. CODE I 12-53-18 (1960); TEX. CODE Cam. Pmoc ANN. arts. 42.12 | 7, .13 | 7 
(1965); UTAH CODE ANN. | 77-35-17 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. f 9.93.240 
(1961); Wvo. STAT. ANN. | 7-315 (1957) (statute uses term "parole," but seemingly 
tfers to probation or "court parole** only). For an invidious use of the Utah statute 
** State v. Schreiber, 121 Utah 653, 245 P.2d 222 (1952), where the conviction had 
bee
*
1
 vacated on the condition that defendant '•permanently leave the state on account 
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essentially similar provisions applicable to youth offenders; however, under 
the federal statute, the issuance of an order setting aside the conviction a 
automatic upon the unconditional discharge of the offender before the 
expiration of his sentence.*1 The effects of such statutes are not entirely 
clear, and they have been subjected to interpretations quite at variance 
with the post-conviction relief they purport to provide." Though the 
scope of alleviation provided by them is said to be broader than that 
provided by pardon," they are clearly not statutes of expungement and 
do not in fact restore the offender's former status among his fellow men, 
despite some judicial language to that effect.*4 
of his ill health." MODEL PENAL CODE | 306.6(2) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962) penssts 
discretionary vacation of conviction if the offender is discharged from probation «r 
parole before expiration of the maximum term, or if he has led a law-abiding life for five 
years after expiration of sentence. 
CAL. WELFAAE ft INST'NS CODE SI 1179, 1772 provide that a person honorably aV 
charged from the control of the Youth Authority shall be released from all penalties 
and disabilities resulting from the offense. Section 1179 operates automatically, whit 
| 1772 requires the discharged offender to petition the court for relief, which may be 
denied. The apparent overlap of the two sections is not clarified by the statutory lan-
guage, but it is the interpretation of the Youth Authority that § 1179 applies only t» 
juvenile court commitments and { 1772 only to commitments from criminal coats. 
Baura, Wiping Out m Criminal or JuveniU Record, 40 CAL. S.B.J. 816, 821 (1965). 
MODEL PENAL CODE | 6.05(3) allows vacation of the conviction of a young adoh 
offender as an alternative to providing that his conviction shall not constitute a disability. 
31. 18 U.S.C. { 5021 (1964). 
32. For example, note the interpretation of CAL. PEN. CODE | 1203.4 in Gards-
Gonzales v. Immigration ft Naturalization Service, 344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 
382 U.S. 840 (1965). Despite the language of the statute that the setting aside of the 
guilty plea and the dismissal of the information *'shall . . . [release the petitioner] frost 
all penalties and disabilities . . .," the court ruled that the conviction was not expunged 
for purposes of 8 U.S.C. { 1251 (1964), authorizing deportation of an alien convicted of 
a narcotics offense. 18 U.S.C. | 5021 (1964) was similarly treated in Hernande* 
Valensuela v. Rosenberg, 304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962). See Adams v. United States, 
299 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1962) (discusses CAL. WELFARE ft INST'NS CODE | 1772). 
33. 18 U.S.C. | 5021 (1964) acts to "expunge the conviction" while pardon «•& 
removes disabilities and restores civil rights. Tatum v. United States, 310 F.2d 8MV 
856 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Bui see 1957 N.J. OPS. ATTV GEN. 143 (expungement of 
record has less effect than a pardon). 
34. If the conditions of probation are fulfilled, the plea or verdict of guilty msy 
be changed . . . [and] the proceedings expunged from the record. . . . He has then 
. . . received a statutory rehabilitation and a reinstatement to his former status in 
society insofar as the state by legislation is able to do so. . . . Stephens v. Toomey, 
51 Cal. 2d 864, 870-71, 338 P.2d 182, 185 (1959) (dictum). 
Contra, In the Matter of Phillips, 17 Cal. 2d 55, 61, 109 P.2d 344, 348 (19*D-
[I]t cannot be assumed that the legislature intended that such action by the trial 
court under [Penal Code] section 1203.4 should be considered as obliterating the 
fact that the defendant had been finally adjudged guilty of a crime. 
The Phillips case involved a lawyer disbarred upon conviction of a misdemeanor «•* 
volving moral turpitude; the court held that relief under CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4 dm 
not work reinstatement. It is not entirely dear whether the decision turned upoa • • 
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It is not the explicitly articulated disabilities which are most trouble-
jone to the reformed offender. It is rather the less-direct economic and 
social reprisals engendered by his brand as an adjudicated criminal. Th c 
vagaries of public sentiment often discriminate against persons with a crimi-
nal past, with very little regard for the severity of the offense, and they 
do not frequendy distinguish between persons arrested and acquitted or 
otherwise released and persons convicted." This is particularly true in 
the vital matter of employment, which perhaps as much as anything eke 
influences a man's concept of himself and his worth, and accordingly in-
fluences the values which guide his conduct. 
A recent study found that only eleven per cent of employers who were 
seeking to hire were willing to consider a man convicted of assault** Only 
one-third would consider a man who had been charged with the same 
crime and acquitted. Despite the small sample used (25 employer* of 
whom 9 had need of employees), the crippling effects of the stigma ensuing 
from criminal adjudication are immediately apparent. 
Not only will the offender have trouble finding unskilled employment, 
bat his difficulty will increase directly with the skill level of the job sought 
!Jnastudy of the employment experiences of 258 men with criminal records 
Boa-obliteration of thc judgment or upon the fact that the court viewed disbarment as 
outside the "penalties and disabilities* clause of the statute. MODEL PENAL COO» J 3 ^ $ 
(Prop. Official Draft, 1962) provides that the order vacating the conviction *,,»%
 noV 
inter alia, preclude proof of conviction whenever relevant to the exercise of official 
discretion, nor does it justify a defendant in denying conviction unless ht *\%,t ^ j , 
attention to the order. 
35. Cf. RUBIN et of. at 630-31. As a partial solution to the problem, **»* ttates 
«quire the destruction of fingerprints and arrest data upon acquittal or 4itchars« 
without trial, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. | 749.2 (1950), or their return to tU p ^ n 
involved, «.f., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, | 206-5 (Smith-Hurd 1964). Often *+ j , n g c r . 
pnnts are not returned unless requested. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV, { 29-1S MS',8) 
Absent a statute, return or destruction has been denied even when the arrest has been 
found patently improper. In Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal 
fcptr. 696 (1962), a woman was arrested under a city ordinance prohibitum the de-
frauding of a taxicab operator when the driver refused to change a twenty drjflar bill 
^ttpite her judgment against the cab company for false arrest and malicious protscu-
t*00. return of the fingerprints and "mug shots" from police files was deaed See 
tfnerally Note, 42 I I I . L. REV. 256 (1947); Note, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 441 (1954) - An™* 
M AX.R. 127 (1933). ' ^ 
3& Schwartz ft Skolnick, supra note 7, at 134-38. In conducting this portion of the 
•tody, the authors prepared four hypothetical application files, which were submitted 
J° Prospective employers by an employment agent Three of the files reflected an arrest 
•Gf usauit: the first file showed a conviction and satisfactory completion of semence, 
* • »econd an acquittal, and the third an acquittal with a personal letter fr*>m the 
**&& verifying the finding of not guilty and stressing the legal presumption of ssaoosnee 
*&* fourth file made no mention of any criminal record. All applications *•?> for 
**tst-!evel 
positions as unskilled laborers. 
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the participants were asked whether a criniinal record truly handicaps a 
person in seeking employment, and whether criminal conduct is stimulated 
by discriminatory rejection of those with past records of offense. Ninety, 
four per cent of the men replied affirmatively to each qucsttonTjWhcn the 
same questions were put to 223 businessmen, 57% responded affirmatively 
to the first query and 84% to the second^^\nother oft-cited study sur-
veyed 44 business and professional employers: 16% expressed a policy of 
total exclusion of persons with any criminal past, while 84% would hue 
a former offender for unskilled labor.*8 However, only 64% would coo. 
sider such a person for a skilled labor position; only 40% for clerical work; 
and only 8% for sales jobs. ffJone would consider a person with a record 
of criminality for a position as an accountant, cashier, or executive?*) The 
principal determinants in the policy of complete exclusion may have 
been the assumptions, first, that any former offender was by definition 
untrustworthy, and, second, that the engagement of such a person would 
undermine the morale of the present employees.40 
37. Wallerstein, Testing Opinion of Causes of Crime, 28 Focus 103 (1949), cited 
in Tappan, supra note 7, at 89. 
38. Melichercik, Employment Problems of Former Offenders, 2 N.P.P.AJ. 43 (1956). 
See also RUBIN, op, eit. supra note 11, at 151-54. 
39. In the course of several informal interviews with personnel administrator! of 
companies located on both the east and west coasts, the writer gained the impresswa 
that personnel officers regard the picture given by this study as unrealistic Most wA 
that they had no definite policy of exclusion, but wanted full disclosure of the details 
of the offense in order to weigh each case "on the merits" and to match the individual 
to the job. Several expressed distrust of an expungement procedure, and indicated 
that they would not look favorably on someone who had invoked it As one man pot 
it: "We probably wouldn't fire the guy outright [i.e., in the event of subsequent <&• 
covery of the offense], but I think we'd be rather hurt that he didn't feel he couM 
come and tell us about it" 
Administrators of two of the concerns (a major university and a nationwide tem-
porary-help service) indicated that they did not ask the applicant about prior offense** 
but relied exclusively upon the recommendations of former employers. (This woo* 
effectively foreclose those who had been incarcerated and could not "account v* 
their past") On the other hand, firms in the electronics field typically made flean^ 
inquiry of all applicants, even those applying for the most menial positions. presunuW* 
this practice reflects the companies* concern over security risks, but in some cases u* 
probing exceeds relevant inquiry. In one firm, an applicant for the position of nvcto-
wave tube assembler (two dollars/hour) was required to list all arrests or convict** 
and give full details, indicate in detail any other "misconduct" with which he or *j 
had been charged (presumably relating to employment but not clearly), account for *" 
past absences from work, explain all garnishments or other credit impairment, and *0 
an "agreement" that he or she could be immediately discharged without recourse 
any information given was found to be "false or misleading." (Application ft** 
possession of the author.) 
40. Melicherdk, supra note 38, at 48-49. 
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flic ex-offender's chances of employment by public or governmental 
fgtadca—even in the most ordinary positions—are no brighter. One 
undy has concluded that nearly one-half of the states, and the federal 
government, do not automatically exclude a person with an adjudication 
a\ criminal guilt from consideration for public employment41 This is by 
go means indicative of the extent of former-offender employment, because 
denial of hire usually results from the exercise of administrative discretion 
ty the examining or certifying agency.48 Only one state expressly provides 
that a rehabilitated offender shall not be barred from public employment 
by his conviction.48 Exclusion from employment may result either from 
rejection because of a former offense or from dismissal because of the com-
mission of a present offense. Surely these situations are different, and dif-
ferent policies should apply. 
It would be naive in the extreme to suggest that the governmental em-
ployers of our nation drop their bars and become a haven for unregenerate 
brigands, and no such proposal is put forth here. The public good demands 
die utmost probity of its servants. It also demands, however, the reassimib-
tkm into full social status of all who have offended against i t The removal 
of the stigma of conviction by annulling it upon proof of reform would 
open large areas of public employment now closed to the rehabilitated 
offender. 
It is necessary to differentiate, moreover, among the kinds of positions 
iought. This need applies to licensing mechanisms as well as to direct 
employment, and in general it is not met Surely the considerations that 
require exclusion of former offenders from law enforcement and public 
»fety positions do not thrust with the same force in the case of a truck-
driver, or an engineering aide, or a forest firefighter. There are valid and 
necessary reasons for permanently foreclosing those with records of violative 
«mduct from certain critical and highly sensitive positions in the public 
*rvice, but surely some account must be taken by the law of the gravity 
j j h c offense, and some reasonable criteria—other than the shopworn 
*1. RUIIM et ml at 628-30; tee Wiie, Public Employment of Persons with a Criminal 
w£?'' 6 N P P A J - 197» l9B ( 1 9 6°)- *uWn'« «*»«« *** t»«xl largely upon 
*>ddifield, The State Convict, 1952 (unpublished doctoral thesis on file at Yak 
J*w School Library). Variant results were reported by Green in a study conducted in 
J^^orty-two states were reported as having no rule completely prohibiting em-
fkflnent of ex-offenders. However, only twenty-eight states indicated that they did 
*wet hire such persons, usually in positions of unskilled labor. Green, op. eit. supra 
j * * J3, at 74. This survey also included a limited inquiry into municipal hiring practices. 
*2. RUBIK at al. at 625, 628. 
43
- Mn. AMK. CODE art. 64A, f 19 (1957). The appointing authority may consider 
^^vJctkrn in granting employment 
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dichotomy of felony and misdemeanor—must be developed.44 Not ink* 
quently the disability of a record for even a single offense bars nulhar/ 
enlistment, though the selection standards vary with the national need for 
service manpower." ^ 
The effects of criminal stigma are felt perhaps even more strongly In 
the area of licenses and government-regulated occupations than they ait 
in the sector of public employment. Green lists some fifty-nine occupation!, 
from accountancy to yacht selling, in which a license is required and from 
which a reformed offender may be barred; his list is only illustrative, not 
exhaustive.*4 The relevance of an offense of petty theft to the practice of 
the profession or trade may be immediately apparent, as in the practice of 
law, or may be recondite in the extreme—if there at all—as in the case of 
barbering. Even though the offense may be relevant, this is not to say that 
it should be determinative of entry into the trade or profession. 
A few years ago, a young man of twenty-one celebrated his college's 
basketball victory with more enthusiasm than good sense, and with two 
cohorts—all in a happy state of bibulosity—broke into the rear service 
porch of a vacant apartment, from which he abstracted a large metal 
garbage can. When the police arrived shortly thereafter, he was busily 
engaged in rolling it up and down the rear stairs of the apartment, to 
the vast annoyance of the building's occupants. His comments to the police 
were not of the politest sort. He was arrested on charges of burglary, 
malicious mischief, disturbance of the peace, public intoxication, and con-
tributing to the delinquency of minors (his companions were below the 
age of twenty-one). The burglary charge was dropped; he pleaded guilty 
to the other counts, and was granted probation conditioned upon replace-
44. For discussion on the need for an expungement statute to make some differentia-
tion on the basis of the gravity of the offense and the criticality of the purposes for 
which the information is sought see text accompanying notes 132-44 infra. 
45. Broadly speaking, persons convicted of felonies are excluded. Major commands* 
may grant waivers to persons convicted of ksser offenses if they have been free of si 
t forms of civil control for at least six months. Adjudicated juvenile and youthful offendtn 
may be granted waivers by main station commander*, who may delegate their authority 
to recruiting main station commanders. The latter may grant waivers for certata 
single minor offenses such as drunkenness and truancy. 32 C.F.R. | 571.2(eM" 
(1962). See generally MacCormick, Defense Department Policy Toward Former Of** 
ders, NATIONAL PROBATION AND PA»OLE ASSOCIATION 1951 YEAABOOK 1. 
46. Green, op. eit. supra note 11, at 26. For a more enlightened example of statutory 
exclusion from occupation see | 504 of die Labor-Management Reporting and J*** 
closure Act, 29 U.S.C. I 504 (1964), which bars persons convicted of specified criff* 
from holding various positions in labor unions. It should be noted that even in *° 
"high-risk" an occupation, the ban is not perpetual but extends only five years from <*** 
viction. The statute recognises the possibility of reformation. 
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pent of the battered garbage can and suitable apologies to its owners. His 
probation was satisfactorily completed; he graduated from college, went 
on to a large law school, and graduated with honors near the head of his 
f>«. Save for this casual and unfortunate incident, his record is other-
wise without blemish. Would it really make sense to require that for the 
itst of his life he be foreclosed from the practice of his profession?** The 
labels of "malicious mischief," "disturbance of the peace," "drunk in 
public," and "contributing to the delinquency of a minor" (this last par-
ticularly opprobrious and connotative of moral turpitude) are surely not 
properly descriptive of his offense, or of his moral character. Yet, he must 
bear them the rest of his life, listing them on credit and job applications, 
and otherwise having them dredged up in a host of ways. 
Should such persons—and no one can estimate successfully how many 
there may be—be forced to bear forever the stain of their immature and 
impulsive conduct? To take a few examples: someone in the shoes of 
this young man, if he were a barber, would likely lose his license in 
Michigan or California.4* Apparently, he could not work as a physical 
therapist or practice optometry or chiropractic in Minnesota.4* He could 
be denied a license to breed or raise horses or to process or sell horsemeat 
in Illinois,*0 and might lose his cosmetologist's license in Wisconsin." With-
out the aid of an expungement statute, he would be compelled to bear the 
mark of his past mistake. Statutes permitting the setting aside of convictions 
are no help here;82 it is not uncommon for the law to provide that despite 
the vacation of conviction under such an act, the conviction may neverthe-
less be considered for licensing and disciplinary purposcs.•, 
47. This roughly describes a case known to the author. The young man in question 
"as admitted to the bar examination after giving a full explanation and now enjoys a 
**cestful practice. 
48. GAL. BUS. & PXOF. CODE | 6576 (disqualification on conviction of crime of moral 
fcwpitude); MICK. STAT. ANN. { 18.106 (1957) (disqualification upon conviction of 
»ay crime). 
49. MINN. STAT. ANN. | f 147.02 (optometrist), 148.10 (chiropractor), 148.75 
(Physical therapist) (Supp. 1965). 
50. I I I . RSV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, | 242.2 (Supp. 1965) (disqualification on convic-
•°a of felony or "any crime opposed to decency or morality**). 
5.1. Wis. STAT, f 159.14 (1961) (disqualification on conviction of any crime). 
*2. See text accompanying notes 30-54 supra. 
33. See, e.g., exceptions to the stated effect of CAL. PEN. COOS | 1203.4 in GAL. BUS. 
* P*or. CODS | | 1679 (dentist*), 2383, 2384 (physicians), 2963 (psychologists), 
6 ,
°2 (attorneys), 6576 (barbers), 10177(b) (real estate brokers), 10302(b) (business 
opportunity brokers), 10562(b) (mineral, oil, and gas licensees); CAL. EDUC CODS | 
*^i0 (teachers); CAL. VEHICLS COOS | 13555 (revocation of driver'* license). 
** also Epstein v. California Horse Racing Board, 222 Cal. App. 2d 831, 35 Cal. Rptr. 
* 2 (1963). 
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In ways more indirect than employer rejection or legal restriction, the 
stigma of a former offense is likely to militate against successful employment 
of the redeemed offender. He may be denied union membership, although 
apparently no union admits to a hard-and-fast policy of exclusion. More-
over, many positions require bonding as a precondition of hire, and former 
offenders are generally not bondable, whatever the relevance of their offense 
to the risk covered by the bond. One young man who fights another on 
the street over the hitter's interference with his lady fair, and who is 
convicted of assault and battery or disturbing the peace as a result of Ins 
passions, should not necessarily be marked thereafter as an employment 
risk, unworthy of trust. The problem is particularly acute in companies 
using low-cost "blanket bonds" which commonly contain provisions void-
ing protection if the employer hires any person with an offense record, at 
least without the prior consent of the surety.8* «J 
Similarly, a person with a record of criminal conduct may experience 
substantial difficulty in obtaining automobile liability coverage (or in getting 
inclusion under his employer's liability policy), and may be foreclosed from 
any work requiring the use of a car either in the course of the job or in 
getting to and from his place of employment Alternatively, he may not 
be precluded from coverage but may be treated as an "assigned risk," 
whatever his offense." Although this has the advantage of giving the 
former offender access to insurance, it has the disadvantage of subjecting 
him to perhaps prohibitive expenses at a time when he can least likely 
afford them. Further, a person with an arrest or conviction record may in 
54. Frequently, it is said that hiring of an offender will void all coverage. See FryBi 
The Treatment of Recidivists, 47 J. Cant. L., C. ft P.S. 1 (1956). The following ii» 
typical liberal "blanket bond" provision: 
The coverage of this bond shall not apply to any employee from and after tht 
time that the Insured or any partner or officer thereof, not in collusion with suck 
employee, shall have knowledge or information that such employee has committed 
any fraudulent or dishonest act in the service of the Insured or otherwise, whether 
such act be committed before or after the date of employment by the Insured. 
Lykke, Attitude of Bonding Companies Toward Probationers and Parolees, 21 Fed. 
Prob. 36 (1957). 
This study suggests that the surety companies may be willing to examine indMdsw 
cases and permit the employer to assume the risk himself, and the wording of the bosp 
would import that the cancellation of protection would apply only to the iiidividaw 
and not to the concern as a whole. This is preferable to blanket invalidation, bat • 
nevertheless requires uncommon understanding and effort on the part of the employ*1 
and there is no guarantee that the consent of the surety will be given. The bond*** 
firms interviewed in the course of Lykke's study felt that their alleged unwillingness * 
give coverage was more often than not used as an excuse to mask the employer's hoe*™1 
toward hiring persons with an offense record. 
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jouie jurisdictions be denied a vehicle operator's license (or even, appar-
ently, a fishing license ).M 
Typically, a former offender who is called as a witness is subject to 
impeachment of his credibility on the basis of his prior conviction." This 
may be so despite an order "setting aside" or vacating a conviction and 
releasing him from "all penalties and disabilities."** Once a person has 
been cast as an offender, he seems always to be suspect as a liar.** Let us 
suppose that the young purloiner of garbage cans, whose fate is recounted 
above, observes a traffic accident some five years after his conviction and 
is asked whether he has pertinent testimony. It is not beyond the bounds 
of reason to suppose that he would be strongly tempted to deny that he 
had seen anything, that he would do whatever he could to avoid the 
witness stand and the possibility of public exposure and humiliation. Last, 
but as usual not least, the former offender becomes a target for future 
investigation and suspicion. This is simply a fruit of his error, and he 
should bear it—up to a point. Unfortunately, that point may be passed, 
and the former offender may be subjected to unwarranted harassment 
by a law enforcement agency whose standards of courtesy and professional 
practice have not caught up with its zeal.w It is not at all unreasonable 
for a young man who burglarized a service station one month before to be 
quizzed regarding a burglary perpetrated by similar modus operandi at 
another station—providing his rights are respected and he is handled with 
the courtesy incumbent upon a police officer. It is highly unreasonable for 
him to be "rousted" on a service station break-in five years later, when 
the events of the interim indicate that he is comporting himself as a law-
abiding citizen. 
The point distills to this: should we permanently maintain, as a matter 
of social policy, the stigmatic ascriptions of a single adjudication? How 
56. See the commentary to the N.C.OD. MODEL ACT, supra note 17, at 98. 
57. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 89-94 (1954). There are very great variation* among 
** *tate§ as to the crimes that will serve as a ground of impeachment. 
5*. *4* People v. O'Brand, 92 Cal. App. 2d 752, 207 P.2d 1083 (1949); People 
•• James, 40 Cal. App. 2d 740, 105 P.2d 947 (1940). The new California Evidence 
Cod
* (to take effect on January 1, 1967) codifies in | 788(d) the dictum of People 
*• Mackay, 58 Cal. App. 123, 208 Pac 135 (1922), that a conviction set aside under 
7**~ Pan. CODE | 1203.4 cannot be used to impeach unless the person is the de-
•*•**« in * subsequent criminal proceeding. The present state of the law is by no 
***»« clear, and the Mackay case has been seriously eroded by later holding*; these 
***» are discussed in Comment, 2 STAN. L. REV. 222 (1949). 
«yen under the new California Evidence Code the offender who has erred in a state 
***"*»; a vacation or expungement statute would be open to attack in a California court 
*>• Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.BJLJ. 1017 (1965). 
•k W. at 1021. 
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long is enough? In the recent case of DeVeau v. Braistedf1 the Supreme 
Court of the United States sidestepped this question in affirming the ex-
clusion of petitioner from the position of secretary-treasurer of a longshore-
man's local under § 8 of the New York Waterfront Commission Act of 
1953" Petitioner had pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny thirty-five 
years before his removal from office and had received a suspended sentence. 
Though terming the result "drastic," the Court noted the long history of 
abuses on the New York waterfront and upheld the application of the Act 
While one cannot quarrel with the Court's assessment of the "high risk" of 
the occupation, one must regret the Court's failure to confront the problem 
of how long disqualification resulting from an adjudication of criminal 
guilt should endure.** 
It is not for the confirmed recidivist that primary concern about restora-
tion ol status is due, but for the first offender—the "accidental" criminal, 
if you will—whose violative conduct never reoccurs. Though an accurate 
count is impossible, the number of such persons is staggering. Nussbaum 
has estimated that in the United States today there are nearly 50,000,000 
persons with offense records; he concludes that between 15,000,000 and 
20,000,000 are first offenders who do not recidivate.*4 His calculations 
are based upon extrapolations from the number of arrests per 100,000 
population as determined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform 
Crime Reports in 1953 and 1954 (assuming a recidivism rate of 63%), 
projected over one generation of 30 years. ^ He places the number of first-
time offenders arrested each year at roughly 1,600,000?5 
It is beyond the present capacity of the social sciences to verify these 
estimates; adequate statistical information is not available. Nussbaum's 
61. 363U.S. 144(1960). 
62. N.Y. UWCONSOL. LAW* | 99S3 (McKinney 1961). 
63. For a suggestion that the problem if one of due process see Green, op. cii. smfrt 
note 11, at 31-35. It must be remarked that petitioner had not obtained a certifies* 
of good conduct, N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW | 242, following his discharge from sentence; 
if he had, he would have escaped the bar of | 8. There is no indication that he w* 
•ware of the availability of this relief. ^ 
64. NUSSBAUM, FaaT OFFENDERS, A SECOND CHANCE 8-11 (1956). The am* 
rate per 100,000 population in 1953 is given as 4,231.6. 1954 FBI UNIFORM CM** 
REP. 52-53 (table 17). The most recent rate (for the year 1963) is shown as 3,460.4-
1964 FBI UNIFORM CHIME REF. 106-07 (table 18). Frym estimates that there •* 
10,500,000 persons with offense records exclusive of traffic matters. Frym, **P™ "J* 
54, at 3. While Nussbaum's estimate seems excessive, Firm's seems too low, hi 
light of the F.B.I. figures. 
65. NuaaaAUM, op. tit. suprm note 64, at 9. The F.B.I. indicates that 41% « {* 
arrests reported nationally are of persons under the age of 25. 1964 FBI UNIFORM &*** 
REF. 108-09 (table 19) (1,919,641 arrests out of 4,685,080 below age of 25). 
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totals may be faulted for assuming too high a redvidism rate,**^t one 
Kudy being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicates 
that the rate may be as high as 76% in the case of persons who commit 
jnajor crimes." Further, it is apparent that the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation's base figures are not accurate indices of the incidence of crime and 
arrest; many police agencies do not report at all, or do so sparse&J The 
totals commonly exclude vagrancy, drunkenness, peace disturbance, and 
other low-order offenses, and they generally do not include arrests of 
juvenile offenders. The imprecision of our count is obvious, but however 
imprecise it may be, the conclusion is surely apt that there arc millions 
of persons in the United States who bear the opprobrium of a criminal 
record despite their reformation and avoidance of further crime. 
To say that the prevention of crime is served by the ^ socialization of 
the offender is to utter the obvious, and yet the proposition is largely gain-
said by present penal practice. From the nearly impenetrable morass of 
conflicting theories regarding the etiology of crime, we may at least— 
without pretending causational expertise—extract the common sense prin-
tipk that if a man is permanently marked a criminal outcast, he will be 
isolated from social groups whose behavior patterns and values are anti-
criminal. Sutherland and Cressey have stated 
When he is effectively ostracized, the criminal has only two alterna-
tives: he may associate with other criminals, among whom he can find 
recognition, prestige, and means of further criminality; or he may 
become disorganized, psychopathic, or unstable. Our actual practice 
is to permit almost all criminals to return to society, in a physical 
sense, but to hold them off, make them keep their distance, segregate 
them in the midst of the ordinary community.** 
H the offender is to be rehabilitated, two things must be done: he must 
** made a part of groups emphasizing values conducive to reform and 
«w-abiding conduct, and he must concurrently be alienated from groups 
whose values are conducive to criminality.** Neither of these goals is 
farthered by the failure of the law to provide means of restoring status. 
ft- Note 65 supra, 
67. 1964 FBI UNIFORM CRIME R I F . 26-29. Of a special study group of 92,869 
•"fenders, 76% had a prior arrest record. On the other hand, any statistical measure-
tt
*
nt
 of rehabilitation is extremely difficult, because it involves Use determination of 
^native factor, that is, the absence of arrest or conviction over a given period of tone. 
/. Glajcr, Differential Association and Criminological Prediction, 8 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 6 
(i960). 
**• SUTHERLAND ft CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 318 (5th ed. 1955). 
W
- Cressey, Changing Criminals: The Application of the Theory of Differential 
*'******, 61 AMERICAN J. SOCIOLOGY 116 (1955). 
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In sum, there has been insufficient recognition of the responsibility of 
the penal law in alleviating the corrosive effects of the stigma its applica-
tion necessarily creates. Dean Joseph Lohman of the University of Cali-
fornia School of Criminology, a former sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, 
has written: 
There is too little concern with the stigmatizing and alienating ef-
fect of arrests of such violators [minor offenders, especially first offen-
ders]. We equate them with bank robbers and murderers. Once a 
youngster has a police record, this fact, in the eyes of the law—and 
potential employers—is more real than the person himself. People 
stop looking at a young man. They look at his record, his "sheet" as 
it is called. Over and over boys told me, "It isn't me; it's the sheet 
They won't listen to me." We have pushed these boys on the other 
side of the law. They may well stay there.10 
In a very real sense, the problem is one of the "self-fulfilling prophecy": 
the offender initially moved toward reform becomes what we condemn htm 
to be. The failure of the law to treat the former offender as a person with 
the potential to become a law-abiding and useful member of society, by 
omitting means of removing the infamy of his social standing, deprives 
him of an incentive to reform. To the extent that this shortcoming con-
tributes to the repetition of criminal conduct, it renders the system of penal 
law a "monument to futility" and tends to erode public confidence in the 
legal order/1 
II. T H E ANNULMENT OF ADULT CONVICTIONS 
To date, few jurisdictions have adopted expungement laws permitting 
the annulment of conviction upon proof of reform, and, of those that have, 
fewer still provide truly effective relief.1* Because so little information on 
such statutes is available, a summary survey of existing laws may be helpful; 
the outline below excludes statutes dealing with juvenile court adjudication, 
which are discussed in part III.
 r 
70. Lohman, Upgrading Law Enforcement, 9 POLICE 19 (1965). For psychiatric 
comment to the Mine effect tee Erickson, The Problem of Ego Identity, 4 J. A****** 
PSYCHOANALYTIC A. 56 (1956). •;5! 
71. Correctional policy mutt be viewed not only fat terms of its direct effect «P°* 
criminal activity but alto in terms of its effect upon other value systems of society, w* 
BLOCK * GEM, MAN, Gams ft Socnrr 494 (1962). 
72. The first offender's need for expungement has been recognised in at least ta« 
other legal systems. Japanese law provides that after five years in the case of a nw* 
crime and after ten years in the case of a serious crime, the Msentence [conviction] 1<"* 
its effect** if there has been no further offense. PENAL COOS OF JAFAN, art. 54-2, 2 EJ*-* 
LAW BULL. 10 (Ministry of Justice transl. 1961). , 
Interestingly, among the most comprehensive provisions for the cancellation ^ 
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CaBfomid: CaL Pen. Code § 1203.45 provides that a person under the age 
of twenty-one committing a misdemeanor 
may petition the court for an order sealing the record of conviction 
and other official records in the case, including records of arrests result-
ing in the criminal proceeding, and including records relating to other 
offenses charged in the accusatory pleading, whether defendant was 
acquitted or charges were dismissed. 
: the order is granted, the "conviction, arrest or other proceeding shall 
i deemed not to have occurred, and the petitioner may answer accordingly 
iy question relating to their occurrence." 
The section is expressly inapplicable to traffic violations, registrable sex 
fenses,T* and narcotics violations. It seems further to be limited to persons 
who (1) were not convicted on the charge they seek to have expunged, or 
(2) if convicted, were eligible to have the conviction set aside under 
lection 1203.4 or section 1203.4a of the Penal Code (respectively, satisfac-
tory completion of probation or satisfactory completion of misdemeanor 
sentence where probation was denied). It is not wholly clear whether the 
relief is available to one who has had a prior conviction, though the thrust 
of the kss-than-pellucid language and the history of the statute would sug-
gest that it is not.'4 It is also not clear just how the operation of section 
1203.45 overlaps that of the "setting-aside" provisions, sections 1203.4 and 
1203.4a. The latter provide for the abolition of all "penalties and disabil-
ities" resulting from a conviction; section 1203.45 does not so specify, but 
tbe provision that the arrest or conviction shall be deemed never to have 
occurred must surely include this, if the language is to have any consistency 
of meaning. 
Notable in this statute is the lack of any provision directing the court's 
orier of sealing to the attention of arresting or repository law enforcement 
agencies who may have records of petitioner on file. The expungement 
"faue records are those of the Soviet Union. The law specifies various probationary 
roods, based on the severity of the original sentence, during which there must be no 
*w offense. Upon cancellation of the record of conviction, the offender reverts to his 
iorn
*r status; the relief is not necessarily limited to first offenders. RSFSR Cant. COD* 
**• ^7, hi BsaMAN, SOVIBT CRIMINAL LAW ft PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR Coosa 173-75 
U966). The cancellation is initiated by petition of the offender or of a social organiza-
*
0
°» and the cause is heard by the district people's court at the offender's place of 
**dence, Notice must be given to the procurator, and tbe presence of the offender at 
oc
*
r
«g is apparently jurisdictional. If the petition is denied, a new petition may 
** he lied for one year. RSFSR CODE OF CJUM. PROCEDURE, art. 370, in BERMAN, 
•*• «*. snpra, at 402. 
79> Persons convicted of specified sex offenses are required by GAL. PEN. CODE f 290 
***ter with local police departments. 
74
« See Baum, supra note 30, at 823. 
164 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY 
statute relating to juvenile courts™ so provides, and experience has shown 
it to be necessary, in order to give the law full effect. If one agency retains 
unsealed an arrest or crime report, fingerprint card, "mug shot," or other 
record naming petitioner, a check is likely to reveal it, and the expungement 
will be rendered nugatory.7' Further, section 1203.45 does not provide for 
examination of records so sealed upon subsequent petition of the person 
who is their subject; the juvenile court expungement statute has such i 
provision." At first examination, this would seem highly anomalous, prob-
ably derogative of the intent of the enactment. It has become apparent, 
however, that there may be situations in which the person who has had 
his record sealed has made disclosure—such as in security clearance appli-
cations—and finds it impossible to prove that his record was in fact ex-
punged." The order of the court sealing the records is by common practice 
sealed with the other material in the case. 
A further point may be noted with respect to the California enactment 
which is equally applicable to the other acts discussed, save for the National 
Council on Crime and Delinquency Model A c t " Though such an action 
would quite evidently be in conflict with the spirit of the act, an employer 
or licensing agency is apparently able to compel a former offender to dis-
close whether he has ever sought the relief provided by the statute.*0 
75. CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE $ 781. 
76. The author was informed of a recent case in which a young man had been 
granted relief under | 1203.45 following his conviction for gasoline theft The arresting 
police agency had learned of the sealing order and had closed its files, as had the 
State Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation. However, in the partsculv 
county where the young man was arrested, the booking of all prisoners is handled it 
the county jail and separate records are kept by the sheriff's department. The booking 
record reflecting the theft came to light in a record check prior to a military appoint-
ment. Because the military authorities not unnaturally raised the question of wilful 
concealment of the record, the young man was in a worse position—at least until fuB 
explanation could be given—than he would have been had no sealing order bees 
entered. 
77. CAL. WKLPAEB ft Iitrr'Na COD* | 781. 
78. On the desirability of full disclosure of record in applications for certain criocw 
positions, see text accompanying note 135 infra. 
79. N.C.OD. MODEL ACT, 8 CHIME ft DELINQUENCY 97, 100 (1962). Of the «d*i* 
or proposed enactments found in the course of this study, only the Model Act prohiW 
employers or licensing bureaus from inquiring into the fact of expungement CAL. P**j 
CODE | 1203.45 has been interpreted, however, to require any official agency *[ 
records which have been sealed to answer any inquiry: **We have no record oni*j* 
named individual." 41 CAL. Ora. ATTV GEN. 102, 104 (1963); ef. 40 CAL. Or* 
ATT'Y GEN. 50 (1962). * 
80. Baum, supra note 30, at 824. Several California probation officers «"** 
cated to the author that they had encountered instances of such questioning, *"**. 
expungement becomes more widely invoked one would expect the practice to spre** 
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A major consideration in evaluating the effectiveness of any expungement 
jtatute is its realistic use: does it in fact afford an accessible relief, actually 
invoked, or does it simply sit as dressing upon the statute books? It is 
impossible to determine the proportion of eligible offenders who utilize 
section 1203.45 but there appears to be a steadily rising use of the section, 
1,066 actions being received by the Department of Justice during the last 
focal year.*1 Of these, 862 were reported to have been processed to com-
pletion. During the last six months of 1965, 732 such closures were com-
pleted, as compared to 243 in the period from July 1962 through June 
1963. On the basis of these figures, the conclusion that the relief is relatively 
accessible is not inappropriate." 
Michigan: Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.1274(101) (Supp. 1965) provides that 
any person who pleads guilty to or is convicted of not more than one 
offense occurring before he is twenty-one (other than traffic violations 
and crimes punishable by life imprisonment), may, when five years have 
elapsed from the time of conviction, move the court to set aside judgment. 
As previously indicated," this alone would not be considered an expunge-
ment statute without the provisions of Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.1274(102) 
(Supp. 1965), which specify that upon entry of such an order vacating 
judgment, the applicant shall "for purposes of the law" be deemed not to 
have been previously convicted. This language is broad but has not yet been 
subjected to interpretation. Insofar as this section fails to indicate the dis-
position of the records and on its face omits to cover the problem of proper 
answer to inquiry, it fails as an effective expungement statute. 
Under these provisions, notice must be served upon the prosecuting at-
torney, who must be given the opportunity to contest the setting aside of 
Ac judgment. Since the statutes were enacted in 1965,*4 no statistical in-
formation relative to their invocation is available. 
The inquiry may take various forms, from "Have you ever had an offense record 
espunged?" to "Have you ever appeared as a moving party in any court? E*pl^ in 
fully." Cf. Note, 79 JUav. L. REV. 775, 800 (1966). 
81. Letter from Ronald H. Beattey, Chief, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, California, 
Department of Justice, to the author, January 17, 1966. The Bureau reports 2,917 actions 
fled under section 1203.45 in the period from July 1962 through December 1965. Of 
™e»e, 2,379 were processed to completion and the identification files closed; in the re-
**ining cases, the Bureau was unable initially to identify the defendant, and the order 
"*d therefore to be returned with a request for more information. 
82
- Whether it is accessible enough, and how it might be made more accessible, is 
^^dered in part IV below. 
•*. Note 16 tuprm. 
•*• Mich. Laws 1965, act 213, at 1134. 
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Minnesota: Under Minn. Stat Ann. § 638.02(2) (Supp. 1965), any p ^ 
son convicted of a crime may upon discharge from his sentence petition the 
Board of Pardons for a •'pardon extraordinary." This the Board may gnu* 
if it finds that he is a first offender ( " . . . not convicted of [any crime] other 
than the act upon which [his present conviction was] founded") tad 
determines that he is of good character and repute. The pardon extnu*. 
dinary restores all civil rights and sets aside and nullifies the conviction, 
"purging" the offender. The statute specifically provides that petitioner 
shall never thereafter be required to disclose the conviction at any tmy 
or place other than in subsequent judicial proceedings. Since the judical 
proceedings in which the conviction may be raised are not limited to those 
in which petitioner is a defendant, it would seem that the record might be 
revived for impeachment purposes in a later civil or criminal proceedng 
where petitioner is a witness. 
The statute does not treat the problem of police and arrest records, 
fingerprint cards, and the like, and it is probable that a routine check of 
enforcement agencies would turn up the fact of arrest, thus frustrating the 
enactment's intended end.** 
Prior to 1963, the law applied only to those under twenty-one years of 
age.M There is apparently no limitation as to kind or type of offense for 
which expungement may be had, although the statute has been interpreted 
to be inapplicable to traffic violations." 
The Minnesota law is distinctive in providing for expungement by ad-
ministrative action rather than judicial order. Since an effective expunge-
ment process requires the sealing of court and agency records, court action 
would appear preferable. 
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:164-28 (1953) permits the court to 
order expungement when petitioner (1) has received a suspension of sen-
tence or a fine not exceeding $1,000 and (2) has suffered no subsequent 
conviction. Ten years must elapse from the date of conviction before appli-
cation for expungement can be made, and the remedy is unavailable to per-
sons convicted of treason or misprision thereof, anarchy, any capital offense, 
kidnapping, perjury, any crime involving a deadly weapon including tbe 
carrying of such a weapon concealed, rape, seduction, aiding or conceafing 
persons convicted of high misdemeanors, aiding the escape of prisoners, 
embracery, arson, robbery, or burglary. The petitioner must pay all cosr 
85. See note 76 suprm. 
86. In 1963, the law was extended to mil first offenders regardless of age. Min«- * * 
Laws 1963, ch. 819, at 1441-42. 
87. 1949 MINN. OPS. Arr*y Gut. 328-B. 
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of die expungement proceeding, and notice must be served upon the 
prosecutor and police department(s) concerned. No provision is made for 
the expunging or sealing of police and enforcement agency records. 
The exact utility of this statute is open to much doubt No figures as 
to its invocation could be found, but the long period of time before relief 
is possible (ten years) and the fairly extensive catalogue of ineligible of* 
(eases restrict both the efficacy of the relief and the likelihood of its being 
sought More to the point, the statute has been construed as "lacking the 
force and effect of a full pardon" (whatever that may be), apparently on 
tbe basis that to grant the law any greater effect would be to impinge upon 
die pardoning power of the governor.** Since New Jersey has taken the 
position that a pardon does not permit the recipient to respond in the 
negative to questions about his conviction,*' it would seem a fortiori that a 
successful petitioner under section 2A: 164-28 would also be constrained to 
disclosure. In terms of restoring the essential status of the former offender, 
the relief afforded K Ms enactment is limited at best and illusory at worst. 
There is one £u oser provision of New Jersey law upon which comment 
must be made: after five years (presumably from the date of entry), the 
records of "disorderly pcrsons,, on file in the office of the county clerk may 
be destroyed.*0 This appears to be a "housekeeping" provision rather than 
in enactment designed to affect the status of such "disorderly persons"— 
which is doubtful, to say the least A "disorderly person" has been defined 
as one guilty of a "quasi-criminal act," something below a misdemeanor, 
who is spared "the brand of being adjudged a criminal with all of its 
political, business and social implications. . . ."" It is hard to see how he 
is so spared when he is subject to immediate arrest without process,** may 
be summarily tried without indictment or jury,** and may be imprisoned.** 
Since <<being a disorderly person" is something less than committing a crime, 
such person is apparently ineligible even for the meagre relief of section 
2A:164-28.M 
«8. 1951-53 NJ. OP«. ATTV GIN. 143. 
**. Id. at 206. 
90. N.J. STAT. ANN. | 47:3-9(i) (Supp. 1965). 
91. In rt Garofone, 80 NJ. Super. 259, 271, 193 A-2d 398, 405 (1963), •fa\ 42 
NJ- 244, 200 A.24 101 (1964) (possession of barbiturates). 
92. NJ. STAT. ANN. f 2A: 169-3 (1951). 
93. In u Garofooe, 80 NJ. Super. 259, 193 A.2d 398, (1963), • # % 42 NJ. 244, 
2 0 0
 A.2d 101 (1964). 
94. KJ. STAT. ANN. f 2A: 169-5 (1951). 
**5. Parenthetically, the scope of the disorderly person classification is disturbingly 
bro
*d- In one startling case, a disgruntled husband procured a revolver, jimmied the 
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Tixas: Though not an expungement act Insofar as it fails to provide ft* 
the destruction or sealing of records, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 42.13, 
§ 7 (1966) deserves mention if only because it does not classify easily. 
Subsection (a) provides that upon completion of probation following con-
viction of a misdemeanor, the court shall enter an order setting aside the 
finding of guilt and dismissing all accusatory pleadings. By subsection (b), 
the offender's finding of guilt may not be considered for any purpose (italics 
in the statute) except to determine entitlement to probation in a trial for 
a subsequent offense. The relief is available only to misdemeanants. 
It will be noted that the statute appears to be (like the Michigan enact* 
ment discussed above) simply a "setting-aside" provision, which does not 
reach the status of an offender.** However, provisions similar to subsection 
(b) are not found in article 42.12, section 7, the cognate statute permitting 
the setting aside of felony convictions. It is thus inferable that the legisla-
ture intended the broader relief of article 42.13, section 7 to extend to the 
status itself. The section may well go farther in giving the reformed offender 
protection against forced divuJgence of his record to employers and licensing 
agencies than would most expungement acts. The great lack of this hybrid 
statute—in terms of its efficacy—lies in its failure to provide for the closure 
of court and agency records. 
III. EXPUNGEMENT AND THE JUVENILE COURT 
A. The Need 
Every state, most territories, and the United States have provided special 
adjudicative and dispositive procedures in the case of juvenile offenders. 
It is truistic to say that the juvenile court is not a criminal court, and that 
adjudications, since not convictions, are not productive of criminal dis-
abilities. Nearly every jurisdiction so provides." All but a handful of states 
screen of hit long-estranged wife's bedroom with a putty knife, and shot her lover wbea 
the latter attacked him with an axe. His argument of self-defense was denied on the 
ground that by carrying implements of entry (the putty knife) and the revolver, he was • 
"disorderly person who was subject to immediate arrest, which the deceased was staplf 
trying to effect--with the axe. State v. Agnesi, 92 N.JX. 53, 104 Atl. 299 (1918), «#% 
92 N.JX. 638, 106 Atl 893, 108 Atl. 115 (1919). Just what are the bounds of "qua* 
criminality*'? 
96. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra. 
97. ALA. COD* tit 13, | 378 (1958); ALASKA STAT, f 47.10.080(g) (1962); AEB-
Rav. STAT. ANN. | 8-228A (1956); CAL. WELFARE ft INST*NS CODE f 503; COLO. R>* 
STAT. | 22-8-1(3), -13 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. { 17-72 (1958); DEL. Cot* 
ANN. tit 10, | 982(b) (1953); D.C. Com ANN. | 16-2308(d) (Supp. IV, 1965); Fu-
STAT, f 39.10(3) (1961); GA. CODE ANN. f 24-2418 (1959); HAWAII REV. LAW* I 
333-1 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. ! 16-1814(5) (Supp. 1965); I I I . REV. STAT. ch. 37, 
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expressly prohibit public access to records of the juvenile court,94 and many 
extend the restrictions to the files of law enforcement and social agencies.*9 
Commonly, the fact of adjudication in juvenile court and any evidence 
given in connection therewith are inadmissible against the minor in any 
other court,*00 and a large number of states provide that such adjudication 
is no bar to future military service or public employment.1*1 
| 702-9 (1965); IND. ANN. STAT. S 9-3215 (Supp, 1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. | 
38*01 (1964); Kv. REV. STAT. { 208.200(5) (1962); LA. R E V . STAT, f 13-1580 
(1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 15, | 2502(1) (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art 26, | 54 
(1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, | 53 (1958); MICH. STAT. ANN. | 
27.3178(598.1) (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. M 242.12, 260.2110) (Supp. 1965); Miss. 
CODE ANN. | 7185-09 (Supp. 1964); Mo. REV. STAT. | 211.271(1) (1959); MONT. 
KIT. CODES ANN. { 10-611 (Supp. 1965); NEV. REV. STAT. $ 62.190(3) (1963); N i l . 
Riv. STAT. ANN. | 169:26 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. $ 2A:4-39 (1951); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. { 13-8-65 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT i 781; N.C. GEN. STAT. $ 110-24 
(1959); NJ>. CENT. CODE | 27-16-21 (1960); OHIO REV. Cot* ANN. | 2151.35 (Page 
Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT, tit 20, f 891 (1961); ORE. REV. STAT, f 419.543 (1963); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit 11, § | 261, 269-417 (1965); P.R. LAW« ANN. tit 34, § 2011 
(Supp. 1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. f 14-1-40 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. f 15-1202 
(1962); SJ>. CODE ( 43.0327 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. \ 27-267 (Supp. 1965) (by 
implication); T E X REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 2338-1, | 13 (Supp. 1965); UTAH CODE 
ANN. I 55-10-105(2) (Supp. 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. t i t 33, \\ 601, 627 (1958) (by 
implication); VA. CODE ANN. f 16.1-179 (1950); V.I. Coo* ANN. tit 5, f 2506 
(1957); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. | 13.04.240 (Supp. 1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. | 
4904(83) (1961); Wis. STAT, f 48.38(1) (1961); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 14-109(d) 
(1957). The federal provision is found in 18 U.S.C. $ 5032 (1564). 
98. Only Iowa, Maryland, Nebraska, and Vermont appear to lack statutes explicitly 
governing juvenile court records. In these states, the matter may be covered by court 
nue. C/. MD. ANN. CODE art 26, f 64 (1957). Miss. CODE ANN. f 7185-20 (1942) 
prohibit* divulgence of the names of minors for statistical reputing purposes, but does 
not expressly protect police or court records from public inspection. MONT. REV. CODES 
ANN. { 10-633 (Supp. 1965) limits disclosure of identity and opening of hearing to cases 
*here the minor is charged with a felony. See Geis, Publication of the Names of Juvenile 
Felons, 23 MONT. L. REV. 141 (1961). In several states, <xJy the probation officer's 
sports are withheld from public access. E.g., N.M. STAT. AK*. ( 13-8-66 (1953); cf. 
Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.321(3) (1959) (discussed pages 177-78 infra). In Ohio, the 
exclusion of persons other than parents, child, or counsel of record is implicit rather than 
«*press. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. { 2151.18 (Page Supp. 1H5). 
99. I I I . REV. STAT. ch. 37, 702-8(3) (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. | 260.161 (Supp. 
1965); and N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT | 784 are typical statutes requiring police department 
ac&Tcgation of juvenile files and prohibiting public disclosure. The Minnesota statute has 
"cen interpreted as forbidding the furnishing of police records to governmental agencies, 
»t least without court order. 1965 MINN. Ors. ATT»Y GEN. 2W-L. A number of states 
•**e statutes regulating the taking and transmission of fingerprints and identification 
l^otafraphs in juvenile cases. See MYEEN ft SWANSON, POLICE WORE WITH CHILDREN 
*?-80 (1962). 
100. On the use of juvenile court adjudication records in kter adult proceedings sec 
Aja>°t, 96 A.LJL2d 792 (1964); Note, 32 So. CAL. L. REV. 207 (1959). 
]pi. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, f 60 (1965/ (no disqualification for 
Public service either under the Commonwealth or in any politic*! subdivision thereof); 
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In the face of this panoply of statutory insulation to shield the youthful 
offender from the criminalization that would normally attach to him, the 
question must be put: are expungement procedures needed for juvenile 
records, and if so, why? One may conjecture that those jurisdictions which 
have provided for the annulment of adult conviction records and have 
omitted such provision for juvenile adjudications—such as Alaska, Minne-
sota, and New Jersey—have done so because it was believed such protection 
was unnecessary and superfluous.10* 
The plain fact is that expungement provisions are necessary to effectuate 
the intent of the juvenile court acts, because society does not make the fine 
semantic distinctions attempted by the law. As a recent survey put it, "the 
results of . . . [statutory classification of juvenile court records as confiden-
tial] have been so unsatisfactory that it may fairly be characterized as a 
failure.*'10* In the public eye, an offender is an offender, be he juvenile or ^  
adult. The cliches of noncriminality and lack of stigma attendant upon 
the juvenile court process104 have so often been repeated that we have 
become piously obtuse to the fact that the enlightened instrumentality of 
the juvenile court is frequently not as felicitous in practice as it is in 
theory.10* 
UTAH CODE ANN. | 55-10-105(2) (Supp. 1965) (no disqualification for any civil or 
military service appointment). Several Massachusetts probation officers informed the 
author that the law is ineffective as a real aid to employment because it fails to cover 
private hiring. An attempt to deal with private employment would probably be in-
effective unless it restricted the scope of permissible questioning of an applicant Some 
jurisdictions expressly preserve the right to examine Juvenile records when application it 
made for a law enforcement position. E.g., I I I . REV. STAT. ch. 37, { 702-9(3) (Supp. 
1965). 
102. Cf. ALASKA STAT, f 47.10.060(e) (1962) which provides for expungement of die 
record of any minor tried as an adult on a waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction. No 
comparable provision is available for juvenile court adjudications. See also MINN. STAT. 
ANN. I 242.31 (Supp. 1965). 
103. Note, 79 HA»V. L. RET. 775, 800 (1966). 
104. £-/., In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 604, 109 AJtd 523, 525 (1954): "No sugft* 
tkm or taint of criminality attaches to any finding of delinquency by a juvenile court" 
105. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 73 (1964). The problem is not limited to ** 
United States. In Great Britain, expungement procedures were proposed in 1960; these 
were rejected by the Committee on Children and Young Persons on the ground thst 
there was not "a record" in the case of a juvenile delinquent, but in fact many records-
While the Committee was sympathetic to the need, it apparently felt an expungement 
law would be ineffective. COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN ft YOUNO PERSONS, REPORT, Cn» 
No. 1191, at 74-75 (1960-61). * 
In Finland, on the other hand, the law permits the "abolition*' of all accusatory p^j* 
ings and adjudication records where a punishable offense occurred before the off coders 
eighteenth birthday. Ddlling, "Finnish Juvenile Penal Law" (Das Finnische Jugeo* 
strafrecht, Rcchtd. Jugend [1961], 9/21, at 325-28), abstracted in 2 EXGEETTA Cat*-
INOLOOICA 501-02, No. 1221 (1962). 
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Recognition of the stultifying effect of juvenile court adjudication was 
forcefully given in the much-cited case of In re Contreras: 
While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication . . . [as] a 
ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime, 
nevertheless, for all practical purposes, this is a legal fiction, present-
ing a challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason. Courts can-
not and will not shut their eyes to everyday contemporary happenings. 
It is common knowledge that such an adjudication . . . is a blight 
upon the character of and is a serious impediment to the future of such 
minor. Let him attempt to enter the armed services of his country or 
obtain a position of honor and trust and he is immediately confronted 
with his juvenile record.10* 
The considerations set forth in the preceding discussion of the adult of-
fender's plight of status apply with equal force to a juvenile. In fact, they 
may thrust with more force in his case, because he may more surely be fore-
closed from the education and training needed to fit him for a useful and 
productive life.107 As well, he may more likely be discouraged from applying 
for military service.10* 
Additionally, there are three factors in juvenile cases which especially 
compel an expungement statute reaching not only police and arrest records 
but all juvenile records, including those of dependency and neglect 
First, the arrest records of the referring enforcement agencies are the 
principal source of knowledge of a minor's past. Because the court records 
arc commonly made confidential by statute or court practice,10* employers, 
licensing agencies, and other persons seeking information usually resort to 
106. 109 CaL App. 2d 787, 789-90; 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952); accord, Jones v. 
Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 341-42, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946). In a mordant distent 
»In
 u Holme*, 379 Pa. 599, 612, 109 A.2d 523, 529 (1954), Musmanno, J., terms the 
notion that a juvenile record does its owner no lasting harm a Mmost disturbing fallacy" 
•ad a "placid bromide." He colorfully describes a juvenile record as 
•lengthening chain that its riveted possessor will drag after him through child-
hood, youthhood, adulthood and middle age . . . . It will be an ominous shadow 
following his tottering steps, it will stand by his bed at night, and it will hover 
over him when he dozes fitfully in the dusk of his remaining day. 
107. NUSSBAUM, FIRST OFFENDERS, A SECOND CHANCE 4 (1956), quotes the applica-
fcoa form of a leading university as asking, "Have you ever been placed on probation or 
P**oIe, or had any other penalty, scholastic or disciplinary, imposed?** The application for 
8*»*»te fellowship assistance under Title IV of the National Defense Education Act 
*3uires full reporting and certification of all crimes other than those committed before 
~* *PpHeant*s sixteenth birthday and minor traffic violations. U.S. Dep't of Health, 
J*"- * Welfare, form OE 4149. The NDEA application, however, provides that all in-
•Jnaation will be "treated confidentially" and will be weighed "only as to the suitability 
* * • applicant as a . . . Fellow." 
'08. For a discussion of military regulations see note 45 supra. 
'°9. Note 98 supra and accompanying text. 
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police fifes, where they all too often gain access.119 The effect on an adult 
of arrest without conviction has already been remarked.111 It is apparent 
that the devastation of arrest may well be much greater in the case of a 
juvenile, because the confidentiality of court records may preclude verifica-
tion of non-involvement. The inquirer is more likely to stop with the arrest 
record and draw his own conclusions regarding guilt.11* Even if the dis-
missal by the juvenile court is reflected (as it should be) upon the police 
record, the observer is likely to conclude that the minor did something, at 
feast, and the court "let him off light." 
Further, many—if not most—juvenile cases are disposed of at the police 
level, without referral to juvenile court11* Of those that are referred, many 
are "settled at intake," or are placed on informal supervision in lieu of im-
mediate adjudication. Because of widely varying practices and policies, no 
meaningful national figures can be given, but California has reported that 
only 42.5% of boys and 42.2% of girls referred to the juvenile courts for 
delinquent acts are handled by court hearing.114 In virtually all cases, police 
arrest or contact records exist. 
The second factor making the need for an expungement statute particu-
larly acute in juvenile cases is closely tied to the first: the labels or offense 
designation on the police department's records (or even the juvenile court's, 
for that matter) may not fairly reflect the minor's conduct While this is 
true for adult offenders, it is even more the case in juvenile matters. Not 
uncommonly, the more serious of two possible crime classifications will be 
selected, either in honest doubt as to which is applicable or in an effort to 
make the clearance rate for the more serious offense appear higher.11* There 
110. Cf. Note, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 785-86 (1966). 
111. Note 35 supra and accompanying text. 
112. Authority cited note 110 supra. 
113. The F.B.I. estimate* that 51.5% of all juvenile caaet are settled without referral 
to the court, either within the police department itself (47.2%), referral to a welfare 
agency (1.6%), or referral to another police agency (2.7%). 1964 FBI Umrom* 
Cams Rar. 102 (table 13). On the informal handling of delinquents see Tappaa* 
Unofficial D<linqu*ncy, 29 Naa. L. Rav. 547 (1950). 
114. GAL. DEP'T or JUSTICE, DELINQUENCY AND PROBATIOK m CALIFORNIA 92-9* 
115. A common example is the choice between "grand theft auto" (commonly a M" 
ony) and the lesser offense of "joyriding" (commonly a misdemeanor). The author * * 
informed by official* of the Office of Economic Opportunity on the West Coast that to* 
was a particularly troublesome dichotomy, since some police agencies and juvenile court* 
classified all automobile thefts by minors as felonious, while others classified them as joT 
riding unless there were aggravating circumstances. The net effect of these dispart** 
policies is to exclude some youths from Job Corps placements while permitting the •** 
mission of others who committed precisely the same act but did so in a more lento* 
jurisdiction. 
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js leas chance that the officer will be called in a juvenile case to account 
other for his judgment or the evidence to support it. 
Extreme cases, while they may make bad law, can be apt examples, and 
two may serve to illustrate the point In one case handled in 1958 by the 
author as a probation officer, an eleven year old boy was placed in juvenile 
hall for burglary: he had stolen a package of bologna from a grocery store 
to sustain himself while running away from home, because of conflict with 
Ids present "Uncle." The California definition of burglary technically in-
cludes entry into an open place of business with intent to steal,11* and when 
die young man told the policeman he had gone into the store intending to 
shoplift the meat, the officer (under some pressure from the ired shop-
keeper) concluded he was indeed a burglar. The minor was presented to 
the court as a dependent child, but there nevertheless remains an appre-
hension record for burglary in the police files. 
In an even more ludicrous case, the author was informed of a highly re-
spected and capable police juvenile sergeant who had contacted the juve-
nile court for assistance in shedding a record of apprehension for "child 
nxriesting," which had occurred when he was fourteen years old. While 
walking home from school with his thirteen year old inamorata, he had suc-
cumbed to his vernal urges and kissed her—in public view upon the street 
His heinous conduct was espied by the city's sole juvenile-aid-officer cum 
pursuer-of-truants, and he was hustled to the police station, where appropri-
ate forms were filled out before he was sternly admonished and his parents 
called. The section under which he was "charged" deals with conduct 
arousing or tending to arouse the passions of a child under the age of 
fourteen years!1" The arrest record remained in the police department's 
"fes. He obviously had little trouble in obtaining public safety employment 
ty divulgence and explanation, but the significant point is that the record 
*as there, buried in some dust-covered bin, and that it turned up and 
**eded explanation. 
Manifestly, the moral of these tales is not that outlandish results occur 
m
 juvenile cases and that we should therefore protect their subjects. It is 
ttther that records of very real offenses do exist in a variety of places from 
wWch they can be retrieved, and that without the protection of an expunge-
"fcnt statute reaching them, the bromidic recitals of the juvenile court's 
! 16. CAU PEN. COO* { 459. 
**7. CAL. PEN. COOK | 288. The municipality in question, it may be noted in pass-
J?^*«at to have displayed singular concern over the oscillatory activity of its citizens. 
J^'tedly, it had upon its books until very recently an ancient ordinance prohibiting 
* I j *"° l , c r , o n , f r o m k»»ng unless each first wiped the lips of the other with carbolized 
'"•e-water. 
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non-punitive philosophy win not save the juvenile from the records' stigma. 
The third reason underlying the especial need for expungement in juve-
nile cases is shortly stated. The distinction between delinquency and de-
pendency is blurred enough in theory and frequently not drawn at all in 
fact The public often identifies the juvenile court with delinquency and 
assumes a child under its care to be an offender.11" Further, even a status of 
dependency or neglect carries its own special measure of opprobrium which 
the child should not have to bear. i 
B. The Existing Law j 
In recognition of the need, a few states have enacted expungement pro-
visions of varying efficacy. As in the case of the acts applicable to criminal 
convictions, some extended comparison may prove helpful. * 
Alaska: Alaska Stat § 47.10.060(e) (1962) permits a minor who has been 
tried as an adult after waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction to petition the 
court for the sealing of his record. The petition may not be filed until the 
sentence has been successfully completed and five years have elapsed. (It is 
not clear whether this period is to be measured from the date of conviction 
or from the date of completion of the sentence.) The petition may be made 
by the Department of Health and Welfare on his behalf, and the order re-
stores all civil rights. The statute provides that no person may ever use the 
records so sealed for any purpose, but is silent on the appropriate response 
to questions regarding the past offense. 
No comparable provision exists for actions under the juvenile court law, 
and the section does not reach police records. 
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. § 8-238 (1956) provides for mandatory 
destruction of the court records upon the expiration of the period of 
probation or after two years from the date of discharge from an institution, 
unless before that time the minor has been convicted of another offense. 
By implication, this relief is not available to dependent or neglected chil-
dren, and the law is silent as to the effect of the sealing. The language 
("records of the proceeding") would not seem to reach police records. ' 
California: Under Cal. Welfare & Inst*ns Code § 781, any person who 
has been the subject of a petition in juvenile court or of a citation to apnea* 
before a probation officer, or who has been taken to a probation offieeii 
may petition for the sealing of his records. The section does not apparently 
cover the minor whose case has been concluded by the police without re-
us . REPORT OF GAL. SPECIAL STUDY COMIC, ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, pt. U •* 
(1960). 
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fatal. The relief extends to children referred for dependency and neglect 
is well as to those referred for delinquent conduct Either the person in-
tolved or the probation officer may file the petition, which cannot be done 
nntil five years have elapsed from the termination of jurisdiction (in cases 
of court disposition) or from the date of referral (in informal disposi-
tions).u* The relief is mandatory if the court finds that the petitioner has 
not since been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor involving moral 
turpitude, and has attained rehabilitation "to the satisfaction of the court" 
The sealing is expressly extended to records and files in the possession of 
other agencies, and the application for the order requires the applicant to 
1
 1st agencies he thinks may possess records. The order is directed to each 
such agency, and requires it to seal its records, advise the court of its com-
pfiance with the order, and then seal the order of sealing itself . m The law 
specifies that after sealing, the events shall be deemed never to have oc-
?
 curred, and the person "may properly reply accordingly" to any inquiry. 
The statute does not preclude inquiry as to the fact of expungement, nor 
does it specify whether official agencies may disregard its provisions and 
press for information, though its plain wording would seem to compel the 
conclusion that they could not The statute has been interpreted to require 
an official agency whose files have been sealed to respond to any inquiry: 
"We have no record on the named individual."1*1 
H9. In a number of counties it it the practice for the probation department to offer 
to file the petition for expungement. This reflect* recognition of the need to make the 
persons involved aware of the possibility of such action and to minimise expense and red 
upe. 
120. The intricacies of these provisions have not insured their uniform success, and a 
number of ploys have been developed to circumvent them. In one police department tur-
***** by the writer, the "sealing" ii accomplished by stamping "seated" upon the face 
of the master index card (the so-called "alpha card") and then replacing it in the file. 
**» Angeles County reportedly interprets the statute as narrowly as possible and ieals 
f°ly the records of the particular offense or situation which resulted in wardship or ad-
indication as a dependent chad, leaving untouched any prior or subsequent entries. 
**«« the case hat been transferred between counties, Los Angeles county—and appar-
""ly others following its lead—altegedly will not honor an expungement order from 
**J*her Juvenile court, but will require the institution of new proceedings in its own 
fraction. (It has not been possible to verify these practices because the writer's in-
****** to the county in question have gone unanswered.) 
. Upon 
occasion a minor is first brought to municipal court and man is certified to 
mnile court when his age is established. The author was told of two instances where 
** Municipal court refused at first to honor the sealing order of the juvenile (superior) 
court 
. *ha probation department personnel interviewed indicated, however, that such eva-
*** tactics are relatively rare, and from the author's observations, the general level of 
^ '•operation has been quite high. 
*21. 40 CAU O n . ATT>Y GEH. 50 (1962). 
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The statute uniquely provides that the person whose records are sealed 
may at a later time petition the court to grant the right of inspection to per-
sons named in the application, apparently to effectuate security clearances 
and other investigations for high-risk employment.1** 
Far less utilization has been made of this relief than that afforded by 
CaL Pen. Code § 1203.45 to misdemeanants under twenty-one. The records 
of the Bureau of Criminal Statistics indicate that for the period July 1962-
December 1965, 791 requests for file clearance were received by the Iden-
tification Bureau; 545 were processed to completion.1" The possibility that 
this is due to a large number of juvenile referrals who become recidivists 
and are ineligible does not seem to be borne out in fact; probably the best 
guess is that somewhere between 60% and 85% of delinquents do not be-
come adult violators.1*4 A more plausible explanation is threefold: minors 
are not as aware as more mature offenders of the possibility of expunge-
ment; they less frequently have the advice of counsel; and there is no re-
quired lapse of time before relief is possible under section 1203.45. It is 
likely that by the time five years have elapsed since the jurisdiction of the 
court was terminated (frequently if not typically at age eighteen) the person 
involved may feel the relief is too delayed to be worth the effort.1*8 
Indiana: Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3215(a) (Supp. 1966) empowers the court to 
order the destruction or obliteration of the record of any child adjudged a 
delinquent but never committed to a public or private institution, provided 
he has not been arrested for a delinquent act or "cited for any offense," is 
reformed, and has been of good behavior for at least two years after judg-
ment. The order of obliteration may be made upon the court's own motion 
or upon the motion of the probation officer, cither with or without formal 
hearing. The court, at its discretion, may order law enforcement agencies 
to produce their records for destruction, and may continue the case for one 
year before ruling on the motion for obliteration. The section is not applica-
ble to children handled for dependency and neglect and is silent as to the 
effect of destruction. 
122. Cf. text accompanying note 78 supra. Only Utah has a similar provision. Set 
UTAH CODE ANN. f 55-10-117 (Supp. 1965) (discussed in text accompanying ***** 
128-31 infra). 
123. See note 81 supra. 
124. MATZA, op. eit supra note 105, at 22. 
125. "(TJhe period of time that must elapse before the procedures are available * 
often that in which the existence of the record is most important—the time of higher 
education, military service or initial employment'* Note, 79 HARV. L. R*V. 775, 800 
(1966). 
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jfomjar. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38-815(h) (1964) provides that when a 
record is made of any public offense committed by a boy under sixteen years 
of age or a girl under eighteen, the juvenile court in the county where the 
record is made may order either a peace officer or a judicial officer having 
such records to destroy them. A unique feature of this law is that it provides 
for use of the contempt power to enforce compliance. It docs not reach 
dependency or neglect records, but does reach records of police agencies 
even where the child was not referred to the court."* The statute requires 
any person making a record to notify the juvenile court both of the fact of 
the record and its substance. The law sets down no criteria for the exercise 
of the court's discretion, and this is one of the most troublesome facets of 
expungement acts. It must be presumed that a "standard of reformation" 
guides the judge in his decision."1 
Minnesota: Minn. Stat Ann. § 242.31 (Supp. 1965) permits the "nullify-
ing" of adjudication records if a minor is committed to the care of the 
Youth Conservation Commission and discharged before the expiration of 
his maximum term, or if he is placed on probation. In the former case, the 
nullification is at the discretion of the court. The order of nullification has 
the effect of "setting aside" the conviction and "purging the person thereof." 
The conviction shall not thereafter be used against him except when "other-
wise admissible" in a subsequent criminal proceeding. The precise scope of 
the section is unclear, and the relief available under it apparently overlaps 
that afforded by Minn. Stat Ann. § 638.02(2) (Supp. 1965), discussed 
above. 
While this enactment applies to juveniles, by its terms it does so only 
upon conviction of crime. Under Minn. Stat Ann. §§ 242.12, 260.211 
(Supp. 1965), juvenile court proceedings are not criminal in nature and do 
not result in conviction. Thus, the anomalous conclusion is compelled that 
a minor can have his record nullified only if he commits an act sufficiently 
grave to warrant waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and trial as an adult. 
A. fortiori, the law does not reach neglect adjudications. 
The section makes no provision respecting police or other agency records, 
and it is not clear whether the conviction is actually to be removed from the 
judgment record. 
Missouri: Though it is sometimes referred to as an expungement statute, 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.321 (3) (1959) does not have the full effect of wiping 
126. The Attorney General hat ruled that a sheriff or county attorney cannot disclose 
information from juvenile records even before expungement. See 6 KAN. L. RET. 396 
(1958). 
127. The difficulties in application of such a standard and the Gordian question of 
*no should be excluded from expungement are taken up in greater detail in part IV. 
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the slate clean and should not properly be so termed. It provides that the 
court may destroy, in January of each year, the social histories and informa-
tion other than the official court file pertaining to any person who has 
reached the age of twenty-one. Though other subdivisions of this section 
impose confidentiality on both court and law enforcement records, it it ap-
parent that the statute leaves untouched the essential adjudication of status. 
Utah: Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-117 (Supp. 1965) permits anyone whose 
case has been adjudicated in a juvenile court (seemingly including depen-
dents) to petition the court for sealing of records after one year from the 
termination of court jurisdiction or release from the state industrial school 
The section provides that the court shall order the sealing if petitioner has 
not since been convicted of (and does not have pending) any felony or mis-
demeanor involving moral turpitude, and if the court is satisfied as to his 
rehabilitation. The language of the statute appears quite similar to that of 
the California law, specifying that upon entry of the order, the proceedings 
are deemed never to have occurred and the petitioner may so respond to in-
quiry. The sealing order may be extended to law enforcement records, and 
subsequent inspection of records is permitted only upon request of peti-
tioner. Since the statute was enacted in 1965,"* it is too soon to assess its 
effects. There is indication, however, that the courts regard the relief af-
forded by the section as exceptional, rather than viewing it as regularly to 
be given absent some affirmative reason to the contrary.**• The latter posi-
tion is apparently taken by the California courts.1*0 
In some states, physical destruction of court records may be effected at 
the court's discretion, but there is no indication that such destruction affects 
the status or nullifies the adjudication.1*1 
IV. Two PROPOSEO LAWS AND SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE 
Two recently proposed acts represent especially significant attempts to 
readjust the status of the reformed first offender: the New York "Amnesty 
Law for First Offenders" proposed in 1965"* and the National Council on 
Crime and Delinquency's Model Act for the Annulment of a Conviction 
128. UTAH CODB ANN. | 55-10-117 (Supp. 1965). 
129. Note, 79 HABV. L. REV. 775, 800. 
130. Ibid. 
131. Compart WASH. Rav. CODB ANN. \ 13.04.230 (Supp. 1965), with Va. 
GODB ANN. | 16.1-193 (1950). The latter permiti destruction of juvenik and • * * 
records at the clerk's discretion, after the passage of varying periods of time depend*** 
on the seriousness of the offense. 
132. State of N.Y. Ass'y BUI, Int. No. 233 (3d Rdg. 547, Print. 5363, Rec 70S) 
(1965). 
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cfCrime.m The two proposals adopt different means of achieving roughly 
the same end. Taken in comparison, they point up three of the most press-
ing considerations of policy that must be met in constructing an expunge-
ment law: whether the relief should be automatic or a matter of discretion; 
whether the record should be required to be revealed in some circumstances; 
and by what means the purpose of the statute is best achieved. 
The New York bill very nearly became law. After passage by both the 
Assembly and Senate of New York, the act was vetoed by Governor Rocke-
feller on the ground that it was "unsound" because "too broadly con-
caved."1*4 The enactment provided for the automatic amnesty of all first 
offenders—adult, youthful, or juvenile—who had not been convicted of a 
felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude during a "probationary 
interval" immediately following completion of sentence. Before amnesty 
could be granted, the offender was to file an affidavit of eligibility in the 
court of original conviction.1** The probationary period was established as 
five years in the case of felony, three years in the case of misdemeanor, and 
one year in the case of an adjudication as a youthful offender, wayward 
minor, or juvenile delinquent."* 
The act specifically restored to the amnestied first offender his accredita-
tion as a witness, his right of franchise, his right to hold public office, and 
his right to have issued or reinstated any license granted by federal, state, 
or municipal authority (provided, of course, that he were otherwise quali-
fied).1" The amnestied offender was granted the "absolute right to negate" 
the fact of his arrest or conviction whenever inquiry was made by either 
private persons or public authority.,w All records including fingerprints, 
photographs, and the like would be sealed against disclosure by the grant 
133. 8 G U M I ft DELINQUENCY 100 (1962). The Model Act w u drafted in response 
to recommendations of the National Conference on Parole. NAT*L PROBATION ft PAROLE 
AM*W, PAROLE IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 136 (1937). 
134. New York Times, July 23, 1965, p. 1, col. 7; p. 32, col. 6. A revised version of 
** bill hat been introduced in the 1966 legislative session. State of N.Y. Sen. Bill, Int. 
No. 1146 (Print. 1159) (1966). It removes the -automatic amnesty** provision of its 
l**<kcesior, and provides for the initiation of proceedings by a verified petition. Under 
*» modified bill, the petitioner would be entitled to amnesty if he "reasonably establishes** 
* the court's satisfaction that amnesty -would best serve and secure his rehabilitation 
* * would best serve the public interest.** Id. at f 91. Cf. note 147 infra, and accom-
l^ nying text This bill was reported passed by the Senate on March 8, 1966. New York 
T
«>*», March 9, 1966, p. 30, col. 2. To avoid confusion, all references in the text are to 
*** 1963 bffl. 
135. State of N.Y. Ass'y Bill, supra note 132, at if 90-91. 
*36. Id. at | 90(6). 
13
*. W . a t | | 9 2 ( 3 ) - ( 6 ) . 
,3
«- Id. at f 92(2). 
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of amnesty, but express provision was made for retention, use, and disclosure 
by law enforcement personnel actually engaged in investigation of crime.1*1 
Expungement was extended to the records of persons arrested and released 
without charge or acquitted after the lapse of a probationary interval of one 
year.14* Provision was made for acceleration of amnesty for first offenders 
released on probation or parole, at the discretion of the sentencing court,141 
and the amnestied status of any first offender granted relief under the statute 
was to be forfeited on subsequent offense.,u 
The N.C.C.D. Model Act differs from the New York bill in several ways. 
The relief of annulment of conviction is not restricted to first offenders, as it 
is under the New York legislation."* The Model Act provides that the 
order may be entered immediately upon discharge from sentence; the pro-
ceedings may be initiated either by the individual or the court.1*4 The 
granting of the relief is discretionary rather than automatic, though it is 
submitted that this is a difference somewhat more illusory than real: the 
New York bill in effect provided automatic issuance after the court's dis-
cretion had been exercised. It is nevertheless true that the New York ap-
proach makes the grant more a matter of right. The Model Act by implica-
tion permits the court to withhold some or all civil rights, though it provides 
that the person shall be treated in all respects as if he had never suffered 
conviction. 
The most striking feature of the Model Act is its provision to protect the 
offender whose record has been expunged from the bind of disclosure of his 
past In any application for employment, license, or "other civil right or 
privilege," or in any appearance as a witness, a person may be questioned 
about his previous criminal conduct only in language such as the following: 
"Have you ever been arrested for or convicted of a crime which has not 
been annulled by a court?"14* This approach to the very difficult balance 
of disclosure against denial has not been adopted in any existing enactment, 
and seems eminently sound. As will be later discussed, it lends itself to the 
solution of the problem of high-risk employment.1** To date, no jurisdiction 
has adopted the Model Act 
139. Id. at f 93. " ~~~~ 
140. Id. at | 99. 
141. Id. at H 97, 98. 
142. Id. at | 95. Enforcement of the bill wa« vested in the State Comminioo f<* 
Human Rights, and specific penalties were provided for violation of Its provisions. M ** 
194 . 
143. 8 CRIME * DELINQUENCY 100 (1962). 
144. Ibid. Presumably, the offender would be required to file a petition in «*tbef 
case. 
145. Ibid. 
146. See p. 183 imfr*. 
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In vetoing the New York bill, the Governor remarked its failure to dis-
tinguish among the various grades of crime, and its apparent grant of relief 
jtgardless of the individual's efforts at rehabilitation.147 In part, these criti-
oans are pertinent; in part, they miss the mark of the bill. A significant 
aspect of the bill was its express reservation to the court of the power to 
deny amnesty in the case of a "dangerous offender," defined as one deemed 
by the court "to be suffering from a serious personality disorder indicating 
t marked propensity towards continuing criminal conduct or activity."14* 
For the realistic protection of the community, such a provision is indispensa-
ble and this standard of classification seems far preferable to differentiation 
<m the basis of felony versus misdemeanor, or even on the basis of crimes 
against person versus crimes against property. The young man who, on 
impulse, attempts to hold up a candy store with a toy pistol and is charged 
with armed robbery may be far less a menace to the community's safety than 
the would-be cat burglar who sets out to "hot prowl" an apartment, is 
found loitering on the rear stairs under suspicious circumstances, and is 
charged with disorderly conduct (very likely on the agreement that he will 
"cop a plea"). Under the usual grade-of-crime standard, the former would 
(h is assumed) be ineligible for amnesty or expungement, and the latter 
would be qualified. 
Manifestly, some safeguard must be built into an expungement statute 
against the erasure of criminal records in improper cases, but the safeguard 
must be grounded on rational criteria. The vice of the "dangerous of-
fender" standard adopted by the New York bill is in its vagueness, but 
therein may be precisely its strength as well. The legislature cannot fix with 
exactness every case that it wishes to exclude from the operation of the law. 
If the law is to work realistically and effectively, the enactment must enun-
ciate the standard and leave its application to the courts. 
In the author's view, the yardstick of the "dangerous offender" as a 
measure of exclusion would be improved by eliminating the "serious per-
sonality disorder" term and expanding the "clear and present danger" test 
embodied in the standard of "marked propensity towards continuing crim-
inal conduct" The test of serious personality disorder requires a finding 
that the trial court is ill-equipped to make, at least without more effective 
Psychiatric assistance than is presently available. The expansion of the 
*andard of clear and present danger to the community would require that 
U* court be empowered, in the case of specified serious crimes (murder, 
forcible rape, vicious assaults, and the like), to find the person a "dangerous 
H7. New York Times, July 2S, 1965, supra note 134. 
148. State of N.Y. A » > Bill, supra note 132, at | 90(2). 
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offender" ineligible for expungement simply on the gravity of the offense, 
without specific finding on the likelihood of further criminality. 
Such a standard would permit a more realistic discrimination between 
offenses than can be gained by the use of a felony-misdemeanor formula. 
Practically speaking, the likelihood of a person committing a crime of such 
serious magnitude seeking expungement seems small. 
The assertion that the New York bill granted expungement without re-
gard to rehabilitative effort is chimerical and overlooks the presumption 
obviously indulged in by the legislature; t.*., that if the person has com-
pleted the probationary interval without conviction, he has in fact made 
efforts toward rehabilitation. If the requirement were added that the judge 
could not grant expungement without a finding of "sincere effort toward 
rehabilitation," by what other criteria would this be measured and by what 
other evidence could it be proved? Surely the best evidence of rehabilitative 
effort is the avoidance of future criminality. 
Two examples are frequently chosen to illustrate the unrealistic "do-
gooder" spirit and visionary blindness to danger often claimed for those who 
advocate expungement statutes: the embezzler could deny his past in seek-
ing a position at a bank, and a school teacher could conceal a sex offense. 
These illustrations of the breadth of the proposed New York law were used 
by Governor Rockefeller, and the point is by no means invalid. There is no 
easy answer to i t What it comes to is this: are we willing to run the risk of 
the embezzler's resumption of his larcenous habits in return for the oppor-
tunity to restore a very large number of persons to a useful social state? The 
risk of the repetition of the school teacher's offense upon one of his charges? 
Surely it is immediately apparent that these risks arc of vastly different 
magnitude and cannot be singly answered. In order to have any sensibk 
assessment of the risk, the offense cannot be viewed in vacuo, but only in 
terms of the individual who committed the offense and the drcumstances 
in which he committed i t It is precisely here that the "dangerous offender" 
discretion of the court is essential. 
Beyond this, however, is another consideration: we cannot lose sight of 
overriding values society wishes—and n«eds—to protect We value so highly 
the sacrosanctity of the child's person that we may very well wish to pre-
clude a former sex offender from again dealing with children, on the ca 
chance that he may reoffend. The possibility of serious harm is too gf**** 
though the probability of reoffense might be small. By the same token, d* 
harm caused by a repetition of embezzlement is more easily insured again* 
and more easily borne, and this risk we may wish to assume. 
As a mztter of policy in view of the risk, we may deem it necessary to b** 
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a prior offender from police employment because he may be unable to with* 
stand the stresses of his position; the risks to the public from his defalcation 
are too great (But again, the risk cannot be intelligently weighed in ab-
straction from the offense and the offender. Some of the most compassion-
ate and effective policemen of the author's acquaintance have had rather 
besmirched pasts. Lacking any sure calculus of risk, we are remitted to the 
sound and understanding discretion of the hiring agency, and it would seem 
necessary to have full disclosure.) To require a former offender to divulge 
his past offense in seeking police employment is not to say that he cannot 
reform, or even that he will likely reoffend. It is rather to say that by his 
past difficulty, he has indicated possible instability and lack of judgment, 
and the appointing authority must be made aware of the risk before it places 
him in a position requiring coolness of head and firmness of self-control to 
accompany the loaded sidearm. This is a very different thing from forever 
holding him a social outcast because of his past. 
Even greater risks exist in the area of the national security and defense, 
and here too full disclosure seems essential. Consider the position of an air-
man charged with responsibility for a missile or other vastly lethal piece of 
modern armament To prevent an unauthorized detonation or launch, it 
is imperative that the personnel chosen for control operate at a continued 
high level of reliability. Those who are possibly unreliable must be ex-
cluded."* Since a prior unlawful act may be indicative of an impulsive 
character, and an individual who possibly could not cope with the tremen-
dous pressures of such an assignment, its commission must be divulged. 
The antagonistic desiderata of abolition of record on the one hand and 
required revelation of it in particular circumstances on the other are not as 
irreconcilable as they seem. If an expungement statute only authorizes a 
response denying any record, it fails to meet the problem and throws the 
whole matter upon the person whose record is expunged. Per contra, if the 
statute adopts the "limitation on inquiry" mode of the Model Act, it is 
possible not only to permit the regenerate offender to take advantage of his 
°cw status, but also to protect the overriding interests of public security. 
This might feasibly be done with provisos, excepting from the limited 
"equity enjoined by the statute any cases where the person granted expunge* 
ment makes application (for example) for a position involving the super* 
v&on of children, for a position in law enforcement, or for a position 
U9. On the compelling need for pertontJ stability in a "dispenser of lethal power** 
** U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, Guidancg /of Implementing th§ Human R*-
***%ty Program, AFM 160-55 (1962), in KATZ, GOLDSTEW ft DWSHOWITZ, MATMUALS 
° * PSYCHOANALYSIS ft LAW 577-92 (5th temp, mimeo. ed. 1965) (cited with pennmion 
^tfce author*). 
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sensitive in terms of national security. The use of the limited inquiry would 
do much to facilitate employment and would eliminate the circumvention 
of the expungement order save in the few excepted cases. 
The contrast of the New York bill and the Model Act is instructive in rais-
ing another difficult point: should expungement be wholly automatic, man-
datory upon fulfillment of the prescribed conditions as the New York bill 
sought to make it; or wholly discretionary, as the National Council on 
Crime and Delinquency recommends?180 Bluntly put, if the grant of ex-
pungement is wholly automatic, some will get it who should not; if it is 
wholly discretionary, some will not get it who should have i t Closely tied 
to this problem is another desideratum: effective accessibility. Considera-
tion of the latter issue may help to illumine the former. 
It makes no sense whatever to provide statutory means for redefinition of 
status and then surround their utilization with such procedural obstacles 
that they are not invoked. Really, the problem is twofold: the reformed 
offender must be made aware of the remedy (else its incentive value is lost), 
and he must be able to invoke it with a minimum of difficulty. Quite simi-
lar to the expungement problem is the matter of restoring competency fol-
lowing discharge from hospitalization for mental illness, and experience 
with such procedures is of significance to this inquiry. 
A recent study in the District of Columbia compared the means there 
available for restoration: automatic restoration on certificate of discharge 
from the hospital superintendent, and petition for restoration upon con-
ditional release."1 Of 329 persons studied, 327 were "officially restored" to 
competency by certificate (mandatory on discharge as cured). Only one 
had gained restoration by petition following conditional release. One other 
person had filed an application, but after six months it had not been pro-
cessed. The study concluded that although the precise reasons for the ex-
tremely small number of applications for restoration on conditional release 
were unknown, "lack of knowledge of the necessity for taking such action is 
probably a factor."1" 
On the other hand, the CalfforniajrtatisrJcs on the invocation of the 
youthful offender expungement statute1** suggest that requiring the offender 
to petition for the relief does not necessarily deter him from procuring rt* 
His awareness of the existence of expungement and the means of achieving 
150. 8 CMMI k DELINQUENCY 99 (1962). 
151. Zenoff, Civil Incompetency in the District of Columbia, 32 GBO. WASK. I* 
243 (1963). 
152. Id. at 249. 
153. GAL. Pan. GODS | 1203.45. See note 81 supra and accompanying tent. 
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jt, and his expectation that it may be gained without undue trouble, hu-
jniliation, and time, would seem far more significant factors. 
Typically, the reformed offender may hold a dim view of the law and its 
pjocesses, and be chary of invoking their aid. On the other hand, he has 
committed an offense, and it is surely not unreasonable to expect him to take 
tome steps to initiate the process of expungement. It will be recalled that 
even the "automatic" New York act required the offender to commence the 
amnesty by filing an affidavit. The procedures necessary should be kept to 
a high degree of simplicity and a low degree of cost. It would not be in-
appropriate to permit the court to hold the hearing informally, in chambers, 
after appropriate notice to the agencies involved. 
A satisfactory resolution of these points can be reached if the court is 
required to inform the first offender at the time of imposition of sentence of 
the possibility of expungement. Notice should be included in any copy of 
the sentence order given him. At the termination of his sentence, a letter 
informing him of the availability of the expungement remedy and of the 
probationary interval should be sent by the clerk of the court to his last 
known address. It would seem desirable to have the probation department 
assist in the preparation of the simple petition and any necessary supporting 
documents, and the offender should be informed of this in the clerk's 
letter and instructed to contact the probation department for assistance.184 
The statute authorizing the expungement should be mandatory rather 
than directory; that is, the court should be required to order expungement 
if the person has not suffered further conviction during the probationary 
interval unless the court finds strong affirmative cause to deny it (a finding 
that the person is a "dangerous offender"). In that sense, the process should 
be "automatic," and the filing of a simple request with a supporting docu-
ment should be prima facie entitlement to expungement. 
For yet another reason it seems wise to the writer to require that the 
offender initiate the proceedings, and that is the reason of incentive. As 
**& paper has attempted to show, our penal law, in its present state, is 
one-sided, providing only negative motivation for reform—the avoidance of 
future focarceration.1" If the offender is provided with a positive stimulus 
154. While this suggestion might teem unrealistic in view of the fact that probation 
deP*rtments are often overworked and understaffed, it must be pointed out that the 
J^Hfcd documents are very largely pro forma and the task is essentially a clerical one. 
^•Printed petition and affidavit forms may be helpful The restoration of the reformed 
endcr to his place in society is the goal of any probation program, and the specialized 
•*«« of probation personnel would seem particularly useful in assisting the eligible 
***t offender to avail himself of the relief. The availability of expungement can be a 
***rful asset in a casework plan. 
US. Professor Graham Syket has aptly pointed out that the system of punishment 
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and is given an initiating role in the process by which the readjustment of 
status is achieved, it is likely that he will regard it as more meaningful** 
As a means of social control, reward for achievement of the conduct winch 
punishment was designed to attain is more effective than punishment 
alone.1" If the transgressor is forgiven by the law as he was condemned by 
it, he may hold the legal process in better esteem and be less impelled to 
violate its dictates.1* 
Since the expungement procedure here proposed requires a certain dis-
cretion and since the sealing process should extend to agency records, it 
is preferable that it be a matter of judicial order rather than administrative 
direction. The court is likely more accessible than an administrative body 
and its power is better known.1** The National Council on Crime and De-
linquency has concluded that authorization of expungement by judicial 
order should produce wider and more uniform invocation of the power, 
while allowing for sound discretion to take individual circumstances into 
account.1*9 The regular purgation of police department files is desirable 
from several standpoints,1*1 but for the foregoing reasons it seems unwise 
to expect that expungement can be accomplished by such agency action 
alone. 
V. ASUMMTNG-UP 
Creating a "model" statute is more often a matter of conjury than of 
construction, and it will not be attempted here. However, as a starting 
point for future discussion, it may be useful to summarize the requisites of 
an effective expungement statute and some of the means by which those 
requisites are most likely to be achieved, and to add a few interstitial 
remarks. _ 
implies a scheme of reward, and that it is precisely upon this point that our systeinj* 
penal law founders—at feast from the point of view of the individual it seeks to ccatt* 
Though he spoke in particular of the prison and its administration, his remarks •** 
germane to the correctional law as a whole. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 50-W 
(1958). ; 
156. Cf. Goldstein, Potic* Discretion Not to Invoke the Crimtntl Proeess: Um**+ 
biUty Decisions m the Administretion of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 590-92 (I960). * ' 
157. Cf. MANNHEIM, MAW AKD SOCIETY m AW Aox<*>r RECONSTRUCTION 2Sl-*» 
(1940). This observation assumes the point that we punish with a purpose of ^ 
habitation, and not solely to satisfy our urge for vengeance.
 w « 
158. Professor Mataa observes that delinquency is facilitated when the "moral "*j 
of the law is neutralised." MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 98 (1964). A "**g 
injustice (*.«., that even if one reforms, one will not be forgiven and cannot rid ***^ 
of the stigma of the crime) supports the processes by which the neutralization «xon>^ 
159. 8 CRIME A DELINQUENCY 99 (1962). ^ 
160. Ibid. The same conclusion was reached by the commentators to the W*T 
Penal Code. MODEL PEWAL CODE f 6.05, comment at 30-S1 (Tent Draft No. 7, ** 
• 161. MYREN ft SWANSOK, POLICE WORK WITH CHILDREN 79 (1962). 
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If it is to serve its purpose, the action of expungement should be complete, 
accessible, realistic, and at least acceptable to the public taste. To that 
end, the following observations are offered. 
(1) The expungement of the adjudication of guilt of a juvenile de-
foquent or an adult first offender should be made mandatory, upon petition 
of the offender, if the court finds that he has not reoffended, unless strong 
affirmative reason exists for denial The court should have the power to 
deny expungement upon a finding that the person is a "dangerous offender," 
either because there is a likelihood of further criminal conduct or because 
the offense was sufficiently grave. A judgment denying expungement 
Aould be made appealable. 
" (2) A probationary interval following the completion of sentence as a 
precondition to expungement is a wise precaution. There is no magic in 
a metric of time, but what we are seeking is the man who can remain 
stable in his community life without the need even of minimal correctional 
restraint or supervision. He must be able to succeed "on his own," and 
expungement immediately upon discharge seems ill-conceived. 
Unfortunately, there is evidently no period of time beyond which social 
Kientists can say there is any given likelihood that the offender will not 
reoffend, and so we must strike a balance of common sense. An apt selec-
tion would seem to be two years (after termination of supervision) in the 
case of a juvenile delinquent or in the case of a misdemeanor, and five 
years in the case of a felony, with the court empowered to accelerate the 
expungement in its discretion. Whatever time selected should not be so 
k>ng as to render the relief useless. (In the case of a dependency or neglect 
adjudication in the juvenile court, expungement should be made available 
•^mediately upon attainment of majority.) 
(3) The expungement statute (or statutes) should include juvenile and 
*dult offenders, and extend as well to dependent children of the court. 
°n the juvenile court level, expungement should not be limited to first 
winders, since a minor may commit a number of misdeeds before 
"^ghtening out" through maturation. 
(4) At both adult and juvenile levels, the statute should reach not only 
*e officially adjudicated case but cases of arrest-release and cases of acquit-
13
 well. It should extend the order of sealing to all law enforcement and 
*
Ilcr
 agency records, including those in cases disposed of intra muros. Be-
t
**
3s
* tiie petitioner may wish to permit limited inspection of the records at a 
time—for example, in making application for a security-critical job— 
***ute should provide for sealing rather than destruction of the records. 
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Records so sealed should be required to be removed from the mam cr 
master file and kept separately. 
The widespread dissemination of records is an aid to effective law enforce-
ment, but it poses a problem for effective expungement. The order of 
sealing should be directed to each enforcement agency having a record of 
the petitioner, and should be sent as well to all central indices and reposi-
tories. As one commentator has put it: "It seems that when the Moving 
Finger writes these days, a dozen Xerox copies likely are made."m In 
this respect, consideration must be given to records and identification data 
forwarded by the police department to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
These submitted materials are considered by the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation to be the property of the transmitting agency, which must author-
ize any changes or deletions.10 When a card reporting an arrest is returned 
to the contributor at the latter's request, the arrest entry is deleted from 
the individual's identification record at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
Therefore, the order of expungement should direct the local enforcement 
agency to request the return of any transmitted records. 
Provision should be made for certification of compliance by the agenda 
named in the order, and, upon receipt of the certifications, the judgment 
reciting the order of sealing should itself be sealed, to remove any chance 
of unauthorized public access. 
(5) The statute should expressly set forth the effects of the order in 
restoring the civil rights of the redeemed offender, and it should expressly 
annul the conviction and the offense. In addition to specifying that the 
person will thereafter be regarded as never having offended, it should pro-
vide that in all cases of employment, application for license or other civil 
privilege, examination as a witness, and the like, the person may be ques* 
tioned only with respect to arrests or convictions not annulled or expunged. 
Exceptions should be set out in cases of high-risk employment where very 
great interests are at stake, such as law enforcement positions and the* 
directly involving the national security. 
The adoption of the "limited inquiry" provision will do more than en-
able the accommodation of the conflicting need! of the individual and 
the overriding public good; it will remove much of the public objection *> 
162. Baum, Wiping Out a Criminal or Juvenile Record, 40 CAL, S.B.J. 816, 
(1965). 
163. Information on the policy of the F.B.I. regarding submitted record* " * 
tained from identification division administrators in Washington, D.C., through tht I 
of special agents of the San Jose, California, field office. The author gratefully 
knowledges their assistance. 
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this type of statute In commending Governor Rockefeller's veto of the 
Hew York bill, the District Attorney of Manhattan is reported to have 
said that the bill was unrealistic because "it permitted a person to lie about 
his former conflict with the law."1*4 It is perhaps hard to articulate but 
there is—to the writer's mind, at least—something objectionable about 
legalized prevarication even though one can rationalize the point by the 
worthiness of the end. It impairs the law's integrity by creating a fiction 
where none is needed. To only allow the offender to deny his offense leaves 
the burden on him; 10 restrict the questioning about his offense places the 
focus where it belongs, on the attitudes of society.1*5 
(6) Because of the differences in kind and the overwhelming need for 
records in the control of thoughtless and irresponsible drivers, the privilege 
of expungement should not be extended to traffic offenses. Moreover, these 
violations are regarded by society in an entirely different light than the 
usual order of crimes and leave no such residue of stigma; hence, there 
is no compelling need for their inclusion in the scope of an expungement 
provision. 
(7) The statute should provide that upon subsequent conviction, the 
expunged record of an adult violator may be considered by the court for 
the purposes of sentencing or appropriate disposition. 
In conclusion, most offenders do not remain criminals all their lives, and 
we should not treat them as if they do. It is manifestly not the purpose 
of the penal law to ascribe permanent criminality to a first offender, though 
that is largely its effect1M This article is not intended as a panegyric for 
a soft-headed penology. It is rather an attempt to point up a serious flaw in 
164. New York Tunes, July 23, 1965, p. 1, col. 7; p. 32, col. 6. The objection that 
expungement and vacation of conviction laws permit the "rewriting of history" is fre-
quently raised. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE f 6.05, comment at 30 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 
1957). 
165. The adoption of a "limited inquiry" rule does not solve all the former offender's 
employment problems or insure that the employer will not discern the offense. It 
"trely blocks the route of direct inquiry, and its virtue in so doing is that it makes 
**tch more clear the spirit of the statute by cutting off the main source of forced dis-
cfcxure. Total compliance with that spirit can never be assured, and employers will be 
*°k to learn by indirection what they cannot learn directly. Customarily, inquiry is 
**de about past employment; personnel officials desire to know when, where and why 
*• longer. Thus, an employment gap because of a jail sentence may be all too apparent 
While questioning of this kind can allow the employer to evade the statute's intended 
tn
»* it is neither realistic nor desirable to attempt to foreclose all questioning about past 
^
or
». The "limited inquiry** mode can substantially reduce the potential for forced 
^^osure of offense, but it cannot wholly eliminate it. 
166. People v. Pieri, 269 N.Y. 315, 327, 199 N.E. 495, 499 (1936). 
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our present legal system: the failure to provide means for redefining the 
status of the rehabilitated transgressor. It is submitted that an expunge, 
ment process will not serve to hamper effective law enforcement, but will 
stand as an adjuvant to the goal of the correctional law. It should provide 
a potent incentive to reformation, and should render our response to 
criminality less febrile and more effectual. At the very least, it is deserving 
of serious trial. 
We would do well to bear in mind that 
it is a legal principle that correctional law is forgiving. Forgiveness is 
part and parcel of rehabilitation, whether of criminals or anyone else 
who has erred, or who has, in fact, what all of us have—the defects of 
being human.1*7 
167. R U B I N *t «/. at 694. 
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advisor or Chant name of other appropriate police or prosecution 
official). Model Rules mth Commentary 
Introduction 
These Model Rides set forth guidelines governing the di 
semination and retention of arrest and conviction records and recoi 
information by law enforcement agencies. Unlike other Model Rult 
prepared by the Project on Law Enforcement Policy and Rulemakinj 
they are not aimed principally at the street police officer. They ai 
intended to provide guidance for law enforcement administrators an 
recordkeeping personnel They cover an area where law enforcemer 
discretion has, in the past, been virtually unguided by legislative c 
judicial pronouncement To the extent practicable they draw upo 
existing statutes, judicial decisions and agency policies- For the men 
part, however, no such sources exist and a variety of other material 
have been relied upon.1 
These Rules have been drafted to provide for the legitimat 
need of law enforcement agencies to have access to information witt 
out violating the rights of privacy of individual citizens. Their nugc 
AO0 D 8 8 C vOVBvBp ^ fUfflyTTiff I B ii.rl l l W U n w UKvvV A i m I H W M I V * 
0) MODEL ADMINISTRATIVE' REGULATIONS *OR CRDflNAl 
OFFENDER RECORD INFORMATION, Technical Memorandum No, 4 , Maicfa 1972, prt 
p«ed by Project SEAilCH^ystcm for ElcctioafcAni^ 
torks (hereinafter referred to at SEARCH MODEL REGULATIONS* 
0 0 Uniform Jtrfenflc Omit Act, approved by the National Conference o 
Commhrioners on UmTotm State U w t aM the Ainwkra Bar Aaiodatlonm 1968; 
( $ ) PoBcks aad practice* of tba poflcc departments of ancfamatl; OaDaf 
Daytc*; District of Cctnmo^ 
Qt) RETORT OF TOE COMMIT1CT TO I N V E S T O R 
POLICE ARREST RECORDS ON EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES WTHEDBTWC] 
OF COLUMBIA 0567) (commonly and hereinafter lefened to as t * ^ 
adofrtedly the District of Colom^^ 
arrest and conviction records; „^~* 
(Y) NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME 0973X * * * * * 2 
,e|«rt of the National Adtiaoiy C c « ^ ^ 
<vi) CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ( W 3 X prepared by the^National AcM 
scry Commission on CdmJnat Justice Standards and Goals (berein#ftcr referred to as tn< 
NAC REPORT). 
feature is the Habitation on dissemination of arrest and conviction 
record information to prospective employers. This reflects the view 
that a Strang law enforcement interest exists in preserving the confi-
dentiality of such records, particularly when easy access for prospec-
tive employ eii serves to make persom with a criminal histo 
unemployable, and, as such, more likely to continue or resume their 
criminal activities. Furthermore, it now seems likely that unless law 
enforcement agencies take positive steps to control the dissemination 
of arrest and conviction records legislatures and the courts will do so 
in ways that might harm legitimate law enforcement needs.2 
2* Since the pobtcarlon of the original approved draft of these Rnkt in May 1973, 
(hoe have been rigm^.^ developments in efforts by the Federal government to legulate 
the dlnfMlmllon and setention of anest and conviction records. Although these efforts have 
not yet leached fruition, they axe likely to have a substantial Impact c* the practices of law 
enforcement agjenciet. 
Of greatest long term importance is the legislation now under consideration by the 
93d Congress, Two principal bills are Senate Bills 2964 introduced during the administration 
of then-President Richard II Nxon (hereinafter referred to as the administration bill) and 
2963 (hereinafter refetred to as the Ervin bill). The sponsors of mis legislation have made it 
dear that they are not committed to the present language of the bills, but are more concerned 
with eliciting comments regarding the problems of criminal justice data collection and dis-
semination and the right to privacy. However, considering die widespread support in the 
Congress for some kind of legislation to regulate die use of criminal justice data, it is probable 
that legislation v/ffl be forthcoming. 
Both bills provide for the sealing of a person's crimirua record siter the i«son has o ^ 
free from the supervision of any criminal justice agency for seven years Of convicted of a mis-
demeanorX In ad^ 9tio% bom bOb would req 
the dale of an anest if no conviction occurs during mat i»ric^ no prc«ec«tic« is pending at 
the end of that period, and the person is not a fugitive. The term seating, as used in both 
bffis, means that the record b to be closed and thereafter made available onty for strictly 
limited purposes ( e ^ research, icview by the ihdrvidud), or rnusu^ 
administration bill requires a specific determination by the US. Attorney General 
Both bflb generally limit access to and dissemination of crhninalJustice record knfor-
snation to crinmul jautioe aa^ndes only9 and m 
tiomase provided for bona fide research im j^ects, for me indivttud 
m the Ervmbity for the purpose of deter^^ 
by staaa or federal statute (or federal ewcuthe order, m me adrninistiati^ 
also provide piooedases for ensuring that record information is secure and accurate. Arrest 
records must contain the ultimate disposition or current status of the case. 
The bffis differ in their implementation and control schemes, in the limits placed on 
teswsauldtaasisnattdlcaitf 
of records as opposed to only their seafing. Tlieadmiiristmtionbffl places snost of te 
of Implementation and control on the US. Attorney General, while the Ervin bftl would 
estabhsh a new federal agency, the Federal Information Systems Board, to oversee the imple-
mcyntatkm and functioning of the legation. _ .
 4 
The more objectionable features of the legislation from a law enforcement standpoint 
are the provisions in the Ervin bill calling for prompt sealing or purging of criminal history 
record information when the police do not refw the case to the prosecutor or fte 
SECTION L PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
For the purposes of these Model Rules, the foUowing defini-
tions are operative. 
Rule 101 Definitions. 
Anest Record: A compilation of information, centrally 
maintained in law enforcement custody, of any arrest or tempo-
rary detention of an individual. It also is known as a rap sheet and 
includes the identity of die person arrested or detained, the 
elects not to initiate formal criminal proceedings, strict limitations on the dissemination of 
arrest record information even to other criminal justice agencies, purging and seafing criminal 
history records. 
However, the set of security and privacy guidelines designed to regulate the dissem-
ination of criminal record and history information which were issued by the VS. Department 
of Justice on February 8, 1974 is viewed as the most significant development to date (Fed-
eral Register, Volume 39, No. 32, Feb. 14,1974, pp. 5636 et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as 
the Proposed Rules.) The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration subsequently held 
public hearings and solicited written comments on the rules. The final regulations are expected 
to differ in some respects from those proposed, although the substance of the proposed rules 
will remain largely unchanged. 
The Proposed Rules are divided into three parts. Part A consists of general provisions; 
Part B covers state and local criminal justice information systems; and Part C deals with the 
federal system and the interstate exchange of criminal Justice information. 
Part A states that the purpose of the regulations is: 
to assure that criminal Justice information systems are operated In a manner 
to ensure that adequate provisions are made for: The completeness, integ-
rity, accuracy, system security, and the protection of individual privacy. 
Proposed Rules * 20.1. 
A criminal justice information system involves the equipment, faculties, procedures, 
etc for the collection, processing, preservation or dissemination of criminal justice informa-
tion. Criminal Justice information includes criminal intelligence information plus information 
compfled by a criminal justice agency consisting of identification data, notations of arrests, 
nature and disposition of criminal charges, sentencing, confinement, rehabilitation, pardon 
and release. Proposed Rules ( 20.2(a) (b) (c). 
Part B provides that the ree^tiom contaaeed merem appfy 
svstoiastf any rnrt of the system fe 
by the Uw Enforcement Assistance Adiiiinhliation under Title I of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trot and Safe Streets Act, and to state and local systems which exchange information with 
any information system operated by the VS. Department of Justice to the extent that the 
state or local system participates. Proposed Rales | 2020(a). Excluded from the operation 
of Part B are systems employed to identify or apprehend Ihghtves or wanted persons. Pro-
posed Rales 5 20.20(b). (The reguUtiom do not attempt to define such systems.) 
Part C applies to all VS. Department of Justice (*£, Federal Bureau of Investigation) 
criminal justice information systems that serve two or more states and to all state and local 
criminal justice agencies to the extent that they utilize the Department's systems. Part C also 
applies to both manual and automated systems. 
n 
nature cf the police contact («£.. arrest or detention), the charge 
Of any), and flie final disposition or presentstate of each charge 
or arrest incfaded in the record. Compilations of general or in-
resttfrtlrc ipfonnation (often referred to as investigative reports 
fr*ttnementtoffacts),*adurcst books, if pubhc records accord-
ing to state or federal law, are not inclnded within'the definition' 
of arrest record. 
Owwicfion Record: Any record maintained in law enforce-
ment custody which indicates that the indhidnal who is the 
subject of me record has been convicted of committing a criminal 
offense. 
Crhninal Justice Personnel: Judges, clerks of courts, prose-
cutors, correctional officers (including officers in juvenile insti-
tutions), parole boards and officers, and probation officers. 
Juvenile Record: An arrest or conviction record of any 
person who is defined as a juvenile according to state or federal 
^^ Law Enforcement Agencies: All local and municipal police 
Apartments, sheriffs' departments, and states and federal 
agencies with criminal law enforcement responsibilities. 
Law Enforcement Purposes: The prevention, detection and 
control of crime, and the identification, location, and appre-
hension of criminal offendeis. 
Temporaiy Detention: A restraint on liberty (such as a 
stop) not resulting in a full-custody arrest and booking. 
Commentary 
^ ^ The term arrest record includes records of all full-custody 
wrests and temporary detentions of juveniles as well as of adults. It 
raters to centrally maintained records which list an arrestee's identity 
i2^^V? l , B* l l u mtm <* * • define*** «** the brad applicability of Hie 
< r
^ ^ j y a B I : ™ gmtafaay the eflecto on law enforccmcot agencies wffl be tabttantiaL 
™*»#** thateModel Roles botfe the fmpom* Kto m& ih*noaah*Utoikm 
•we Dean fomiin*i»vi iw m~— !—•.->,• *t^ • ^r**-. *>-• «.__-__ ~ -'*•«••«*» IHV.1 tirui. ~ZZMZ~TV " ^ ~ ™ w w - "^ ™*™°» * • » «wi n>opeiiiuittiecls!atioa 
J f ™ » - ] W w e f h h f c ^ h J u . b e e . noted in tbeCommentay.HtwcfctewJ^Tto 
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the date and place of the arrest, the offense(s) and the status or 
F ^ i ! of *'.<**&&' The SEARCH Model Regulations simiL 
taut the definition of arrest record, and California has taken 
same approach through legislation. CaL Penal Cede § 11120 (19: 
Investigative reports are not included in this tenn and are not cove 
by these Rules.3 
Arrest books are chronological records of all persons 
carcerated by law enforcement personnel. If they are public reco 
acconhng to state or federal law (see, e.g.t District of Columbia Q 
8 4-135) and are, therefore, open to inspection by the public or 
press, they are outside the scope of these Rules. If they are not put 
records, they are included within the definition of an arrest rect 
and are subject to the Rules. 
.. . .
T h e t e r m
 conviction record refers to any record which 
dicates that a person has been convicted of any crime. Often « 
yiction records are the same as updated arrest records, but they a) 
include conviction data on persons summoned to appear to answ 
criminal charges and never subject to arrest Originally, the Rul 
attempted to combine arrest and conviction records, but it was f< 
that in certain instances agencies may want to distinguish betwa 
arrest records and conviction records for purposes of dissemination 
outside recipients. 
The term detention includes, along with stops, those fu 
custody arrests which are promptly followed by release.* 
3. Lew Enforcement •feades need Btife eneooi*«ement to strive foe selntasl nvbfi 
AcceaMfy of Stored Pernod Da*, 31 LAW. A CONTENT. PROS. 342. 365 flSeV 
""H"*™ * it necessary to protect sources of tafonn.tio.md to promote thwo^iaei 
In^<^/.N»«» Comity RreM«rf^55Ml^ 2d 951.2«7KYi2dl(M(S»^CLl9«71 
*•** • ? • • J««*«caoiif. certain foB-cnstody attests by ctatote most be classified « 
£ ? £ " • «?• CAL.fENALCODE 8 SSI* wMchreqrfresthatany arrest followedbrie 
leasebecniK meduu^ was found tobegroondlen 
IS 
A juvenile record is to be distinguished from records of court 
proceedii«s involving juveniles; the latter frequently arc treated in 
statutes providing for eventual sealing or expungement Few slates, 
SISTuL i , fari ,ar P 1 0 ^ 0 1 * Pertaining to juvenile records main-
II /^J*" ' enforcement agencies, although some states require 
E2£ r^t***1* a n d a d u l t rccords *P***e (see, e.g.f Missouri H
^ "
d y c t f « C 3 o d e § 211J21)andafew provide for return of 
ponce records relating to juveniles when the record of court proceed-
ings has been expunged. 
Law enforcement agencies include (those) various public 
agencies which exercise the police function. Excluded are (persons 
acting as) private detectives, personnel investigators and private secu-
rity agents. 
Law enforcement purposes is a term frequently used by 
? ? ! ? t 0 d i s c u s s ttit permissible scope of release of records. It 
includes those duties normally performed by law enforcement agen-
cies m carrying out the police function. 
Oimlnal Justice personnel denotes public officers-other 
than law enforcement officers-who are part of the system of criminal justice. 
SBCnONIL SCOPE OF THE RULES 
Rule 201 General Rule. 
^ J ^ n w t or conviction records and information contained 
therein may not be released except as authorized by these Rules. 
Commentary 
^ This Rule expressly limits authority to disseminate arrcst or 
conviction records and information contained therein to that provided 
by the Model Rules. 
i * 
SECTION IIL PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE RECORDS AN 
RECORD INFORMATION 
Rule 301 General Rule. 
Only departmental personnel expressly authorized by la* 
or by the (insert title of head of agency) pursuant to his authoi 
ity, may release arrest or conviction records or information con 
tained therein. 
Commentary 
This Rule requires that authority to release record informa 
tion be delegated to a specific person or persons. In some cases, 
authority is provided specifically by law (as in the District of Colum-
bia). In other cases, the head of the agency provides the authorization 
(as in Dallas). Confidentiality and accountability are more easily 
ensured by restricting and clearly defining the authority of Department 
personnel to release records. Cf. SEARCH Model Regulations, Regula-
tion 6. 
SECTION IV. PERSONS TO WHOM AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH DISSEMI-
NATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORD INFORMATION IS 
AUTHORIZED 
Historically, the decision to collect, retain, and release arrest 
and conviction records has been regarded as being almost exclusively 
within the scope of law enforcement discretion. Courts generally have 
recognized that where such records are compiled following a lawful 
arrest, their retention in confidential files for use as an investigative 
tool, including dissemination to other law enforcement agencies for 
such (purposes), is justified in the interest of promoting effective law 
enforcement. See Walker v. Lamb, 259 A.2d 663 (DeL 1969); CisseU 
v. Brostron, 395 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. App. 1965); and Fernlcoh v. 
Keenan, 39 A.2d 851 (NJ. Chan. 1944). Further, the courts tradi-
tionally have refused to interfere with the practice of limiting access 
to such records to certain persons. See cases cited, Comment, Reten-
tion and Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial Response, 38 U. 
CM. L. Rev. 850 0971)- Although records are fieely exchanged 
among taw enforcement agencies, certain limits have often been 
placed on public inspection on the grounds that the public has no 
light to inspect criminal records maintained by taw enforcement agen-
cies. See CaL GcVt Code § 6254 ( 0 (1968);Pec*fe v. Wttkms, 287 
P.2d 555 (CaL App. 1955); Cal. Ops. Atfy Gem 1 (I960). Recent 
Congressional legislation has similarly limited the right of pubHc in-
spection, specifically exempting law enforcement records from the 
Freedom of Information Act On the other hand, when release of such 
records to the pubfic has been challenged as an improper invasion of 
individual privacy, the majority view has been to reject the contention. 
See Purdy v. Mutkey, 228 So.2d 132 (Fb. App. 1969); KoW v. 
O'Connor, 142 NJb\2d 818 (in. App. 1957); Voelker v. Tyndatt. 
IS NJB^d 548 (1947). 
The retention of arrest and conviction records, and the re-
lease of information they contain, only lately have been subject to 
successful challenge, and then only in a handful of cases generally in-
volving unusual facts. See United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 
(D.P.R. 1967); United States v. Jones. Crim. No. 36388-69 (D.C 
Gen. Sess., April 1970) (return of record required after dismissal of 
charge because of a case of mistaken identity); Irani v. District of 
Columbia, 272 A.2d 849 (D.C. App. 1971) (court may order some 
relief on affirmative showing of innocence including, perhaps, expunge-
ment of arrest record; case remanded to lower court for determination 
of appropriate relief); In re Alexander? 259 AJJd 592 (D.C App. 
1969) (return of arrest record might be justified in rare cases involv-
ing unusual facts); Henry v. Looney, 317 N.YJ5.2d 848 (Sup. CL 
Nassau Co. 1971) (arrest record ordered expunged on affirmative 
5. Utwba^oCkv.OMiktarCUa^bk2S3A.3dl40>.CApp.l971X>adTJbtiict 
ctOohmAUr.So^^y»A.U6S2(P.C.App.l973XT^Vbi^<ACUmBa^OMXtot 
shown, the proper ninety k not to destroy or seal the moid of arrest bat to darttythe 
record by a ""titton reflecting the bet tint no ddpabOity existed. Furthermore, records 
already ofctiS^ted need not be setawned provided a suitob^ 
fr. fM p m n n . fftfl mgfm^f f~* Kmmt iwriwJ the ICCOld OT tofoniWtlOB Contained thereto. W 8M fWMBI UM agCNCM* tMt • • * • lOlXWeg TOO rccoiu m momnuwrn « w w m w . 
For this latter point tea Sophia, tL, at-654. The Coarfs rulings are bated o a t 4-137 of the 
Ebtrfct of Cohanbb Cade which provides that aB r e c c ^ of the Metropolitan poOcesboold 
be preserved, except that the Board of Comwtaiooers might cause Obsolete or nsek» records 
to bo dcstiuved. t  e estroy . 
i « 
showing of innocemce); and Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 
(WJ>. N.C. 1969) Cyouth of "hippies- arrested under vagrancy si 
utes and extreme musbehavior of police justified order expung 
arrest records), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in fight 
Younger v. Harris. <401 US. 987 (1971). 
More recant cases, however, have expanded the rehthn 
narrow principles o f these decisions. In SuuTvan v. Murphy, 478 F 
938 (D.C Or. 1973), a class action on behalf of persons arrested 
connection with May Day demonstrations in the District of Columl 
during the week o f May 3,1971, the Court stated that in an acti 
brought to remedy the denial of a federal constitutional right, t 
Federal Court's "broad and flexible equitable powers call for, 
order that limits tihe maintenance and dissemination of the arn 
records, and of all materials obtained from persons taken into ct 
tody..., in the absence of affirmative evidence produced by t 
Defendants to demonstrate the existence of probable cause either 
the time of the arrest or subsequent thereto.*' Id. at 971. Furthf 
more, the Court held that when an infringement of constitution 
rights is involved the need for an effective remedy is paramount, ai 
a federal court in fashioning such a remedy need not be bound by tl 
law of the jurisdiction where the acts took place (ie., District < 
Columbia Code § 4-137,supra, note 5.) See also Davidson v. Dili, 5( 
P.2d 157 (Colo. 19>72);£tfdfy v. Moore. 487 P.2d 211 (Wash. Apj 
1971) (requiring return of photos and fingerprints after dismissal < 
criminal charges in the absence of a compelling showing of necessif 
to justify retention); and Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316F.Sup 
401 (CD. Cal. 1970) (employer found in violation of Cm] Righ 
Act of 1964 when use of arrest records resulted in discriminatk 
against black job applicant and no business necessity was showi 
Court ordered payment of damages and fees, and enjoined defendai 
from denying employment to job applicants on the basis of arresi 
not resulting in convictions unless required by national security clea 
ance regulations), modified, ATI F.24 631 (9 Or. 1972) (injunctio 
vacated as being neither incidental nor necessary to the resolution c 
the litigation; otherwise judgement tffinsed). 
There are three principal reasons for this judicial trend 
(i) Increasing pubfc concern about the loss of pr 
vacy as a "natural by-product of our modern technology, 
Davidson v. Dili, supra, at 158; 
19 
(ft The belief that a person with a criminal record is 
mote Ekely to be subject to police scrutiny and other gov-
ernmental disadvantages. See cases cited id. at 1S9; 
On) The economic harm that might inure if the arrest 
of a person becomes known to present or prospective em-
ployers and credit reporting agencies* 
Primary concern has focused on the harmful effects of a 
criminal record upon employment, whether with government or pri-
vate employers. Documentation of the use of such records to assist in 
employment decisions is extensive. Perhaps the best known example 
j* the Duncan Report, which examined employment practices in the 
District of Columbia and found that information on arrest records was 
supplied to 350 to 400 persons daily by the D.C. Metropolitan Police 
Department, and that the use of such records very often resulted in 
denial of employment See Duncan Report at 6; cf Morrow v. District 
of Columbia, 417F.2d 728 (D.C. Or. 1969). Another study indicated 
that 75 percent of New York employment agencies surveyed would 
not even refer someone with an arrest record to a prospective employ-
er. See President's Commission on Law Enforcement & Administration 
of Justice Report: The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 75 (1967). 
In still another report it was found that many employers ask a job ap-
plicant whether he has ever been "arrested," "detained;' or "taken 
into custody." See Karabian, Record of Arrest: The Indelible Stain, 
3 Pacific LJ. 20, 32 (1972); cf. Note, Civil Liability for Illegal 
Arrests and Confinements in California, 19 Hastings LJ. 974, n. 17 
(1968). 
Conviction records also lead to difficulties in obtaining em-
ployment See Schwartz and Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 
10 Soc. Plrobs. 133 (1962); Special Project-The Collateral Conse-
quences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 929,1001 et seq. 
(1970). See also The Closed Door: The Effect of a Criminal Record 
on Employment with State and Local Agencies (1972) for a recent, 
comprehensive study on the effect that release of arrest and conviction 
records has on employment opportunities. (This study is reproduced 
in Hearings on HJR. 13315 Before a Subcommittee of the House 
Comrtt on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).) 
Evidence of this concern is found in the summary report of 
of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards 
and Goals, supra, which contains several recommendations concerning 
retention and dissemination of criminal offender record information 
t>0 
(including arrest and conviction records as defined herein). The major 
recommendations of the National Advisory Commission were: 
(i) That each state establish through legislation a 
Security and Privacy Council having the authority to adopt 
and administer security and privacy standards for criminal 
justice information systems; 
(ii) That strict security and privacy procedures be 
established to insure that no dissemination of criminal his* 
tory files occurs outride of government, except in very 
limited circumstances; 
(iii) That all copies of information filed as a result of 
an arrest which is legally terminated in favor of the individ-
ual shall be returned to that individual within sixty days of 
final disposition, upon order of a court or if requested by 
the agency which disposed of the case. Id. at 58,59. 
See the NAC Report for elaboration and explanation of these and ad-
ditional recommendations. 
Clearly developing is the belief that dissemination and reten-
tion of arrest record information should be limited and yet consistent 
with valid law enforcement interests. Some police departments already 
have acted on their own to restrict the scope of record dissemination, 
viz., Dallas; the District of Columbia; Kansas City, Missouri; and San 
Antonio. The Rules in Section IV provide for modernizing record re-
tention and release practices. 
Rule 401 General Rule. 
Unless otherwise specified by state or federal statute or 
federal executive order, arrest and conviction records or infofina-
tion contained therein may be released only under the following 
circumstances: 
(i) To law enforcement agencies of any jurisdiction 
for law enforcement purposes; 
(fi) To criminal justice personnel for purposes of exe-
cuting the responsibilities of their position in a matter re-
lating to the individual whose record is requested; 
(in) To defense counsel for purposes of providing 
representation in a criminal or juvenile proceeding to the 
person whose record is requested, upon acceptable proof of 
that representation; 
?! 
<iv) To the individual who is the siritfert^^ 
wquested for purposes of his representing himself in any 
criminal or juvenile proceeding, or for assisting his counsel 
fa nch representation; 
(•) To projective employers, governmental or pri» 
^rte, to the extent expressly and specifically required by 
state or federal statute or federal executive order* 
Commentary 
This Rule Efts those agencies and persons who are permitted 
• o o « to arret and conviction records and information contained 
therein. It also limits the purposes for which access is allowed. The 
compilation, retention and dissemination of such records is still, in 
general, recognized as a proper law enforcement function. See David-
son v. Dill, supra; Spock v. District of Columbia, supra, note 5\Mor-
row F. District of Columbia, supra. Only by curtailing access to such 
records and record information, however, will this recognition con-
tinue to be ensured. 
Rule 4010) permits the release of records and record infor-
mation to law enforcement agencies for law enforcement purposes. 
The Rule agrees with the SEARCH Model Regulations, the Duncan 
Report, provisions of statutes which apply to the records of various 
state Bureaus of Criminal Identification, (See Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. 
§ 41-1750); the Proposed Rules; the NAC Report, Standard 8.3(4) 
(to flie extent that the record has not been "pinged" from the files); 
and the administration MIL The Ervin bill, however, would limit the 
dissemination of arrest record data to other law enforcement agencies 
to certain enumerated purposes, eg., the individual who is the sub-
ject of the record has applied for employment at the requesting agen-
cy and the information sought is to be used solely to screen the appli-
cation. The Rule is substantially similar to the existing policies and 
practices of C&cinnati;Dall^; Dayton; Kansas Qty, Missouri; the Dis-
tact of Columbia; Oakland; Phoenix; San Antonio; and San Diego. 
Rule 401 (fi) authorizes the release of records and record 
information to criminal justice personnel and agencies for use in the 
performance of their official functions while dealing with the individ-
ual who is the subject of the record requested. Release to these per-
sons and agencies is generally in accord with the existing policies of 
the Police Departments on the Project's Advisory Board, although, 
unlike the Model Rules, criminal justice personnel are usually placed 
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together hi one category with law enforcement agendes, &&,asfa 
enforcement agents in the Duncan Report, or criminal Justice agenck 
in the SEARCH Model Regulations and the Proposed Rules, and t 
the Dallas and Kansas City, Missouri, Pofice Departments. The Mod 
Rules have adopted separate categories of law enforcement agenck 
and criminal Justice personnel (see Section 1(c) and (e)), to perm 
distinction to be made between the information which may be release 
to each and the circumstances under which release is authorized. Tfc 
distinction also gives law enforcement agencies its more commo 
meaning. 
Some of the purposes for which release of arrest and convfc 
tion information may be made to criminal justice personnel are 
(i) in deciding whether to chaige an individual wit] 
an offense; 
(ii) in determining the severity of the offense to b 
charged; 
(Hi) in deciding whether to arrest or to summon 
(iv) in determining whether to release the accuse* 
prior to trial or appeal (see, eg., Russell v. United States 
402 F.2d 185, 186 (D.C. Or. 1968)); 
(v) in impeaching a witness with a prior convictioi 
(see, e^., Suggs v. United States, 407 F.2d 1272 (D.C Or 
1969) and Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C 
Cir. 1967)); 
(vi) in sentencing6 (see £.&, Powell v. State, 22! 
P.2d (Ok. App; 1951) and Murphy v. State, 40 A.2d 231 
(Mi App. 1944); and 
(vii) in determining whether to grant parde (see 1 ^ 
can Report at 16. See also, Comment, Retention andDts 
semination of Arrest Records: Ju<Bdal Response, supra, a1 
855.) 
Rule 401 Oil) provides for the release of records or record 
information to defense counsel upon presentation of proof that the 
attorney-client relationship exists. Release is limited to the purpose ol 
providing representation in any criminal or juvenile proceeding. This 
provision is largely in accord with the practice in the District of Coium 
Ma. The Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department permits a defense 
6w The Aduiiiihtutrne Office of the United States Court! l i locomroftndcd the inctpsiot 
of jncfionf ancrti not resulting in convictions fa pic icntfncciepotti. The Presentence Repon 
at 110965). ' 
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attorney to have access to record information if the request is ap-
proved by the department's legal advisor. The Dallas Police Depart-
ment permits a defense attorney to have access to conviction records, 
but not to arrest records. The SEARCH Model Regulations exclude a 
defense attorney and legal aid societies from having access to record 
information. The Errin bill permits a defense attorney to have access 
to record information for the purpose of reviewing it for accuracy and 
compliance with the bill's provisions. The administration bill is silent 
regarding access to record information by defense counsel, as are the 
Proposed Rules. Finally, the NAC Report, in Standard 8.4, recom-
mends permitting a defense attorney to examine his client's record 
upon presentation of a sworn authorization from the client together 
with proof of identity. 
The Model Rules permit a defense attorney to have access 
to record information because it may be relevant in preparing a de-
fense or in plea bargaining. Moreover, it does not seem necessary to 
require a defense attorney to seek a court order before being permit-
ted access to the record. 
Rule 401 (iv) provides access to record information to the 
individual who is the subject of the record in cases in which he ap-
pears pro l e i n a criminal or juvenile proceeding. No comparable 
specific provision was found, although several departments seem to 
follow the Rule under more broadly phrased provisions, e.g., San 
Antonio; Dayton; and the District of Columbia. In any event access 
would be permitted pursuant to Rule 402. 
As a result of developments occurring since May of 1973, 
the text of Rule 401 (v) has been altered, and an alternative subsec-
tion 401 (v) has been eliminated altogether. 
^ The subsection now permits the dissemination of record 
information for employment purposes only to the extent that the re-
lease is required by state or federal law or by a federal executive 
order. Previously the subsection permitted release when, in the judg-
ment of an agency head, reasons of national security so required. 
In the alternate version, it allowed the release of conviction record 
information for a limited number of years following the conviction. 
However, the best policy is for law enforcement agencies to 
eliminate altogether the voluntary dissemination of record informa-
tion for employment related purposes. First, the national security 
situation usually will be covered by statute or executive order; 
see Exec. Order No. 10, 450, 3 CJF.R. 936 (1953) and Cole 
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v. Young, 351 UJS. 536 (1956). See also Booth, The Expungement 
Myth, 38 L.AJB. BulL 161, 163 (1963), pointing out that even the 
sealing of records probably will not prevent the obtaining of record 
information when a top security clearance is required, and Gregory 
v. Litton Systems, Inc., supra, where the Court made clear its inten-
tion not to prohibit the defendant employer from complying with 
any requirements of national security regulations. Second, all the 
current and recent efforts at regulating the dissemination of record 
information severely restrict the use of such information for 
employment related purposes, including information contained in 
conviction records. See the Ervin Mil, §§ 201(aXc), 202(a)(bXl) 
(cXD, 204, 207(5XB)(c); the administration bill, §§ 5(dX4)(e), 
6(d), 8(d); The Proposed Rules, §§ 20.22, 20.33; and the NAC 
Report, Standard 8.3. Where record information is permitted to 
be used for employment related purposes, it is (with a few limited 
exceptions) only pursuant to statutory provisions-state or federal, 
or both-or federal executive order. Sometimes release would not 
be permitted at all for employment purposes, notwithstanding 
contrary statutory provisions, e.g., sealed records under the Proposed 
Rules § 20.22(b). 
The alternative of giving government employers access to 
records while barring private industry was considered by the Project 
Advisory Board, but it was felt that the government should not ask 
private industry to do what it is unwilling to risk doing itself. Except 
in cases of national security, government, when acting as an employer, 
is really no different from a private employer. Indeed, it can be argued 
that government agencies should take a leadership role in hiring se-
lected individuals with a (prior) criminal history, in the hope that prK 
vate industry will follow suit 
Rule 402 Inspection By the Subject of a Reconl 
Any person desiring to inspect his own arrest or conviction 
record shall be allowed to do so for a period of up to (one hour) 
at the place where the record is kept, provided that he con-
forms to (insert appropriate application, fee, and identification 
procedures). 
The person may obtain a copy of his record upon payment 
of (insert a reasonable fee) or may take notes or make a written 
summary in his own handwriting. If a copy is obtained it shall 
be clearly identified as such. If a person is unable to inspect his 
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own record because of illiteracy, he may select a person to pro-
vide asststanoeto him. 
D* * person is unable to inspect his own record because he is 
focwcerrted, appropriate arrangements shall be made either to 
allow Mm to inspect the record at the [dace of detention or to 
*How anot&erpecson to inspect the record on his bdbaH] 
Commentary 
The right to personal inspection on one*s own arrest or con-
wtion records exits now in Calif ornia, where recently enacted legis-
l^onspecificallyaffonlsthiscvportunity^ 11120-
11127 (1971). Similar provisions allowing individual inspection are 
contained in the SEARCH Model Regulations, Regulation 13; the 
™ J Ml. § 207; the administration bill, § 6; the Proposed Rules, 
§ § 20.22(d), 2034; and the NAC Report, Standard 8.4. 
The Modd Rule is designed to permit an individual to ascer-
tain if an agency maintains an arrest or conviction record pertaining 
tohim and, if so, to inspect the record for accuracy and completeness. 
The Rule has been modified to permit an individual to obtain an ac-
tual copy of his record, which was not permitted in the original 
approved draft This change has been made to bring the Rule into 
greater compliance with the provisions of the Ervin and administra-
tion bills, the Proposed Rules, and the NAC Standards. Also, the revi-
sion makes the Rulesimilar to the policies of San Antonio; Dayton; the 
District of Columbia; and Kansas City, Missouri,7 Police Departments. 
A potential problem with permitting an individual to ob-
tain a copy of his record is the possible abuse by prospective em-' 
ployers. They may require the furnishing of a copy of die record as a 
condition of employment It was to protect against this possibility 
that the Rule as previously drafted did not permit an individual to ob-
tain an actual copy of his record. Subsequent developments and re-
flection have effected modification. There is nothing to prevent 
* prospective employer from requiring a person to turn over his hand-
written notes, and a copy is a more accurate and an easier method for 
7. TlwcuepoBcfatifcitwcie fa effect at the time of the pqfaBcHkm of the oririmfl 
*P«w«d daft and do not leflect subsequent changes. 
*)fs 
an individual to obtain record infonnation about himself. The i 
effective protection Oat can be offered an individual would be 
enactment of legislation prohibiting or limiting potential emplo 
from seeking arrest or conviction record information from pros 
tive employees. Agency regulation alone can only be of lim 
effectiveness. 
Rule 403 Release to Bona Fide Researchers. 
Upon written application and approval thereof by (in 
title of head of agency or his designee), infonnation contai 
in arrest or conviction records may be released to bona, 
researchers for research purposes, provided they agree no 
make public or otherwise to disseminate information that id< 
fies particular individuals or to attempt to contact such i 
viduals. 
Commentary 
Rule 403 permits the release of record infonnation for b 
fide research uses. What is or is not bona fide is, of necessity, lei 
the judgment of the appropriate agency officials. Presumably they 
act in good faith in making the determination and will carefully sci 
the credentials of those seeking access to record data for resa 
purposes. 
Affording access to record information can provide an 
portunity for important research. See Kogan and Loughery, Sec 
and Expungement of Criminal Records-The Big Ue9 61 J. C 
L.L. and P.S. 378 (1970). The SEARCH Model Regulations, 
Ervin bill, the administration bill, the Proposed Rules, and the) 
Report all contain provisions permitting the release of record hi 
mation for bona fide research purposes. 
In many cases aggregate data that does not identify oi 
den by name will suffice. Where this is true, anonymity of reo 
should be preserved. The Proposed Rules § 20.22(eXl) prohibit 
release of record information for research purposes which ident 
an individual except as authorized by state or federal statu* 
federal executive order. This approach is rejected by the 1 
as being too restrictive on research activities. Suppose, for exam 
that the purpose of the research is to compile aggregate data regar 
a particular aspect of arrests made by a law enforcement agenq 
*>*7 
•wewhe o n t e ^ t o S ^ . " 8 8 " * * * 6 **•» m e «. if no statutes 
down. Alternatively T « ™ ! r re*ea"he* wqwtt must be turned 
«wt compile ^SRiSnaSS^i * * rcsean*« access, « 
me most likdy r e s u l t ^ t n a t r c f i , s a l o f a c c e s s to the data would be 
Rule 404 R d e ^ o f J w e n f l e R e e ^ 
«* mT« (<&££ Z°S2 " 2 J*"* "*° has n o t c h e d 
be released tohh^^t^J^ m e r e c o n l fa guested may 
custodian. *" ^ ^^ 8Wadtan* o r other duly authored 
c o m i c t i o n ^ S 1 ^ ! ? ^ ° f raese R u l « * on adult arrest and 
*™fl« « c S d s ^ r S f l H ? n d a r d S We,C COnsidercd n e c e ^ for 
"" S^^sS^410 - ^ ^ 
sons authored4^ S t ^ S l K 0 ! * i T * " * « * * P * 
custodiansof t h e c h i l T w ^ t S ^ T * ' R u l e «<». In addition, 
access-since t h e k ^ t ^ I ^ S ? ^"""S o r ^tattoos, are allowed 
-»d the ^ £S^1SSSS£ * " ^ ^ ^ 
Court Act J S S J S S R ^ W *"" * • U n i f o n n ' « — 
Uiriform StateTt . fa**"*^ 
BarAssodationin Au««t i&«v*£' ^ f aP?roved by the American 
" * " • of h w e n f o ^ e l S ^ S ff°Tk! S p c d f i c "*» for the Duncan Report ™ ^ e n t m ^ r e h t ^ t o j u v e i i f l e s ; and from the 
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Rule 501 Statement of Disposition or Present Status. 
No information concerning an arrest or conviction th*t 
occurs after (insert effective date of adoption o T t t ^ o S 
Rules) shaU be released unless it includes a^tainent of riSS 
the final disposition of the matter or the r * t t E £ 2 £ 
case if no final disposition has yet been made. 
Commentary 
Rule 501 provides that information concerning an arrest or 
conviction may not be released unless the information is complete 
Le it shows not only that an arrest occurred but also what hamSnS 
or is happening as a result of the arrest Happened 
j «. IT J*.!?8 b e e n e s t i m a t e d * * 8-7 million arrests8 were made 
?mrllffiS?mV?n£tt*€t43 a n C S t S p e r W Potation 
U C R / w M . ^ 0 ^ S ^ ^ , l R c p 0 ^ t S • a t 3 1 (hereinafter referred t o £ 
UCR). While the UCR makes no estimate of the percentage of arrests 
followed by fonnal charging, it does state that 83 percent o f X s e 
arrested for crime index type offenses9 were prosecuted. It islikelv 
that the percentage is less for offenses of a minor nature i e that 
more persons arrested for felonies are formally charged than'those 
arrested for misdemeanors. Of those who are formally charged manv 
n o r o ^ ° n V i C t e d * , ^ U C R CSt imatcs m o n e tebte * £ ouHf 
i,8y6,936 persons formally charged, 60.8 percent were found guilty 
as charged, 4.4 percent were found guilty of a lessor offense 17 7 
percent were referred to juvenile command 17.1 percent were acquit-
I S S •?"• f f ^ r V* d i s m i s s e d- « * at 113. One author has esti-
mated that half of the 1,340,000 arrests made in California uTl971 
resulted in release without formal charging, dismissal or acquittal. 
Karabian, supra, at 21, n. 1. - «4««». 
WO or cwta value, „>d ,uto theft, UCR . t l7 " • ^ • ^ • U N r . l w r 
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!>
 LL t - j ^ t e °f the large number of arrests that do not result in 
^ ° ™ dMS^B-^nudi less conviction-it has been suggested that 35 
percent of all anest records do not include any information conceal* 
fagthc final disposition of fee case. See Presidents Oommission on Law 
tttforoment and Administration of Justice: The OiaUenge of Qime 
™ ^ ™ Society 268 (1967). It is not surprising that fte widespread 
wease of incomplete records has led to criticism of law enforcement 
•Sacks (and efforts to correct the problem). See Hess and LePoole, 
Abuse of the Record of Arrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13 Crime 
md Delinquency 494 (1967); Kaist, The Files: Legal Controls Over 
the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 Law and 
Contemp. Pwb. 342 (1966). 
The FBI has recently become concerned with assuring that 
***** wbmitted to it are kept complete. In a letter dated June 2, 
1971, from then-FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to all law enforcement 
agencies, the Director asked that "special attention- be given "to the 
urgent need to report a final disposition for each charge submitted to 
the FBI . . .•• Citing Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., supra, and 
Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Or. 1970), on remand, 328 
F. Supp. 718 (DJXC. 1971,10 Mr. Hoover noted that: 
[T] here is an answer to this problem, one answer and 
one only. Report the final disposition in each case at what-
G W level • . . the public interest in safety from criminal 
attack demands it, as well as our own interest, and the in-
terests of other dements in the criminal justice system in 
performing professionally and efficiently toward that same 
objective. 
^HLJ^T??9 * • • « * ww «pfa « * subject o f t decision by the Mstrk* of ColnnAia 
arotfCOnnt of AppeaJa, Menard
 r . Saxbe, 15 OX. 2105 (Apr. 23,1974). 
Un remand, the District Court bad refined to order the FBI to remove Menard** 
Bu^^Ulanett record from its criminalIdentificationfiles.TheOrcri t Covrt, in again re-
—-™%lis caae, Erected the District Court to issue an order instnicting tke Burean to 
wMa »otdetenaniatrreoftheoqtcoig«^ 
4 the lad; of any cflbit by the Bmean's Ideatfi&anlonlKviaioaitoaasnretliat 
hieceiresbaccmate arid complete, or to follow «^ on 
. . " " J * 0 ^ * * show the final olsr^ 
l ^ < ^ ^ V e w , I I O C * ^ U n the Buieati, which emphasizes the dcpciide^ 
»for the accuracy aiid completeness of its recc^dx. 
Concern with the problem of inaccurate and incon 
criminal record information is reflected in provisions of the NA 
port, Standard 7.5; the Proposed Rules, § § 20.21, 2037; the 
bill, § 206; and, the administration bill, § 7. 
Rule 501 is given prospective application only becai 
the immense administrative burden that would be involved in sear 
out the final disposition of thousands of old cases. In some inst 
such information may not be available or, if available, may be 
difficult to discover. Limiting the Rule to prospective applicati 
similar to the approach taken in California where the Cat Penal 
§§ 1115 to 1117 (1961) washdd to apply only to post-1961 ai 
53 Cat Ops. Atty. Gen. 109 (1970). Also prospective in applic 
are the provisions of the Proposed Rules § 20.21 relating to 
pleteness of record information. 
The fact that the Rule is prospective does not mean 
law enforcement agencies should not make every effort to bring 
records up to date. There is little difference between did and 
records insofar as the reasons for requiring completeness are 
cerned, and except for the administrative burden involved, Rul< 
would have been retroactive instead of prospective. 
Rule 502 Certification of Purpose; Indemnification. 
Any nongovernmental person or agency authorized by 
Rules to receive information contained in arrest or convi 
records shall be furnished such information upon applicati 
writing accompanied by a certification stating: 
(i) That the requesting person or agency is far 
with the limited purposes set forfli in the policies o 
(insert name of Ote releasing agency) for which arres 
conviction record information may be used; 
(ii) That flieinfonnation requested mil be used s 
for fliese limited purposes and not to harass, degrad 
humiliate any person, (nor shall the information be 
for any employment or related purpose); 
(Hi) The specific purpose for which the inform 
sought is to be used; and, 
(hr) That the requesting person or agency will in 
nify flie (insert name of the releasing agency) for any I 
ity arising out of the improper use of the inform 
provided. 
Commentary 
m ^pwiwre of requiring a f o r ^ 
not, ft reduces the burden of verifying proper purpose by requiring 
fje agency or penon requesting flic information to state, in writing, 
J e puipoee for which it will be used. Second, it places the onus of 
demonstrating the propriety of the purpose, and the liability for any 
fa^P01" "* of the information, on the requesting agency or person. 
TWra, it creates a written official record-thereby protecting the 
integrity of the parties involved. 
Ttoe language of certification is a revision of that contained 
in the San Diego Police Department's Instruction on Official Depart-
ment Correspondence. It is very similar to the certification required 
JyCaL Penal Code § 11105. The indemnification provision was 
jargdy taken from a notarized request form used by the City of 
Spokane, Washington (see Winner, Police Court Records-Problems 
Now Confronting Cities In Light of Eddy v. Moore, Municipal Re-
search and Service Center of Washington) which was in keeping with 
* JSruC s t a t u t o iy Provision. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 72.50.170 
established a cause of action to anyone whose record was released in 
t !X?n ° f * * r d c a s e $ ta tu tcs- W1* statute was repealed in 1972.) 
to addition to protecting the releasing agency from potential liability, 
the indemnification provision should assist in assuring that the infor-
mation is used properly by the requesting person or agency. 
Rule 503 Maintaining Records of Persons and Oiganizations Receiving 
Information. 
A record shall be kept of all persons and organizations re-
ceiving information contained in arrest or conviction records, and 
of flie purposes for which such release is authorized. If appli-
cable, the statutory authority under which the information is 
released shaO be indicated. 
Commentary 
A
 complete record shall be kept of all persons and agencies 
to^whom arrest and conviction records are released—so that these 
recipients may be informed of the destruction or dosing of a record, 
of any change in the status of a charge, and of any correction of the 
record. The Rule insures that the releasing agency can identify those 
pereons to whom records are released, and that release was made 
within permissible limits. 
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The SEARCH Model Regulations, Regulation IS, contain a 
similar provision requiring a listing of agencies to whom criminal 
offender information is released; the Proposed Rules § 20.22(aX3) 
require that releasing agencies maintain a list of all noncriminal justice 
dissemination being allowed within the state and showing, in addition 
to the identity of the recipients, the specific purpose and tire statu-
tory citation requiring dissemination. Record keeping provisions are 
also included in the administration bill, § 5(f). The Ervin bill § 301 
(cX8) gives the Board established by the legislation authority to 
require reports from agencies concerning their collection and dissemi-
nation of record information. 
Role 504 Responding to Requests for Non-Rdeasable Information. 
When a request for information contained in arrest and con-
viction records is received, and the requested information may 
not be released under these Rules, the following reply shall be 
made: 
The arrest and conviction records of tiie (insert 
name of agency) are not public records and are not 
open to public inspection. As a matter of department 
policy, release of such records is limited almost en-
tirely to law enforcement agencies and criminal justice 
personnel. The purpose of this policy is to protect the 
rights of privacy of individual citizens. Accordingly, 
the department has not conducted a search of its rec-
ords for information relating to your request 
Commentary 
This Rule requires a standard response for use in denial of 
access to arrest or conviction record information. This response is to 
be used for all inquiries where release is not authorized, irrespective of 
whether or not there is a record for the individual who is tire subject 
of the inquiry. This approach is necessary to implement the depart-
ment's policy of limiting disclosure. If requesting persons are informed 
in one case that "the subject has no criminal record" and in another 
that "the subject's record cannot be released," the nondisclosure 
policy might be defeated by those sophisticated enough to note the 
difference in response. 
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SBCHONVL DESIKULIION AND CLOSING OF RECORDS 
Rule 601 Destruction 
A. Geneal Ride. Unless required by statute or judicial 
order, arrest or conviction records shall not be physically de-
stroyed until the subject thereof readies the age of (seventy). 
B. Exception. Upon a written determination by the (in-
sert title of tihe head of agency) that manifest injustice would 
result from die maintenance of such record, destruction may be 
authorized. 
Commentary 
The Model Rules adopt the position that; unless required 
by law, die destruction of arrest or conviction records is not dear-
able. A number of considerations have influenced this position. 
Fist, it is believed that adoption of and adherence to these Modd 
Rules will vastly reduce the record dissemination abuses which de-
struction is designed to eliminate. Second, attempts to eliminate 
every vestige of an actual event seem futile, since an individual's 
past brushes with the law can very often be reconstructed through 
indirect sources. See Kogen & Loughery, supra. Indelible traces still 
remain: 
(i) Present limitations exist on the success of re-
questing full return of records distributed to other agencies; 
(it) Employers may ask the employee whether he has 
ever had an arrest record expunged or destroyed. There may 
even be available a record of expungement (perhaps sealed). 
See Note, Discrimination on the Basts of Arrest Records, 
56 CorneD L. Rev. 470 (1971)11; 
(Hi) In the case of conviction and actual incarceration, 
the time seived is hard to explain on an employment form 
asking for past history, see Kogen and Loughery, supra, at 
385; 
. **: J*» Note rtatat that > mref at fopns collected in m Aaeoricaa aftmjwnimt 
Awnrh(k« Book of Emptoyaient Foam 167-274 0967) Aowi that 66 percent of private 
mmpiiiili i asfaod whether an appScant tot employment bad ever been attested. CORNELL 
L REV. at 471, a. 5 . 
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(jhr) Certain convicted persons often have to acknowl-
edge their presence in a community by registering with a 
law enforcement agency, e&, persons convicted of speci-
fied sex offenses are required to register with the county 
sheriff (Ariz. Rev. Stat Amu § 13-1271); and, 
(v) Destruction does not erase the memory of per-
sons connected with a given event who may appear later 
and unexpectedly with their recollection warped to the 
detriment of the subject individual. 
Third, it is unclear that destruction will truly protect the person 
who was the subject of the destroyed arrest record. As Judge 
Nebeker notes in his concurring opinion in Irani v. District of 
Columbia, supra, at 851, there are numerous circumstances in which 
a person might have to reveal the fact of arrest regardless of the de-
struction of his arrest record. Further, the majority opinion in Irani 
expressly states that, absent specific statutory authorization, courts 
may lack authority to permit persons to give a negative answer to 
questions concerning their criminal history because the courts have 
no inherent power to grant those persons immunity from prosecution 
for perjury or other criminal offenses. Fourth, retention of arrest 
and conviction records allows for the conduct of research which 
ultimately may be of service to the criminal justice system. See 
Kogon & Loughery, supra, at 386 n. 33, quoting an extract 
of a letter from the Director of the Ohio Youth Commission 
which states: "Many of the psychiatrists and psychologists wish 
to retain the records for research purposes." Fifth, the availability 
of the record may be a benefit to the individual in some cases, 
&&, where it provides proof that no conviction occurred. Sterling 
v. City of Oakland, 24 Cat Rptr. 696 (App. 1962). Sixth, and-
perhaps the most important, the retention of records may be 
necessary to protect the department and individual officers from 
civil liability. These records may be material in a civil case tried 
long after the event Spock v. District of Columbia, supra, at 17, 
expressly notes the possibility of a charge against a police officer 
as a valid justification for retention of records. 
The first optional provision of Rule 601 permits destruc-
tion when the subject of a record readies the age of seventy. This 
provision reflects a judgment that when a person readies an advanced 
age, the likelihood of his engaging in further criminal actmty is mini-
mized, and, therefore, the continued maintenance of his records is of 
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««"y • suggestion; adopting agencies should feel f»» *« « ~ T ^ 
appropriate. ™*WT >ny 
cfnirM .^ i ? £ *eooild optional provision is intended to permit de-
to^mZZZZSfcZSE? "SO* **? i ^ t o n p h t e d is a situa-
t ^ S S i , ttem50rd"-€VBn fa d o s e d fonn-oould cause harm to 
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Commentary 
As an alternative to requiring physical destruction ol 
records, Rule 602 provides that the arrest or conviction record of i 
person who has been arrested or convicted be closed if that person 
stays "clean" for a period of ten years after a conviction or five yean 
after an arrest not resulting in a conviction. The concept of closing 
records is drawn from the proposed SEARCH Model Regulations, 
Regulation 12. 
In the original approved draft the various provisions dealing 
with dosing of records was made optional. However, developments1* 
since May, 1973 have convinced the drafters that it is now necessary 
to have mandatory closing provisions. 
12. The Proposed Rules, the administration bill, the Ervin bin, and the NAC Report 
each contains mandatory closing (or seating) provisions. The Proposed Rules ft 20.22(b) 
require that an arrest record be sealed when the arrest does not result in a disposition adverse 
to the person arrested, or no disposition is provided within five years of the arrest, or upon 
receiving formal notice from the agency that made the arrest. When a record is sealed it 
means that dissemination of information contained therein is limited to criminal Justice 
agencies solely for criminal Justice purposes, to qualified researchers for research purposes, 
to the individual himself for purposes of review, and where necessary, to resolve a claim by 
the subject of a record that it is misleading, inaccurate or incomplete. See Rule 604. 
The administration bin, ft 9, provides for the sealing of records pursuant to a court 
order, state or federal statute, or regulations issued by the US. Attorney GeneraL At a mini-
mum, the U.S. Attorney General's regulations'must provide for sealing a persons records if 
he has been tree from the jurisdiction or supervision of a criminal Justice agency for seven 
years, if previously convicted of a crime penm t^ing the imriosition of a sentence in excess of 
one year; five years if convicted of a crime where the maximum sentence is not greater than 
one year; five years following an arrest that did not result m a convictioa during the period 
(ff no prosecution is pending and the Individual is not a fugitive at the end of the period). 
Access to a sealed record would be permitted for purposesof review by the indhiduil, on the 
basis of a court order, or pursuant to a specific detenninatkmof the U^. Attorney GeneraL 
IheErvinbll, ft 206(b)* contains sfcnflar provisions to fheadmtoistiationbulbut, 
in addition, provides for the seafing of record faifonnation to any case where the p 
refer the natter to the prosecutor or where 
ceedmgs. Once a record is sealed, information contatocd to H may be mate 
research, to the individual or his attorney for review, for an audit, or to response to a court 
order. 
Finally, the NAC Report, Standard 7.S, recommends that information be purged 
from active files when, because of its age or for other reasons, h is swlcoger a rcfiable guide 
to the subject's present behavior. Sjpecificalry, information concerning convictions should be 
purged ten years following release from sur^ rvkuon if the conviction wis for a serious o^ 
or five years if for a less serious offense, provided the individual remains "dean" for the pre-
scribed period. Purged information is not necessarily destroyed; but may be disseminated 
oruy when necessary for in-house custodial activities or the regulatory needs of the Security 
and Privacy Council, for research, for review by the individual, for adjudication of a claim 
that the information is inaccurate or incomplete, and to meet the demands of a state statute. 
*yn 
Closing of records can serve many of the functions Oat 
destruction is intended to save, but without the adverse effects on 
law enforcement Oat destruction entails. In vetoing a bffl passed by 
theNew tasey kgidature (which provided for destruction of arrest 
records when (he anest did not result in a conviction) the Governor, 
*nhis *eto message* expressed some of die advantages of dosing 
records compared wifh destroying them: 
The primaqr objective of any expungement statute is 
to insulate fee person from any disabilities or adverse effects 
resulting from the information sought to be expunged The 
only danger in maintaining arrest records is the possible 
effects of dissemination of the fact of the arrest or the 
practical necessity that an arrested person must indicate 
that he has been arrested on employment applications. 
The possible adverse effects of an arrest record can be 
prevented without physically destroying the information or 
removing it from police files. Police records can be sealed 
so that there will be no dissemination and provision can be 
made so that an arrested person, whose arrest record has 
been sealed, can answer in the negative when an applica-
tion for employment requests information concerning that 
arrest Sealing, therefore, achieves the purpose of both the 
police and the arrested person. It enables law enforcement 
agencies to retain the record for their needs and protects 
file arrested person from the possible adverse effects result-
ing from the arrest 
Application ofRaynor. 303 A.2d 896,897,898 (NX Sup. 
Ct, App. Kv. 1973). 
Shorter time periods prior to (requiring the) closing of 
record* were considered by the drafters and rejected as being unrealis-
fic and unmindful of criminal patterns and activities. H.R. 13315, 
*2d Cong^ Seas. (1972), proposed destruction of arrest records-
including those with a disposition of conviction-after a two year 
dean period. It came under heavy criticism from the police com-
mumty. See, e&9 Commentary on HJL 13315, Police Legal Center, 
IACP Research Division (1972). ^ ^ 
Rule 602 does not distinguish between serious and less 
senous offenses. To do so would involve administrative judgments 
Perhaps possible with a computerized infonnation system, but other-
wise placing a huge burden on law enforcement agencies. Where an 
3S 
agencyfs files are computerized, consideration might be given to setting 
lesser time periods prior to closing of records when conviction is for 
less serious offenses. 
Rule 603 Opening a Closed ReconL 
A closed arrest or conviction record may be opened if fee 
individual who is the subject of fee record is subsequently 
dunged wife a crime. If fee charge does not result in conviction, 
fee opened record shall be redosed, but fee record of fee new 
charge shall remain open until dosed pursuant to Rule 602. If 
fee diarge does result in conviction, fee opened record will re-
main open until dosed pursuant to Rule 602. 
Commentary 
Rule 603 provides for reopening a dosed record if the 
subject thereof is later charged wife a crime. Reopening is provided 
for because the subject's entire criminal history may have relevance 
to the treatment and disposition of the new charge. 
Rule 604 Rdease of a Closed Record. 
Infonnation contained in a dosed record shall be hdd in 
confidence and shall not be released to any person or organiza-
tion except as follows: 
(i) Where necessary for in-house custodial activities 
of the department; 
(u) Where fee infonnation is to be used for bona 
fide research purposes as allowed by Rule403; 
(ffi) Where access is allowed by Rule 402 (personal 
inspection by fee subject of fee record); 
(iv) Where necessary to permit the adjudication of a 
claim that fee record is inaccurate; and 
(v) Where a statute or court order specifically pro-
vides otherwise. 
Commentary 
The purpose of dosing a record is to insulate an individual 
from the liabilities which normally attach simply due to fee existence 
of arrest or conviction records. The principal justification is that 
"careful purging programs would contribute significantly to effective 
programs of rehabilitation/* SEARCH Modd Regulations at 53. Where 
an arrested individual has not previously been convicted of a crime 
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and his arrest does not culminate in a conviction, dosing or expunging 
his record is required by state or court decision in some jurisdictions. 
See, e.g.. U.S. v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5 Or. 1967); U.S. v. Kalish, 
supra. 
Closed records would not be available for dissemination to 
employers or law enforcement agencies, for example, unless allowed 
under the exceptions: for in-house custodial activities; bona fide 
research; the individual's own access; adjudication of a claim that the 
record is inaccurate; and compliance with a statute or court order. 
These are instances where release is for the subject individual's benefit, 
or where it poses a minimal threat to his privacy. 
Rule 604 permits dissemination of information contained 
in a closed record under many of the same conditions as the Proposed 
Rules, the administration bill, the Ervin bill, and the NAC Report. 
See, supra, note 12, for a discussion of the conditions under which 
dissemination of information contained in closed records is permitted 
by these proposals. 
Rule 60S Notification of Other Agencies. 
When a record has been destroyed or deemed closed, 
all persons or organizations who are known to have a copy 
of the record shall be notified at the time of destruction or 
closing and shall be requested to destroy or return all copies 
of the record. 
Commentary 
This Rule simply provides that if the records are destroyed 
or closed, or if release is otherwise limited, all law enforcement 
agencies to whom such records have been released shall be notified 
of the requirement. This is similar to California practice. California 
provides, for example, that when a custodian is informed of a sealing 
of records which wore sent to him by another law enforcement 
agency, subsequent requests for such records are to be answered with 
"We have no record on that named individual." 40 Cal. Ops. Atty. 
Gen. 50 (1962). Similar requirements are imposed by the Ervin bill, 
§206. 
SECTION VH. PROCEDURES FOR CHALLENGING RECORD CONTENTS 
This section is an addendum to the originally approved 
draft of the Model Rules. A requirement that the subject of a record 
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be permitted to challenge its contents is included in the Proposed 
Rules, § 20.22(d); the NAC Report, Standard 8.4; the Ervin bill, 
§ 207; and the administration bill, § 6. The Rules herein are based 
largely on the recommendations of t|ie NAC Report (which were in 
turn based on the SEARCH Model Regulations). 
Rule 701 Notice of Right To Challenge. 
When an individual requests the right to inspect his own rec-
ord pursuant to Rule 402, he shall be told that he may submit 
written exceptions to the contents of the record on a form sup-
plied by the agency, challenging its accuracy or completeness/3 
Commentary 
Rule 701 is complimentary of Rule 402. If an individual 
has the right to inspect his own record, he should also have the right 
to correct any mistakes therein. The requirement that he be told of 
this right imposes no great hardship on the agency maintaining the 
record, and will encourage its exercise. This will be of benefit to both 
the agency and the individual, as each has an interest in seeing that 
the record is as accurate as possible. This requirement is taken 
from the NAC Report, Standard 8.4(2). See also the administration 
bill, § 6(b) (2) and the Ervin bill, § 207(b) (2). 
Exceptions must be made in writing because otherwise 
administrative review is difficult. To discourage frivolous and untrue 
claims, the individual or his counsel should be required to affirm that 
any exceptions are made in good faith and are believed to be accurate. 
NAC Report, Standard 8.4(2) (f). 
Rule 702 Administrative Review of Exceptions. 
The completed exception form shall be forwarded to (in-
sert title of appropriate agency official) for review (in accordance 
with such procedures as the agency may wish to adopt). If the 
record is found to be accurate no changes shall be made. If in-
accuracies or omissions are found they shall be corrected. After 
the review is completed the individual or his counsel shall be 
notified in writing of the results. 
13. This form should require the individual or his counsel to affirm that the exceptions 
are made in good faith and that they are true to the best of the individual's knowledge and 
belief. 
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nmentary 
Rule 702 requires each agency to establish its own internal 
cedures for reviewing challenges to the contents of its records, 
cific procedures have not been addressed in the Rule, except that 
xmsibility for their implementation should be with the one agency 
icial who is most familiar with the agency record practices. Other 
ails of the review procedure will depend on such factors as the 
} of the agency, the volume of records kept and the number of 
llenges anticipated, and the resources available to the agency to 
>ose of record challenges. 
Written notification to the individual or his counsel of the 
llts of the review is mandated. This will facilitate any additional 
ew that the individual might wish to pursue, will create a written 
?rd for the agency's files, and will assure the individual that his 
m has been given proper consideration. 
For a further explanation of the requirements of this Rule, 
the NAC Report, Standard 8.4(2) (g); the Proposed Rules, 
10.22(d); the Ervin bill, § 207(b) (2) (3); and the administration 
,§ 6(e) (0(g). 
e 703 Notification of Other Agencies. 
When a record has been modified as the result of a challenge, 
all persons or organizations who are known to have a copy of 
such record shall be notified that the record has been modified 
and shall be requested to modify all copies of the record in their 
possession. 
nmentary 
This Rule is quite similar to Rule 60S and serves a similar 
pose. If an agency's own records are found to be inaccurate or in-
iplete it is not unreasonable to require that all possible measures 
taken to insure that the inaccurate or incomplete information in 
hands of others is corrected. This is necessary to be fair to the 
ject of the record and may be important to whoever holds the 
xurate or incomplete record. See the commentary to Rule 501, 
ra. 
Similar notification requirements are included in the NAC 
K>rt, Standard 8.4(2) (g); the Ervin bill, § 207(b) (5) (A) (B); and 
administration bill, § 6(e). 
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SECTION Vm. WHEN FOREGOING RULES MAY BE DISREGARDED 
Whenever it appears that any of the foregoing Rules should 
be modified or disregarded because of special circumstances, specific 
authorization to do so shall be obtained from the department's legal 
advisor or (insert name of other appropriate police or prosecution 
official). 
Commentary 
Section VIII recognizes that there may be a few unantici-
pated situations where the application of the foregoing rules will 
interfere with or impede reasonable law enforcement action. For 
these unusual circumstances it provides the opportunity for certain 
designated high officials to suspend application of the Model Rules. 
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PARTl 
Introductory 
Of the several things America can and should do to reduce 
the incidence of crime, one with a particularly great potential 
for reducing it significantly and soon is improving the ways in 
which the nation's jails and prisons, its juvenile detention 
homes and training schools, its probation and parole services 
induce or help or enable criminals and delinquents to become 
law-abiding men, women and children. This big expensive 
"correctional system"—which is not a system at all, really, 
but a fortuitous agglomeration of a Federal system, 50 state 
systems and well over 3,000 county and municipal systems— 
has under its authority on any given day something like a 
million and a half people, and during a year it deals with 
perhaps twice that many. No one knows how many of them 
return to the community willing and able, as the result of 
their contact with corrections, to lead constructive lives; how-
ever, there is little doubt that the number, whatever it is, is 
too small. A substantial part of the correctional population, 
including perhaps a majority of serious offenders, are people 
who are being "corrected" for a second or third or fourth 
time. Furthermore, very many of those repeaters began their 
criminal careers by committing minor offenses, often when 
they were not more than 14 or 15 years old. 
Those facts define with some precision the two great chal-
lenges the correctional system faces: The present safety of the 
community requires that thousands of dangerous and persis-
tent criminals somehow be steered away from destructive pur-
suits, and the future safety of the community requires that 
hundreds of thousands of minor offenders, especially young 
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ones, be given the opportunity, the means and the desire to 
choose careers that are not criminal. Moreover, the magnitude 
of these challenges is increasing year by year not only because 
the amount of crime is increasing but because throughout the 
nation police and court operations will be improving; an inevit-
able consequence of better work by the police and the courts 
will be more work for corrections. In short, if the correctional 
system expects to perform only as well during the next few 
years as it does now, it will have to change considerably. To 
improve its performance will take great changes, indeed. 
Locating specific places in the correctional system where 
Federal action now, beginning in 1970, can give impetus to 
such changes was the assignment the President gave this Task 
Force on Prisoner Rehabilitation. 
He instructed us 
to review, in broad perspective, what the public and pri-
vate sectors are now doing in the area of prisoner reha-
bilitation and to recommend what might be done in the 
future, providing an overview of problems faced by the 
ex-offender in order to determine how he could best 
achieve a lastingly productive and rewarding return to 
society. 
He gave us wide discretion about which aspects of corrections 
we considered, specifying only that what he particularly 
wanted was some practical proposals for actions he or the 
Congress could take at once. 
We concluded early that there was no need for us to search 
for new ideas about rehabilitating prisoners. The voluminous 
literature on the subject—in the last two and a half yean; 
alone, according to the Library of Congress, almost 500 
books, articles and monographs on corrections have been 
published—overflows with excellent ideas that never have 
been implemented nor, in many cases, even tested. We con-
ceived our task as one of devising mechanisms through which 
the Federal government might help convert a few of the most 
promising of those ideas into action. We have made no at-
tempt to be comprehensive, to deal with every aspect of cor-
rections. We have been guided in our selection of what to 
discuss and what not to by the criterion of immediate feasibil-
ity. We have recommended only such actions as seem to us to 
be publicly acceptable and financially supportable right now. 
Under the circumstances this report may appear to be more 
a patchwork quilt than a tapestry. However, we believe that 
our specific recommendations, unrelated to each other as they 
may seem to be at first glance, have a common general con-
text and that it will be useful for us to describe it briefly. 
First, anyone concerned with prisoner rehabilitation also is 
concerned, perforce, with the reason people commit crimes. 
Obviously a program designed to restore offenders to the 
community must be based on some views about why they left 
the community in the first place. We have no novel thoughts 
about this much-discussed subject. We simply wish to record 
our agreement with the National Crime Commission, the Riot 
Commission, the Violence Commission, and scores of other 
thoughtful and painstaking analyses, that some of the tough-
est roots of crime lie buried deep in the social conditions, 
especially poverty and racial discrimination, that prevail in 
the nation's inner cities. These conditions not only make it 
difficult for millions of Americans to share in America's well 
being, but make them doubt society's good faith toward 
them, leaving them disposed to flout society. America's be-
nefits must be made accessible to all Americans. How suc-
cessfully America reduces and controls crime depends, in the 
end, upon what it does about employment and education, 
housing and health, areas far outside our present mandate or, 
for that matter, our particular competence. This is not to say 
that improvements in the correctional system are beside the 
point; on the contrary, many more improvements than those 
we call for in this report are needed, in fact overdue. Our 
point is that improvements in the correctional system are nec-
essarily tactical maneuvers that can lead to no more than 
small and short-term victories unless they are executed as part 
of a grand strategy of improving all the nation's systems and 
institutions. 
Second, perhaps the greatest obstacle to improvement in 
the correctional system always has been the tendency of much 
of the public to regard it and treat it as a rug under which to 
sweep difficult and disagreeable people and problems. The 
myopia of this attitude scarcely requires demonstration. After 
all, the overwhelming majority of offenders do not stay under 
the correctional rug. Sooner or later, they and their pfoblems 
emerge and inflict themselves once more upon the commu-
nity; as a matter of fact, the two-thirds of the correctional 
population who are on probation or parole are in the commu-
nity right now in body, if not in spirit. "Community-based 
corrections" is no visionary slogan but a hard contemporary 
fact. We support wholeheartedly the proposition that the 
community is the appropriate place in which to prepare of-
fenders for useful participation in community life. Doubtless 
the public safety demands that certain dangerous people be 
kept behind bars, but we think it unlikely that custody in itself 
helps them learn how to be good citizens in a free society. In 
any case, a prerequisite of successful community-based cor-
rections is public helpfulness toward offenders. The President 
put it well in his November 13, 1969 statement on correctional 
problems: 
One of the areas where citizen cooperation is most 
needed is in the rehabilitation of the convicted criminal. 
Men and women who are released from prison must be 
given a fair opportunity to prove themselves as they re-
turn to society. We will not insure our domestic tranquil-
ity by keeping them at arm's length. If we turn our backs 
on the ex-convict, then we should not be surprised if he 
again turns his back on us. 
Third, significant improvements in corrections are going to 
cost large amounts of money—and Federal money at that, 
since the states and localities barely can meet their present 
obligations. Because of our instructions to come forth with 
proposals meant to be adopted at once, we have avoided sug-
gesting anything that would cost large sums in Fiscal Year 
1971. However, a Fiscal Year is not long distant when there is 
no such thing as a commitment to a better correctional system 
without a concomitant commitment to spend money to get it. 
What the money is needed for mostly is people; of correctional 
bricks and mortar there are plenty on the whole—though of 
course there are in many places antique and squalid jails and 
prisons that urgently need remodeling or replacing if on no 
other ground than that of common humanity. But the real 
shortage in the system is of skilled personnel, particularly in 
non-custodial jobs—teachers, therapists, counselors, proba-
tion and parole officers. It is a shocking fact that between 80 
and 90 percent of the billion dollars or more a year America 
spends on corrections is spent on custody and its administra-
tion. When at most 15 percent of the system's annual budget is 
spent on what presumably is the system's chief objective, it is 
small wonder that that objective is all too seldom achieved. 
Moreover, for most of the people now working in the system, 
including those in custodial jobs, the pay is far too low, with 
resulting failure to attract the best people, and training is in-
adequate with a resulting less-than-optimum performance even 
by talented and dedicated people. Unless money is found to 
staff the correctional system adequately with respect to both 
quantity and quality, even the modest proposals we offer in 
this report will be difficult to translate into action. A program 
can be only as effective as the people who operate it. 
Fourth and finally, it is probable that no discussion of cor-
rections makes as much sense as it should because there is 
available so little precise information about correctional suc-
cesses and failures. Extraordinarily enough, until some three 
years ago when the National Crime Commission made a 
survey, no one even knew the size or the composition or the 
cost of the correctional system in the United States—and 
most guesses about these matters by knowledgeable people 
had been so inaccurate that the survey's figures, when they 
were published, caused general astonishment in the field. Par-
ticularly little is known about either the amount or the causes 
of recidivism. Guesses about the percentage of prison leavers 
who commit new offenses range from 30 to 70. No one even 
ventures to guess about the percentage of crimes that are 
committed by prison leavers. And, most importantly, there is 
little or no hard information about which offenders repeat 
and why—or, even more to the point, which offenders do not 
repeat and why. Until some light is thrown on this last matter, 
the success of any correctional program will depend at best on 
intuition rather than on knowledge and planning. 
We are reasonably confident that the recommendations in 
this report are sound, but we would be even more confident if 
they had arisen not only from our hard thinking and consid-
erable experience, but from solid objective data as well. In-
deed, we are sure that many ongoing correctional programs 
would be strengthened or altered or abandoned, and many 
new ones would be organized, if correctional authorities knew 
a little more about the way offenders of various kinds respond 
to treatments of various kinds. Therefore, as one early and 
essential step toward assembling those basic facts about of-
fenders that every correctional authority—and, for that mat-
ter, policemen, prosecutor and judge needs—we recommend: 
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of 
the United States Department of Justice should proceed 
at once to put its National Criminal Justice Information 
and Statistics Service into full operation. 
As another early and essential step, we recommend: 
The United States Bureau of the Census should in 
each decennial census make a comprehensive enumera-
tion of institutional inmates, and should make plans to 
conduct, using sampling procedures, regular interdecen-
nial enumerations of all adjudicated offenders. 
A fully operating crime information center will cost a lot of 
money—though when compared with the billions of dollars a 
year crime and the efforts to control crime cost America. If 
such a center makes it possible for not only corrections but 
every agency of law enforcement and justice to plan and 
evaluate its works rationally, it will be more than worth its 
price. 
PART II 
Jobs and Job Training 
A constructive member of the community, by definition, is 
a working member. A common characteristic of offenders is a 
poor work record; indeed it is fair to conjecture that a consid-
erable number of them took to crime in the first place for lack 
of the ability or the opportunity—or both—to earn a legal 
living. Therefore, satisfying work experiences for institution-
alized offenders, including vocational training when needed, 
and the assurance of decent jobs for released offenders, 
should be at the heart of the correctional process. To subject 
people with poor work habits and a low work motivation to 
the enforced idleness that prevails in most prisons and airbut 
a few jails, or to the meaningless chores and humiliating 
working conditions that are characteristic of many prison pro-
grams, is simply to reduce further their capacity'to derive 
Satisfaction from, or even take part in, workaday commumty 
life And of course the best institutional job and job-training 
program is futile if it does not lead on the outside to reasona-
bly rewarding jobs. .,:,«„„ ;„hc 
It is pertinent to note that, when it comes to providing jobs 
outside, those very entities that are responsible for renaDi'i-
tating prisoners, the states and the Federal government set a 
most unedifying example. Most states either arc barred by 
statute or bar themselves by habit from hiring ex-offenders. 
The Federal government let down its bars somewhat a tew 
years ago; it will now hire ex-offenders on an individual basis 
if the agency that wants their services presents a strong Dnei 
and after an elaborate and time-consuming screeningj by the 
Civil Service Commission. In other words, it is a great deal 
more trouble to hire an ex-offender than somebody eIse and, 
as a general rule, only agencies with a stake in «h« m a ^ r ' J ™ 
Bureau of Prisons or the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad 
ministration, for example, are willing to take that much 
t T u V h e - y first step toward improving its correctional 
process that any government-municipal, state or hederai 
should take is to allow ex-offenders to be employed by gov-
ernment. The government is scarcely P ^ ^ ^ . ^ X J d S 
industry to adopt employment policies toward ex-offenders 
that it itself is unwilling to adopt. We recommend: 
The United States Civil Service Commission should 
devise and put into operation a plan to stimulate Federal 
employment of ex-offenders. 
We also recommend: 
The National Institute of Law Enforcement and 
Criminal Justice of the Department of Justice should 
frame guidelines for state and local governments con-
cerning the employment of ex-offenders. 
What is required to make correctional job and job-training 
programs fruitful is close day-by-day collaboration between 
correctional agencies on the one hand and industry and labor 
on the other. The Federal correctional system has been a 
pioneer in establishing such relationships, and some of the 
results have been extremely promising, as with the training 
program for electronic welders operated by Dictograph in the 
Danbury, Connecticut prison, and a similar program for air-
craft sheet-metal workers run by Lockheed in the prison in 
Lompoc, California. 
Some state correctional agencies are beginning to work 
along the same lines, and this year the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration will fund local and state commu-
nity-based employment and training programs for offenders 
to the extent of several hundred thousand dollars. 
Taking these good, but small, beginnings as a cue to go 
farther and faster, we suggest a mechanism that could expand 
such efforts, coordinate them, bring additional expertise to 
both economic and correctional planning, disseminate infor-
mation about programs to correctional authorities throughout 
the country and to the public, stimulate with ideas and money 
innovations and experiments, and evaluate ongoing programs. 
We recommend: 
The President should establish a national agency 
whose function would be to stimulate, in the states and 
localities particularly, the adoption of programs for the 
employment and training of criminal offenders. 
One form such an agency might take would be a public 
corporation with a presidentially appointed chairman and half 
a dozen directors representing industry, labor, voluntary 
agencies and the public. 
One example comes to mind of how such an agency might 
work. Suppose it learned that the aircraft industry in the Pa-
cific Northwest had projected its labor needs for the next 
several years as so-and-so many workers of this and that skill. 
The agency would find out from state and Federal correc-
tional authorities in the area how many offenders might be 
available during those years for training in those kinds of 
skills, and broach to leaders of labor and management in the 
industry the idea of locating a certain number of training 
programs in nearby correctional institutions. It would partici-
pate in the contractual negotiations leading to such programs 
between the industry and the correctional authorities, or, if 
necessary, itself contract to administer the programs. It would 
make sure that the standards of instruction in the programs 
were of the same quality as those the industry insisted upon 
on the outside, and that the working conditions were equiva-
lent to those enjoyed by outside labor. It would preserve a 
relationship with the programs only until industry and the 
correctional authorities were able to operate them without its 
help; it would then withdraw. However, the agency would 
retain in an obligation to evaluate each program or project so 
that the experience that it produced was widely available. The 
industry probably would be willing to pay all or part of the 
operating costs of the programs; after all, it would have to 
pay as much or more for training programs elsewhere. The 
chief cost to the taxpayer would be the agency's overhead 
expenses. 
Some programs might require that ex-prisoners be bonded 
when they move into certain kinds of jobs. The agency would 
explore the various ways this might be done, seeking to ex-
pand the use of Federal funds to provide back-up financial 
service. 
The agency would by no means confine its activities to 
programs within institutions but would seek to encourage 
training and employment programs for prisoners granted 
work release from institutions, for prisoners in halfway houses 
and community rehabilitation centers, and for probationers 
and parolees. Indeed, no matter how effective an employ-
ment and training program behind bars may be, one of 
equivalent quality in the community is bound to be more 
effective for most offenders. The agency, therefore, would 
have a particular interest in testing a variety of community-
based employment and training programs for offenders. 
Another important opportunity at the local level would be 
for the agency to arrange for the establishment of community 
workshops and vocational training schools that offenders 
would be required to attend as a condition of probation or 
parole or early release from correctional institutions. Such an 
innovation would reduce the population of institutions, would 
be cheaper than institutional placement, and, if used selec-
tively, would better protect the community. Programs and 
projects of this sort, though initiated by the agency, should be 
transferred as soon as feasible to local interests to run. 
The agency could arrange regional and local conferences on 
the training and employment of offenders, and thus involve 
management, labor and the local community in defining and 
launching local projects. It could also contribute, through 
public relations programs, to educating the public to special 
needs and problems of the ex-offender, and the importance of 
the individiual citizen's role in his successful return to the 
community. 
The agency could initiate and support experimentation with 
a variety of industrial programs in prisons. For example, the 
time has come for experimentation with a "prevailing wages" 
or "factory" prison. In establishing such a program, arrange-
ments might be made for prisoners to support their families; 
or, to pay some of their wages towards the cost of room and 
board, or for that matter in income taxes. Consideration 
would have to be given also to grievance procedures and col-
lective bargaining in relation to working conditions in a fac-
tory-prison. A factory-prison must not be a "sweat shop." 
One distressing holdover in the criminal process from less 
enlightened times is the "thirty-days or thirty-dollars" kind of 
sentence in the misdemeanor courts, which means that each 
year many thousands of petty offenders are imprisoned for 
lack of money to pay fines—for debt, not to mince words. 
Often imprisonment causes them to lose their jobs. The 
agency could stimulate experiments with time payments, with 
loans to offenders who appeared to be good risks, and with 
"weekend jailing," which would allow offenders to serve their 
time in a series of two-day weekends. If such techniques were 
successful, many misdemeanants could continue to support 
themselves and their families while paying the price that soci-
ety exacts from them. 
The agency should review jointly with labor and manage-
ment all laws, regulations and practices concerning the pur-
chase of prison-made products and beyond that look into the 
possibility of the sale of such products to government agencies 
and through voluntary non-profit channels for domestic and 
foreign use. 
The agency should encourage and stimulate the employ-
ment of selected ex-offenders in correctional work. One place 
it would appear entirely appropriate for ex-offenders to serve 
would be on an advisory committee to the agency, which 
would also include, of course, representatives of other parts 
of the community. Support should be given to the develop-
ment of associations of ex-offenders for employment and 
therapeutic purposes. 
The agency should maintain the closest liaison with Fed-
eral Prison Industries, Inc. There is larger need for the work 
of the agency in state and local corrections than in the Fed-
eral system, but there is certainly an opportunity to develop 
experimental models and test them in Federal institutions 
and programs. It may be that the agency should collaborate 
with Prison Industries in this regard, or it may be preferable 
for Prison Industries itself to assume the same functions in 
the Federal sphere as those we have suggested for the 
agency at the state and local levels. In any event they should 
draw strength from each other. One possible source of such 
strength is the annual dividend to the United States Treasury 
that Prison Industries declares which in 1969 amounted to $5 
million. Instead of going into the Treasury, this dividend 
might well be earmarked for use in rehabilitation work. It 
very likely would be more than enough, for one thine, to 
fund the agency we have been discussing. We recommend: 
The Board of Directors of Federal Prison Industries, 
Inc. should undertake a study of the ways its annual 
dividend to the Treasury might be used in the area of 
prisoner rehabilitation, with special emphasis on job and 
job-training programs. 
Finally, we have no illusion that the recommendations we 
have made here about employment and training for employ-
ment, even if fully implemented, will meet the immediate 
needs of all offenders. A lamentably large number of mem-
bers of the correctional population are so educationally defi-
cient, so lacking in self-confidence, so hostile to society, that 
before they will be able to learn vocational skills, much less 
work at them as free men, they must undergo extensive 
schooling and therapy and controlled experiences in commu-
nity living. Enlightened correctional authorities in many lo-
calities and states, and in the Federal system, are devoting 
themselves to these problems. We applaud their efforts and 
urge that they be given every possible Federal support, by the 
Department of Justice, of Labor, of Health, Education and 
Welfare, and on any other agency with technical expertise or 
funds that can be applied to this all-important purpose. Only 
to the extent that offenders are made employable can employ-
ment programs for them be worthwhile. 
PART III 
Regional Institutions and Programs 
Inefficiency and ineffectiveness due to jurisdictional frag-
mentation are pervasive and endemic in America's correc-
tional system—as in its entire system of criminal justice. 
Thousands of administrative units in villages and rural coun-
ties are too small to provide any services at all to offenders, 
and even some of the sparsely populated states cannot afford 
the facilities and services needed for offenders whose prob-
lems are in any way out of the ordinary. At the other end of 
the spectrum are those big-city, big-state systems that are so 
grossly overcrowded that their personnel barely manages to 
keep them going administratively, and has little or no time for 
any work in the field of rehabilitation. Gross inequality of 
institutions and services from jurisdiction to jurisdiction is the 
rule in corrections. One state may be relatively generous to 
corrections, while its neighbor may be parsimonious to the 
point of demanding its system show an annual profit. The 
penal code of one state may be liberal about probation and 
parole, and that of its neighbor restrictive. The misdemean-
ants in one county may be put to useful work during their 
incarceration, while in the adjoining county people serving 
the same sentences for the same offenses may sit idly in their 
cells. 
The political and financial, not to say the Constitutional, 
obstacles to converting this vast nest of eels into a rational 
system are formidable. However, there are few promising and 
inexpensive steps toward regionalizing or pooling facilities 
and services that could be taken right now to eliminate some 
of the system's anomalies and correct some of its injustices. 
Jails 
The most glaringly inadequate institution on the American 
correctional scene is the one that affects more human lives 
than any other—the jail, be it county or city. According to 
the report of the Corrections Task Force of the National 
Crime Commission, there were 3,473 jails in operation in 
1966, about three-quarters under county governments, the 
rest under cities or cities and counties combined. During 1966 
the number of persons held for the service of a sentence—as 
distinct from suspects being detained pre-trial—was 1,016,748 
and the average daily population of those serving sentences 
was 141,303. A jail can be anything from a two-cell hovel in a 
small rural county to a concrete and glass skyscraper in a big 
city. Whether it is one or the other of those or, more likely, 
something in between, more often than not the living condi-
tions within it are squalid, whether because of obsolescence 
or overcrowding or just plain indifferent housekeeping by the 
staff. And the vocational, counseling, educational, psycho-
logical and even medical services and programs it offers its 
inmates range from skimpy to nonexistent. 
The anomaly of this situation is that offenders who commit 
small transgressions against society are treated more harshly 
than those who commit large ones—for, with a few egregious 
exceptions, both living conditions and correctional programs 
are far better in state prisons than in county jails. And the pity 
of the situation is that the small transgressors who make up the 
bulk of the jail population, many not being as yet confirmed 
criminals, may well be more susceptible to rehabilitation than 
prison inmates. We believe that if jails—and juvenile detention 
homes—did as much as they should do in the way of rehabili-
tation, a great many fewer young men and women would 
choose to pursue criminal careers than now do. If prisons con-
firm many offenders in crime, jails first turn them toward it 
and, in that sense, are the real "schools of crime." Bui be that 
as it may, the conditions that prevail in many jails are <*o abo-
minable that they are nothing less than an affront to o,mmon 
humanity, and every American who knows the facts, regard-
less of his philosophy about corrections, must insist they they 
be drastically bettered. We recommend: 
The Federal government, through subsidies, should 
encourage individual states or combinations of states to 
establish, by conversion or construction, regional jails of 
approved standards of construction and operation for 
persons serving sentences of more than one month or 
less than one year. 
We further recommend: 
The Federal government should withhold all subsidies 
for conversion or construction of correctional facilities of 
any kind in any state that fails to initiate a program for 
the establishment of regional short-term institutions 
where needed. 
There are two corollaries to the above. 
First, large local jurisdictions should be encouraged, by a 
system of subsidies and standards, to establish county or me-
tropolitan Departments of Corrections, so that not only jails 
but also juvenile detention halls and adult and juvenile proba-
tion services would be under professional correctional adminis-
trators. 
Second, every local jurisdiction should be encouraged, 
again by a system of subsidies and standards, to reduce its 
local jail population. Two ways of doing this that many juris-
dictions already have adopted are to institute special pro-
grams for chronic alcoholics, who now make up perhaps half 
the jail population, and by bail reform, so that as few suspects 
as possible undergo pre-trial detention for lack of money bail. 
Juvenile Detention Homes 
To say that juvenile detention facilities in well-organized 
local jurisdictions are, on the whole, better than adult facilities 
is not to say much. What is more to the point is that the basic 
deficiencies of the jail system—overcrowding, obsolete facili-
ties, unprofessional supervision, inadequate programs—can be 
found in somewhat less aggravated form in the juvenile deten-
tion system as well. And, of course, in those small or poor or 
callous jurisdictions where there are no separate juvenile de-
tention facilities the situation is far more aggravated. 
Part of the solution to this problem, clearly, is to expand 
programs under which juveniles are released—to their par-
ents, to foster homes, to a social agency of one kind or 
another—rather than detained. More juvenile officers are 
detained today than need be. We urge the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration to search with special diligence for 
programs of release for juveniles, and to fund them gener-
ously. 
A second part of the solution may be regionalization, as 
with jails. No doubt removing a child or youth from his family 
would work a hardship on both him and them, but it is a 
hardship that can be better borne than the damage an inade-
quate and squalid local detention home may do him. 
In sum, we have only one specific recommendation about 
juvenile homes other than those we have made out of jails. 
We recommend: 
The Federal government should withhold correctional 
funds from any jurisdiction that does not have detention 
facilities that separate juveniles from adults, or at the 
very least a plan for creating such facilities at once. 
Offenders Who Have Been Adjudicated 
Mentally Abnormal or Deficient 
The Joint Information Service of the American Psychiatric 
Association and the National Association for Mental Health 
has recently completed a national survey of the resources cur-
rently available to meet the needs of adult mentally ill of-
fenders, who always have posed a very difficult problem for 
the entire criminal justice system. 
A significant finding was that nearly 40 percent of all of-
fenders admitted to the state hospitals or psychiatric wards 
the survey covered were being held for competency determi-
nation pending trial. The survey did not inquire into how 
much of their time the professional staffs in those facilities 
spent on diagnosis and on testifying at competency hearings, 
but one can reasonably suppose that it is a substantial enough 
percentage to reduce sharply their ability to administer ther-
apy to the offender patients under their care. 
We believe that both increased administrative efficiency 
and improved therapeutic care for offender patients would 
result from relieving the staffs of treatment facilities of the 
responsibility for diagnosing those charged with crimes, and 
lodging it in special community mental health centers. There, 
the staffs of such centers do the diagnostic work for the 
courts, and develop experimental programs for dealing with 
special kinds of mentally ill offenders in collaboration with 
the police, the courts and corrections. We recommend: 
The Federal government should establish centers in 
selected metropolitan areas for the purpose of providing 
diagnostic clinical services to both Federal and state 
courts, and to offenders on probation and parole. 
Some offenders who are hospitalized for mental illness are 
being reasonably well treated in existing state facilities. 
Others receive little more than bed and board; the psychiatric 
therapy, the education, the skill training and vocational guid-
ance that have a direct bearing on their behavior after dis-
charge—or, for that matter, on their eligibility for 
discharge—are inadequate or even lacking altogether. A 
chief reason for such deficiencies, where they exist, is that 
many jurisdictions do not have enough offender patients to 
justify the operation of up-to-date, full service mental health 
programs and hospitals for them. We recommend: 
The Federal government should establish regional 
mental health programs and institutions for offenders, in 
which the states should be permitted to board prisoners 
needing such care at one-half the per capita operating 
costs, including treatment. 
The fifty-fifty figure for cost-sharing is arbitrary, but the 
principle behind it is not. In our opinion, even if Federal 
regional mental health facilities were vastly superior to state 
ones, no state would make much use of them unless lodging a 
patient in one cost it no more than keeping him in the state. 
The Long-Term Tractable Prisoner 
In every prison system there is a small percentage of of-
fenders who, although presenting minimal custodial prob-
lems, are serving life sentences or their equivalent. Programs 
of counseling, vocational education and the like are irrelevant 
as far as they, and the correctional authorities, are concerned. 
They need constructive employment, but few state prison sys-
tems have sufficiently well developed industrial programs to 
provide it. Moreover, the current trend in many institutions is 
in the direction of using industries less for productivity than 
for on-the-job training in preparation for release into the 
community. We recommend: 
The Federal prison system, which has as good a prison 
industries organization as any in the country, should ac-
cept long-term tractable prisoners from the states on a 
low-cost basis. Existing Federal prisons could become 
the regional facilities for this kind of prisoner. 
A corollary to putting the above proposal into effect would 
be to divert certain prisoners now in the Federal system to the 
states. For example, there is a large number of Federal of-
fenders who violated a state law at the same time that they 
violated a Federal one. We call attention, especially, to those 
convicted under the Dyer Act, which makes it a Federal of-
fense to transport a stolen vehicle across a state line. More 
than 3,000 Dyer Act violators are committed annually to the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons, which is not only inappropriate 
use of a statute designed to deal with professional car thieves, 
but also costs the Federal government better than eight mil-
lion dollars a year. Dyer Act offenders who are not profes-
sional criminals or members of car-theft rings should be left to 
the states to prosecute. The substantial savings made possible 
could be spent to better purpose on operating regional institu-
tions and programs, which ultimately would be of financial 
benefit to the states. 
A second group that might be diverted from Federal to 
state facilities are the between one and two thousand Federal 
prisoners serving sentences of a year or less. 
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The Narcotic Addict 
Though many cities and states have programs of one sort or 
another for narcotics addicts, and the big states of New York 
and California, where many of the country's addicts reside, 
have extensive programs of civil commitment, the extent of 
the problem is such that much more must be done. Federal 
help is needed, especially, for those many metropolitan areas 
where the number of addicts, though large enough to cause 
serious concern, is not so large as to justify embarking upon 
the kind of elaborate program of long-term treatment and 
supervision that experience indicates is essential to making 
headway against addiction. Regional facilities, each one of 
which could handle patients from several such areas, appear 
to be a sensible way to deal with the problem, and the United 
States Public Health Service, with the great amount of 
knowledge it has acquired over the years from operating its 
institutions for addicts in Lexington and Fort Worth, is well 
suited to fill the gap in those regions where there is as yet 
little local expertise. We recommend: 
The Federal government should establish regional care 
and treatment programs for narcotic addicts. 
Such programs should, of course, be situated in metropoli-
tan areas, perhaps in existing facilities in Veterans Adminis-
tration hospitals. 
Recent legislation that authorizes civil commitment of ad-
dicts by United States courts has two serious defects, in our 
opinion. One is that the program is available only to "first 
offenders," a term that has little practical meaning when ap-
plied to addicts, since as a rule and addict does not come to 
the attention of the criminal justice system even for the first 
time until he is a veteran user. The other is that it does not 
call for intensive post-detoxification supervision, which we be-
lieve is essential in any treatment program for addicts. We 
recommend: 
The Federal government should restudy its program 
for addicts with a view to making it consistent with the 
best current practice in the field. 
The Problem of the Female 
Long-Term Offender 
Only a few states have a large enough number of female 
prisoners serving long terms to justify establishment of sepa-
rate, well-staffed institutions. Such states as Idaho, New Mex-
ico and Utah have fewer than fifty such prisoners at any given 
time; some have scarcely any. The Federal government oper-
ates two institutions for females, one in the east and one on the 
west coast, with none in intermediate locations. In addition, 
many county jails have female prisoners serving sentences as 
long as six months to a year under the most inadequate circum-
stances of housing and program. We recommend: 
The Federal Bureau of Prisons should study the need 
for establishing, in appropriate locations, regional insti-
tutions for female prisoners to accommodate such pris-
oners in institutions with a capacity not to exceed 300 
each. 
Such institutions should be built or converted at Federal 
government expense, and the states should be permitted to 
board female offenders in them at one-half the per capita cost 
of operation. We note that interstate compact have been ne-
gotiated in some regions, but financial, political and adminis-
trative difficulties have militated against their successful op-
eration. Some of these problems might be solved, at least in 
part, by Federal participation in the capital outlays and oper-
ating cons. 
PART IV 
Toward Community-Based Corrections 
The argument for conducting as much of the correctional 
process as possible in the community rather than in custodial 
institutions is a simple one. What is wrong with most of-
fenders is that for any number of good or bad reasons they 
are unable or unwilling to respect the standards of the com-
munity, to adhere to its customs, to fulfill their obligations to 
i, or use to advantage the opportunities it provides. Hence 
"correction" or "rehabilitation" or "reintegration"—use what 
polysyllable you will—is at bottom a process intended to give 
offenders the ability and the desire to be good citizens. The 
difficulty of pursuing this objective in the authoritarian, mo-
notonous and, above all, artificial environment of a jail or 
prison is obvious; you do not train aviators in submarines. 
The way to learn how to solve the problems of community 
living is to tackle them where they exist. The way to learn to 
understand and appreciate community life is to become im-
mersed in it. 
However, if offenders could do this on their own, most of 
them would not have become offenders in the first place. 
They need help and supervision, a great deal of both. As 
things stand now, most of that two-thirds of all offenders who 
do live in the community—i.e., those on probation and pa-
role—receive little of either. The prime, though not the only, 
reason for this is numerical. There simply are not enough 
probation and parole officers. The National Crime Commis-
sion suggested that a proper ratio of officers to offenders in a 
probation or parole service was one to thirty-five. It found 
that most adults on probation, including felons, reported to 
officers with caseloads of over 100, and that parole officers 
and juvenile probation officers were in only slightly better 
straits, with caseloads that commonly ran around 75. It does 
not take much of a mathematician to calculate how much 
time, on the average, an officer with a caseload of 100 can 
spend on each of his cases during a 175-hour working 
month—even assuming he writes no pre-sentence reports and 
does no other paperwork or traveling, which actually con-
sume as much as half of the time of many officers. In this 
connection, we note that many probation and parole officers 
spend much of their time on routine investigatory and report-
ing duties that could be handled just as efficiently by parapro-
fessionals, thus freeing them for the expert counseling and 
guidance work the\ were trained for. We recommend: 
The Federal government should grant funds to the 
states and localities for the training and employment of 
substantially greater numbers of qualified probation and 
parole workers, both professional and paraprofessional. 
Along with adequate numbers, adequate training is the kev 
to effective programs of probation and parole. Thorough, up-
to-date training programs, pre-service and in-service/cost a 
great deal more money than any small jurisdiction can afford 
and most large jurisdictions have so far been willing to spend. 
This is particularly true of in-service programs, which arc the 
best possible means for seeing to it that working professionals 
keep abreast of new developments in the field and have an 
opportunity to exchange experiences with colleagues they 
otherwise might not meet. We recommend: 
The Federal government should establish regional 
training programs to provide continuing in-service train-
ing for probation, parole and all other correctional of-
ficers. 
We further recommend: 
The Federal government should promulgate national 
standards for parole and probation services, and condi-
tion its aid to the states and localities on their willingness 
and ability to meet those standards. 
In connection with the last recommendation, we suggest that 
the American Correctional Association's Manual of Correc-
tional Standards, a revised edition of which is now in prepara-
tion, might be a useful guide to those entrusted with formulat-
ing national correctional standards not only for institutions, 
but also for services. The accreditation plan for correctional 
services the Association is now developing also merits Federal 
attention and, in all likelihood, support. 
Probationers and parolees are, of course, people who have 
been through the full criminal process from arrest through 
sentencing—and, in the case of parolees, incarceration. 
There is also a part to play for corrections—or. if "correc-
tions" is the wrong word under the circumstances, for people 
who also perform correctional services—with respect to cer-
tain defendants against whom criminal or delinquency charges 
have not yet been adjudicated, and sometimes also with re-
spect to their families. This applies especially to children and 
young people. A prudent rule to follow for those waiting to 
conserve both human and fiscal resources, is that whenever 
an offender, especially a juvenile offender, can be diverted 
from going through the full criminal process without jeopard-
izing the safety of the community, he should be. However, 
this kind of diversion, which, of course, presumes the consent 
of the offender to a carefully worked out alternative to trial 
and punishment, is possible only if there is available in the 
community pre-adjudication services of many kinds: diagnos-
tic, therapeutic, counseling and guidance, educational, em-
ployment, the entire spectrum. We recommend: 
The Congress should enact legislation and appropriate 
funds for the creation, within existing community and 
mental-health facilities, of special units to provide pre-
adjudication (as well as post-adjudication) services of all 
kinds to defendants, and information about defendants 
to prosecutors and judges, with the object of diverting as 
many defendants as possible from full criminal process. 
We further recommend: 
The Federal government should fund an experimental 
program to determine the effectiveness, first, of pre-trial 
counseling and supervision of defendants and, second, of 
deferred adjudication of certain defendants under proba-
tion. 
One way of stimulating diversion, as California has demon-
strated with its "probation subsidy'* program, is for states 
(under%the Safe Streets Act) to reimburse local governments 
operating programs that succeed in keeping both defendants 
and convicted offenders out of penal institutions. 
Juvenile offenders rather commonly, and sometimes adult 
offenders also, are members of so-called "multi-problem" 
families—families that have a host of difficulties, financial, 
medical, marital, criminal, educational and so forth—and are 
the objects of attention of half a dozen different social 
agencies, from welfare agencies to the police. It appears prob-
able that the best way to rehabilitate many offenders who are 
members of such families is to treat the families as a whole, 
not just the offenders as separate individuals. One program 
along these lines that appears promising, though its results are 
still not conclusive, is the Family Centered Program in Co-
lumbus, Ohio, operated by the probation service. It deals 
with recidivist delinquents in multi-problem families by using 
intensive case work on the family, coordinating the work of 
all the agencies that deal with it, and insisting on uniform 
documentation. It is a kind of experiment that should be tried 
in other localities. We recommend: 
The Federal government should undertake a demon-
stration project to test the effectiveness of non-institu-
tional therapeutic family-oriented programs for treating 
offenders from multi-problem families. 
In some ways, only an ex-offender can understand fully the 
problems offenders face upon their return to the community. 
The use of ex-offenders as counselors to probationers and 
parolees is already being explored. That exploration should 
be intensified. We recommend: 
The Federal government should extend its support of 
demonstration projects to test the effectiveness of using 
ex-offenders as counselors to probationers and parolees. 
Finally, as we noted in the introductory part of this report, 
the feasibility of a comprehensive program of community-
based corrections depends on the attitudes of the community 
itself. The community must be more than passively accepting; 
it must be actively helpful. 
This means that community organizations and agencies of 
every kind—schools, churches, settlement houses, family ser-
vices, mental-health clinics and all the rest—must develop a 
desire to help offenders and an expertise about their special 
problems, so that a policeman has somewhere else to take a 
wayward child then to the lock-up, so that a judge can order 
probation for a person in the reasonable expectation that a 
wealth of community resources are accessible to that person, 
so that a parole officer can get the kind of expert help he so 
often needs. 
It means that newspapers, radio and television should ex-
pand their interest in corrections to include its workaday 
problems and achievements, rather than confine their report-
ing, as so many do, to scandals and riots and the lapses from 
grace of "ex-convicts"—a favorite word in the media. 
It means that homeowners' and businessmen's groups 
should think about human lives as well as real estate values 
and the "tone" of their neighborhoods when proposals for 
halfway houses here or there are made. 
It means, as we said at length in Part II, -hat jobs and 
training for jobs should be easily accessible to ex-offender's. 
One very specific way of easing an ex-offenders way 
through life is to make sure that his criminal record is not 
permanently attached to him. We recommend: 
The Federal government should adopt, and urge the 
states to adopt, legislation that would, with appropriate 
exceptions, prohibit non-judicial use of a misdemean-
ant's criminal record after a defined period of time; in 
the case of felons, legislation should provide that, after 
an appropriate period of law-abiding behavior, the su-
pervising agency could recommend pardons for them. 
In sum, making a place for ex-offenders in their communi-
ties rather than giving them the cold shoulder is one way to 
help convince them that there is another life besides one of 
crime. 
TWO S T U D D ^ Hi LEGAL STIGMA 
RICHARD D. SCHWARTZ 
Northwestern University 
JEROME H. SKOINICK 
University of California (Berkeley) 
Illegal thinking has moved increas-
igjy toward a sociologically meaning-
view of die legal system. Sanctions, 
fc particular, have come to be regarded 
ID functional terms.1 In criminal law, 
Jet instance, sanctions are said to be 
feigned to prevent recidivism by re-
•bilitating, restraining, or executing 
Ac offender. They are also said to be 
btended to deter others from the per-
fennance of similar acts and, some-
toks* to provide a channel for the 
Oppression of retaliatory motives. In 
fcch civil actions as tort or contract, 
t^tooetary awards may be intended as 
jttributive and deterrent, as in the use 
[« Punitive damages, or may be re-
: t^ded as a quid pro quo to compen-
(*f« the plaintiff for his wrongful loss. 
j^while these goals comprise an in-
i?*?J P«t of the rationale of law, lit-
* ? * *nown about the extent to which 
i^h aiC ^ ^ ^ m practice. Lawmen 
j*° not as a rule make such studies, be-
^ r ^ * e ^ traditions and techniques 
W n o t ^ 8 ° * * *or a systematic ex-
•^ounadon o f the operation of the legal 
tax?* m act ioQ, c sP e d a U5 r outside the 
ta!!!0^ '^2l2S, w**ea exagm^s8^ coa' 
vT^ l C e s ^~«-g^ the social stigma of a 
fyf^B -sentence—axe taken into ai 
^gj^pjjed version of paper read at the 
t^t J** Meeting of the American Soaologi-
^-Asioaation, August, I960 This paper 
f
*f th* t^ 0 0 m a t c r i * l s P'cP»rcd by students 
W fk \F. ***& Behavioral Science Division 
£J*f Vale Law School. We wish to ac-
fitftta * * * ^ ^ u t i o n s of Michael 
ladT?cr».T^° »««sted in the experiment, 
l ^ ^ ^ j r that of Dr. Robert Wyckofif, 
iojULV^W medical practitioners We are 
W f k f to D o n a l d T- Camp**11 a n d H a n a n 
E^wJ 0 ^, valuable commencs and 'uggrs 
t^ttf?** tactions are denned as changes 
ictiojj ^5°°dltlons imposed through court 
count at all, it is through the JJJ 
creaonary actions of police, prosecutor, 
judge, and jury. Systematic informa-
tion on a variety of unanticipated out-
comes, chose which benefit the accused 
as well as those which hurt him, might 
help to inform these decision makers 
and perhaps lead to changes in sub-
stantive law as welL The present paper 
is an attempt to study the consequences 
of stigma associated with legal accusa-
tion. 
From a sociological viewpoint, there 
are several types of indirect conse-
quences of legal sanctions which can 
be distinguished These include differ-
ential deterrence, effects on the sane-
donee's associates, and variations in the 
degree of deprivation which sanction 
imposes on the recipient himself. 
First, the imposition of sanction, 
while intended as a matter of oven 
policy to deter the public at large, 
probably will vary in its effectiveness 
as a deterrent, depending upon the ex-
tent to which potential offenders per-
ceive themselves as similar to the sanc-
tionee. Such "differential deterrence" 
would occur ii white-collar and-crust 
violators were restrained by the con-
viction of General Electric executives, 
but not by invocation of the Sherman 
Act against union leaders 
The imposition of a sanction may 
even provide an unintended incentive 
to violate the law. A study of factors 
affecting compliance with federal in-
come tax laws provides some evidence 
of this effect,3 Some respondents re-
ported that they began to cheat on their 
* Richard D. Schwartz, T h e Effectiveness 
of Legal Controls: Factors in the Reporting 
of Minor Items of Income on Federal In-
come Tax Returns.** Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the American Sociologi-
cal Association, Chicago, 1959. 
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tax returns only after convictions for 
tax evasion had been obtained against 
others in their jurisdiction They ex-
plained this surprising behavior by 
noting that the prosecutions had always 
been conducted against blatant violat-
ors and not against the kind of moder-
ate offenders which they then became. 
These respondents were, therefore, un-
intentionally educated to the possibil-
ity of supposedly "safe" violations. 
Second, deprivations or benefits may 
accrue to non-sanctioned individuals by 
virtue of the web of affiliations that 
join them to the defendant. The wife 
and family of a convicted man may, for 
instance, suffer from his arrest as much 
as the man himself. On the other hand, 
they may be relieved by his absence 
if the family relationship has been an 
unhappy one. Similarly, whole groups 
of persons may be affected by sanctions 
to an individual, as when discrimin-
atory practices increase because of a 
highly publicized crime attributed to a 
member of a given minority group. 
Finally, the social position of the de-
fendant himself will serve to aggravate 
or alleviate the effects of any given 
sanction. Although all three indirect 
consequences may be interrelated, it is 
the third with which this paper will 
be primarily concerned. 
FINDINGS 
The subjects studied to examine the 
effects of legal accusation on occupa-
tional positions represented two ex-
tremes: lower-class unskilled workers 
charged with assault, and medical doc-
tors accused of malpractice. The first 
project lent itself to a field experiment, 
while the second required a survey de-
sign. Because of differences in method 
and substance, the studies cannot be 
used as formal controls for each other. 
Taken together, however, they do sug-
gest that the indirect effects of sanc-
tions can be powerful, that they can 
produce unintended harm or unexpect-
«1 Henefit. and that the results are re-
lated to officially unemphasized as-
pects of the social context in which 
the sanctions are administered. Accord-
ingly, the two studies will be discussed 
together, as bearing on one another. 
Strictly speaking, however, each can, 
and properly should, stand alone as a 
separate examination of the unanti-
cipated consequences of legal sanctions 
Study 1. The Effects of a Criminal 
Court Record on the Employment 
Opportunities of Unskilled Workers 
In the field experiment, four em-
ployment folders were prepared, the 
same in all respects except for the 
criminal court record of the applicant. 
In all of the folders he was described 
as a thirty-two year old single male of 
unspecified race, with a high school 
training in mechanical trades, and a 
record of successive short term jobs as 
a kitchen helper, maintenance worker, 
and handyman. These characteristics 
are roughly typical of applicants for 
unskilled hotel jobs in the Catskill re-
sort area of New York State where 
employment opportunities were tested.3 
The four folders differed only in the 
applicant's reported record of criminal 
court involvement. The first folder in-
dicated that the applicant had been 
convicted and sentenced for assault; 
the second, that he had been tried for 
assault and acquitted; the third, also 
tried for assault and acquitted, but with 
a letter from the judge certifying tbe 
finding of not guilty and reaffirming 
the legal presumption of innocence 
The fourth folder made no mention 
8
 The generality of these results rem**0* 
to be determined. The effects of crifl*in£ 
involvement in the Catskill area are pr°|J~ 
ably diminished, however, by the tempo13** 
nature of employment, the generally P°?e 
qualifications of the work force, anc*.}rj 
excess of demand over supply of unskil*** 
labor there. Accordingly, the employ**1^ 
differences among the four treatment £f£?*g 
found in this study are likely, if a^V1 ft 
to be smaller than would be expected 
industries and areas where workers * 
more carefully selected. 
Two Studies of Legal Stigma Bc» 
Of any criminal record. 
:
- A sample of one hundred employers 
was utilized. Each employer was as-
signed to one of four "treatment" 
froups.4 To each employer only one 
folder was shown; this folder was one 
of the four kinds mentioned above, the 
election of the folder being determin-
ed by die treatment group to which 
the potential employer was assigned. 
the employer was asked whether he 
could "use" the man described in the 
fcldcr; To preserve the reality of the 
i'tuarion and make it a true field ex-
periment, employers were never given 
•ny indication that they were partici-
pating in an experiment. So far as they 
ww, a legitimate offer to work was 
J**ng made in each showing of the 
Wder by the "employment agent." 
*4The experiment was designed to de-
•Bnune what employers would do in 
«ct if confronted with an employment 
•pplicant with a criminal record. The 
^tionnaire approach used in earlier 
Jjwjes5 seemed ill-adapted to the prob-
^ a n c e respondents confronted with 
»j?P°thetical situations might be par-
^ w l y prone to answer in what they 
^ttdered a socially acceptable manner. 
*** second alternative—studying job 
, {w^ammes of individuals who had 
lF*^i involved with the law—would 
I ^ J ^ f ^ l e groups of applicants and 
UhMR***' emP^°5rers- * o r &csc reason, 
r'Sn* ^ experiment reported here was 
'deception:was involved in the 
yen were not approached in pre-
* * 2 r f tn<^om o'der, due to a misunder-
l i £ r k g °* ^tractions on the part of 
rterii!?* student who carried out the ex-
I J e r S ^ during a three and one-half week 
£*fcntai ^ c a u s c of this flaw in the experi-
[ t f ^ 4 ^pcedure, the results should be 
&^2» # 5 * *PP'opriate caution. Thus, 
liJJlj^yred analysis may not properly, be 
rfco!«
 #(For those used to this measure, P & k ' t a b l e L) 
?Zm*rz *ubin, Crim* and Juvmilt D#-
^ 5 o ? ' N e w York: Oceana, 1958, pp. 
study. The "employment agent"—the 
same individual in all hundred cases— 
was in fact a law student who was 
working in the Catskills during the 
summer of 1959 as an insurance ad-
juster. In representing himself as being 
both an adjuster and an employment 
agent, he was assuming a combination 
of roles which is not uncommon there. 
The adjuster role gave him an op-
portunity to introduce a single applica-
tion for employment casually and nat-
urally. To the extent that the experi-
ment worked, however, it was in-
evitable that some employers should be 
led to believe that they had immediate 
prospects of filling a job opening. In 
those instances where an offer to hire 
was made, the "agent" called a few 
hours later to say that the applicant 
had taken another job. The field ex-
perimenter attempted in such instances 
to locate a satisfactory replacement by 
contacting an employment agency in 
the area. Because this" procedure was 
used and since the jobs involved were 
of relatively minor consequence, we 
believe that the deception caused little 
economic harm. 
As mentioned, each treatment group 
of twenty-five employers was approach-
ed with one type of folder. Responses 
were dichotomized: those who express-
ed a willingness to consider the appli-
cant in any way were termed positive; 
those who made no response or who 
explicitly refused to consider the can-
didate were termed negative. Our re-
sults consist -of comparisons between 
positive and negative responses, thus 
defined, ior the treatment groups. 
Of the twenty-five employers shown 
the "no record" folder, nine gave posi-
tive responses. Subject to reservations 
arising from chance variations in samp-
ling, we take this as indicative of the 
"ceiling" of jobs available for this kind 
of applicant under the given field con-
ditions. Positive responses by these em-
plovers may be compared with those in 
the other treatmenr irrrnim tn nhtam 
136 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
an indication of job opportunities lost 
because of the various legal records. 
Of the twenty-five employers ap-
proached with the "convict" folder, 
only one expressed interest in the ap-
plicant. This is a rather graphic indi-
cation of the effect which a criminal 
record may have on job opportunities. 
Care must be exercised, of course, in 
generalizing the conclusions to other 
settings. In this context, however, the 
criminal record made a major differ-
ence. 
From a theoretical point of view, the 
finding leads toward the conclusion 
that conviction constitutes a powerful 
form of "status degradation"6 which 
continues to operate after the time 
when, according to the generalized 
theory of justice underlying punish-
ment in our society, the individual's 
"debt" has been paid. A record of con-
viction produces a durable if not 
permanent loss of status. For purposes 
of effective social control, this state 
of affairs may heighten the deterrent 
effect of conviction—though that re-
mains to be established. Any such con-
tribution to social control, however, 
must be balanced against the barriers 
imposed upon rehabilitation of the 
convict. If the ex-prisoner finds diffi-
culty in securing menial kinds of legi-
timate work, further crime may be-
come an increasingly attractive alterna-
tive.7 
Another important finding of this 
study concerns the small number of 
positive responses elicited by the "ac-
cused but acquitted" applicant. Of the 
twenty-five employers approached with 
this folder, three offered jobs. Thus, the 
individual accused but acquitted of as-
sault has almost as much trouble find-
ing even an unskilled job as the one 
who was not only accused of the same 
offense, but also convicted. 
From a theoretical point of view, 
this result indicates that permanent 
lowering of status is not limited to 
those explicitly singled out by being 
convicted of a crime. As an ideal out-
come of American justice, criminal 
procedure is supposed to distinguish 
between the "guilty" and those who 
have been acquitted. Legally controlled 
consequences which follow the judg-
ment are consistent with this purpose. 
Thus, the "guilty" are subject to fine 
and imprisonment, while those who are 
acquitted are immune from these sanc-
tions. But deprivations may be impos-
ed on the acquitted, both before and 
after victory in court. Before trial, legal 
rules either permit or require arrest 
and detention. The suspect may be 
faced with the expense of an attorney 
and a bail bond if he is to mitigate 
these limitations on his privacy and 
freedom. In addition, some pre-trial 
deprivations are imposed without 
formal legal permission. These may in-
clude coercive questioning, use of vio-
lence, and stigmatization. And, as tbtf 
study indicates, some deprivations n& 
under the direct control of the legal 
process may develop or persist after & 
6
 Harold Garfinkel, "Conditions of Suc-
cessful Degradation Ceremonies," American 
Journal of Sociology, 61 (March, 1956), 
«n 420-24. 
7
 Severe negative effects of conviction oj 
employment opportunities have been notp 
by Sol Rubin, Crime and Juvenile &elJ* 
quency, New York: Oceana, 1958. A *«£ 
ther source of employment difficulty is »£ 
herent in licensing statutes and security rtjj 
ulations which sometimes preclude c^\u, 
from being employed in their Pre"c*JjK 
tion occupation or even in the tra4cSJJ?!^ 
they may have acquired during im^t^. 
ment. These effects may, however, be <#*£ 
tttzcztd by bonding arrangements, Pf*£j 
associations, and publicity programs *~\$f 
at increasing confidence in, and s^Etij*, 
for, exconvicts. See also, B. F. MC7L> 
"Finding Jobs for. Released Offender 
Federal Probation, 24 (June, I960).*£* 
12-17; Harold D. Lasswell and R ^ i * 
Donnelly, 'The Continuing D ^ ^ i J t f -
Responsibility: An Introduction to Iso* ^ 
the Condemnation Sanction," Y***„tfc* 
Journal 68 (April, 1959), PP- ?Z&t 
Johs Andeneas, "General Prevention ^ 
lusion or Reality?", /. Criminal W", 
(July-August, 1952), pp. 176-98. 
Two Studies of Legal Stigma 137 
TABLE 1. 
EFFECT 0* Fou* TYPES OF LEGAL FOLDER ON JOB OPPORTUNITIES 
(IN PER CENT) 
Acquitted Acquitted with-
No record with letter out letter Convicted Total 
< N = 2 5 ) 
Positive respond 36 
Negative response 64 
Tool 100 
(N=25) 
24 
76 
(N=25) 
12 
B8 
(N=25) 
4 
96 
100 100 100 
(N=100) 
19 
81 
100 
official decisi011 of AI 14u 111 a 1 I nv, been 
made. 
Thus two kgal principles conflict 
in practice. 0 Q the one hand, *'a man 
is innocent tf°til proven guilty." On 
the other, the accused is systematically 
l created as guUty under the administra-
tion of criminal law until a functionary 
or official body—police, magistrate, 
prosecuting attorney, or trial judge or 
jury—decide* that he is entitled to be 
free. Even then, the results of treating 
bun as guilt/ persist and may lead to 
serious consequences. 
The conflict could be eased bv meas-
tttcs timed At reducing the depriva-
tions impose^ on the accused, before 
*nd after acquittal Some legal atten-
tion has been focused on pre-trial dep-
rivations. The provision of bail and 
COunsel> die availability of habeas cor-
pus, limitations on the admissability of 
coerced confessions, and civil actions 
foe disfe %xteSw is* tsassqtaa t>i ?s«i&» 
***** aimed *t protecting the rights of 
••Ac accused b*&>** trial. Although these 
'
mt
* often lijjiited in effectiveness, es-
pecially for individuals of lower socio-
t^conomic s&nis, they at least xepresent 
***** concert w*d* implementing the 
'presumption of innocence at the pre-
i^stagc. 
&vBy contr»5t, the courts have done 
$*}* toward alleviating the post-ac-
^uittal consciences of legal accusa-
?OQ. One effort along these lines has 
'{**a employed in the federal courts, 
j«owever. Wl**re an individual has been 
•^ttttsed and exonerated of a crime, he 
&*? petition the federal courts for a 
"ate of Innocence- certifying 
this fact.8 Possession of such a docu-
ment might be expected to alleviate 
post-acquittal deprivations. 
Some indication of the effectiveness 
of such a measure is found in the re-
sponses of the final treatment group. 
Their folder, it will be recalled, con-
tained information on the accusation 
and acquittal of the applicant, but also 
included a letter from a judge address-
ed 'To whom it may concern" certify-
ing the applicant's acquittal and re-
minding the reader of the presumption 
of innocence. Such a letter might have 
had a boomerang effect, by reemphasiz-
ing the legal involvement of the ap-
plicant. It was important, therefore, to 
determine empirically whether such a 
communication would improve or 
harm the chances of employment. Our 
findings indicate that it increased em-
ployment opportunities, since the let-
ter folder elicited six positive respons-
es. £w& t^awgsk *A& i*SL &&R. *£ ^ 
nine responses to the "no record" fold-
er, it doubled the number for the "ac-
cused but acquitted" and created a sig-
nificantly greater number of job offers 
than those elicited by the conviaed 
record. This suggests that the proced-
ure merits consideration as a means of 
offsetting the occupational loss result-
ing from accusation. It should be not* 
ed, however, that repeated use of this 
device might reduce its effectiveness. 
The results of the experiment are 
summarized in Table 1. The differences 
^in outcome found there indicate that 
•28 United Si ices C )dc„ Sees 1493, 
2513. 
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various types of legal records are sys-
tematically related to job opportuni-
ties. It seems fair to infer also that the 
trend of job losses corresponds with 
the apparent punitive intent of the 
authorities. Where the man is convict-
ed, that intent is presumably greatest. 
It is less where he is accused but ac-
quitted and still less where the court 
makes an effort to emphasize the ab-
sence of a finding of guilt. Neverthe-
less, where the difference in punitive 
intent is ideally greatest, between con-
viction and acquittal, the difference 
in occupational harm is very slight. A 
similar blurring of this distinction 
shows up in a different way in the 
next study. 
Study II: The Effects on Defendants 
Of Suits for Medical Malpractice 
As indicated earlier, the second study 
differed from the fust in a number of 
ways: method of research, social class 
of accused, relationship between the 
accused and his "employer," social sup-
port available to accused, type of of-
fense and its possible relevance to oc-
cupational adequacy. Because the two 
studies differ in so many ways, the 
reader is again cautioned to avoid 
thinking of them as providing a rigor-
ous comparative examination. They are 
presented together only to demon-
strate that legal accusation can pro-
duce unanticipated deprivations, as in 
the case of Study I, or unanticipated 
benefits, as in the research now to be 
presented. In the discussion to follow, 
some of the possible reasons for the 
different outcomes will be suggested. 
The extra-legal effects of a mal-
practice suit were studied by obtaining 
the records of Connecticut's leading 
carrier of malpractice insurance. Ac-
cording to these records, a total of 69 
doctors in the State had been sued in 
64 suits during the post World War 
II period covered by the study, Sep-
tember, 1945, to September, 1959.9 
Some suits were instituted against more 
than one doctor, and four physicians 
had been sued twice. Of the total of 
69 physicians, 58 were questioned. In-
terviews were conducted with the ap-
proval of the Connecticut Medical As-
sociation by Robert Wyckoff, whose 
extraordinary qualifications for the 
work included possession of both the 
M.D. and LLB. degrees. Dr. Wyckoff 
was able to secure detailed response to 
his inquiries from all doctors contact-
ed. 
Twenty of the respondents were 
questioned by personal interview, 28 
by telephone, and the remainder by 
mail. Forty-three of those reached prac-
ticed principally in cities, eleven in 
suburbs, and four in rural areas. Sev-
enteen were engaged in general prac-
tice and forty-one were specialists. The 
sample proved comparable to the doc-
tors in the State as a whole in age, 
experience, and professional qualifica-
tions.10 The range was from the lowest 
professional stratum to chiefs of staff 
and services in the State's most highly 
regarded hospitals. 
Of the 57 malpractice cases reported, 
doctors clearly won 38; nineteen of 
these were dropped by the plaintiff and 
an equal number were won in court by 
the defendant doctor. Of the remaining 
nineteen suits, eleven were settled out 
of court for a nominal amount, fou* 
for approximately the amount vf 
plaintiff claimed and four resulted & 
judgment for the plaintiff in court. 
The malpractice survey did not re-
veal widespread occupational barm *? 
the physicians involved. Of &e ; 
respondents, 52 reported no negan 
effects of the suit on their practice 
and five of the remaining six, all sp<^  
° A spot check of one county tJv^Ltf 
that the Company's records covered *vj^ 
malpractice suit tried in the courts ot ^ 
county during this period. u+tirtC* 
1 0
 No relationship was found t# t r^j 
any of these characteristics and the -t 
or extra-legal consequences of the 1* 
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oaKsts, reported that their practice 
mproied after the suit. The heaviest 
loser in court (a radiologist), reported 
(be largest gaia He commented, f,I 
ris all the doctors in town felt sorry me because new patients started 
«ming in from doctors who had not 
t lent me patients previously." Only one 
jfcoor reported adverse consequences 
^D his practice. A winner in court, this 
«un suffered physical and emotional 
ttess symptoms which hampered his 
Iwcr effectiveness in surgical work. The 
temporary drop in his practice appears 
to have been produced by neurotic Jfflptoms and is therefore only in-recdy traceable to the malpractice 
*ut Seventeen other doctors reported 
laying degrees of personal dissatisfac-
*to and anxiety during and after the 
*ut, but none of them reported im-
P^nnent of practice. No significant 
ftlarionship was found between out-
^ffte of thr suit and expressed dissat-
waction. 
#t A proteaive institutional environ-
**&t helps to explain these results. No 
£^* were found in which a doctor's 
"fcpical privileges were reduced fol-
d i n g the suit Neither was any phys-
•Gan unable later to obtain malprac-
p* insurance, although a handful 
J*"*d it necessary to pay higher rates. 
'%?5 State Licensing Commission, 
j /^h is headed by a doctor, did not 
^rvene in any instance. Local medi-
^ societies generally investigated 
r**ges through their ethics and griev-
•**e committees, but where they took 
J2^lct*0n» it was almost always to 
,^ commend or assist in legal defense 
IK 
| | ^ , r t DISCUSSION 
^Accusation has different outcomes 
[ t f i^^Ncd workers and doctors in 
'*"* tWO «m,J.* TT 1 I. l> l^^ studies. How may these be ex-
W / u *ust> ^ ^ m i 8 n t be nothing 
CT* than artifacts of research method. 
K vL L BV&uoieBb & was possible 
***** wiavior directly, Le^ to de-
termine bow employers act when con-
fronted with what appears to them to 
be a realistic opportunity to hire. Re-
sponses are therefore not distorted by 
the memory of the respondent. By con-
trast, the memory of the doctors might 
have been consciously or unconsciously 
shaped by the wish to create the im-
pression that the public had not taken 
seriously the accusation leveled against 
them. The motive for such a dis-
tortion might be either to protect the 
respondent s self-esteem or to preserve 
an image of public acceptance in the 
eyes of the interviewer, the profession, 
and the public Efforts of the inter-
viewer to assure his subjects of anony-
mity—intended to offset these effects 
—may have succeeded or may, on the 
contrary, have accentuated an aware-
ness of the danger. A related tvpe of 
distortion might have stemmed from 
a desire by doctors to affect public at-
titudes toward malpractice. Two con-
flicting motives might have been ex-
pected to enter here. The doctor might 
have tended to exaggerate the harm 
caused by an accusation, especially if 
followed by acquittal, in order to turn 
public opinion toward legal policies 
which would limit malpractice liabil-
ity. On the other hand, he might tend 
to underplay extra-legal harm caused 
by a legally insufficient accusation in 
order to discourage potential plaintiffs 
from instituting suits aimed at securing 
remunerative settlements and/or re-
venge for grievances. Whether these 
diverse motives operated to distort 
doctors* reports and, if so, which of 
them produced the greater degree of 
distortion is a matter for speculation. 
It is only suggested here that the in-
terview method is more subject to 
certain types of distortion than the di-
rect behavioral observations of the field 
experiment 
Even if such distortion did not oc-
cur, the results may be attributable to 
differences in research desiga In the 
field experiment, a direct comparison 
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is made between the occupational po-
sition of an accused and an identical 
individual not accused at a single point 
in time. In the medical study, effects 
were inferred through retrospective 
judgment, although checks on actual 
income would have no doubt confirm-
ed these judgments. Granted that in-
come had increased, many other ex-
planations are available to account for 
it. An improvement in practice after 
a malpractice suit may have resulted 
from factors extraneous to the suit. 
The passage of time in the community 
and increased experience may have 
led to a larger practice and may even 
have masked negative effects of the 
suit. There may have been a general 
increase in practice for the kinds of 
doctors involved in these suits, even 
greater for doctors not sued than for 
doctors in the sample. Whether inter-
views with a control sample could have 
yielded sufficiently precise data to rule 
out these possibilities is problematic. 
Unfortunately, the resources available 
for the study did not enable such data 
to be obtained. 
A third difference in the two de-
signs may affect the results. In the 
field experiment, full information con-
cerning the legal record is provided 
to all of the relevant decision makers, 
i.e., the employers. In the medical 
study, by contrast, the results depend 
on decisions of actual patients to con-
sult a given doctor. It may be assum-
ed that such decisions are often based 
on imperfect information, some pa-
tients knowing little or nothing about 
1 1
 See Eliot Freidson, "Client Control 
and Medical Practice," American Journal 
of Sociology, 65 (January, I960) , pp. 374-
82. Freidson's point is that general practi-
tioners are more subject to client-control 
than specialists are. Our findings empha-
size the importance of professional as com-
pared to client control, and professional 
protection against a particular form of client 
control, extending through both branches of 
the medical profession. However, what 
holds for malpractice situations may not 
Vv true of routine medical practice. 
the malpractice suit. To ascertain how 
much information employers usually 
have concerning the legal record of the 
employee and then supply that amount 
would have been a desirable refine-
ment, but a difficult one. The alterna-
tive approach would involve turning 
the medical study into an experiment 
in which full information concerning 
malpractice (e.g., liable, accused bur 
acquitted, no record of accusation) was 
supplied to potential patients. This 
would have permitted a comparison of 
the effects of legal accusation in two 
instances where information concern-
ing the accusation is constant. To carry 
out such an experiment in a field situ-
ation would require an unlikely degree 
of cooperation, ffor instance by a medi-
cal clinic which might ask patientsto 
choose their doctor on the basis of in-
formation given them. It is difficult 
to conceive of an experiment along 
these lines which would be both realis-
tic enough to be valid and harmless 
enough to be ethical. 
If we assume, however, that these 
methodological problems do not UJ* 
validate the basic finding, how may *J 
be explained? Why would unskilled 
workers accused but acquitted of J5* 
sault have great difficulty getting job* 
while doctors accused of malpractice-^  
whether acquitted or not—are left un-
harmed or more sought after than K-, 
fore? 
First, the charge of criminal assauk 
carries with it the legal allegation ^ 
the popular connotation of ^n r e°C^ 
harm. Malpractice,, on the other h ^ 
implies negligence or failure t 0 5 ^ . ' 
cise reasonable care. Even though ., 
tual physical harm may be ff*****^»f 
malpractice, the element of intent JT 
gests that the man accused of *&* 4 
would be more likely to repeat tn*£ 
tempt and to find the mark. Ho** -i 
it is dubious that this fine dlstlJv! 
could be drawn by the lay PubI l\ 
oil A&i Perhaps more important, *** -j*] 
tors and particularly specialists & J < 
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immune from the effects of a mal-
practice suit because their services are 
is short supply.11 By contrast, the un-
billed worker is one of many and 
therefore likely to be passed over in' 
fan* of someone with a "cleaner" 
fecord. 
> Moreover, high occupational status, 
•xh as is demonstrably enjoyed by 
doctors,12 probably tends to insulate 
«ke doctor from imputations of in-
competence. In general, professionals 
ire assumed to possess uniformly high 
Aility, to be oriented toward com-
Btoftiry service, and to enforce ade-
quate standards within their own or-
|HUiation.1B Doctors in particular re-
<*j*e deference, just because they are 
*ctors, not only from the population 
* t whole but even from fellow pro-
".fttiionals.14 
^Finally, individual doaors appear to 
* Protected from the effects of ac-
*»»rioa by the sympathetic and pow-
JJ^ J wpport they receive from fellow 
T™**s of the occupation, a factor 
•»*at in the case of unskilled, un-
* J £ ^ laborers,15 The medical so-
k 2^9 provides advice on handling mal-
f ^ c e actions, for instance, and re-
****** by other doctors sometimes in-
r ^ * *s a consequence of the sym-
pwft7 felt for the malpractice suit v io 
•j^atioiul Opinion Research Center, 
££»*** Occupations: A Popular Evalu-
H\nP?J0n N#tt"' 9 (ScPL* 1947)' too^y** -More recent studies in several |T^»o tend to confirm the high status 
#?*>Physician. See Alex Inkeles, -Indus-
i ^ ' The Relation of Status to Ex-
£*****» Perception and Value,** American 
IjjJ1^0/ Sociology, 66 (July, I960), pp. 
I C U ^ 0 " Parsons, The Social System, 
' ^ V ^ L 1 ^ F w c PrefS' W51. PP. 454-
^ M Ju5f*'Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958. 
kfiSII?1 Z*****. Arthur R. Cohen, and 
\¥<4hpf *ol§ Motions m the Mental 
£** $t*il!0l§sst0ns' Ana .Arbor: Institute 
g ^ j f ^ a r c h , 1957. * 
[J^i^^^'ornetimes act to protect the 
i S T i i ^ L o f m c mben who, discharged 
^•HenTL/i uP°n ****** *«k re-em-
^ ^ allowing their acquittal. 
tun, buch assistance is further evidence 
that the professional operates as "a 
community within a community/*10 
shielding its members from controls 
exercised by formal authorities in the 
larger sociery. 
In order to isolate these factors, ad-
ditional studies are needed. It would be 
interesting to know, for instance, 
whether high occupational status would 
protect a doctor acquitted of a charge 
of assault. Information on this ques-
tion is sparse. Actual instances of as-
saults by doctors are probably very 
rare. When and if they do occur, it 
seems unlikely that they would lead to 
publicity and prosecution, since police 
and prosecutor discretion might usually 
be emplpyed to quash charges before 
they are publicized. In the rare in-
stances in which they come to public 
attention, such accusations appear to 
produce a marked effect because of the 
assumption that the pressing of charges, 
despite the'status of the defendant, in-
dicates probable guilt. Nevertheless, 
instances may be found in which even 
the accusation of first degree murder 
followed by acquittal appears to have 
left the doctor professionally unscath-
ed.11 Similarly, as a test of the group 
protection hypothesis, one% might in-
vestigate the effect of an acquittal for 
assault on working men who are union 
.members. The -analogy would be par-
ticularly instructive where the union 
plays an important part in employ-
ment decisions, for instance in indus-
l*See William J. Goode, "Community 
Within A Community: The Professions/' 
American Sociological Review, 22 (April, 
1957), pp. 194-200. 17
 For instance, the acquittal of Dr. 
John Bodkin Adams after a sensational 
murder trial, in which he was accused of 
deliberately killing several elderly women 
Citients to inherit their estates, was fol-wed by his quiet return to medical prac-
tice. New York Times, Nov. 24, 1961, 
p. 28, col. 7. Whether the British regard 
acquittals as more exonerative than Ameri-
cans is uncertain. 
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tries which make use of a union hiring 
halL 
In the absence of studies which iso-
late the effect of such factors, our find-
ings cannot readily be generalized. It 
is tempting to suggest after an initial 
look at the results that social class dif-
ferences provide the explanation. But 
'subsequent analysis and research might 
well reveal significant intra-class varia-
tions, depending on the distribution of 
other operative factors. A lower class 
person with a scarce specialty and a 
protective occupational group who is 
acquitted of a lightly regarded offense 
might benefit from the accusation. 
Nevertheless, class in general seems to 
correlate with the relevant factors to 
such an extent that in reality the law 
regularly works to the disadvantage of 
the already more disadvantaged classes. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal accusation imposes a variety 
of consequences, depending on the 
nature of the accusation and the char-
acteristics of the accused. Deprivations 
occur, even though not officially in-
tended in the case of unskilled work-
ers who have been acquitted of assauli 
charges. On the other hand, malprac-
tice actions—even when resulting in a 
judgment against the doctor—are not 
usually followed by negative conse-
quences and sometimes have a favor-
able effect on the professional position 
of the defendant. These differences ifl 
outcome suggest two conclusions: one, 
the need for more explicit clarification 
of legal goals; two, the importance of 
examining the attitudes and social 
structure of the community outside the 
courtroom if the legal process is to 
hit intended targets, while avoiding in-
nocent bystanders. Greater precision ifl 
communicating goals and in apprais-
ing consequences of present practices 
should help to make the legal process 
an increasingly equitable and effective 
instrument of social control. 
THIEVES, CONVICTS AND THE INMATE CULTURE 
JOHN IRWIN and DONALD R. CRESSEY 
Departments of Anthropology and Sociology 
University of California, Los Angeles and Santa Barbara 
In the rapidly-growing literature on 
the social organization of correctional 
institutions, it has become common to 
discuss "prison culture" and "inmate 
culture" in terms suggesting that the 
behavior systems of various types of in-
mates stem from the conditions of im-
prisonment themselves. Use of a form 
of structural-functional analysis in re-
search and observation of institutions 
has led to emphasis of the notion that 
* We are indebted to the following 
persons for suggested modifications of the 
original draft: Donald L. Garrity, Daniel 
Glaser, Erving Goflman, and Stanton 
internal conditions stimulate lfl*?\! 
behavior of various kinds, and tfc 
has been a glossing over of the o ^ 
notion that inmates may bring a ^ u f " 
ture with them into the P1^500: ^ 
aim is to suggest that much of ^ j ^ * 
mate behavior classified as part 01 ^ 
prison culture is not peculiar^  to •> 
prison at all. On the contrary, it ^ ^ . f 
fine distinction between P r i ^ ^ J 
ture" and "criminal subculture ^ < 
seems to make understandable ^ ^ Q 
distinction between behavior pa 5ft 
of various categories of in*11**[!L«<51 
A number of recent P u b .^ f*ff 
have defended the notion that D& o | 
patterns among inmates develop 
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The Collateral Consequences 
of a Criminal Conviction 
The language of these statutes, in the absence of other recognized 
and established principles of law, would seem to divest a citizen of all 
rights whatsoever and render him absolutely civiliter mortuus, but the 
principles of law which this verbiage literally imports had [their] 
origin in the fogs and fictions of feudal jurisprudence and doubtlessly 
(have] been brought forward into modern statutes without fully 
realizing either the effect of [their] literal significance or the extent of 
[their] infringement upon the spirit of our system of government. 
Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728,731,139 P. 948, 
949(1914). 
As a general matter [civil disability law] has simply not been 
rationally designed to accommodate the varied interests of society 
and the individual convicted person. There has been little effort to 
evaluate the whole system of disabilities and disqualifications that has 
grownup. . . .As a result, convicted persons are generally subjected 
> numerous disabilities and disqualifications which have little 
relation to the crime committed, the person committing it or, 
consequently, the protection of society. They are often harsh out of all 
proportion to the crime committed. 
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: 
CORRECTIONS 88 (1967). 
9?9 
1000 VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 23 
demands that public affairs be administered by officers bearing ao 
stigma of a conviction.4* 
Although the courts seem to agree that provisions excluding 
convicted citizens from public office are reasonable, some courts have 
been more restrictive than others in applying the provisions to specific 
problem areas. One area in which the states are in conflict involves the 
question of whether a convicted person can seek public office after his 
rehabilitation or after receiving a pardon.411 In the absence of a pardon, 
the offender, even though rehabilitated, will be unable to hold public 
offices in most states.40 The courts have reached conflicting decisions 
when considering the effect of a pardon on public office 
disqualifications.41* There also is judicial disagreement on the question of 
whether a conviction in one state prevents an offender from holding 
public office in another state.41* Some courts have held that only a 
conviction in the state where the person is a candidate for office renders 
him ineligible.449 Others, however, hold that criminal offenders are 
disqualified from office, regardless of where they were convicted.411 
Although the courts have upheld laws disqualifying convicted 
persons from public office, these laws have been criticized by the 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration 
of Justice. The Commission has suggested that the states should rely on 
the judgment of the voters for elective officials and on the appraisal of 
the persons with appointive power for appointive positions.441 The 
Swedish already follow the policy suggested by the President's 
455. State ex ret. Guthrie v. Chapman. 187 Wash. 327.329-34.60 P-2d 245.246-47 (1936). 
456. For a general discussion of the posuble way* to remove civil disabilities see aotes 570-
659 on pages 1143-54 infra and accompanying text. 
457. People ex rH. Symonds v. Gaalano. 97 111. App. 2d 24S. 240 N.E-2d 467 (1968) 
(candidate disqualified even UMMgh the court recognized that he had been rehabilitated since bis 
conviction more than a quarter of a centnry earlier). Contm. Webb v. County Court, 113 W. Va. 
474.476-78,161 S.E. 760.761 (1933). The case involves an interpretation of a West Virginia stats* 
excluding persons convicted of certain crimes from public office "whits such conviction remains 
BttTCvcrsed." W. V*. CODE ANN. f 6-5-5 (1966). 
45S. People ex ret. Symonds v. Gaalano. 2(0 N.EJd 2S4 0»-App. C t r970) (governort 
certificate of restoration removes dw^ficatioa); Stale c* *«£ Ckwd v. Ekctto 
363.366,36 P2d 20.23 (l934)(paf*Mfcc4mda*«afifkatto^ 
Ark. 323.379 S.WJd 277 (1964) (disqualification Respective of pardon), noted as 7S HAS*. t~ 
Rev. 1676(1965). 
459. Fnr a detailed disnmion see notes 142-71 smprm and accompanying lent. 
460. See. *f.. HSdtctb v. Heath. 110. App. 12 (1S7S* Suit ex ret. Mitchell v. McOoaftM. 
164 Miss. 405.145 So. 508 (!933).S«r e to Goltermaa v. State. 141 So. 2d 21 (Fta. 1962). 
461. £*. . Cramptoo *. O'Mara. 193 lad. 551. 139 NX. 360 (1923). error dismissed. #* 
VS. 575 (1925). 
462. PRESIDCHT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENroactMixT AND TNC AOMiNtsTnATtON or 
JUSTICE. TASK FORCE RETOKT: CORRECTIONS 90 (1967) (hereinafter died as TASK FORCE REPORT). 
1970) CIVIL DISABILITIES !00t 
Commission, reasoning that if an ex-convict becomes a candidate, his 
former conviction probably will become an issue during the campaign. If 
the voters are informed about the candidate and nevertheless choose to 
elect him, the Swedes believe that the legislature should not interfere with 
their choice.40 
VI. Loss OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
The right to work has been acclaimed ~thc most precious liberty 
that man possesses."*4 For the ex-convict, however, the right to work in 
an occupation of his choice is at best a qualified right and in many 
instances is nonexistent. A job applicant with a criminal record may face 
substantial prejudice on the part of many prospective employers. In 
addition, the ex-convict is confronted with a vast array of federal, state, 
and local regulations labeling him unsuitable for public employment and 
a host of licensed occupations. 
A. Exclusion of Convicted Criminals by Private Employers 
Conviction of a crime can have lasting social and economic 
consequences for the offender.4** Depending upon the nature and gravity 
of his offense,444 employment opportunities in the private sector may be 
severely limited. Numerous studies have surveyed the extent and effect of 
private employers* discrimination against former convicts.4*1 Although 
findings have not been consistent, it is generally concluded that 
substantial discrimination is practiced.411 Many employers, for example, 
flatly reject applicants with criminal records. Most employers avoid 
hiring released convicts if other personnel are available.4* Moreover, 
463. Damaska. Adverse Legmi Consequences Of Conviction mni Their RemovL A 
Compor*tlveStm4ty.&I.C™.L.C.**S.W.}5*0?g).
 n „ 
464. B « * y v . Board of R e « e * ^ ^ 
Alaeyer v. Loaisiaaa. 165 VS. 37S. 5t9 (1S97); Crowley v. ChtaHinsin. 137 U.S.M.S9 (IS90). 
« J . S ~ Plrter *. Ellis. 362 VS. 574. 593*4 (I960) (Warn.. CJ„jHs^thsg). See 
Kmrmtfy D. GLASS*. Tmj EmcrtvEiaas or A r^m^sMrAB^Srvmtm^mn^. 
466. Aaes^os^i ic l iabM^i io l smie ln^ 
c««*kind.Statistkssin1icaie,h^ 
«ne.arelemlkelytoiet*wtocrfcm.$«ef^^ 
467. S « . e * . D . G t A S E K . i * l ^ i * t e 4 6 5 , « 3 2 * ^ 
Jl-33 (1967); MeUchcrc*. Employment Problems of Former Offenders. 2 NATY PKOIATION * 
*AIOU ASS'N J. 43 (1956). ^ _ 
465. S a r i H A e 4 6 7 s » s v * S . R t » w . T « L A W o r C * o ^ 
D. CLASEK. smprm note 465. at 361 (saggestinf that a former com;iflprmiary bamer to 
•»0oymcnt h not his criminal record, bm rail** Ws lack of catcnsivew^ 
469. SeeS. R U B I N . * * * note 468. at 63S-*>, Note, Employment of Former Crbnmeb.» 
CotMEU. L. REV. 306.307 (1970). 
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since most fidelity insurance companies refuse to bond ex-convicts, the 
released offender is often ineligible for employment in positions that 
require bonding.479 Past criminality is usually overlooked only in 
employing persons for low-skilled jobs.47,Xonsequcntly, many ex-
convicts who are successful in obtaining meaningful employment 
probably did not disclose their criminal records.472 
Discrimination by private employers based on age, sex, or race is 
unlawful.47* Moreover, in a recent federal court decision a private 
employer's refusal to hire a job applicant because of his arrest record 
was held to be violative of the Civil Rights Act.474 Convicted criminals, 
however, may be refused private employment with impunity. 
Elimination of private prejudice and discriminatory practices against 
former convicts was long thought to be the task of educators and social 
scientists.47* There is increasing awareness, however, that equal 
employment opportunity for released convicts, like other minority 
groups, requires government action.47* At present, nevertheless, an ex-
convict probably stands a better chance of gaining entrance to private 
employment than to either public employment or licensed occupations.477 
B. Exclusion of Convicted Criminals from Licensed Occupations 
No member of society is more likely to forfeit his right to engage in 
a licensed occupation than a convicted criminal. Laws of the fed-
eral government,47* every state,47* and countless municipali-
470. Lykke, Attitude of Bonding Companies Toward Probationers and Parolees. 21 FED. 
PROBATION 36 (Dec. 1957). 
471. See. e*.. Harris. Chanting Public A ttitudes Toward Crime and Corrections. 32 FED. 
PROBATION 12 (Dec. 1968). 
472. See D. GLASER. supra note 465, at 350-55. 
473. 29 U.S.C. §5 621-34 (Supp. IV. 1969) (age); 42 U.S.C. | | 2000e-a (1964) (race, sex, 
and religion). 
474. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 39 U.S.L.W. 2049 ( C D Cal. Aug. 10, 1970) (en-
joining employer from denying job to applicant because of his arrest record on the ground that 
the practice discriminates against Negroes since they are arrested more frequently than whites). 
475. SeeS.Kvitfi, supra *ot*A6&. *l 639. 
476. See note 34 on page 1160 infra and accompanying text. 
477. See. e*.. D. GLASER. supra note 465. at 414; S. RUBIN, supra note468. at 640. 
478. Eg.. 7 U.S.C. f l2a(2KB) (Supp. IV. 1969) (Secretary of Agriculture may refuse to 
register fdons as futures commission merchants and floor brokers); 46 C.F.R. | 10.02-1 (1969) 
(persons convicted of narcotics violations ineligible for licensing as deck or engineering officers for 
10 years after conviction). 
479. ALA. CODE tit. 46. f f 1-345 (1958 a Supp. 1967); ALASKA STAT, f f 08X)IJ010- .99 .100 
(1968); ARIZ. REV. STAT. A N N . ff 32-101 to-239! (1956*Supp. 1969); ARK. STAT. A N N . f f 71-
101 to -2423,72-121 to -1717 (1947 * Supp. 1969); CAL. BUS. A PROF. CODE f f 1-300047 (1962 * 
West Supp. I970X CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. f f ,20-1 to -395 (1968); DEL. CODE A N N . tit. 24, f f 
101-3536 (1953 * Supp. 1968); D.C CODE ANN. f f 47-2301 to -2350 (Supp. III. 1970); FLA. STAT. 
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ties*** single out the ex-convict for possible exclusion from the major-
ity of regulated occupations. In general, if a trade, profession, business, 
or even an ordinary job requires licensing, conviction of any serious 
crime may disqualify the offender from obtaining or holding a license.4*1 
1. Scope of Occupational Licensing.—Under licensing laws, an 
individual's right to engage in an occupation becomes a privilege granted 
by the state.4*1 Entrance to and continued participation in a licensed 
occupation is conditioned upon the applicant's ability to meet 
qualifications prescribed by the legislature.4*3 Unlicensed participation 
in a regulated activity may lead to criminal prosecution.4*4 Until the end 
ANN. f f 454J0M9356 (1965 a Supp. 1969); GA. CODE A N N . f f 84-K)I to-9980 (1970); HAWAII 
REV LAWS f f 25-436 to-471 (1968 * Supp. 1969); IDAHOCODE A N N . f f 54-101 to-2705 (1947 a 
Supp. 1969); IND. A N N . STAT, f f 63-101 to -3617 (1961 * Supp. 1970); IOWA CODE f f 147.1-
158.11 (1949 * Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT. A N N . f f 65-1001 to-3101 (1964 ft Supp. 1968); KY. REV. 
STAT, f f 311.250-333.990 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. A N N . f f 37.l--.2368 (1964 ft Supp. 1970); ME. 
REV. STAT. A N N . tit. 32. f f 1-4803 (1964 ft Supp. 1970); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 43. f f 1B-754 
(1957 ft Supp. 1969); MASS. A N N . LAWS ch. 112, f f 1-107 (1965) ft Supp. 1970); MICH. STAT. ANN. 
ff 18.1-1259(1957 * Supp. 1970); MINN. S"TAT. A N N . f f 147.01-157.15 (1947* Supp. 1970); Miss. 
CODE ANN. f f 8632-01 to 8923-51 (1956 ft Supp. 1968); Mo. A N N . STAT, f f 326.001-343 J50 (1960 
ft Supp. 1970); MONT. REV. CODES A N N . f f 66-101 to-3l 14 (1970); NEB. REV. STAT, f f 71-101 to 
-3715 (1966); NEV. REV. STAT, f f 623.010-654.210 (1969); N.H. STAT. A N N . f f 309:1-332:17 
(1955 * Supp. 1969); N J . STAT. A N N . f f 45:l-:25 (1963 ft Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. A N N . f f 67-1-
I to -36-18 (1953 ft Supp. 1969); N.Y. EDUC. LAW f f 6501-7713 (McKinney 1953 * Supp. 1969-
70); N.C. GEN. STAT, f f 83-1 to93D-!6 (1965 * Supp. 1969); N.C. CENT. CODE ff 43-01-01 to 
-34-14 (1960 ft Supp. 1969); OHIO REV. CODE f f 470IX)I-4749.99 (1964 ft Supp. 1969); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. lit. 59. f f 1-1408 (1963 ft Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. A N N . lit. 63, f f 9.1-1015 (1963 ft 
Supp. 1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS A N N . f f 5-1-1 to -44-25 (1956 ft Supp. 1969); S.C. CODE A N N . f f 56-
I to-1617 (1962 ft Supp. 1969); S.D. CODE f f 36-1-1 to-25-30 (1967 a Supp. 1970); TENN. CODE 
ANN. f f 62-101 to 63-1521 (1955 ft Supp. 1969); UTAH CODE A N N . f f 58-1-1 to -34-9 (1953 ft 
Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. A N N . tit. 26, f f 1-2598 (1967 ft Supp. 1969); VA. CODE A N N . f f 54-1 to 
-915 (1954 ft Supp. 1970); WASH. REV. CODE A N N . f f 18J04.O2O-.92.90O (1961 ft Supp. 1969); W. 
VA. CODE A N N . f f 30-1-1 to-21-15 (1966 * Supp. 1970); WYO. STAT. ANN. f f 33-1 to-385 (1957 ft 
Supp. 1969). Licensing provisions appear throughout the codified statutes of Colorado, Illinois, 
Texas, and Wisconsin. 
480. Municipal ordinances excluding former criminals from occupations are generally upheld 
when the regulation bears reasonable relation to public health, safety, and welfare. See. e.g.. 
Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau. 236 Md. 476,204 A.2d 521 (1964), cert, denied. 382 U.S. 849 (1965) 
(taxicab operator); Moyant v. Borough of Paramus, 30 N J . 528,154 A 2d 9 (1959) (solicitors); cf 
Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251,183 A. 534 (1936) (regulation of paper hangers held unresonable). 
See generally E. MCQUILUN. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS f 26.74 (3d rev.ed. 1964). 
481. A license may be refused if an applicant has committed any act for which a licensee 
would be subject to disciplinary action. See. e*.. CAL. BUS. ft PROF. Coot f 4511 (West Supp 
1970) (psychiatric technicians). 
482. See. r*.. In re Morris, 74 N. W. 679.681,397 PJd 475,476 (1964) (license to practice 
law confers no vested right, but is a conditional privilege, revocable for cause). 
483. Statutory qualifications often embrace the applicant's character, criminal record, age 
education, skill, experience, and entrance examination scores. See generally Barron, Business and 
Professional Licensing—California. A Representative Example. 18 STAN. L. REV. 640 (1966). 
484. See. e.g.. N.J. S T A T . A N N . f 45:25-13 (Supp. 1969-70) (misdemeanor to seek 
employment as x-ray technician without license). 
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of the nineteenth century, few occupations other than medicine and law 
were subject to license requirements.4*1 Since that time, however, 
occupational licensing has proceeded at a foerish pace.*** In addition to 
licensed professional callings,*1 modem routes regulate semi-skilled 
and unskilled workers ranging from ambuh^ce attendants418 to billiard-
room employees:,t* Regulations for many A these licenses are imposed 
by local ordinances.4* Although no define* figures are available, it is 
clear that a substantial portion of the working population is subject to 
licensing. 
The United States Supreme Court has sbeld the local regulation of 
essential occupations as a valid exercise of police power necessary to the 
safety, health, good order, and morals of oe community.m The Court, 
however, has consistently emphasized thn a state cannot, under the 
guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily deny access to lawful 
occupations by imposing unreasonable restrictions."* Consequently, 
patently unreasonable regulations have ben stricken by a number of 
courts.4" As a general rule, however, cour-i arc reluctant to substitute 
their judgment for that of the legislature.4* 
Access to licensed employment h tnost often a matter of 
485. See W. GELLHORN. INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND VAOWESTAL RESTRAINTS 126 (1956). 
486. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPA-O**L LICENSING LEGISLATION IN THE 
STATES 7-8 (1952) (indicating that approximately 80 ocaaxum **rc licensed by state laws). 
487. £>. . ALA. CODE tit. 46, }} 258-94 (Supp. 19T CT%*aans); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
| | 32-2016 to -2755 (Supp. 1969-70) (attorneys): CAL. BS. « Ptof. CODE | | 1600-1808 (West 
Supp. 1970) (dentists); FLA. STAT. ANN. }} 461J01 to .'> Siec 1969) (podiatrists); GA. CODE 
ANN. II 79A-501 lo -521 (Supp. 1969) (pharmacists): 4/ ^ STAT. ANN. {{ 322J0IO-J8O 
(Baldwin 1969) (engineers): MICH. STAT. ANN. | | 18.1 -2t Sax 1970) (accountants); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. | | 83-1 to-15 (Supp. 1969) (architects). 
488. £. / . . MICH STAT. ANN. | 14328(59)(1970). 
489. Eg.. N Y . GEN. BUS. LAW {{ 460-72 (MCKJQET .*»«>. See also ALA COOE tit. 46, 
II 64(38)-(70) (Supp. 1967) (cosmetologists); CAL. BUS « ^of CODE | | 9540-45 (West Supp. 
1970) (dry ckancrst IND. ANN. STAT. | | 63-2301 to - 1 3 m\) (watch makers); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. | | 72-31 to -45 (1965) (tourist camp operators); N_ ir4T \ s v | | 45:4-27 to -56 (Supp. 
1969-70) (barbers). 
490. Slates often delegate broad regulatory power it numeral corporations. 1 n some states, 
the power of municipalities extends to the licensing of -ssaboaans. trade, business, vocations, 
occupations, and professions conducted within the mumccakv See generally E. MCQUILUN | | 
26.22-J1, supra note 480. 
491. Dent v. West Virginia. 129 US. 114 (1889). 
492. Eg.. Jay Burns Baking Co.v. Bryan, 264 VS 5* 5U (1924). 
493. £.g.. State v. Ballance. 229 N.C. 764,51 S.E2t~l «9«9) (licensing of photographers 
held an unreasonable restriction of a lawful and harmless acaesocn. bearing no relation to public 
health, morals and safety); Livesay v. Tennessee Bd. of tanners. 204 Tenn. 500,322 S. W26 209 
(1959) (licensing of match repairmen bdd unnecessary). 
494. Ej.. Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Cc. 31 L5. 220 (1949) (upholding state 
statute regulating insurance agents). 
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administrative determination.41' Federal"* and state4" statutes, as well as 
municipal ordinances,** confer licensing authority on administrative 
agencies such as licensing boards and boards of examiners. In some 
instances, authority is vested in a single official.41* Most agencies are 
composed of appointed members of the regulated occupation and 
exercise broad discretion in processing applications and supervising 
licensed personnel.*** 
!t is well settled that licensing authorities may not refuse, revoke, or 
suspend a license without informing the applicant or licensee of the 
reason for the proposed action and giving him an opportunity to be 
heard.*1 In the absence of a hearing satisfying due process standards, 
mandamus or similar relief is available in most state courts."* 
Moreover, it has been held that arbitrary action by licensing authorities 
is a violation of civil rights cognizable in federal courts.*** When an 
agency determination is contested on the merits, however, the scope of 
judicial review varies considerably between jurisdictions.**4 A number of 
courts, for example, have held that licensing authority actions are 
exclusively administrative and have refused to accord review on the 
merits.*** In other jurisdictions, however, expanded judicial review is 
either authorized by statute*** or assumed by the reviewing court.**7 
495. See generally W. GELLHORN. supra note485. at 105-51 (1956). 
496. Eg.. 47 U.S.C. ff 303. 318 (1964) (FCC licenses radio operators); 49 U.S.C. 
H 1421-22 (1964) (FAA establishes eligibility requirements for civil airman). 
497. Eg.. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71. | 102 (Supp. 1969). 
498. See generally E. MCQUILLIN. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS f f 26.62-.67 (3d rev. cd. 1964). 
499. Ej.. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. f 3905.01 (Baldwin 1964) (insurance). 
500. See W. GELLHORN. supra note 485, at 105-18. See also AfTeldt a Scaey, Group 
Sanctions and Personal Rights—Professions. Occupations and Labor Law. 11 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 
382.399-414 (1969): Barron, supra note 483, at 649-57. 
501. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (refusal of Bar 
admission without hearing b denial of procedural due process). 
502. See generally L. JAFFE. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 176 (1965). 
503. See.e,f..Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605.612 (5th Cir. 1964) (arbitrary refusal of liquor 
license held to be w violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983(1964)). 
504. See L. JAFFE. supra note 502, at 107-09; Note, DeNovo Judicial Review of State 
Administrative Findings. 65 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1965). 
505. See. eg.. DcMond v. Liquor Control Comtn'n, 129 Com. 642, 30 A.2d 547 (1943); 
State Bd.v.Scherer. 221 Ind. 92.46 N.E.2d 602 (1943); Johnson v. Sanchez,67 N.M. 41.351 P.2d 
449 (I960); State v. Huber, 129 W. Va. 198,40 S.E.2d 11 (1946). 
506. £*.. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59. f 689 (1963) (appeal from refusal or revocation of 
veterinarian's license); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. f 5-31-11 (1956) (appeal from revocation of dentist's 
license); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. art. 4506 (1966) (appeal from revocation of license to practice 
medicine). 
507. State v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 229 Ore. 543, 368 P.2d 386 (1962); 
Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa.469,9 A.2d408 (1939); McAnemey v.State.9 Utah 2d 191,341 
P.2d2l2(l959). 
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Some courts have found that pursuit of an occupation Is a propon 
right, the deprivation of which requires a trial de novo on review."*^ 
2. Effect of Criminal Conviction under Licensing Statutes.~-i$i 
United States Supreme Court, in Hawker v. New York,m recognized the 
power of local governments to bar individuals from occupations on the 
basis of past criminality. In upholding a provision prohibiting convicted 
felons from the practice of medicine, the Court noted that a legislature 
might reasonably require that members of a profession be of good 
character and provide that conviction of crime demonstrates a lack of 
this requisite character.*" More recently, in Barsky v. Board of 
Regents*11 the Court upheld suspension of a practicing physician's 
license because of his conviction for refusing to produce records 
subpoenaed by a congressional committee. In Schware v. Board of Bar 
Examinerst,,, however, the Court indicated a readiness to examine more 
closely character standards that bar citizens from professional life. In 
reversing on due process grounds the refusal of an application for Bar 
admission, the Court noted that any standard by which an applicant is 
measured must have a rational connection with his fitness for the 
profession. ,u In its most recent decision in this area, DeVeau v. 
Braisted*u the Court upheld a provision of the New York Waterfront 
Commission Act of 1953 prohibiting convicted felons from holding 
office in waterfront unions. Although this latest decision cites Hawker 
with approval, it is clear that the Court attached special significance to 
the circumstances that prompted the challenged legislation. In light of 
the conditions then existing on the waterfront, the Court found the 
legislature's judgment entirely reasonable.il, Read together, Schware 
506. See, ej., Laisne v. California State Bd. of Optometry. 19 Cal. 2d 831. 123 P26 457 
(1942) (license to practice optometry is a vetted property right). See also Milljgan v. Board of 
Registration in Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 783.204 N.E.2d 504 (1965): "There is growing recognition 
. . . that administrative decisions on applications for licenses and permits to engage in a lawful 
occupation . . . directly affect the personal rights, property, or economic interests of the applicant, 
and . . . that fundamental considerations of fairness require such decisions . . . to be made 
objectively, under reasonable procedures and with appropriate opportunity for judicial review 
. . . . The problem is important because of the increasingly large numbers of occupations now 
being subjected to administrative regulations.*' 14, at 788.204 N.E.2d at 508. 
509. 170 U.S. 189 (1898). 
510. "It is not open to doubt that the commission of crime . . . has some relation to the 
question of character . . . . When the legislature declares that whoever has violated the criminal 
laws of the State shall be deemed lacking in good moral character it is not laying down an arbitrary 
or fanciful ru le . . . ." Id. at 196. 
511. 347 VS. 442 (1953). 
512. 353 VS. 232 (1957). 
513. Id. *t 239. 
514. 363 VS. 144 (I960). 
515. Id. at 158. 
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tad DeVeau indicate that in the future the United States Supreme Court 
trill subject legislative restrictions on occupational choices to greater 
scrutiny than is suggested by the Hawker decision. Even so, recent 
legislation"* and judicial decisions*17 make it clear that a criminal 
conviction remains a serious obstacle to the pursuit of a licensed 
occupation. 
For a significant number of former convicts, the barriers to 
employment created by licensing laws may be insurmountable.*" 
Entrance to a licensed occupation may be especially difficult for an 
individual with a criminal record because he has the burden of 
establishing good character.*1* The person already holding a license is in 
a more favorable position, since he has the benefit of prior performance 
in the occupation as evidence of his fitness. Moreover, the burden of 
demonstrating unfitness rests with the licensing authority.09 On the 
other hand, the licensee convicted of crime may be faced with a 
presumption that he has betrayed the trust conferred by the license, 
thereby forfeiting his privilege to continue in the occupation.m Once 
expelled, reinstatement is unlikely.m 
As a general rule, acquittal of criminal charges does not preclude 
refusal or revocation of a iicense.m Moreover, it is usually held that 
neither suspension of sentence nor pardon will prevent exclusion from 
licensed employment.04 Even in states that provide for expungement81* of 
516. See. e.g.. Mo. ANN STAT, f 334390 (Supp. 1969) (conviction of felony or crime 
involving moral turpitude bars licensing as physical therapist); N.C. GEN STAT § 89A-7 
(Supp. 1969) (convicted felons may be excluded from practice of landscape architecture). See also 
Model Professional and Occupational Licensing Act. 5 HARV J. LEGIS 67, 77 (1967) 
(conviction of felony or crime involving moral turpitude suggested as basis for possible exclusion 
from all licensed professions and occupations). 
517. See. e*.. Kaufman v. Taxfcab Bureau, 236 Md. 476.204 A.ld 521 (1964). cert, denied. 
382 U S. 849 (1965) (taxicab license refused because of applicant*! prior convictions of 
pantctpmting in student civil disorders); In re Morris. 74 N.M. 679,39* P.2d 475 (1964) (attorney's 
conviction of involuntary manslaughter justifies suspension from the Bar). 
519. It is likely that many former convicts barred from licensed employment do not seek 
judicial relief due to the prohibitive expense of litigation. 
519. S<w.e.g.. Application of Patterson. 213 Ore. 398,410,318 P.2d907,912 (1957) (casting 
on petitioner "the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he is of good moral 
character," but failing to define "good moral character**). 
520. See, ej , Ska v. Board or Police Comm*rs, 200 Cal. App. 2d 137,19 Cal. Rptr. 277 
(1962) (public dance hall permit). 
521. S«.e^../nf»Morris,74N.M.679,6Sl-S2,397 P.2d475T476(l964). 
522. In re Flynn, 52 Wash. 2d 5S9,596,328 P.2d 150,154 (1958). 
523. Cases cited note 549 infra. 
524. See. ej . Page v. Watson, 140 Fla. 536, 192 So. 205 (1938) (physicians); Stone v. 
Oklahoma Real Estate Comm'n, 369 P.2d 642 (Okla. 1962); State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. 
Breeland, 208 S.C. 469,38 S.E.2d 644 (1946). 
525. £.g.. CAL. PENAL CODE f 1203.4 (West Supp. 1970). 
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penalties and disabilities incident to conviction, it is generally held that 
this relief does not extend to licensed employment.*" 
The extent that occupational freedom is diminished by licensing 
laws is uncertain. Conviction of an abominable crime will probably 
make an individual unsuitable for most licensed employment. Petty 
offenses, on the other hand, seldom bar the offender.127 Between these 
extremes there is a broad range of criminal conduct that invariably 
casts a shadow on an individual's employment future. Disqualification 
depends largely on the nature of both the occupation pursued and the 
crime committed. To determine the exact effect of his conviction, a 
former convict must look to the applicable licensing provisions of the 
jurisdiction in which he seeks employment. In some instances, federal 
law is pertinent,*2* but more often state or municipal regulations control. 
Licensing laws vary considerably among the states and even among 
regulated occupations within a state. Municipal regulations contribute 
further to the lack of consistency. Thus, a conviction that bars a person 
from an occupation in one state may not preclude licensing in another.42* 
Similarly, within the same state an ex-convict may be excluded from 
some occupations and qualified for others.*** Exclusion may be 
mandatory for certain occupations and for others discretionary.**1 In 
some instances, the conviction's proximity in time may be 
526. Copctand v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control. 241 Cal. App. 2d 186.50 Cat. 
Rptr. 452 (1966) (beer license denied on basis of lack of good character evidenced by expunged 
conviction). 
527. Misdemeanors involving moral turpitude, however, may disqualify the offender. Set, 
e*.. CAL. BUS. * PROF. CODE « 3094 (West 1962) (optometrists); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-4 
(1965) (real estate brokers). 
52S. See. eg, 18 U.S.C. | { 922(g)(1). (h)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969) (unlawful for any person 
under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to ship, transport, or receive firearms or ammunition in 
interstate or foreign commerce). 
529. Alabama requires mandatory license revocation when an engineer is convicted of a crime 
mrorriag moral turpitude. ALA. CODE tit. 46, f 128(20) (Supp. 1967). California provides for 
discretionary revocation for a felony in connection with engineering or any crime involving moral 
turpitude. CAL. Bus. * PROF. CODE | 6775 (West 1964). Michigan bases revocation on an 
engineer's professional negligence. MICH. STAT. ANN. f 18.84(21) (1957). 
530. Arizona, for example, no longer lists felony convictions as a ground for refusing a 
barber's ticense (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. | 32-353 (1956)). but still prohibit* issuance of a license to 
practice cosmetology if the applicant has been convicted of a felony. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 32-
552 (Supp. 1969-70). 
531. The reason for the distinction is often not dear. North Carolina, for example, requires 
mandatory refusal or revocation of a physical therapist's license for any act derogatory to the 
standing or morals of the profession. N.C. GEN. STAT, f 90-265 (Cum. Supp. 1969). In the same 
state, however, revocation of a physician's license is discretionary. N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-14 
(1965). 
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determinative.18 A few jurisdictions have enacted provisions mitigating 
the effect of a criminal record on employment opportunity ,m Although 
these statutory variations and inconsistencies make it difficult to gauge 
accurately the effect of a criminal conviction on future employment, it is 
possible to determine the extent of probable exclusion from licensed 
employment by examining typical statutory provisions. 
(a) Common grounds for excluding convicted criminals.—Prior 
criminal conduct may disqualify an individual in several ways. Most 
licensing laws exclude persons convicted of relatively serious crimes or 
crimes indicating lack of moral character. Moreover, general character 
requirements often preclude licensing of ex-convicts. Professionals 
convicted of a crime may be disqualified on the basis of unprofessional 
conduct. 
(i) Lack of good moral character.—Statutes and ordinances 
frequently establish character standards that must be met for admission 
to an occupation.04 Some statutes also authorize revocation of licenses 
for immoral acts.*** Most, if not all, professional callings require 
applicants to prove good character.13* In addition, a surprising number 
of non-professional occupations impose character requirements. Thus, 
failure to demonstrate good moral character may prevent an individual 
from operating a dry-cleaning plant,**7 selling hearing aids,*** or 
becoming a forester.*** Although character standards bearing little or no 
relationship to a regulated activity may be stricken, courts have found 
good character to be a reasonable prerequisite in a wide variety of 
vocations and activities.*49 Even when character is not a statutory 
532. See. rg.. MICH. STAT. ANN. f 19.803 (Supp. 1970) (authority to deny or revoke a 
real estate broker's license because of a felony conviction is limited to cases in which an applicant 
has been convicted within the past 5 years). 
533. See notes 568-71 infra and accompanying text. 
534. Character standards are now so firmly embedded in admission requirements thai little 
thought b given to their relevance. See. ej.. A Model Professional and Occupational L icensing A ct. 
5 HARV. J. Lects. 67,81 (1967) (good moral character should be an entrance requirement for all 
licensed professions and occupations). 
535. Teachers* certificates may be revoked on the basis of immoral conduct. See. eg., ALA. 
CODE tit. 52. | 337 (I960); N.Y. Eouc. LAW | 3020 (McKinney 1953). In Anions a dental 
hygienist*s license may be revoked for acts of gross immorality. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. | 32-1290 
(1956). 
536. See generally AfkMt^Scocy.nayranoU 500, *t399-4\0. 
537. £*.. CAL. BUS. ft PROF. CODE f 9551J (West Supp. 1970). 
538. £*., MICH. STAT. ANN. f 18.276(6) (Supp. 1970). 
539. £*. . OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, f 1212 (Supp. 1969-70). See also ALA. CODE tK. 46, 
| 120(35) (Supp. 1967) (dental hygienists); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. f 20-80 (1968) (mkfwires); 
Mo. ANN. STAT, f 329.050 (1966) (cosmetologists); N.C. GEN. STAT. | 87-74 (1965) (water wdl 
contractors); PA. STAT. ANN tit. 63, $ 642 (1968) (poultry technicians). 
540. See. ej.. Movant v. Paramus. 30 NJ. 528, 154 A .2d 9 (1959) (ordinance imposing 
character requirements on solicitors and canvassers). 
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requirement, some courts find that the licensing authority has the 
implied power to bar persons who are found morally unfit for participa-
tion in the licensed activity.141 
Conviction of a crime is quite generally held to be evidence that the 
offender lacks the requisite character for either a professional calling10 
or the most ordinary pursuit.*43 Some reviewing courts look beyond the 
conviction in determining whether an individual's exclusion on character 
grounds is justified.*44 A court may conclude, for example, that denial of 
a license is unreasonable in light of the applicant's rehabilitation.94* 
More often, however, a record of conviction will be conclusive evidence 
of bad character. Exclusion on character grounds may be upheld even on 
the basis of an applicant's association with criminals.*4* 
(ii) Conviction of crime.—Most statutes expressly make 
conviction of certain types of crimes a ground for exclusion.*47 The 
record of conviction is normally a sufficient basis for the licensing 
authority to act.*41 In a few cases, licenses have been revoked even though 
the holder was acquitted of the criminal charge.*49 
541. Eg.. Dorf v. Fielding. 20 Misc. 2d IS. 197 N.Y.S.2d 2*0 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (denial of 
license to sell secondhand goods because of convictions for running house of prostitution). 
542. Eg.. Application of Brooks, 57 Wash. 2d 66.355 P.2d 840 (I960), cert, denied. 365 VS. 
813 (1961) (denial of application to practice law because of conviction for failure to report to work 
camps for conscientious objectors during World War II). 
543. See. eg . H inch v. City and County of San Francisco. 143 Cal. App. 2d 313,300 PJd 
177 (Oist. Ct. App. 1956) (merchant); Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476. 204 A .2d 521 
(1964). cert, denied. 382 U.S. 849 (1965) (taxicab operator). 
544. A few states expressly provide for the exercise of similar discretion by licensing 
authorities. See. e.g.. CAL. BUS. a PROF. CODE § 1 1 7 (West 1962) (record of conviction only 
conclusive of the fact of conviction and authorities may inquire into the circumstances to determine 
if the offense involved moral turpitude). Butcf. CAL. BUS. a PROF. CODE fl 95403(d) (West 1964) 
(conviction of felony or crimes involving moral turpitude constitutes evidence that applicant for 
license to operate dry cleaning establishment lacks moral character). 
545. See. e.g.. Tanner v. DeSapio. 2 Misc. 2d 130. 150 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 1956) 
(reversing a refusal to license former convict to operate beauty parlor). 
546. H o n v. City and County of San Francisco, 233 Cal. App. 2d 375.43 Cal. Rptr. 527 
(Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (denial of application to operate massage parlor because applicant's wife, 
running same establishment, had been convicted of morals violations). Contra. Roosevelt Taxi, Inc. 
v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 27 App. Div. 2d 753.279 N. Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (reversal 
of denial of taxicab license because applicant's brother, a known criminal, was applicant's business 
associate). 
547. A few statutes provide for license revocation upon the commission of a crime. See. *,f.. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. A N N . fl 32-1263 (1969-70) (mandatory revocation of dentist's license upon 
commission of a felony). 
548. See. e.g.. Otash v. Bureau of Private Investigators a Adjusters. 230 Cal. App. 2d 568.41 
Cal. Rptr. 263 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (private investigator). 
549. See. eg. Freeman v. Board of Alcohol Control, 264 N.C. 320.141 S.E.2d 499 (1965): 
accord. Silver v. McCamey. 221 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1955). 
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Conviction of a felony*1* is often a ground for denial or revocation 
of a license. Felons are barred from occupations ranging from practical 
nursing**1 to selling horsemeat.1** Crimes, irrespective of where 
committed, are generally classified as a felony or misdemeanor 
according to the law of the licensing jurisdiction.**3 When a license is 
refused or revoked on the basis of a felony conviction, courts are 
reluctant to disturb the licensing authority's determination.*** There 
have been instances, however, when reviewing courts have found the 
exclusion of felons unreasonable.*9* 
Crimes involving moral turpitude are frequently grounds for 
disqualification from a licensed occupation. A few statutes exclude 
persons convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude,*** but the usual 
provision embraces any crime involving moral turpitude.**1 Thus, 
misdemeanors involving moral turpitude may exclude the offender under 
most statutes.*** Irrespective of statutory language, both licensing 
authorities and courts have experienced considerable difficulty in 
applying the moral turpitude standard.*** 
A few statutes bar persons convicted of enumerated crimes. These 
provisions may limit exclusion to crimes that indicate unfitness for a 
550. For a discussion of the definition of felony, see notes 108-20 supra and accompanying 
text. 
551. £ * . . N.C. GEN. STAT. fl 90-1713 (Supp. 1967). 
552. Eg.. 111 . A N N . STAT. ch. 56Vi. fl 2422(d) (Smith-Hurd 1967). See oho CAL. BUS. a 
PROF. C O D E fl 17769 (West 1964) (trading stamp dealers); N . Y . A L C O . BEV. CONTROL 
LAW fl 102 (McKinney 1970) (night dub employees). 
553. Eg.. Erdman v. Board of Regents. 24 App. Div. 2d 698, 261 N.Y5.2d 634 (1965) 
(conviction of felony in federal court was a misdemeanor under state law). See notes 151-61 supra 
and accompanying text. 
554. Eg.. Barton Trucking Corp. v. O'Connell. 7 N.Y.2d 299.165 N.E.2d 163.197 N.YS. 
2d 138 (1959) (denial of public cart license because of felony conviction 20 years earlier). The court 
stressed that the petitioner's conviction had been for criminal activities linked to the business 
in which he sought to be licensed. Id. at 313.165 N.EJd at 170. 
555. See. e*.. Brown v. Murphy. 3 Misc. 2d 151. 224 N.Y.S.2d 423 (S«p. Ct. 1962). A 
license to drive a tow truck was refused by the New York City Police Commission based on the 
applicant's court-martial conviction of carrying a concealed, loaded weapon and subsequent bad 
conduct discharge from the Navy 15 years earlier. The New York Supreme Court reversed because 
of the Commissioner's failure to accord a proper hearing, but noted hi dictum that deprivation 
based solely upon the stated grounds would be capricious in light of the applicant's commendable 
record since discharge from the service. Id. at 157-59.224 N.Y.S.2d at 429-31. 
556. See. e.g.. Awz . REV. STAT. A N N . fl 20-289 (Supp. 1969-70) (insurance agent's license). 
557. £\g., ARK. STAT. ANN. fl 72-1613 (Supp. 1969) (inhalation therapist's license refused 
or revoked for conviction of moral turpitude crime). 
558. £\g.. ALA. CODE tit. 46. fl 16 (Supp. 1967) (revocation of architect's license authorized 
for misdemeanor involving moral turpitude). 
559. For a discussion of what constitutes moral turpitude set notes 139-41 supra and 
•ccompanying text. 
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particular occupation. The offense of receiving stolen property, for 
example, may prevent licensing as a junk dealer.119 Revocation may also 
be confined to offenses involving use of a license."1 As a general rule, 
however, specificity is lacking in licensing legislation. 
Statutes also may provide that persons separated from the Armed 
Forces under less than honorable conditions are barred from licensed 
employment. New York, for example, refuses to issue a peddler's license 
to a former serviceman who failed to obtain an honorable discharge.** 
Court-martial conviction of a wide variety of military offenses may 
subject the offender to dishonorable discharge.1" Moreover, Armed 
Forces personnel may be separated administratively as undesirables 
under less than honorable conditions.1*4 
(iii) Unprofessional conduct.—Professionals such as doctors, 
lawyers, and accountants may have their licenses revoked or suspended 
for unprofessional conduct.*** Courts have upheld this vague criterion 
despite attacks on the failure to prescribe specific standards of 
conduct.*** Conviction of a crime is generally regarded as unprofessional 
conduct, and revocations frequently are sustained even though criminal 
proceedings are dismissed.**7 
(b) Mitigating provisions.—A few states have enacted legislation 
mitigating the effect of criminal conviction under licensing laws. Several 
statutes, for example, provide for reinstatement of revoked licenses 
following specified periods of time, normally one to five years.*" A 
similar remedy is available in New York where a certificate of good 
conduct may be issued to former criminals after five years of satisfactory 
conduct.*** Although this statute expressly states that issuance of a 
360. N.Y. GEN BUS. LAW | 61 (McKinney 1968). See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32. 
9 575 (Supp. 1970) (embezzlers barred from becoming collections agents); N.Y. GEN. BUS. 
LAW § 74 (McKinney 1968) (conviction of illegal possession of weapons disqualifies for guard 
duty). 
561. See. ej.. Ana. REV. STAT. ANN. f 32-2322 (Supp. 1969-70) (structural pest control). 
562. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW $ 32 (McKinney 1968). 
563. £\f.. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL. UNITED STATES 1 127c (rev. ed. 1969) (absence 
without leave, violation of a lawful general order, feigning illness). 
564. See generally Lynch. The Administrative Discharge: Changes Needed? 22 ME. L. REV. 
141 (1970). 
565. See. eg. MICH. STAT. ANN. f 14.533 (Supp. 1970) (physicians). 
566. E.g.. Irwin v. Board of Regents. 304 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1969) 
(upholding statute revoking license of accountant for unprofessional conduct, defined as acts 
evidencing moral unfitness). 
567. See. eg.. Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners. 34 Cal. 2d 62. 206 P.2d 1085 (1949) 
(physicians). 
568. See. e.g.. N.Y. GEN BUS. LAW | 409 (McKinney 1968) (reinstatement of 
cosmetologist's license possible after one year). 
569. N.Y. EXEC. LAW { 242 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70). 
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certificate shall not proscribe licensing authority discretion, a few New 
York licensing statutes require recognition of the certificate."* 
California recently enacted legislation requiring licensing authorities to 
recognize prison training *hen passing upon a former criminal's 
application.171 Under this provision, an inmate who has received training 
for an occupation in the course of a prison rehabilitation program can-
not be denied the right to take the examination required to obtain a 
license for that occupation. In effect, if the applicant is otherwise 
qualified, his conviction will not bar licensing. 
Most licensing statutes, however, make no provision for mitigating 
the effect of a criminal conviction. In these jurisdictions, an applicant 
excluded from licensed status on the basis of his criminal record must 
depend upon the courts for relief. In many instances, judicial review of 
the agency determination may be of limited scope.1" In the absence of a 
showing of arbitrary or capricious action, it is unlikely that a licensing 
authority's exclusion of a convicted criminal will be disturbed by the 
reviewing court.*7* 
C. Exclusion of Convicted Criminals from Public Employment 
The difficulties experienced by the ex-convict in securing public 
employment are no less formidable than those he encounters in seeking 
entrance to licensed occupations. The restrictions excluding convicted 
criminals from public employment affect a large number of job 
opportunities. Federal, state, and local governments employ more than 
twelve million people.474 One out of six civilian workers is a public 
employee.*7* Moreover, three and one-half million men and women 
currently serve in the Armed Forces.*7* 
A number of government employees are elected or appointed to 
positions of public trust. Individuals occupying these positions are 
generally thought of as public officers. The many restrictions on the 
convicted criminal's privilege of holding public office, as well as the 
distinction between officers and employees, are fully discussed 
elsewhere.*77 The present inquiry embraces the many public occupations 
570. £.*.. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW % 74 (McKinney 196S) (private investigators). 
571. CAL. BUS. * PROF. CODE § 23% (Wert Supp. 1970). 
572. See note 505 supra tnd accompanying text. 
573 See. eg . Stephens v. Dennis, 293 F. Supp. 589. 595 (K.D. Ala. 1968) (revocntion of 
pharmacist's license). See generally W. GELLHORN. supra note 485, at 118-25. 
574. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE L'MTED STATES: 1969, at 
430-31 <90thed. 1969). 
575. Id. at 211. 
576. Id at 255. 
577. See notes 342-60,363-77 supra and accompanying text. 
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that are not appreciably different from jobs in the private sector. 
Although a number of these positions appear particularly suited to ex-
convicts, both federal and local governments have been slow to recognize 
this fact.*7* Thus, it is not unusual to find constitutional and statutory 
provisions barring convicted criminals from a wide variety of routine 
public occupations. Additionally, regulations requiring that public 
employees be of good moral character may disqualify many offenders. 
The decision whether to employ an applicant with a criminal record 
is often discretionary with governmental agencies. Available 
information indicates, however, that examining and certifying agencies 
actually hire few ex-convicts.*7* It is likely that those offenders who do 
succeed in obtaining employment are most often placed as unskilled 
laborers.**4 Even an acquittal of a criminal charge will generally not 
prevent the offender from being denied employment if the public agency 
regards him as unfit.**1 Similarly, neither pardon nor expungement 
preclude exclusion.**2 There may even be instances in which members of 
a convicted criminal's family will be barred from public employmcnt.•,, 
For some offenders, the passage of time may lower the barriers to 
employment.**4 Others may be employable by reason of positive 
rehabilitation measures initiated by the federal government and certain 
states.*** Under a few court decisions, pardoned offenders may have 
increased employment opportunities.*** It is apparent, however, that 
under current practices many ex-convicts are barred from public 
employment. It is equally clear that reviewing courts arc not likely to 
578. See. e.g.. C. RHYNE. MUNICIPAL LAW f 8-2 (I9S7) (typical public employees include 
architects, medical inspectors, engineers, matrons, janitors, park attendants, superintendents of 
nurses, switchboard operators, and watchmen). 
579. See Wise, Public Employment of Persons with a Criminal Record. 6 NAT'L PROBATION 
* PAROLE ASS'N J. 197 (I960). 
580. See D. GLASER. supra note 465. at 359-61. 
581. See. e.g.. Berman v. Gillroy. 198 Misc. 369,97 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1950). affd. 305 
N.Y. 688,112 N.E.2d 771 (1953), cert, denied. 347 U.S. 921 (1954). 
582. Taylor v. Macy. 252 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (upholding dismissal from United 
States Civil Service even though state conviction of vagrancy had been expunged). 
583. Eg., Sheridan v. Gardner. 347 Mass. 8. 196 N.E2d 303 (1964) (upholding provision 
that convicted person's immediate family cannot score on crime commission). 
584. Eg.. MASS. ANN.. LAWS ch. 31, § 17 (1966) (convict eligible for public employment 
one year following conviction). 
585. See. eg.. Mo. A N N . CODE art. 64-A, { 19 (1968) (expressly declaring ex-convict* 
eligible for civil service appointment). 
586. See. e.g.. Slater v. Olson. 230 Iowa 1005. 299 N.W. 879 (1941) (application for civil 
service position as assistant smoke inspector): Commissioner of Metro. Dist. Comm'n v. Director 
of Civil Serv., 348 Mass. 184. 203 N.E.2d 95 (1964) (disabled veteran applying for police 
department position). 
19701 CIVIL DISABILITIES 1015 
intervene unless exclusion is found to be arbitrary or patently 
iiiireasonable.*w 
1. Federal Employment.—The United States Constitution does 
not require exclusion of convicted criminals from federal employment 
Congress, however, has enacted legislation barring certain types of 
offenders from many federal positions. A number of disqualifying 
provisions under the Federal Criminal Code have already been discussed 
in connection with the prohibitions against convicted criminals holding 
public office."* Many of these provisions apply equally well to public 
employees.Mf Other federal statutes, however, make it clear that 
individuals convicted of certain crimes are barred from all federal 
employment. Conviction of either advocating the overthrow of the 
government990 or promoting insubordination in the Armed Forces,**1 for 
example, disqualifies the offender from employment by the United 
States government or any department or agency thereof for a period of 
five years following the conviction. Moreover, under the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,*** a person convicted of inciting a 
riot or civil disorder and sentenced to imprisonment for one year will be 
ineligible for federal employment for five years subsequent to conviction. 
Under the Study Draft of the New Federal Criminal Code,*** 
disqualification from federal office or employment because of criminal 
conviction is discretionary with the sentencing court.**4 Moreover, the 
Draft provides for automatic removal of the disqualification five years 
after the defendant has completed his sentence.*** 
Conviction of a serious crime often disqualifies the offender from 
military service. Only in exceptional cases, for example, are convicted 
felons permitted to enlist in the Armed Forces.*** In addition, a wide 
587. City of Aurora v. Schoberlein. 230 III. 496. 82 N.E. 860 (1907) (removal from civil 
aervice is administrative and not to be judicially tried de novo on the merits); accord. Appeal of 
Fredericks. 285 Mich. 262.280 N.W. 464 (1938); City of Jackson v. McLeod, 199 Miss. 676,24 So. 
2d 319 (1946). 
588. See notes 365-74 supra and accompanying text. 
589. Eg . 18 U 5 . C . § 1905 (1964) (disclosure of confidential information); id. f 1913 
(lobbying with appropriated moneys). 
590. Id. f 2385. 
591. Id. ft 2387. 
592. 5 U.S.C. f 7313 (Supp. IV. 1969) (inciting, organizing, promoting, encouraging, 
tiding, or abetting a riot or civil disorder or any offense determined by the head of an employment 
agency to have been committed in furtherance of civil disorder). 
593. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS. STUDY DRAFT OF A 
NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1970). 
594. Id. f 3501. 
595. Id. % 3503. 
596. 10 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. IV. 1969) (Service Secretaries may authorize exceptions in 
meritorious cases). 
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variety of civil and military offenses may result in a serviceman's 
separation from the Armed Forces under less than honorable 
conditions.**7 Servicemen who fail to receive an honorable discharge are 
ineligible for preferential Civil Service appointments available to other 
veterans.m 
In certain instances, convicted criminals may be barred from 
employment in activities regulated by the federal government. Under the 
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,,H for 
example, felons are ineligible to serve as of fleers or directors of any labor 
organization. Similarly, an individual convicted of an offense involving 
dishonesty or breach of trust normally is not employable by a bank 
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.1* Convicted 
criminals also may be denied employment with either the federal 
government or defense-related industries because their criminal records 
preclude issuance of the requisite security clea^ance.••, 
Even in the absence of direct prohibitions against hiring convicted 
criminals, federal agencies exercise broad discretion in deciding whether 
to employ applicants with criminal records. United States Civil Service 
regulations, for example, provide that "criminal, infamous, dishonest, 
immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct" may be the basis for 
disqualifying individuals from the federal service.*** Formerly, before an 
applicant could be considered for a responsible position, the Civil 
Service Commission required two years to elapse following discharge 
from a felony sentence, and one year following discharge from a 
misdemeanor sentence.*** Since employment of rehabilitated offenders 
has recently received special emphasis in the federal service,** however, 
the Commission now accepts applications from ex-convicts at any time. 
Determination of the applicant's suitability embraces the nature, 
seriousness, and circumstances of the crime, the offender's age, social 
and economic environment, and rehabilitation. The Commission, 
however, neither requires applicants to disclose information concerning 
convictions by juvenile authorities that occurred prior to age 21, nor 
considers arrests that were not followed by conviction. Moreover, 
597. See note 563 supm. 
59S. 5U.SC. If 2108(1).(2)(Svpp. IV, 1969). 
599. 29 U.S.C. f 504(a) (1964). 
600. I2U.S.C. f 1829(1964). 
601. 32C.F.R. | f 155.5,156(1970). 
602. 5 C.F.R. I 731201(b) (1969). 
603. D.GLASER.jipranotc465>at4l4. 
604. See Employment of the Rrhabilitated Offender t* tk* FedermiService, m CW9 Sarke 
Form 941 (Feb. 1968). reprinted in 32 FED. PROBATION 50 (Sept. 1968). 
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current Civil Service regulations** authorize employment of federal 
prisoners participating in work-release programs pursuant to the Federal 
Prisoner's Rehabilitation Act of 1965.** 
2. State and Municipal Employment.—Many states and 
municipalities bar convicted criminals from public employment."7 The 
disability may be imposed by constitutional provision,** statute,** or 
ordinance.*1* In some instances, former criminals are permanently 
barred,8" while in others employment is permitted at a specified time 
after conviction.*12 In most states, ex-convicts are barred from holding 
police or correctional employment.*M 
Many constitutional and statutory provisions disqualifying 
convicted criminals appear to limit the disability to public office.*14 It is 
clear, however, that a wide variety of routine government jobs may fall 
within these proscriptions. Recently, for example, the dismissal of a 
school bus driver upon disclosure of a felony conviction 24 years earlier 
was upheld under a constitutional provision barring convicted felons 
from holding "office or appointment of honor, trust, or profit."*1* 
State and municipal civil service provisions usually authorize 
exclusion of convicted criminals. Typical regulations provide that both 
state and municipal commissions may refuse to examine or certify an 
applicant guilty of either a crime, or infamous or notoriously disgraceful 
conduct.*1* Thus depending on a commission's policy, a criminal 
conviction can be a serious obstacle to civil service appointment. In 
addition, immoral or criminal conduct may disqualify employees even in 
605. 5C.F.R. § 213JI02(x)(1969). 
606. 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (Supp. IV, 1969). 
607. S«S.Ru»iN,*$>r«note468.at6l3-l4.625-26 (listinf 27 states). 
608 E*.. DEL. CONST, art. 2, $ 21; LA. CONST, art. 8. | 6; PA. CONST, art. 2. f 7; Wis. 
CONST, art. 13, % 3. . . .
 Jfci 
609. £*.. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. | 38-912 (Supp. 1969-70); FLA. STAT. ANN. f II2XH 
(I960); N.M.STAT. ANN. | 5-1-3(1966). 
610. See generally E.MCQVILLW. supra note 498, If 12.58. .*»-.**>. 
611. Eg.. CAL. GOV'T CODE f 1029 (West 1966) (felons prohibited from being peace 
officers). ^ .
 Mm 
612. £ * . . M A S S . A N N . L A W S C I I . 3 M 17 (1966) (civil scrvfcedoaed for one year). 
613. S«rS.RuniN,jia>/«nole468,at628. 
614. See note 344 supra and accompanying text. . _ , . , . , - - . - . . m o i 
615. Thomas v. Evangeline Parrish School Bd.. 138 So. 2d 658 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App. 1962). 
The Louisiana Constitution was recently amended to provide that convicted felons can hold public 
employment not involving responsibility for public funds. LA. CONST, art. 8. | 6. 
616. Eg CAL GOV'T CODE 5 18935 (West 1963); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW f 50(4) 
(McKinney 1959). See.eg.. Alder v. Lang. 21 App. Div.2d 107.248 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1964) (denialof 
application for job as assistant mechanical engineer because of prior arrest record that included 
misdemeanor conviction, reversed because of civil service commission's failure to scrutinize 
circumstances surrounding the petitioner's record). 
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the absence of a conviction.*" One state supreme court, for example, 
recently upheld the dismissal of a water tradesman with fifteen years* 
service on the ground that he had committed adultery and that this 
conduct was wantonly offensive to the public and unbecoming an 
employee of the city.4* Under the reasoning of this case,*1* it is likely that 
many individuals with criminal records will be disqualified from civil 
service. 
VII. Loss OF JUDICIAL RIGHTS 
The American judicial system imposes a number of disabilities on 
the citizen with a criminal record. In some states, for example, the prison 
inmate lacks the capacity to sue, although he or his representative may 
be sued. Similarly, the offender may be unable to execute judicially 
enforceable instruments, such as contracts and wills, or to serve as a 
court-appointed fiduciary, such as an executor, administrator, or 
guardian. A criminal conviction also may affect the offender's 
participation in the judicial process as a witness or juror. Convicted 
persons, for example, generally cannot testify in judicial proceedings 
without their testimony being impeached. Persons convicted of perjury 
lack the capacity to testify in some states. Moreover, convicted persons 
often are precluded from serving as jurors, irrespective of their individual 
qualifications or sentiments. 
A. Capacity to L itigate 
At common law, citizens imprisoned in a penitentiary lacked the 
capacity to sue,** but their imprisonment did not prevent them from 
being sued.'21 This rule developed from the practice that a criminal 
617. See. eg.. 4 N.Y.C.R.R. f 3 2 (1969). appearing in N.Y. Civ. SE»V. LAW. Rules and 
Regulation* of the Dep't of Civil Service % 12 (McKinney Supp. 1969) (applicant who lacks good 
moral character or satisfactory reputation may be disqualified from examination or appointment). 
See also Berman v. Gtliroy. 198 Misc. 369, 97 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1950), affd. 305 N.Y. 688, 112 
N.E.2d77l (1953), cert.denied. 347 U.S. 921 (t9tt)(iipholdii« civil engineer's removal because of 
sodomy charge, even though criminal prosecution dismissed). 
618. State ex ret. Gudlin v. Civil Serv. ComnVn, 27 Wis. 2d 77,133 N. WJd 799 (1965). 
619. "(T]here must be an area where conduct of an employee of a municipality . . . in 
violation of important and fundamental standards of propriety is of legitimate concern to the 
municipality.. . . When an employee's unacceptable conduct falls within this area of concern, we 
find no implication in the statute or ordinance that such conduct cannot be cause for discharge 
unless it can be shown directly to impair performance of duties.** Id. at 86-87,133 N.WJd at 804. 
620. See, eg.. Avery v. Everett. 110 N.Y. 317,18 N.E. 148 (1888); Miller v. Turner, 64 N.D. 
463,253 N.W.437 (1934); Kenyon v. Saunders. 18 R.I. 590.30 A.470 (1894). 
621. See. eg.. Gray v. Gray, 104 Mo. App. 520, 79 S.W. 505 (1904); Green v. Boney. 233 
S.C. 49,103 S.E.2d 732 (1958). 
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conviction resulted in a forfeiture of the offender's goods to the crown.** 
Since prisoners had no property or rights for which suit could be 
brought, there was no reason to give them the right to sue.01 Today, 
forfeiture has been abolished in all states,04 but states that have retained 
civil death statutes generally do not permit prison inmates to maintain 
civil actions. Most states, however, now permit prisoners to bring civil 
actions. The common law rule permitting prisoners to be sued has 
remained unchanged. 
1. Capacity of Prisoners to Sue.**—The majority of states today 
permit prison inmates to institute civil suits either in their own names or 
through personal representatives or committees appointed to manage the 
estates of prisoners. Persons imprisoned in the penitentiary, however, 
lack the capacity to sue in most of the thirteen states that have retained 
civil death statutes.** The overwhelming majority of states, including 
many states that have civil death statutes, provide that imprisonment is a 
disability that tolls the statutes of limitations. Consequently, upon 
release, most prison inmates, including those who are unable to sue while 
incarcerated, can maintain a cause of action that accrued during 
imprisonment. 
(a) Capacity of prisoners to sue in their own names.—In most 
states without civil death statutes, citizens imprisoned in the penitentiary 
retain the right to sue in their own names.*27 In the absence of a specific 
statute, the courts have ruled that prisoners have the capacity to sue since 
the legislatures have not provided that criminal offenders lose their civil 
rights during imprisonment.*1* Some non-civil death states have enacted 
statutes dealing with suits instituted by prisoners. Both New Hampshire 
622. Kenyon v. Saunders. 18 R.I. 590.30 A. 470 (1894). 
623. Id. 
624. See notes 103-19 on pages 1080-82 infra and accompanying text. 
625. This section win not review general restrictions on prisoners or the remedies available to 
prisoners who are mistreated. See. eg.. Hanna, The Convict and the Compensation Law. 34 C A U F . 
L. Rev. 167 (1946); Vogelman. Prison Restrictions—Prisoner Rights. 59 J. CMM. L.C. a ?S. 386 
(1968); Note, Remedies Available to Penal Inmates For Injuries Received While Incarcerated. 34 
IND. LJ. 609 (1959); Note, Federal Remedies for Lawfully Committed Prisoners Who Claim 
Mistreatment. 2 J. Pun. LAW 181 (1953); Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing 
Law. 110 U. PA. L. REV. 985 (1962); Note, Prisoners' Remedies for Mistreatment. 59 YALE LJ. 
800 (1950). 
626. For a discussion of the civil death statutes, see notes 70-79 supra and accompanying text. 
627. See. eg.. Willingham v. King. 23 Fla. 478,2 So. 851 (1887); Department of Welfare v. 
Brock. 306 Ky. 243, 206 S.WJd 915 (1947); Bosteder v. Duling. 115 Neb. 557, 213 N.W. 809 
(1927). 
628. £4.. Bosteder v. Duling. 115 Neb. 557,564,213 N.W. 809,812 (1927). 
